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ABSTRACT
The nature of estoppel by conduct has been dramatically transformed by the High 
Court in the last 15 years. The equitable doctrines of promissory and proprietary 
estoppel have been brought together to form a substantive doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, which provides a cause of action in a wide range of circumstances. 
Recent decisions in the lower courts have shown that the reach of the new 
equitable estoppel is far broader than that of its predecessor doctrines. It is 
beginning to occupy a prominent place in the law of obligations. The High Court 
has also begun in its recent decisions to articulate the principles by which the 
courts should exercise their discretion in giving effect to the new doctrine. At the 
same time there has been increasing recognition of the similarities between 
common law and equitable estoppels by conduct, with a number of judgments 
treating those principles as amalgamated in a unified doctrine of estoppel by 
conduct. Those developments have raised important questions about the 
philosophy of estoppel by conduct at common law and in equity, as well as 
important questions about the way in which the new doctrines operate.
This thesis aims to explore the philosophy of estoppel by conduct in Australia. It 
does so by identifying the contending theories as to the purpose of estoppel by 
conduct, and examining the extent to which those theories are reflected in the 
operation of the common law and equitable doctrines. The contending theories 
identified by the thesis are promise theory (which is based on the notion that the 
purpose of the doctrines of estoppel by conduct is the enforcement of certain 
types of promises), conscience theory (which is based on the notion that the 
purpose of estoppel is the prevention of unconscionable conduct) and reliance 
theory (which is based on the notion that the purpose of estoppel is the prevention 
of certain harm resulting from reliance on the conduct of others). Most judges 
and commentators in Australia adopt a pluralistic view of the purpose of 
estoppel, which assumes that at least the protection of reliance and the prevention 
of unconscionable conduct can be pursued simultaneously.
The central argument of the thesis is that the three contending theories are, at 
various important points, inconsistent with one another. The failure to resolve the 
conflicts between the three contending theories has left fundamental doctrinal 
questions unresolved. In order to resolve those questions, there is a need to 
recognise one of the contending theories as expressing the essential purpose of 
estoppel by conduct. The thesis argues that a reliance-based philosophy best 
characterises both the common law and equitable doctrines of estoppel by 
conduct and appears to provide the fundamental guiding motive of both 
doctrines. The thesis also argues that, normatively, reliance theory provides the 
best basis on which to organise estoppel by conduct and by which to resolve the 
various unresolved doctrinal questions. The thesis focuses on Australian law, but 
traces the development of relevant principles through the English cases, draws on 
New Zealand and Canadian law, and draws comparisons with the laws of 
England and the United States where appropriate.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to identify the goals of estoppel by conduct at common 
law and in equity, and to consider the extent to which the principles of estoppel 
by conduct are structured in accordance with those goals. The philosophy of 
estoppel by conduct has become a matter of considerable importance in recent 
years because the principles of estoppel are in a state of great change. Recent 
decisions of the High Court have witnessed the recognition of a unified, 
substantive doctrine of equitable estoppel and the development of a more 
coherent approach to the granting of remedies to give effect to that doctrine. 
There have also been attempts to unify the common law and equitable principles 
of estoppel. Each of those developments has been accompanied by, or facilitated 
by, an examination of the purposes and philosophies underlying the principles of 
estoppel. As this thesis will show, the recent developments in estoppel doctrine 
have left unanswered questions of great practical and theoretical significance, 
which makes further change inevitable. A coherent philosophy is needed to 
resolve the unanswered questions in estoppel, necessitating a detailed analysis of 
the purposes of the doctrines, and the extent to which those purposes are 
manifested in the approaches of the courts to questions of liability and remedy.
The approach to be taken in this thesis is broadly similar to that used by Jules 
Coleman in his treatise on the philosophy of tort law . 1 The first step will be to 
identify the competing goals or purposes of estoppel, the second will be to 
characterise the principles by which liability and remedy are determined, and to 
consider the extent to which the various philosophies appears to underlie each 
principle. The detailed examination of each of the principal rules relating to 
liability and remedy will reveal tensions between the various philosophies and 
will reveal the extent to which the principles of liability and remedy satisfy the 
various purposes being pursued. That examination will indicate the extent to
1 Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (1992), esp at 204.
which the various philosophies are manifested in the structure and operation of 
the principles of estoppel by conduct, and will thus indicate which of the 
philosophies can, descriptively, be regarded as providing the guiding motive of 
estoppel by conduct.
The central argument of this thesis is that three different philosophies can be said 
to be reflected in the principles of estoppel by conduct. Those philosophies are 
often inconsistent with one another, and there is a need to emphasise one of the 
contending philosophies as expressing the essential purpose of estoppel by 
conduct. The first philosophy is based on reliance: that the purpose of estoppel by 
conduct is to provide protection against harm resulting from reliance on the 
conduct of others. The second contending philosophy is based on conscience: that 
the purpose of estoppel by conduct is to prevent unconscionable conduct. The 
third philosophy can be described as a promise-based philosophy: that the 
purpose of estoppel is the fulfilment of certain promises. This thesis will show 
that there are various points in the establishment of an estoppel, and in giving 
effect to an estoppel, at which a choice must be made between the contending 
purposes. There is thus a need for a single philosophy of estoppel to be given 
primacy and to be recognised and emphasised as expressing the principal purpose 
of estoppel. The recognition of one of the three contending motives as the basis 
of estoppel would facilitate the resolution of important unresolved doctrinal 
questions. The thesis will show that, although all three philosophies are evident in 
estoppel, the fundamental philosophy of the principles of estoppel, as they have 
been reorganised by the High Court in recent decisions, is and should be a 
reliance-based philosophy. Both the equitable and common law principles of 
estoppel by conduct are essentially based on the need to provide protection 
against the detrimental consequences of reliance on the conduct of others.
I. THE STATE OF ESTOPPEL TODAY
The subject matter of this thesis is the set of principles operating at common law 
and in equity by which an estoppel can arise out of a person’s conduct. One of the 
unresolved issues in this area of the law is how many separate doctrines of
2
estoppel by conduct operate, and should operate, in Australian law. The better 
view is that, pending further determination by the High Court, two doctrines of 
estoppel by conduct presently operate: common law estoppel and equitable 
estoppel. Both of those doctrines operate in relation to an assumption which one 
party has been induced to adopt as a result of conduct by a second party, and each 
doctrine requires that the first party must have acted, or refrained from acting, on 
the faith of that assumption, in such a way that he or she will suffer detriment if 
the assumption is not fulfilled. Three basic elements, therefore, make up the core 
of each of the two doctrines: an assumption, inducement and detrimental 
reliance.2 The primary differences between the two doctrines arise in relation to 
the nature of the assumption that is adopted and acted upon by the representee, 
and the way in which the courts give effect to the estoppel once it has arisen.
The first difference between common law and equitable estoppel relates to the 
circumstances in which they operate: while common law estoppel is applied 
primarily to assumptions of existing fact, and occasionally to assumptions 
relating to the legal rights of the parties,3 equitable estoppel can operate in 
relation to assumptions relating to the future conduct of the representor or the 
future legal relationship between the parties. As well as being differentiated by 
the circumstances in which they operate, the common law and equitable doctrines 
also differ quite markedly in the way in which they operate. When common law 
estoppel is applied to an assumption of existing fact, it has what is often 
described as an evidentiary operation. Its effect is to prevent the representor from 
denying the truth of an assumption of fact, and thereby establish a factual state of 
affairs by reference to which the rights of the parties are determined.4 The
2 Once could add the requirement that the representor must also have departed or threatened to 
depart from the assumption in question, thus raising the prospect of detriment. It is more 
accurate, however, to say that an estoppel arises merely by virtue of the assumption, 
inducement and detrimental reliance, even before the representor threatens to depart from the 
assumption. At common law, an estoppel then arises which prevents the representor from acting 
inconsistently with the assumption. In equity, an estoppel then arises which prevents the 
representor from acting inconsistently with the assumption without taking steps to ensure that 
the departure does not cause harm to the representee.
3 The application of common law estoppel to assumptions of existing rights is discussed below, 
text accompanying nn 127-144.
4 Seton, Laing, & Co v Lafone (1887) 19 QBD 68, 70 (Lord Esher MR); Low v Bouverie [1891] 
3 Ch 82, 101 (Lindley LJ); Re Ottos Kopje Diamond Mines Ltd [1893] 1 Ch 618, 628 (Bowen 
LJ). The concept is discussed and explained in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988)
3
representor is said to be ‘estopped’ from denying the facts assumed by the 
representee to be true. When common law estoppel is applied to assumptions 
relating to the existing legal rights of the parties, it is not accurate to describe the 
doctrine as evidentiary, since the estoppel goes beyond merely establishing a 
factual state of affairs. In those cases the estoppel operates in a more direct 
manner to prevent the representor from denying the existence of rights which 
would not otherwise exist. Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, does not operate 
simply to preclude the denial of facts and rights. Rather, it is a substantive 
doctrine which operates to create new rights in the representee, and which 
requires the court to fashion a remedy to give effect to those rights.
A difficulty of discussing estoppel by conduct in the abstract is in finding 
compendious expressions which can be used to describe the parties and the 
relevant conduct on which the estoppel is based. As the following discussion 
will show, an estoppel can arise in at least four different ways: first, from a 
representation as to an existing fact, as to the future conduct of the representor 
or as to the legal rights of the parties; secondly, from a promise, embodying a 
commitment by the promisor that he or she will act in a particular way in the 
future; thirdly, from an act o f remaining silent, which induces a belief in 
another party that a certain state of affairs exists, that the second party has 
certain rights or that the first party will act in some way in the future; and 
fourthly from a course of conduct by one party which induces such a belief in 
another. The different types of conduct from which estoppels arise can, 
therefore, variously be described as representations, promises, silence, 
acquiescence or a course of conduct. The parties can similarly be described in 
numerous different ways. For simplicity, therefore, the person claiming the 
benefit of an estoppel will be referred to throughout this thesis as the 
representee, and the person against whom an estoppel is claimed will be 
referred to as the representor. The expressions are intended to cover all types of 
conduct from which an estoppel can arise, including the making of promises,
164 CLR 387, 415-6 (Brennan J), 444-5 (Deane J), 459 (Gaudron J); Commonwealth v 
Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 411 (Mason CJ), 500 (McHugh J) and George Spencer Bower 
and Sir Alexander Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation (3rd ed, 1977) 7-8.
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the act of remaining silent and other types of conduct which cannot neatly be 
categorised or labelled.
A. Common Law Estoppel
1. Classification and Nomenclature
The doctrine described throughout this thesis as ‘common law estoppel’ is the 
common law principle that prevents a person (the representor) from resiling from 
an assumption of fact which they have induced a second person (the representee) 
to adopt. That principle operates only where the representee has acted on the faith 
of the assumption in such a way that he or she will suffer detriment if the 
representor is allowed to act in a way that is inconsistent with the relevant 
assumption. The following discussion will show that the better view is that there 
is a single principle of estoppel by conduct at common law, which can operate in 
a number of different circumstances, rather than a number of discrete principles.
Unlike estoppel in equity, as will be seen, estoppel at common law remains true 
to the etymology of the word ‘estoppel’. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
suggests that the word ‘estoppel’ originated from the old French word ‘estoup’, 
meaning plug or stopper.5 The effect of an estoppel at common law is to ‘stop up’ 
the mouth of the representor, to prevent the representor from alleging that the 
state of affairs is otherwise than as he or she had induced the representee to 
assume. This connection between the origin of the word and its effect was 
famously described by Sir Edward Coke in 1628 as follows:
Estoppe commeth of the French word Estoupe, from whence the English 
word Stopped: and it is called an Estoppel or Conclusion, because a 
man’s owne Act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to 
alledge or plead the truth.6
5 Lesley Brown (ed), The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 
(1993) vol 1,854.
6 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; or a Commentary 
upon Littleton (1628) 352(a).
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Coke distinguished between three different types of estoppel: estoppel by record, 
estoppel by deed and estoppel in pais, which will be discussed in turn below and 
placed in their modem context:
Touching estoppels, which is an excellent and curious kind of learning, it 
is observed that there be three kinds of estoppels, viz. by matter of record,
n
by matter in writing, and by matter in pais.
(a) Estoppel by record
The first estoppel identified by Coke, estoppel by record, survives today as the 
more limited set of principles of res judicata and issue estoppel, which ensure the
o
binding and conclusive effect of legal determinations. Res judicata prevents the 
re-litigation of causes of action, while issue estoppel prevents the re-litigation of 
particular issues of fact or law .9 Those principles are concerned with the binding 
nature of judicial decisions, and are justified by the public interest in the 
settlement of disputes and by the right of individual litigants to protection from 
vexatious multiplication of suits. 10 Neither res judicata nor issue estoppel have 
anything in common, either in content or rationale, with the principles of estoppel 
by conduct at common law or equity. 11 Accordingly, they will not be discussed 
further in this thesis.
7 Ibid.
8 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Estoppel’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (1996) 201, 
208.
9 Port o f Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 519, 597 (Gibbs CJ, Mason 
and Aickin J).
10 George Spencer Bower, Sir Alexander Turner and KR Handley, The Doctrine o f Res 
Judicata (3rd ed, 1996) 10.
11 Parkinson, above n 8. It was for this reason that Fullagar J said in Jackson v Godsmith (1950) 
81 CLR 446, 466 that issue estoppel is not correctly classified under the heading estoppel at all.
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(b) Estoppel by deed
The second of Coke’s estoppels, the principle of estoppel by writing, is today 
known as estoppel by deed. Although the principle described by Coke applied 
only to the operative part of a deed, 13 it is clear that the principle now operates 
primarily, if not exclusively, in relation to facts set out in the recitals of deeds. 14 
The basis of the principle of estoppel by deed is that where parties to a deed have 
agreed that certain facts form the basis on which they are covenanting, then they 
should be held to those agreed facts for the purposes of the transaction in 
question. 15 There has for some time been uncertainty as to the relationship of 
estoppel by deed with the broader common law principle of estoppel by 
convention, which holds the parties to a state of affairs adopted as the basis of 
any contract or other dealing between them. There remains some doubt as to 
whether estoppel by deed is simply a particular instance of estoppel by 
convention, or whether it is a discrete doctrine which has its foundation in the 
binding effect of the solemn recitation of facts under seal. Spencer Bower and 
Turner suggest that the references in the cases to sealing and delivery are 
sufficiently persistent to raise a real question as to whether it is not the solemnity 
of the execution of a deed which supplies the whole justification of estoppel by 
deed. 16
Despite those references in the cases, Spencer Bower and Turner argue that 
estoppel by deed has evolved into a sub-class of estoppel by convention, which 
applies to the adoption of a state of affairs as the conventional basis of any 
contract, whether those facts are set out in writing or not. 17 It has, as they note, 
been held in a significant number of cases that the principle of estoppel by deed
12 Coke, above n 6, actually described estoppel in writing as operating ‘by deed indented’.
13 Coke, ibid 352b: ‘everie estoppel ought to be a precise affirmation of that which maketh the 
estopped ... Neither doth a recital conclude, because it is no direct affirmation.’
14 Bowman v Taylor ( 1834) 2 Ad & El 278; 111 ER 108, 112-3 (Taunton J), 113-4 (Williams 
J); Carpenter v Buller (1841) 8 M & W 209; 151 ER 1013, 1014 (Parke B); Spencer Bower 
and Turner, above n 4, 172.
15 See Dabbs v Seaman (1925) 36 CLR 538, 548-50 (Isaacs J) and Parkinson, above n 8, 209.
16 Above n 14, 161-2, citing as examples: Greer v Kettle [1938] AC 156, 171 (Lord Maugham) 
and Newis v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation (1910) 11 CLR 620, 628 
(Griffith CJ).
17 Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 4, 161-175.
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may be raised by the recitation of facts in instruments not under seal. 18 
Accordingly, Spencer Bower and Turner conclude that the notion that estoppel by 
deed is sui generis must be abandoned, and the principle should be seen as part of 
the broader principle of estoppel by convention. 19 That brings us to the more 
difficult question whether estoppel by convention forms part of the common law 
principle of estoppel by conduct which, along with its equitable counterpart, is 
the subject of this thesis. The essential question is whether estoppel by 
convention is an emanation of common law estoppel by conduct, and therefore 
operates only on proof of detrimental reliance by the party seeking to assert the 
estoppel, or whether it is a separate principle which is not based on detrimental 
reliance, but rather on the binding effect of the mutual adoption of facts as the 
basis of dealings between parties.
(c) Estoppel by convention
Estoppel by convention is a form of estoppel which applies where parties to an 
agreement have, by convention, adopted a state of affairs as the basis of their 
agreement or relations. The estoppel holds the parties to the agreed or assumed 
facts for the purposes of the transaction in question.20 The estoppel may operate 
by virtue of an express term of a contract, where the parties have expressly agreed 
that they will take certain facts to be true, or, more commonly, the parties may be 
precluded merely on the basis of a common assumption which has been adopted 
as to the factual basis of the contract. In Con-Stan Industries Pty Ltd v
18 Eg: Carpenter v Buller (1841) 8 M & W 209; 151 ER 1013, 1014 (Parke B); Ashpitel v 
Bryan (1864)5 B & S 723; 122 ER 999, 1000-1.
19 This conclusion was approved by Clarke J in Offshore Oil NL v Southern Cross Exploration 
NL (1985) 3 NSWLR 337, 341. In Ferno Holdings Pty Ltd v Lee [1992] NSW Conv R 55-645, 
59,691 Cohen J described estoppel by deed as a example of estoppel by convention, ‘with the 
distinction that it is not necessary in the former to establish that either party has acted to his or 
her detriment as a result of statements forming part of the deed.’ Estoppel by deed was also 
described as an example of estoppel by convention by Needham J in Re Patrick Corporation 
[1981] 2 NSWR 328, 332, although Needham J regarded detrimental reliance as being 
unnecessary for any form of estoppel by convention.
20 In Norwegian American Cruises A/S v Paul Mundy Ltd (The “Visafjord”) [1988] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 343, 351 Bingham LJ noted that estoppel by convention is not limited to parties about to 
enter into a contract, but can operate in relation to any dealings between parties.
21 Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 4, 158-9.
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Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd ,22 the High Court held that an 
estoppel by convention must be based on an assumption of fact, and could not 
arise from an assumption as to the legal effect of the parties’ conduct. There 
have however, been numerous cases in which assumptions as to the legal rights 
of the parties have been held to give rise to an estoppel by convention.24 In the 
light of recent developments in equitable estoppel and estoppel by 
representation, it has been doubted whether the High Court would now follow 
its decision in Con-Stan Industries.
A good illustration of estoppel by convention is to be found in the well known 
decision of the English Court of Appeal in Amalgamated Investment and 
Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd." The case 
was concerned with a loan made by a Bahamian subsidiary of the defendant bank 
to a Bahamian subsidiary of the plaintiff company. The loan was made through 
the bank’s subsidiary in order to avoid legislation which prevented foreign banks 
from trading in the Bahamas without permission. A guarantee intended to cover 
that loan was provided by the plaintiff to the defendant, rather than to the 
subsidiary of the defendant which lent the money. The guarantee covered moneys
22 (1986) 60 CLR 226, 244-5 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ) ( ‘Con-Stan 
Industries').
23 In Eslea Holdings Ltd v Butts (1986) 6 NSWLR 175, 186, a majority of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal regarded this statement from Con-Stan Industries as obiter dictum and 
declined to follow it. The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal has been strongly 
and convincingly criticised: DJM Bennett, ‘Equitable Estoppels and Related Estoppels’ (1987) 
61 Australian Law Journal 540, 549-551. Rory Derham, ‘Estoppel by Convention’ (Part II) 
(1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 976, 982 has suggested that, since estoppel by convention is 
a form of common law estoppel, it should, like other forms of estoppel at common law, be 
limited to assumptions of existing fact. As discussed below, text accompanying nn 127-144, 
however, common law estoppel has not always been restricted to representations of existing 
fact, and has occasionally been applied to assumptions relating to the rights of the parties.
24 See, eg: Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 QB 84; Coghlan v SH Lock (Australia) Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 
158; Eslea Holdings Ltd v Butts (1986) 6 NSWLR 175; Whittet v State Bank o f New South 
Wales (1991) 24 NSWLR 146. It now seems to be well accepted in England that estoppel by 
convention is not restricted to assumptions of fact: Norwegian American Cruises A/S v Paul 
Mundy Ltd (The “Visafjord”) [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 343, 351 (Bingham LJ); Hiscox v 
Outhwaite [1992] 1 AC 105, 127 (Lord Donaldson); Kenneth Allison Ltd v AE Limehouse & 
Co [1992] 2 AC 105, 127 (Lord Goff).
25 Australian Consolidated Investments Ltd v England (Supreme Court of South Australia, 
Doyle CJ, 1 November 1995) 183 LSJS 408, 436; Caboche v Ramsay (1993) 119 ALR 215, 
238 (Gummow J); RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and 
Remedies (3rd ed, 1992) 408; Rory Derham, ‘Estoppel by Convention - Part I’ (1997) 71 
Australian Law Journal 860, 866.
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owed by the borrower to the defendant, and did not cover moneys owed by the 
borrower to the defendant’s subsidiary.
In spite of that defect, the plaintiff and the defendant dealt with each other on the 
assumption that the guarantee given by the plaintiff covered the loan in question. 
On the faith of that assumption, the defendant granted various indulgences to the 
plaintiff and the borrower, including the release of certain security, and extending 
the time for repayment of the loan. When the borrower was ultimately unable to 
repay the loan, the defendant applied against the loan the proceeds of other 
securities which had been granted to the defendant by the plaintiff, leading to the 
present action by the liquidator of the plaintiff. The trial judge, Robert Goff J, 
treated the case as one of equitable estoppel. He held that representations were 
made on behalf of the plaintiff to the effect that the guarantee was binding and 
effective and covered the loan in question, and the defendant was so influenced 
by that representation that it would be unconscionable for the plaintiff to resile 
from it. Accordingly, the plaintiff was estopped from denying that the guarantee
97covered the loan in question.
A majority of the Court of Appeal preferred to treat the case as one of estoppel by 
convention. According to Eveleigh LJ, the parties had negotiated on the 
assumption that the plaintiff had guaranteed the loan in question, the bank had 
acted on that assumption and the plaintiff was therefore prevented from denying 
the truth of it.28 Brandon LJ held that the plaintiff and the defendant had 
negotiated and made various arrangements on the assumption that the guarantee 
bound the plaintiff to discharge the debt in question. The course of the 
negotiations was clearly influenced by that assumption, producing ‘a classic 
example of the kind of estoppel known as estoppel by convention’ .29 While 
Eveleigh LJ regarded as crucial the fact that the defendant was relying on the 
estoppel as a defence to the plaintiffs action, and felt the defendant could not
26 [1982] 1 QB 84 (Texas Bank').
27 Ibid 107-9.
28 Ibid 126.
29 Ibid 131.
10
O0
have succeeded in an action on the guarantee itself, Brandon LJ would have
o  1
allowed the defendant to found a cause of action on the estoppel. The third 
member of the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning MR, dealt with the case on the 
basis of a ‘general principle of estoppel’. That general principle applied where 
the parties to a contract were under a common mistake as to its meaning or 
effect, and had embarked on a course of dealing on the basis of that mistake. 
The effect of the estoppel was that the parties were bound by the conventional 
basis on which they had both conducted their affairs, and either could sue or be 
sued on that basis.32
Like Lord Denning MR in Texas Bank, several judgments in the High Court of 
Australia appear to have proceeded on the assumption that estoppel by 
convention forms part of the broader principle of estoppel in pais or estoppel by 
conduct. In Thompson v Palmer, for example, Dixon J regarded the adoption of 
an assumption as the conventional basis of a contractual relationship as one of the 
circumstances in which the party against whom an estoppel was claimed would 
be regarded as bearing sufficient responsibility for the adoption of an assumption 
to raise an estoppel in pais. Two important points need to be noted about those 
statements. First, all of the statements were made by way of obiter dicta, and do 
not reflect considered decisions to unify the principles of estoppel by convention 
with estoppel in pais. Secondly, none of the statements explicitly suggested that 
estoppel by convention should be regarded as being subject to the same doctrinal 
requirements as estoppel in pais, although such a notion may perhaps be regarded 
as implicit.
30 Ibid 126.
31 Ibid 131.
32 Ibid 121-2.
33 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547. See also Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 430 (Mason and 
Deane JJ); Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641, 676 (Dixon J). 
Kevin Lindgren, ‘Estoppel in Contract’ (1989) 12 University o f New South Wales Law Journal 
153, 156 has also suggested that notion of an ‘assumption’ adopted by Dixon J in Thompson v 
Palmer and Grundt as the basis of an estoppel provides a unifying element for estoppel by 
convention and estoppel by representation.
11
More recently, however, a clear distinction has been drawn by the High Court 
between estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention. In Con-Stan 
Industries, the Court said:
Estoppel by convention is a form of estoppel founded not on a 
representation of fact made by a representor and acted on by the 
representee to his detriment, but on the conduct of relations between the 
parties on the basis of an agreed or assumed state of facts, which both will 
be estopped from denying.34
Although Spencer Bower and Turner regard estoppel by convention as a category 
of estoppel in pais, they suggest that the class of estoppels by convention is 
distinct from other estoppels arising in pais or by conduct.35 They suggest that in 
the case of estoppel by convention it is the agreement, and not the 
misrepresentation, which is the foundation of the estoppel.
It cannot be doubted that estoppel by convention is indeed a class of 
estoppel distinct from other estoppels in pais by reason of the fact that 
agreement, and not misrepresentation, is the source of its foundation; and 
it includes estoppels by deed, which have the same foundation to support 
them, but, added to it, the authority given to them by form.
I will argue in this thesis that the basis of estoppel in pais is not the representor’s 
misrepresentation, as Spencer Bower and Turner argue, but rather the 
representee’s detrimental reliance, as the above statement by the High Court in 
Con-Stan Industries suggests. In other words, estoppel in pais is concerned more 
with the representee’s plight than with the representor’s conduct. Recent 
decisions tend to suggest, however, that estoppel by convention may well be 
consistent with both bases for estoppel in pais. There are two essential doctrinal 
questions which can help us to determine whether estoppel by convention should
34 (1986) 160 CLR 226, 244 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ).
35 Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 4, 163.
36 Ibid.
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be regarded as part of the broader doctrine of common law estoppel. The first 
question is whether a person seeking to establish an estoppel by convention must 
show that the representor bears some responsibility for the representee’s adoption 
of the relevant assumption: in other words, whether there is an ‘inducement’ 
requirement in estoppel by convention. The second question is whether 
detrimental reliance is required for estoppel by convention: that is, whether the 
representee must show that he or she has acted in reliance on the assumption so 
that he or she will suffer detriment if the representor is allowed to depart from the 
relevant assumption.
As to the first question, it appeared until recently to be accepted that a representor 
was not required to bear any particular responsibility for the assumption adopted 
by the representee. Spencer Bower and Turner indicate that this particular variety 
of estoppel arises not from the conduct of the representor, but from the mutual 
adoption of a state of affairs as the basis for a transaction. That also appeared to 
be the approach taken by the English Court of Appeal in Texas Bank. In that case, 
Eveleigh and Brandon LJJ both distinguished between an estoppel in pais, which 
is based on a representor making an assertion and inducing the representee to act 
to his or her detriment on the basis of that assertion, and estoppel by convention, 
which is based on an agreed assumption between parties that a given state of facts 
between them is to be accepted as true. In its subsequent decision in K Lokumal 
& Sons (London) Ltd v Lotte Shipping Co Pte Ltd (The “August Leonhardt”), 
however, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s finding that an estoppel 
by convention had arisen, on the basis that the representee had not done or said 
anything which was capable of giving rise to an estoppel.39 In a joint judgment, 
the Court of Appeal held that all estoppels require some manifest representation 
which ‘crosses the line’ between representor and the representee:
Similarly, in cases of so-called estoppels by convention, there must be
some mutually manifest conduct by the parties which is based on a
37 Aboven 14, 157#.
38 [1982] 1 QB 84, 125-6 (Eveleigh LJ), 130-1 (Brandon LJ). Cf 121 (Lord Denning MR).
39 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 28.
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common but mistaken assumption ... There cannot be an estoppel unless 
the alleged representor has said or done something, or failed to do 
something, with the result that ... his action or inaction has produced 
some belief or expectation in the mind of the alleged representee.40
That decision of the English Court of Appeal was applied in Australia in the same 
year in Coghlan v SH Lock (Australia) Ltd, where the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal unanimously held that it was a requirement of estoppel by 
convention that the party against whom the estoppel is raised has influenced the 
other party, such as by confirming their erroneous belief.41 Samuels and Hope 
JJA found that the ‘mutually manifest conduct’ required in The “August 
Leonhardt” was established,42 whereas McHugh JA found that no estoppel 
arose because there was no evidence that the conduct of the alleged representor 
induced any belief or expectation in the representee 43 It seems clear, therefore, 
that some blameworthy conduct is required on the part of the representor to 
establish an estoppel by convention 44
Turning to the element of detrimental reliance, the courts have often proceeded 
on the assumption that a person seeking to assert an estoppel by convention was 
not required to show that he or she had acted in reliance on the state of affairs as 
assumed, nor that he or she would suffer any detriment as a result of the denial of
40 Ibid 34-5 (emphasis added).
41 (1985) 4 NSWLR 158, 166-8 (Samuels JA, with whom Hope JA agreed), 177 (McHugh JA). 
The requirement in The “August Leonhardt” [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 28, 34 that there must be a 
‘representation which crosses the line between representor and representee’ was again applied 
by the English Court of Appeal in Norwegian American Cruises A/S v Paul Mundy Ltd (The 
“Visafjord") [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 343, 350-1. More recently, Brooke J held that no estoppel 
by conduct arose in Bank o f Scotland v Wright [1991] BCLC 244, 266 because there was no 
‘active encouragement or influencing’ of the representee by the representor which was ‘a 
necessary ingredient of this type of estoppel’. The requirement was also applied by Cohen J in 
Ferno Holdings Pty Ltd v Lee [1992] NSW Conv R 55-645, 59,691-2.
42 (1985) 4 NSWLR 158,170 (Samuels JA).
43 Ibid 177 (McHugh JA).
44 It should be noted that Bennett, above n 23, 549 has argued that ‘not much needs to cross the 
line’ in order to give rise to an estoppel by convention and that Coghlan v Lock illustrates the 
extent to which courts are prepared to go in reducing the difficulty caused by the requirement 
that there be a crossing of the line. Derham, above n 23, 976-80 has conducted a detailed 
examination of the cases which tends to confirm that conclusion, despite the strength of the 
recent statements of principle. As Chapter 3 of this thesis will show, however, it could equally 
be said that very little is required to cross the line between representor and representee in order 
to establish any form of estoppel by conduct either at common law or in equity.
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the correctness of the assumption.45 It may be that questions of reliance are often 
not raised because it is implicit in the principle that the parties had entered into 
the transaction in question on the basis of the assumed facts.46 There have, 
however, been relatively recent cases in which it has explicitly been held that 
detrimental reliance by a representee is not required to establish an estoppel by 
convention.47
In Thompson v Palmer, Dixon J treated estoppel by convention as a manifestation 
of estoppel in pais which requires proof that the representee has placed himself or 
herself in a position of material disadvantage. It has been accepted in a number 
of cases since that detrimental reliance is required to establish an estoppel by 
convention 49 In National Westminster Finance NZ Ltd v National Bank o f New 
Zealand Ltd, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that a party seeking to 
establish an estoppel by convention must establish that they have acted in 
reliance on an assumption and that they would thereby suffer detriment if the 
other party were allowed to resile from it.50 The Court treated estoppel by 
convention as a ‘manifestation of a single doctrine of estoppel’ and, accordingly, 
required the representee to satisfy the more stringent requirements of estoppel by 
conduct.51 In The “August Leonhardt”, the English Court of Appeal also 
appeared to require detrimental reliance. Although the representee had acted on 
the faith of the assumption (by failing to issue a writ on the assumption that an 
extension of time had been granted), the Court regarded it as crucial that he did
45 See, eg: Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 QB 84, 130-1 (Brandon LJ), 121-2 (Denning MR) and 126 
(Eveleigh LJ).
46 This is particularly clear in cases of estoppel by deed. Clarke J in Offshore Oil NL v Southern 
Cross Exploration NL (1985) 3 NSWLR 337, 346 observed that ‘in that class of estoppel by 
convention concerned with recitals in deeds the authorities suggest that no detriment beyond the 
entry into the deed need be shown.’
47 Re Partick Corporation Ltd [1981] 2 NSWR 328, 332; Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc v 
Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 570, 596, followed in Cromcorp Quay Street 
Ltd v The Auckland Harbour Board (1990) 10 ANZ Conv R 307, 310-11.
48 (19 3 3 ) 49 CLR507, 547.
49 In addition to the cases discussed below, see Clark v Sheehan [1967] NZLR 1038, 1040-1 
and Ferno Holdings Pty Ltd v Lee [1992] NSW Conv R 55-645, 59,692.
50 [1996] 1 NZLR 548, 549-50.
1 The elements of estoppel by convention laid down by the Court of Appeal in National 
Westminster Finance NZ Ltd v National Bank of New Zealand Ltd, including the requirement of 
detrimental reliance, have subsequently been applied in rejecting a plea of estoppel by 
convention in Rattrays Wholesale Ltd v Meredyth-Young & A ’Court Ltd [1997] 2 NZLR 363,
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not do so in reliance on anything said or done by the representor.52 Accordingly, 
although it has not always been so in the past, it seems that the courts are 
beginning to require a representee to establish detrimental reliance as a fact, 
rather than treating it as sufficient for a representee to establish that a transaction 
was entered into on the basis of a common assumption.
In summary, although the matter is not yet free from doubt, it appears that the 
trend in recent decisions is towards treating estoppel by convention as an 
emanation of common law estoppel and imposing the same doctrinal 
requirements. Until recently, it may have been arguable that estoppel by 
convention was based on the principle that where parties have adopted certain 
facts as the basis of a transaction between them, then they should be bound by 
that adoption for the purposes of the transaction. Recent decision suggest, 
however, that estoppel by conduct is, like common law estoppel, based on an 
assumption of fact induced by the representor’s conduct, and on detrimental 
reliance by the representee on the faith of that assumption. Accordingly, the 
development of a theory of estoppel by conduct in this thesis will proceed on the 
assumption that estoppel by convention is an emanation of the broader common 
law doctrine of estoppel by conduct, and is subject to the same doctrinal 
requirements.
(d) Estoppel in pais
The third principle referred to by Coke is the principle of estoppel in pais. There 
is some dispute as to the significance to be attached to the word pais, which 
derives from the old French word meaning country.54 Coke considered the 
qualification in pais to distinguish estoppels arising ‘in the countryside’ from
377-8 (Tipping J), and upholding a plea in Helmin v Thorp [1997] 3 NZLR 86, 92 (Fisher J).
52 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 28, 34. Similarly, in Norwegian American Cruises A/S v Paul Mundy 
Ltd (The "Visafjord”) [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 343, 351-2, Bingham LJ noted that ‘what is 
important for an estoppel by convention is that there should have been a common assumption 
which has been acted upon’ (emphasis added).
53 Indeed, Derham, above n 25, has suggested that ‘the essence of conventional estoppel is the 
occurrence of a detrimental change of position by one party to a transaction on the faith of a 
common assumption in circumstances where it is unjust for the other party to depart from it;’
54 Brown, above n 5, vol 2, 2072.
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those arising by writing or record: ‘By matter in pais [is meant] that a man shall 
by estopped in the Countrie, without any writing.'’55 The reference to the estoppel 
arising ‘in the country’ signifies that it has arisen between persons, and without 
any writing or record.56 Peter Birks, on the other hand, has suggested that the 
word pais is used here in its more traditional legal sense, to mean ‘the jury’, 
which represented the country.57 Estoppel in pais, according to Birks, is estoppel 
‘before the jury’, the phrase in pais referring to the effect of estoppel in 
preventing evidence contrary to the assumed state of affairs from being given 
before the jury. The expression ‘estoppel in pais’ thus refers to estoppels arising 
in relation to facts.
Whichever of those two theories about the meaning to be attached to the 
expression in pais is correct, together they provide an understanding of the way in 
which an estoppel by conduct operates today at common law: it arises from 
conduct, rather than documents, and it has the essentially evidentiary effect of 
establishing a state of affairs by reference to which the rights of the parties are to 
be determined. The expression estoppel in pais is used in a number of different 
senses today.58 In some cases it is confined to common law estoppel, 
encompassing estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention,59 and in 
other cases it refers to both common law and equitable estoppels arising by 
conduct.60 The expression has no generally accepted meaning and, as Patrick 
Parkinson has suggested, should now be abandoned as both ‘ambiguous and 
obsolete. ’61 The expression ‘common law estoppel’ will be used in this thesis to 
refer to the principles of estoppel by conduct operating at common law, 
‘equitable estoppel’ to refer to the principles of estoppel by conduct applied in
55 Coke, above n 6 (emphasis added).
56 Parkinson, above n 8, 210 (n 58).
57 Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 University of 
Western Australia Law Review 1,21.
58 As Kevin Lindgren, above n 33, 154 has observed, since the expression in pais simply 
signifies that he estoppel has arisen at large, it is capable of referring to all estoppels other than 
those limited by reference to record or form.
59 See, eg: Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 413-5 (Brennan J).
60 See, eg: Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 430 (Mason and Deane JJ).
61 Parkinson, above n 8, 211-2. Similarly, JS Ewart, An Exposition of the Principles of Estoppel 
by Misrepresentation (1900) 1 has suggested that estoppel in pais has ‘very largely changed its 
character and ought to change its name.’
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equity, and ‘estoppel by conduct’ to refer collectively to both of those sets of 
principles.
2. The Nature of Common Law Estoppel 
(a) Essential operation
Although there is some disagreement between judges as to the scope of the 
contemporary doctrine of common law estoppel, the basis on which it operates 
has been clear in Australia since the great judgments of Dixon J in the 1930s in 
Thompson v Palmer and Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd. The 
broad principle articulated by Dixon J in those judgments, which he called 
estoppel in pais, operates where one person (the representor) causes another 
person (the representee) to adopt an assumption of fact for the purposes of their 
legal relations. An estoppel arises where the representee has changed his or her 
position on the faith of the assumption, so that he or she will suffer detriment if 
the representor does not adhere to the assumption.64 That basic formulation has 
been accepted in numerous recent judgments in the High Court.65
The effect of an estoppel at common law is to prevent the representor from 
denying that truth of the assumption which he or she has led the representee to 
adopt. The rights of the parties are then determined by reference to the state of 
affairs as assumed by the representee. As Deane J pointed out in Waltons Stores 
(Interstate) Ltd v Maher,66 although it is often observed that estoppel at common 
law operates as a shield and not a sword, such observations are accurate only in a 
very limited sense. It is true in the sense that the effect of an estoppel at common 
law is not to create an independently enforceable right in one party against 
another, but rather ‘it is to establish the state of affairs by reference to which the
62 (1933) 49 CLR507.
63 (1937) 59 CLR 641.
64 Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547; Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd 
(1937) 59 CLR 641,674.
65 See, eg: Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 413 (Brennan J), 446 
(Deane J), 458 (Gaudron J); Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 409 (Mason 
CJ), 500 (McHugh J).
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legal relationship between them is ascertained.’ An estoppel at common law 
can be used defensively, where an action which would otherwise be available to 
the plaintiff is not available on the assumed state of affairs.68 It can also be used 
aggressively, to establish a state of affairs in which a cause of action is available, 
where that cause of action would not be available on the true state of affairs.69
(b) Assumptions of fact
• 70As Mason and Deane JJ observed in Legione v Hateley, and Mason CJ and 
Wilson J noted in Waltons Stores, there is a long line of authority to support the 
proposition that, in order to support a case of common law estoppel by 
representation, the representation relied upon must be as to an existing fact, a 
promise or representation as to future conduct being insufficient. That restriction 
is often described as the rule in Jordan v Money, after the House of Lords case in 
which it was established.72 The rule has often been stretched to breaking point, 
with judges going to some lengths to construe representations of future intention 
as representations of fact in order to avoid the operation of the rule. Although
66 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 444-5 (‘ Waltons Stores').
67 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 414 (Brennan J).
68 In Avon County Council v Howlett [1983] 1 All ER 1073, for example, a cause of action for 
moneys had and received would have been available to the plaintiff had it not represented to the 
defendant that he was entitled to the money in question. The effect of the plaintiff being held to 
the assumed state of affairs was that no action was then available.
69 In Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 463-4, Gaudron J (like the trial judge and the Court 
of Appeal below) held that an estoppel arose at common law which prevented the defendant 
from denying that it had entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs. The rights of the parties 
were, therefore, determined on the basis of the assumed state of affairs and the plaintiffs were 
able to maintain an action on the agreement which would not otherwise have been available. 
Other prominent cases in which common law estoppel has been used to establish a cause of 
action include Seton, Laing, & Co v Lafone (1887) 19 QBD 68 (conversion) and Laws 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563 (debt).
70 (1983) 152 CLR 406, 432.
71 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 398, citing Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, Maddison 
v Alderson (1883) 8 App Cas 467, 473; Chadwick v Manning [1896] AC 231; George 
Whitechurch Ltd v Cavanagh (1902) AC 117, 130; Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance 
Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305, 324; Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Craine (1922) 31 CLR 27, 38; 
Ferrier v Stewart (1912) 15 CLR 32, 44; Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 432.
72 (18 5 4) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, discussed below under the heading: B. Equitable Estoppel.
73 As Mason and Deane JJ observed in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 432, ‘much 
judicial ingenuity [has] been employed in seeking to demonstrate that a statement of intention 
with respect to a future occurrence could amount to a statement of present fact.’ A striking 
example is Barns v Queensland National Bank Ltd (1906) 3 CLR 925, 940, where the High 
Court construed a mortgagee’s statement that it did not intend to exercise its power of sale as a 
representation of existing fact: that the mortgagee’s prior demand for the secured debt was to be
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there have recently been findings by members of the High Court that the rule in 
Jorden v Money is no longer good law in Australia,74 such a view has not yet 
commanded a majority in the High Court. Accordingly, common law estoppel 
remains applicable only to representations of existing fact. The continued 
existence of a separate doctrine of common law estoppel, ostensibly restricted to 
representations of existing fact, received majority support in Waltons Stores75 and 
was further supported in Commonwealth v Verwayen. The contemporary 
operation of the doctrine was described by Brennan J as follows:
A party who induces another to make an assumption that a state of affairs 
exists, knowing or intending the other to act on that assumption, is 
estopped from asserting the existence of a different state of affairs as the 
foundation of their respective rights and liabilities if the other has acted in 
reliance on the assumption and would suffer detriment if the assumption 
were not adhered to .77
Mason CJ has suggested that common law estoppel has expanded beyond its 
evidentiary function into a substantive doctrine.78 Since the doctrine is 
occasionally applied to an assumptions of rights, it is not entirely accurate to 
describe it as an evidentiary doctrine.79 In most cases it is applied in relation to 
assumptions of fact, however, and in such cases its effect is simply to compel 
adherence to an assumption of fact. Even where it is applied to assumptions of
regarded as not having been made.
74 See Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 452 (Deane J, who then stopped just short of 
making such a finding); Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385, 435 (Deane J), 411-2 (Mason CJ); 
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 413 (Mason CJ), 444-5 (Deane J).
75 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 397-9 (Mason CJ and Wilson J) (who called it common law estoppel), 
413-5 (Brennan J) (estoppel in pais), 458-9 (Gaudron J) (common law or evidentiary estoppel).
76 (1990) 170 CLR 394 ('Verwayen'), 453-4 (Dawson J), 499-500 (McHugh J). See also Silovi Pty 
Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, 472 (Priestley JA).
77 Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 413, citing Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co 
Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305, 327-328; Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547; Newbon v City 
Mutual Life Assurance Society> Ltd( 1935) 52 CLR 723, 734; Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold 
Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641,657, 674, 676.
78 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 412 (Mason CJ).
79 See above, text accompanying n 3. For a discussion of cases in which common law estoppel 
has operated in relation to assumptions as to rights, see below, nn 132-140 and accompanying 
text.
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existing rights, its effect is simply to prevent the denial of those rights.80 
Accordingly, the common law doctrine is not substantive, in the sense that it is 
not a source of independent rights. In this significant respect, the principle of 
estoppel applied at common law contrasts sharply with its equitable counterpart, 
which goes beyond merely precluding the denial of existing facts or rights. As the 
following discussion will show, equitable estoppel is itself a source of 
independent rights or equities, which are satisfied by the granting of appropriate 
relief.
B. Equitable Estoppel 
1. A Brief Historical Sketch
Unlike common law estoppel, equitable estoppel has been allowed to develop 
into a substantive doctrine, principally because it has not been subjected to the 
full rigours of the rule in Jorden v Money. As noted above, from the time of
o 1
Jorden v Money until very recently, it has been accepted that an estoppel could 
only arise at common law from an assumption of existing fact, and that the 
principle of estoppel has no application to promises or representations as to future 
conduct. Although the restriction imposed in Jorden v Money clearly applied to 
estoppel in equity as well as at common law, two lines of authority evince the 
reluctance on the part of equity judges to accept that restriction. It was the 
recognition of estoppels arising from promises, and relating to the future conduct 
of the promisor, which led ultimately to the development of a substantive 
doctrine of estoppel in equity.
Equitable estoppel has its origins in the equitable jurisdiction to make good 
representations, which has been thoroughly examined in contemporary
80 See the cases discussed below, nn 132-140 and accompanying text
81 See above, n 74 and accompanying text.
82 See, eg, Piggott v Stratton (1859) 1 De GF & J 33; 45 ER 271, 278. As JG Starke and PFP 
Higgins, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (Aust ed, 1966) 687 observed: The plain fact 
is that Jorden v. Money was initiated in a court of equity and was ultimately decided by the 
House of Lords sitting as a court of equity prior to the English Judicature Act of 1873, and it 
was at no time suggested in that case that equity viewed the matter differently from the common
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literature.83 Prior to the decision in Jorden v Money, the equitable jurisdiction to 
make good representations clearly extended to representations as to the existing 
rights of the parties and representations as to the future conduct of the 
representor. The leading case is Hammersley v De Biel, in which Lord 
Cottenham held that ‘a representation made by one party, for the purpose of 
influencing the conduct of the other party, and acted upon by him, will in 
general be sufficient to entitle him to the assistance of this court for the purpose 
of realising such representation.’84 The case concerned a representation made 
by a man to his prospective son in law relating to the representor’s intention to 
settle 10,000 pounds on his daughter and her heirs in his will. The House of 
Lords upheld the decisions of the courts below that the representation, being 
made in contemplation of the marriage, and acted upon by the marriage, was 
enforceable in a court of equity.
Although all members of the House of Lords in Hammersley v De Biel held that
QC
the arrangement was enforceable on equitable principles, the decision was later
oz:
justified by the House of Lords as based on contract. In Jorden v Money the 
House of Lords denied that the jurisdiction to make good representations allowed 
a court of equity to enforce non-contractual promises. The plaintiff in Jorden v 
Money commenced proceedings in the Court of Chancery to prevent the 
defendant from enforcing a judgment at law on a bond given by the plaintiff to 
the defendant some years previously. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had 
made numerous representations that she would not enforce the bond against the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff acted in reliance on those representations in marrying. 
Although the plaintiff succeeded before the Master of the Rolls and the Court of 
Appeal in Chancery, a majority of the House of Lords held that the representation
law.’
83 LA Sheridan, ‘Equitable Estoppel Today’ (1952) 15 Modern Law Review 325; David 
Jackson, ‘Estoppel as a Sword’ (Parts 1 & 2) (1965) 81 Law Quarterly Review 84 & 223; Ian 
Davidson, ‘The Equitable Remedy of Compensation’ (1982) 13 Melbourne University Law 
Review 347, 356-370; Francis Dawson, ‘Making Representations Good’ (1982) 1 Canterbury 
Law Review 329; PD Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985) 59, 
62-71.
84 (1845) 12 Cl & F 45; 8 ER 1312, 1320.
85 Ibid 1327 (Lord Lyndhurst), 1329 (Lord Brougham), 1331 (Lord Campbell).
86 Maunsell v Hedges (1854) 4 HLC 1039; 10 ER 769, 776 (Lord Cranworth LC), 111 (Lord St 
Leonards); see Mark Lunney, ‘Jorden v Money - A Time for Reappraisal?’ (1994) 68
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was not enforceable. The House of Lords held that the doctrine by which 
representations were made good at common law and in equity ‘does not apply 
where the representation is not a representation of fact, but a statement of 
something which the party intends to do or does not intend to do.’
It seems clear that the House of Lords’ decision in Jorden v Money should have 
restricted the application of all estoppels, both at law and in equity, to 
representations of fact. As a number of commentators have pointed out, however, 
the equity judges were not entirely constrained by the decision.88 Two lines of 
authority emerged which effectively represented exceptions to the rule in Jorden 
v Money, although they were not acknowledged as such, and were not at first 
described as instances of estoppel. The first line of authority involved the 
application of the doctrines of encouragement and acquiescence, which allowed 
relief to be granted where the owner of land had encouraged or allowed a person 
to assume or expect rights in that land, and the latter had acted on the basis of that 
assumption or expectation. Those doctrines, which became known as proprietary 
estoppel, recognised that a cause of action existed against the landowner where 
the relevant assumption or expectation had been acted upon. Although those 
principles may be regarded as being inconsistent with Jorden v Money, their 
continued existence was recognised only two years after the House of Lords’ 
decision was handed down.89
Australian Law Journal 559, 568.
87 (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, 882 (Lord Cranworth LC), similarly, 886 (Lord Brougham). 
The demise of the equitable jurisdiction to make good representations in Jorden v Money and 
other cases has been attributed to the increased emphasis on self reliance in the Victorian era, 
and the notion of the assumption of obligation through bargain, which is at the heart of classical 
contract theory: PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 458; Finn, above 
n 83; DW Greig and JLR Davis, The Law of Contract (1987) 24-6; PA Ridge, ‘The Equitable 
Doctrines of Part Performance and Proprietary Estoppel’ (1988) 16 Melbourne University Law 
Review 725, 727-9. This relationship between classical contract theory and estoppel is 
discussed in Andrew Robertson, ‘Situating Equitable Estoppel Within the Law of Obligations’ 
(1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 32, 33-37.
88 Lunney, above n 86, 570-3; Dawson, above n 83, 334-5; Fiona Burns, ‘The “Fusion Fallacy” 
Revisited’ (1993) 5 Bond Law Review 152, 164-5. Like the common law judges, the equity 
judges were also ingenious in construing statements of intention as representations of existing 
fact in order to avoid the operation of the rule, see, eg: the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Chancery in Piggott v Stratton (1859) 1 De GF & J 33; 45 ER 271, discussed by Samuel 
Stoljar, ‘Estoppel and Contract Theory’ (1990) 3 Journal of Contract Law 1, 4-5.
89 Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129, 140 (Lord Cranworth LC); 168 (Lord Wensleydale), 
170 (Lord Kingsdown). The narrow statement of the doctrine estoppel by acquiescence by Lord 
Cranworth may be attributable to a concern not to offend the principle he laid down in Jorden v
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The second line of authority which may be regarded as an equitable exception to 
Jorden v Money was the principle that applied where a party to a contract led a 
second party to believe that certain contractual rights would not be enforced. 
Where the second party had changed their position on the faith of that 
assumption, the first would not be allowed to enforce those rights.90 Again the 
principle was not originally described as an estoppel, but it later developed, 
through Justice Denning’s famous dicta in Central London Property Trust Ltd v 
High Trees House Ltd,91 into a principle which became known as promissory 
estoppel. As King CJ observed in Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia, the 
principle of promissory estoppel ‘appears to run directly counter to the decision
92of the House of Lords in Jorden v Money’.
Thus, notwithstanding the decision of the House of Lords in Jorden v Money, two 
broad principles were subsequently applied in equity which had the effect of 
holding parties to promises and representations relating to their future conduct, in 
circumstances in which those promises and representations had been acted upon 
by the representee or promisee. Those principles of proprietary93 and 
promissory94 estoppel were cautiously applied in Australian courts until 1988, 
when the High Court rationalised the equitable principles of estoppel in Waltons 
Stores.95 In Waltons Stores, the High Court recognised that the doctrines of 
proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel were emanations of a broader
Money (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, 881-2. The broader statement of estoppel by 
acquiescence by Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v Dyson, on the other hand, seems quite 
inconsistent with Jorden v Money: see Chapter 3 and Lunney, above n 86, 572.
90 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439; Birmingham and District Land Co 
v London and North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268.
91 [1947] 1 KB 130.
92 (1980) 26 SASR 101, 102. It is interesting to note that the ratio decidendi of Jorden v Money 
was described by Lord Campbell LC in Piggott v Stratton (1859) 1 De GF & J 33; 45 ER 271, 
278 in terms which directly contradict the High Trees principle: ‘that where a person possesses 
a legal right, a Court of Equity will not interfere to restrain him from enforcing it, though, 
between the time of its creation and that of his attempt to enforce it, he has made 
representations of his intention to abandon it.’
93 See Hamilton v Geraghty (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (Eq) 81; Raffaele v Raffaele [1962] WAR 29; 
Jackson v Crosby (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 280; Cameron v Murdoch [1983] WAR 321; Riches 
vHogben [1986] Q dR 315.
94 See In the Marriage of Duncan (1978) 4 Farn LR 282; Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia 
(1980) 26 SASR 101; Re Ward; Official Trustee v Dabnas Pty Ltd (1984) 3 FCR 112; Miller v 
Barrellan (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1981) 2 BPR 9543.
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principle of estoppel operating in equity, which is of general application.96 It is 
that broad principle of equitable estoppel recognised in Waltons Stores, and 
refined in the High Court’s subsequent decision in Verwayen97 which, along with 
common law estoppel, forms the subject of this thesis.
2. The Nature of the Doctrine
Although there were some important differences of opinion between members of 
the High Court in Waltons Stores and Verwayen as to the nature of equitable 
estoppel, there was broad agreement as to the circumstances in which it
QQ
operates. The doctrine operates where a representor induces a representee to 
adopt an assumption as to the representor’s future conduct or the legal rights of 
the representee, and the representee acts on the faith of that assumption in such a 
way that the representee will incur significant detriment if the assumption is not 
adhered to. The three core elements required to establish an equitable estoppel are 
an assumption, inducement and detrimental reliance: the representee must have 
adopted an assumption (assumption), which was induced by the conduct of the 
representor (inducement), and the representee must have altered his or her 
position on the faith of the assumption so that material detriment will be suffered 
if the representor is allowed to depart from the assumption (detrimental reliance). 
It is often suggested that a fourth element must also be made out in order to 
establish an estoppel in equity: that departure from the assumption by the 
representor would be unconscionable in the circumstances (unconscionability). 
The effect of the estoppel is to raise an equity against the representor, which the 
court must satisfy by granting relief which is the minimum necessary to prevent 
any detriment being suffered by the representee.
95 (1988) 164 CLR 387.
96 In Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, 472, Priestley JA observed that the 
decision in Waltons Stores allows us to say that cases described as estoppel by encouragement, 
estoppel by acquiescence, proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel are all species of 
equitable estoppel.
97 (1990) 170 CLR 394.
98 Those areas of disagreement will be examined below and in Chapters 2-7.
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A number of important questions remain unresolved after the High Court’s 
decisions in Waltons Stores and Verwayen. First, does equitable estoppel apply to 
assumptions of existing fact? Secondly, does equitable estoppel have exclusive 
operation in relation to assumptions as to rights? Thirdly, does equitable estoppel 
itself provide a cause of action? Those three broader questions will be addressed 
briefly below. Other unresolved questions relate to specific elements of equitable 
estoppel, and they will be addressed in detail in Chapters 2-7 below. Chapter 2 
will consider what is the fundamental purpose or rationale of equitable estoppel. 
Chapter 3 will consider what is the threshold requirement for establishing an 
equitable estoppel: is a representation or promise required, or is the court merely 
concerned with whether an assumption has been adopted by the representee? 
Chapter 4 will consider the nature of the detrimental reliance requirement, and 
the level of proof demanded. Chapter 5 will consider the nature of the 
reasonableness requirement: is the representee required to act reasonably in 
adopting and acting upon the assumption, or must the representor reasonably 
expect reliance, or both? Chapter 6 will consider whether there is an additional 
requirement in equity that it must be unconscionable for the representee to depart 
from the assumption in the circumstances. The question of knowledge will also 
be addressed in Chapter 6: whether the representor must know of or expect 
reliance by the representee. Finally, Chapter 7 will address the important question 
of remedy: how should the courts give effect to an estoppel once it is made out?
(a) Does equitable estoppel apply to assumptions of fact?
The first unresolved question relates to the scope of the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel. Two different views can be discerned in the recent judgments. The 
narrow view of equitable estoppel is that the doctrine applies only to assumptions 
relating to the legal rights of the parties or the future conduct of the representor, 
with common law estoppel having exclusive application to assumptions of 
existing fact. The broad view is that the equitable doctrine can, in addition to its 
exclusive application to assumptions of future conduct and rights, apply to 
assumptions of existing fact. While the former view is difficult to justify
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historically, acceptance of the latter would result in overlap and inconsistency 
between the common law and equitable principles.
In Waltons Stores, the narrow view of equitable estoppel appeared to be accepted 
by Mason CJ and Wilson J, although they did not directly address the question. 
Deane J recognised that estoppel by representation spanned the gulf between 
common law and equity, and operated indifferently at common law and in 
equity." The approach taken by Deane J shows that the question of the scope of 
equitable estoppel is only a live question if one accepts the existence of an 
equitable doctrine of estoppel that operates differently from that applied at 
common law. The doctrine of equitable estoppel articulated by Brennan J in 
Waltons Stores was clearly quite different from common law estoppel since the 
former was itself ‘a source of legal obligation’, while the latter simply operated to 
establish a state of affairs by reference to which the rights of the parties were 
determined. 100 It was clear that Brennan J adopted the narrow view of equitable 
estoppel: the principle he applied operated only in relation to assumptions ‘that a 
particular legal relationship existed’ between representor and representee. 101 
Similarly, Gaudron J differentiated between common law and equitable estoppel 
on the basis that the former operated by reference to assumptions of fact, while 
the latter operated by reference to an assumption of rights. 102
The judgments of Brennan and Gaudron JJ in Waltons Stores clearly proceeded 
on the footing that equitable estoppel operated only in relation to assumptions of 
future conduct and rights, leaving assumptions of existing fact to be dealt with at 
common law. Two commentators have argued, however, that equitable 
estoppel can cover all of the territory presently covered by common law
" (1988) 164 CLR 387, 447.
100 Ibid 416.
101 Ibid 428.
102 Ibid 458.
103 In applying the principles laid down in Waltons Stores in Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 
NSWLR 466, 472, Priestley JA distinguished the doctrines of common law and equitable estoppel 
on the basis that common law estoppel operates upon representations of existing fact, while 
equitable estoppel operates upon representations or promises as to future conduct, including 
promises as to legal relations. Implicit in that distinction is a denial of the operation of equitable 
estoppel in relation to representations of existing fact.
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estoppel. 104 Although in Keate v Phillips Bacon VC held that the doctrine of 
estoppel was ‘purely legal’ and could not be applied in a court of equity, 105 it is 
clear that courts of equity have historically recognised estoppels arising from 
representations of fact. 106 The equitable jurisdiction to make representations good 
was often invoked in relation to representations of fact. 107 There is also a long 
line of equity cases in which estoppels have arisen from representations to the 
effect that a representor had no interest in a particular item of property. 108
Although this century the doctrine of estoppel by representation of fact has 
principally been applied at common law, three important nineteenth century cases 
show that the principle was also applied in equity. First, in West v Jones, Lord 
Cranworth VC upheld a plea of estoppel arising from a representation of fact in 
the Court of Chancery. 109 The plea was successfully relied upon by the plaintiff in 
that case in support of his claim for a declaration as to the amount secured by a 
mortgage which he held from the defendant. The defendant was held to the 
assumption of fact which he had induced the plaintiff to adopt: that certain 
moneys had been advanced under the mortgage. Lord Cran worth observed that 
the applicable principle of estoppel was ‘familiar not only to Courts of Equity but 
also to courts of law’ . 110 Secondly, the decision of the House of Lords in Jorden v 
Money was based on the principle that estoppel in equity was limited to 
representations of existing fact. 111 The third important case was the decision of
i  i  o
the English Court of Appeal in Low v Bouverie, “ which proceeded on the basis 
that the principle of estoppel by representation of fact operated consistently at
1CM Alec Leopold, ‘Estoppel: A Practical Appraisal of Recent Developments’ (1991) 7 
Australian Bar Review 47, 51; Mark Lunney, ‘Towards a Unified Estoppel: The Long and 
Winding Road’ [1992] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 239, 246.
105 (1878) 18 Ch 560, 577.
106 As Derham has noted, above n 23, 984, equity has a concurrent jurisdiction with the common 
law in relation to estoppel by representation as to an existing state of affairs.
107 Prominent examples include Evans v Bicknell (1801) 6 Ves 174; 31 ER 927 and Burrowes v 
Lock (1805) 10 Ves 470; 32 ER 927.
108 See, eg, Hunt v Carew (1649) Nel 46; 21 ER 786; Hobbs v Horton (1682) 1 Vern 136; 23 
ER 370; Hunsden v Cheyney (1690) 2 Vern 156; 23 ER 703; Draper v Boralace (1699) 2 Vern 
370; 23 ER 833; Ibbottson v Rhodes (1706) 2 Vern 554; 23 ER 958; Mocatta v Murgatroyd
(1717) 1 P Wms 394; 24 ER 440.
109 (1851) 1 Sim (NS) 205; 61 ER 79.
110 Ibid 81. See also at 83.
111 (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, esp at 880-1 (Lord Cranworth LC).
112 [1891] 3 Ch 82.
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common law and in equity. 113 Although no estoppel was found to arise in that 
case, the Court of Appeal’s treatment of the principles of estoppel has been 
extremely influential in subsequent estoppel cases, both in equity and at common 
law.
It is, therefore, clear that a principle of estoppel arising from assumptions of fact 
has been applied in Courts of Equity for some time. 114 It is also clear that the 
principle has operated in equity in the same way as it has at law . 115 The effect of 
the estoppel has been to establish a state of affairs by reference to which the 
rights of the parties are established. The difficult question, then, is whether equity 
will continue to treat relied-upon assumptions of fact in the same way as the 
common law, and will simply hold the representor to the relevant assumption in 
each case, or whether assumptions of fact will be dealt with in the same way as 
assumptions of rights or future conduct. If the latter view prevailed, then reliance 
upon an assumption of fact induced by another party would raise an equity in 
favour of the representee, and the court would have to fashion relief to give effect 
to that equity in accordance with recognised principles. The question of the scope 
of equitable estoppel is a significant one because of the different ways in which 
equitable estoppel and common law estoppel operate. From a representee’s point 
of view, it will be preferable to invoke the equitable doctrine in those situations in 
which no cause of action is available on the assumed state of affairs, since the 
equitable doctrine itself appears to provide a cause of action. The common law 
doctrine may, however, provide a better remedy for the representee in some 
situations, since it provides a complete bar to the representor relying on the true 
state of affairs. 116
113 Ibid, esp at 111-3 (Kay LJ).
114 See, eg: Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387,447-8 (Deane J) and Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 
394,409-10 (Mason CJ), 500 (McHugh J).
115 Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 447 (Deane J). Meagher Gummow and Lehane, above n 
25, 406 have observed that since Pickard v Sears (1837) 6 Ad & El 469; 112 ER 179 estoppel by 
representation has had the same attributes at law and in equity. Spencer Bower and Turner, above 
n 4, 12 maintained in 1977 that ‘no satisfactory high authority is discoverable offering any firm 
foundation for the view that estoppel in equity is different in any essential respect from estoppel at 
common law, whatever may have been the case in the 19th century when the doctrine was in its 
embryonic stages.’
116 As Chapter 7 will show, the judgments of the High Court in Verwayen indicate that the 
remedy provided by equitable estoppel should be designed to reverse the detriment suffered by 
the representee, rather than to fulfil his or her expectations.
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The difference between the effects of common law and equitable estoppel can be 
illustrated by reference to the facts before the English Court of Appeal in Avon 
County Council v H owlettu l The action was brought by the plaintiff to recover 
payments made under a mistake of fact to the defendant, its employee. The 
defendant queried the payments, in response to which the plaintiff made 
representations which led the defendant to believe that he was entitled to treat the 
money as his own. On the faith of that belief, the defendant expended some of the 
money on things he would not otherwise have bought, and omitted to claim social 
security benefits to which he would have been entitled. The trial judge held 
that the plaintiffs claim to recover the moneys was barred only to the extent of 
the sum spent and the benefits forgone. That decision was overturned by the 
Court of Appeal, on the basis that an estoppel by representation arose which did 
not operate only to the extent of the detriment suffered by the representee, but 
barred the whole of the plaintiffs claim to recover the moneys. The notion that 
estoppel by representation could operate pro tanto was described by Slade LJ as 
being ‘contrary to principle and authority. ’ 119 The contemporary Australian 
doctrine of common law estoppel would have the same result: its effect would be 
to establish a state of affairs by reference to which the rights of the parties would 
be determined. Under the represented or assumed state of affairs, no action would 
be available to the plaintiff. 120
The contemporary Australian doctrine of equitable estoppel may, however, 
produce quite a different result if the situation arose in Australia today. A person 
in the defendant’s position might plead equitable estoppel on the basis that
117 [1983] 1 All ER 1073. The case will be discussed in more detail in the context of estoppel 
remedies in Chapter 7.
118 There was in fact evidence that the defendant had spent all of the money, but Eveleigh and 
Slade LJJ decided the case on the facts pleaded by the defendant, which revealed a change of 
position equivalent in value to approximately half of the amount claimed by the plaintiff.
119 [1983] 1 All ER 1073, 1088.
120 The inflexibility of common law estoppel in this context was noted by the High Court in 
David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353, 385, where 
Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ observed that a number of writers support 
a change of position defence to restitutionary claims, ‘particularly in view of the inflexibility of 
the related doctrine of estoppel, as evidenced by Avon CC v Howlett where the Court of Appeal 
held that estoppel could not operate pro tanto.’
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equitable estoppel extends to assumptions of fact, or on the basis that the belief 
induced by the plaintiffs representation was an assumption as to the future 
conduct of the plaintiff (that it would not enforce its right to recover the money) 
or the rights of the parties (that the defendant was entitled to receive the 
payments). The effect of an equitable estoppel would not be to establish an 
assumed state of affairs, but rather to raise an equity in favour of the defendant. 
According to the approach adopted by several members of the High Court in 
Verwayen, the court should satisfy that equity by granting the minimum relief 
necessary to prevent the defendant from suffering detriment as a result of his 
reliance on the relevant assumption. 121 The court could do that by allowing the 
plaintiffs action only to extent of the amount unspent by the plaintiff less the 
income forgone, or by allowing the action subject to the defendant’s right to be 
compensated for the expenditure and income forgone.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel may, therefore, produce quite different results 
from its common law counterpart in some situations. The scope of the equitable 
doctrine is thus an important issue, with significant practical consequences. The 
question whether equitable or common law estoppel should be applied will 
potentially be an important one in all cases in which the detriment suffered by the 
representee in reliance on the relevant assumption exceeds the value of a benefit
which they expected, or assumed they had, on the facts as represented by the
122representor.
This question of the scope of equitable estoppel was considered at some length by 
Kirby P in Lorimer v State Bank o f New South Wales, 123 His view was that the
121 See Chapter 7 below.
122 Andrew Beech, ‘The Remedy for Estoppel: Identifying and Preventing Detriment’ in Robyn 
Carroll (ed), Civil Remedies - Issues and Developments (1996) 156, 164 has suggested that, 
because of the remedial distinction between common law and equitable estoppel, it will always 
be to the representee’s advantage to establish an estoppel at law, rather than in equity. That 
statement is not, however, entirely accurate. It will be preferable for a representee to establish 
an equitable estoppel in those situations in which the assumed state of affairs does not provide 
the representee with a cause of action. The fact that equitable estoppel operates as a substantive 
source of rights will then make it more advantageous to the representee than its common law 
counterpart.
123 (New South Wales Court of Appeal, Kirby P, Priestley JA and Handley JA, 5 July, 1991) 
19-24.
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modern authorities contemplate that equitable estoppel applies to assumptions of 
fact as well as assumptions as to future conduct. This, he suggests, is confirmed 
by Justice Brennan’s suggestion that an equitable estoppel may be founded upon 
an assumption that a particular legal relationship existed between the parties.124 
Accordingly, Kirby P suggested, the same assumption could conceivably found 
both an estoppel in pais at common law and an equitable estoppel. As Kirby P 
has suggested, the result of such a state of affairs is a conflict between the 
common law and equity, since the courts give effect to the different estoppels in 
entirely different ways. The effect of a common law estoppel is to hold the 
representor to the assumed state of affairs and to determine the rights of parties 
on the basis of that state of affairs. The effect of an equitable estoppel, on the 
other hand, is to raise an equity in favour of the representee, which the court must 
satisfy by the granting of relief which prevents or reverses the detriment suffered 
by the representee as a result of his or her reliance.
Any conflict between the common law and equitable doctrines must be resolved 
in favour of the equitable doctrine, as Kirby P has suggested. Under the statutes 
in force in each Australian state and territory which re-enact the provisions of the 
English Judicature Act of 1873, where there is any conflict or variance between 
the rules of equity and the rules of the common law relating to the same matter, 
the rules of equity prevail.125 The result is that the equitable doctrine is to be 
applied in situations where both are potentially applicable. If the view of Kirby P 
is right, then that would extend to every situation in which the common law 
doctrine of estoppel by conduct applies. Common law estoppel must, according 
to this view, be regarded as a dead letter, which has been superseded by the 
substantive doctrine of equitable estoppel.
It must be recalled that common law estoppel will only be supplanted by 
equitable estoppel if the latter is regarded as extending to representations of fact.
124 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 428-9. One might question, 
however, whether Justice Brennan’s reference to an assumption that a particular legal 
relationship exists between the parties can unquestioningly be treated as a reference to as an 
assumption of fact. See below, text accompanying nn 127-143.
125 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 33; Law Reform (Law and Equity) Act 1972 (NSW), s 5; 
Supreme Court Act (NT), s 68; Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), s 249; Supreme Court Act 1935 
(SA), s 28; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 11(10); Supreme Court Act 1986
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That question has not yet been squarely addressed by the High Court. Since most 
members of the High Court have, in its recent decisions, assumed the continued 
existence of common law estoppel, it must also be assumed that equitable 
estoppel is confined to assumptions relating to the representor’s future conduct 
and the legal rights of the parties, leaving common law estoppel with exclusive 
application to assumptions of existing fact. The notion that common law 
estoppel retains its exclusive application to situations involving assumptions of 
existing fact has been justified by Andrew Beech on the basis that where 
common law estoppel operates ‘there is nothing to enliven the jurisdiction of a
1 9Acourt of equity on an argument of estoppel’. In other words, since the 
common law adequately protects the position of the representee, equitable 
intervention is not justified.
(b) Which estoppel applies to assumptions of rights?
If common law estoppel does retain its exclusive application to representations of 
existing fact, then another important question of demarcation arises. Is an 
assumption relating to the existing legal rights of the representee covered by 
equitable estoppel, or is it regarded as an assumption of fact, which is dealt with 
under common law estoppel? In Waltons Stores, Gaudron J distinguished 
between common law and equitable estoppel on the basis that the former applied 
to assumptions of fact, while the latter applied to assumptions as to rights. 127 It is 
possible to cite numerous cases of estoppels arising in equity from assumptions 
as to rights, particularly amongst the proprietary estoppel cases. While there have 
been many proprietary estoppel cases arising from assumptions relating to the 
representor’s future conduct, there have also been several that have arisen from
(Vic), s 29(1); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 25(12).
126 Above n 122, 160.
127 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 458.
128 Ie: that the representor would transfer certain property to the representee, either inter vivos 
or by will, or would allow the representee to occupy or use the land in some way. Examples of 
such cases include: Plimmer v Wellington Corporation (1884) 9 HLC 699; In re Whitehead 
[1948] NZLR 1066; Inwards v Baker [1965] 1 All ER 446; Pascoe v Turner [1979] 2 All ER 
945; Greasely v Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306; Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179; 
Jackson v Crosby (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 280; Riches v Hogben [1986] 1 Qd R 315; Collin v 
Holden [1989] VR510.
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mistaken assumptions relating to the existing rights of the parties. 129 The 
availability in a court of equity of this type of proprietary estoppel, based on an 
assumption of existing rights rather than future conduct, has been confirmed in 
several well-known statements of principle. 130 Accordingly, it cannot be 
suggested that equitable estoppel is limited in its application to assumptions 
relating to the future conduct of the representor.
It is not, however, historically accurate to suggest that courts of equity have
1 T I
enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction in relation to assumptions as to rights. There 
have been many cases at common law in which representations as to the legal 
rights of the parties have been treated as representations of existing fact. 132 In 
Mooregate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings, Lord Denning MR held that the 
common law principle of estoppel by conduct ‘applies to an assumption of 
ownership or absence of ownership. ’ 133 Perhaps the clearest and most common 
instance of common law estoppel operating in relation to an assumption of rights
129 Eg: Huning v Ferrers (1711) Gilb Eq 85; 25 ER 370 (representee built on land assuming he 
had possession under a valid lease); Savage v Foster (1723) 9 Mod 35; 88 ER 299 (representee 
purchased and build on land assuming he was obtaining good title); Steed v Whitaker (1740) 
Barn Ch 220; 27 ER 621 (representee built on mortgaged property on the assumption it was 
unencumbered); Hardcastle v Shafto (1793) 1 Anst 184; 145 ER 839 (representees spent 
money improving land on the assumption that they had possession under a valid lease); 
Hamilton v Geraghty (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (Eq) 81 (representee built on land assuming it was 
his own); Attorney General to HRH Prince o f Wales v Collom [1916] 2 KB 193 (representee 
expended money on improvements to a house, believing it to be her own).
130 Dann v Spurier (1802) 7 Ves 231; 32 ER 94, 95; Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129, 
140; Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 Ch D 96, 105-6; Svenson v Payne (1945) 71 CLR 531, 539.
131 Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 4, 38-42 note that there have been several cases in 
which estoppels have arisen from statements of fact ‘accompanied by, or involving, an 
inference of proposition of law’. They argue that inextricably mixed statements of fact and law 
are properly treated as statements of fact, and if as a result of the representor’s ambiguous use 
of language it is impossible to say with certainty which is the proper construction, the statement 
is deemed one of fact on the basis of the contra proferentem rule. On the application of 
common law estoppel to assumptions of mixed fact and law, see also Waltons Stores (1988)
164 CLR 387, 415 (Brennan J).
132 Eg: Pickard v Sears (1837) 6 Ad & El 469; 112 ER 179 (representee purchased goods on 
the assumption that representor had no interest in them); Bank o f Australasia v Adams (1890) 8 
NZLR 119 (directors signed bond in the belief they were incurring no personal liability); 
Farrow v Orttewell [1933] 1 Ch 480 (tenant vacated premises on assumption that notice to quit 
was valid and tenancy had come to an end); Rodenhurst Estates Ltd v WH Barnes Ltd [1936] 2 
All ER 3 (landlord refrained from ejecting occupier on assumption that occupier was in 
possession as assignee of lessee); Mooregate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1976] QB 225 
(representee induced to assume that representor had no interest in vehicle purchased from third 
party; overturned on appeal on grounds not relevant to present discussion: [1977] AC 890); 
Eastern Distributors Ltd v Goldring [1957] 2 QB 600 (representee purchased representor’s 
vehicle on the assumption that it was owned by a third party).
133 [1976] QB 225,242.
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is in the long line of cases in which it has been used as a defence to claims for 
moneys had and received. 134 The relevant assumption in each of those cases 
could be regarded as an assumption as to rights: that the moneys in question 
belonged to the recipient, or that the recipient was legally entitled to the moneys 
paid. The cases could almost have been dealt with under the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel, on the basis that the recipient incurred expenditure on the 
faith of an assumption of rights in the money being paid. 135 The payer’s 
representation that the recipient was entitled to the money paid has, however, 
consistently been treated as a representation of fact and the common law principle 
of estoppel applied as a complete defence to the payer’s claim for repayment.
Another prominent case in which an assumption of rights was treated as an
1assumption of fact was Texas Bank, the facts of which were discussed above. 
The trial judge, Robert Goff J, applied the principles of equitable estoppel, on the 
basis that the relevant assumption adopted by the bank was that the guarantee 
given by the plaintiffs constituted a binding and effective guarantee covering the 
relevant loan. ' This could clearly be characterised as an assumption as to the 
bank’s rights. 138 Since the guarantee in Texas Bank was secured on real property, 
the relevant assumption could even be construed as an assumption as to the 
bank’s proprietary rights. As discussed above, however, two members of the 
Court of Appeal applied the common law principle of estoppel by convention, on 
the basis that the parties had contracted on the basis of an assumed state of
134 Skyring v Greenwood (1825) 4 B & C 281; 107 ER 1064; Shaw v Picton (1825) 4 B & C 
715; 107 ER 1226; Cave v Mills (1862) 7 H & N 9 1 3 ; 1 5 8 E R  740; Deutche Bank (London 
Agency) v Beriro & Co (1895) 73 LT 669; Holt v Markham [1923] 1 KB 504; Avon County 
Council v Howlett [1983] 1 All ER 1073.
135 Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 4, 295 in fact treat these cases as instances of estoppel 
by acquiescence or encouragement which, they suggest, ‘is as applicable to transactions with 
respect to money as it is to transactions with respect to land.’
136 Above nn 26-32 and accompanying text.
137 [1982] 1 QB 84, 107.
138 In Norwegian American Cruises A/S v Paul Mundy Ltd (The “Visafjord”) [1988] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 343, 351 Bingham LJ acknowledged that the relevant assumption in Texas Bank was an 
assumption as to the effect of the guarantee. This, he said, exemplifies the principle that the 
agreed assumption required to establish an estoppel by convention ‘need not be one of fact, but 
may be one of law.’
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affairs. 139 The relevant assumption was held to be one of existing fact: that the 
plaintiffs had guaranteed the loan in question. 140
The cases discussed above demonstrate the great difficulty, if not impossibility, 
of distinguishing clearly between assumptions of fact and assumptions of rights. 
An assumption of rights can be regarded as an assumption of existing fact 
because the existence of rights is itself a fact. 141 It was the artificiality of drawing 
this type of distinction that led the High Court to abandon the distinction between 
mistakes of fact and mistakes of law in the law of restitution. 142 It is equally clear 
that the distinction between assumptions of existing fact and assumptions as to 
existing rights cannot be maintained in circumstances in which the 
characterisation of the assumption could potentially lead to great differences in 
the result of a case, as the above discussion of Avon County Council v Howlett 
illustrated. 143 It may be possible to resolve this problem by drawing a clearer line 
between facts and rights, but it is far from clear that it would be possible to devise 
an effective formula for making such a distinction. 144 It would, therefore, be 
preferable to recognise the existence of a doctrine of estoppel in which the
139 Lord Denning MR, ibid 121-2, applied a ‘general principle [of estoppel] shorn of 
limitations’. He held the relevant assumption to be an assumption as to the meaning or effect of 
the contract.
140 Ibid 126 (Eveleigh LJ), 131 (Brandon LJ).
141 J Unger, ‘The High Trees Case: Promise or Gift’ (1965) 28 Modern Law Review 231, 233-5 
has argued that the difficulties inherent in promissory estoppel can be avoided in cases where 
contractual rights have been waived, because it is possible to construe the relevant ‘promise’ as 
a representation as to the rights of the parties, which is a representation of existing fact. An 
example of such a construction is provided by Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Assurance 
Company Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305. The High Court held in that case that a representation by an 
insurer that the insured’s rights under an insurance policy were unimpaired by his failure to 
comply with the terms of the policy was a representation of fact sufficient to establish an 
estoppel at common law.
142 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank o f Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353, esp at 
374 where Mason CJ and Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ referred to the ‘artificiality’ 
as well as the ‘difficulty and illogicality of seeking to draw a rigid distinction between cases of 
mistake of law and mistake of fact.’
143 Above text accompanying nn 117-122. If a similar situation arose in Australia today, then the 
characterisation of the representee’s assumption would be of great significance. If it were 
characterised as an assumption of existing fact, then common law estoppel would apply, 
preventing any action by the representor. If, on the other hand, it were characterised as an 
assumption as to rights, then equitable estoppel should be applied, the effect of which would be 
limited to preventing or reversing the detriment suffered by the representee as a result of his or her 
reliance.
144 The difficulty of devising such a formula has been observed by Bennett, above n 23, 550.
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remedial consequences of estoppels arising from assumptions of fact are the same 
as those arising from assumptions as to rights.
(c) Does equitable estoppel itself provide a cause of action?
The notion that equitable estoppel is itself a source of legal obligation, and 
provides an independent cause of action, is central to this thesis. 145 Such a view 
of equitable estoppel is not, however, universally accepted. The alternative view 
is that equitable estoppel operates in the same way as common law estoppel, 
simply to establish a state of affairs by reference to which the rights of the parties 
are then established. There are three reasons why such a view is not tenable. First, 
the flexibility exercised by courts of equity in the granting of relief in estoppel 
cases is only possible if the estoppel is itself a source of legal obligation. 
Secondly, an estoppel which operates in relation to assumptions as to future 
conduct logically must operate as a source of rights. Thirdly, there have been 
many cases in which estoppel has been successfully relied upon in which no other 
cause of action was available; in such cases the estoppel must itself have 
provided the grounds for relief. 146
The notion that equitable estoppel is not a cause of action is articulated most 
clearly in the judgment of Deane J in Verwayen. Deane J remarked that the 
principle of estoppel by conduct ‘does not of itself constitute an independent 
cause of action. ’ 147 Rather, the effect of an estoppel, both at common law and in 
equity, 148 is to preclude denial of an assumed state of affairs by reference to
145 This view was supported by statements of principle in Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 430 
(Brennan J: ‘in strict theory, a party who is entitled to equitable relief to make good some 
detriment suffered in reliance on a promise has a cause of action’), 500 (McHugh J: ‘the 
equitable doctrines of estoppel create rights. They give rise to equities which are enforceable 
against the party estopped.’)
146 It should also be noted that in News Corporation Ltd v Lenfest Communications Inc 
(Supreme Court of New South Wales, Giles J, 20 September 1996), Giles J held that, for the 
purpose of determining whether the plaintiffs cause of action arose within the state (so as to 
enable originating process to be served outside the jurisdiction), it was strongly arguable that a 
claim in the nature of an equitable estoppel claim was a cause of action.
147 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 445.
148 In Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 451-2, Deane J held that the principle of estoppel by 
conduct applies uniformly at common law and in equity to assumptions of existing fact. That 
principle was extended in Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 387, 435, when Deane J recognised
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which the rights of the parties are determined. 149 Although Deane J was applying 
a unified principle of estoppel in Verwayen, it is clear from earlier judgments that 
he regarded equitable estoppel as having a similar preclusionary operation. 150
Although Deane J has been alone in recent High Court decisions in his adoption 
of the view that equitable estoppel is not itself a source of substantive rights, the 
view finds support in other quarters. It reflects Lord Denning’s conception of 
promissory estoppel as a principle that did not create new causes of action, but 
only prevented a party from insisting upon his or her strict legal rights in 
situations where it would be unjust to allow them to be enforced. 151 Justice 
Gleeson echoed Justice Deane’s view of equitable estoppel in a recent paper, and 
in fact took it to be the prevailing view. In summarising the direction in which the 
High Court is moving in relation to promissory estoppel, he said that: ‘An 
estoppel may be used defensively or aggressively, in aid of a cause of action; but 
it cannot on its own constitute a cause of action. ’ 152
The first problem with the notion that equitable estoppel does not create a cause 
of action is that it is inconsistent with even Justice Deane’s own limited approach 
to the question of remedy. ' Deane J has said that, prima facie , the operation of 
an estoppel by conduct is to preclude departure from the assumed state of 
affairs. 154 That prima facie entitlement must be qualified, however, if such relief 
would ‘be inequitably harsh’ 155 or ‘would exceed what could be justified by the 
requirements of good conscience and would be unjust to the estopped party. ’ 156 
In those cases some lesser form of relief should be awarded. 157 In some cases, 
Deane J suggested, ‘the appropriate order may be an order for compensatory
that Jorden v Money should no longer be regarded as good law, and the principle should be 
regarded as applicable to assumptions relating to the future conduct of the representor.
149 (1990) 170 CLR 394,445.
150 Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 450; Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385, 435.
151 See, eg: Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215, 219.
152 AM Gleeson, ‘Innovations in Contract: An Australian Analysis’ in PBH Birks (ed), The 
Frontiers of Liability (1994), vol 2, 113, 119.
153 As will be seen in Chapter 7, other members of the court adopted an approach to remedy 
which indicates even more clearly the substantive nature of equitable estoppel.
154 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 442, 443, 445-6.
155 Ibid 443.
156 Ibid 445-6.
157 Ibid 443.
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1 SRdamages.’ It is not at all clear from Justice Deane’s judgment in Verwayen, 
however, how a ‘remedy’ can be granted where there is no cause of action. It is 
particularly difficult to identify a basis on which a court could make an order for 
the payment of compensatory damages. Deane J appeared to appreciate the 
difficulty when, after referring to the notion that in some cases ‘equitable relief 
may be available only on a more restricted basis’, he insisted that ‘the point 
remains that promissory estoppel does not o f itself give rise to any entitlement to 
relief in equity. ’ 159
This problem of remedy reveals the illogicality of applying the principles of the 
preclusionary common law doctrine of estoppel to a representation relating to the 
representor’s future conduct, which was observed by Gaudron J in Waltons 
Stores'.
It is clear from Jorden v Money and the many cases in which it has been 
applied that a representation as to future conduct will not found a 
common law or evidentiary estoppel. That it will not found a common 
law or evidentiary estoppel is not merely a matter of authority, but also a 
matter of logic - at least in so far as the representation gives rise to an 
assumption as to a future event. Because common law or evidentiary 
estoppel operates by precluding the assertion of facts inconsistent with the 
assumed fact, the assumption must necessarily be as to an existing fact 
and not to a future event. 160
Accordingly, it is clear that a doctrine of estoppel which operates in relation to 
the future conduct of one of the parties logically must be regarded as creating 
substantive rights.
The third problem faced by proponents of Justice Deane’s approach is that there 
have been many cases in which equitable estoppel has been applied in which the
158
159
160
Ibid 442.
Ibid 437.
(1988) 164 CLR 387, 459.
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estoppel must itself have provided the cause of action, because no other cause of 
action was available on the facts. The leading examples of such cases are the 
proprietary estoppel cases, in which plaintiffs were able to claim interests in land 
solely on the basis that they had relied on an assumption, induced by the conduct 
of the defendant, that they had been, or would be, given an interest in the subject 
land. 161 The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Western Fish Products 
Ltd v Penwith DC162 appeared to be based in part on the principle that estoppel 
could only operate as a cause of action in relation to rights and interests in or over 
land and possibly other forms of property. The decisions of the High Court in 
Waltons Stores and Verwayen, however, remove any doctrinal distinction 
between promissory and proprietary estoppel in Australia. One result of that 
doctrinal unity is that equitable estoppel must be able to be used as a cause of 
action outside the proprietary estoppel context, and, indeed, subsequent cases 
show that equitable estoppel has not been so limited since those High Court 
decisions. A striking example is the recent case of W v G, in which Hodgson J 
granted relief on the basis of equitable estoppel where it was clear that no other 
cause of action was available.
The facts of W v G were as follows. The plaintiff and the defendant lived together 
in a lesbian relationship for more than eight years. Some years into the 
relationship, the plaintiff told the defendant that she wished to have children. The 
defendant assisted the plaintiff in a course of artificial insemination, as a result of 
which the plaintiff ultimately bore two children. Hodgson J found that the
161 Examples of prominent proprietary estoppel cases in which the estoppel itself must be 
regarded as the cause of action include: Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 ER 
1285; Flimmer v Wellington Corp (1884) 9 App Cas 699; Crabb v Arun District Council 
[1976] Ch 179; Greasley v Cook [1980] 1 WLR 1306; Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498;
Jackon v Crosby (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 280; Riches v Hogben [1986] 1 Qd R 315. Spencer 
Bower and Turner, above n 4, 303-6 argued that Flimmer v Wellington Corp could be 
explained as decided on an implied contract, and Dillwyn v Llewelyn as founded on an equity 
giving rise to a trust. They conceded, however, that the facts giving rise to an estoppel by 
acquiescence establish a cause of action without more, and in this respect estoppel by 
acquiescence differs from other estoppels.
162 [1981] 2 All ER 204.
163 (1996) 20 Farn LR 49. Another example is Lee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd 
(1991) 23 NSWLR 571, where a builder completed certain building works for a property owner 
in financial difficulties on the faith of a representation that the builder would be paid by the 
owner’s bank from the sale proceeds of the property. Brownie J held that an equitable estoppel 
arose against the bank in those circumstances, which prevented the bank from denying the
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defendant created or encouraged in the plaintiff an assumption that ‘the defendant 
would act with the plaintiff as parents of the two children, and would assist and 
contribute to the raising of these children for so long as was necessary. ’ 164 He 
held that the plaintiff relied on that assumption in deciding to have each of the 
children, and that the defendant knew or intended that the plaintiff would do so. 
Accordingly, Hodgson J held that the plaintiff was entitled to relief on the basis 
of equitable estoppel. 165
The case of W v G affords an instance of the granting of relief on the basis of 
equitable estoppel, outside the proprietary estoppel context, where it was clear 
that no cause of action was available to the plaintiff other than the estoppel itself. 
Hodgson J noted that counsel for the defendant relied on ‘obiter comments by 
Deane J in Commonwealth v Verwayen ... to the effect that estoppel may be used 
as a sword only where the claim is based on an independent cause of action 
arising under ordinary principles of law . ’ 166 Hodgson J did not explain why he 
was prepared to disregard those comments, but clearly did not see them as 
representing the law, since he granted relief to the plaintiff where no other cause 
of action arose.
3. Equitable Estoppel and Contract Law
A final aspect of equitable estoppel which must be mentioned by way of 
introduction is the relationship of the doctrine to contract law. Equitable 
estoppel can be said to be closely analogous to contract law in those cases 
where the estoppel gives legal force to a promise: the promisee’s reliance on 
the promise can be seen as providing a substitute for the valuable consideration 
required to give rise to contractual obligations. That is particularly so when, as 
is very often the case, the effect of the estoppel is that the promisor is made to
existence or the binding quality of its representation to the builder.
164 (1996) 20 Farn LR 49, 66.
15 The actual relief granted was an order that the defendant to pay the sum of $151,125 into an 
interest bearing account, which was then to be used to buy annuities for each child providing 
monthly payments until the child reached 18.
166 (1996) 20 Farn LR 49, 66.
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1 7fulfil the promise. It is therefore, necessary to consider the doctrinal basis of 
the equitable estoppel cases, and the extent to which those cases can be 
distinguished from contracts enforced on the basis of valuable consideration.
Paul Finn has examined in some detail the doctrinal basis of equity’s 
jurisdiction to make good representations. His analysis of the cases shows 
that the basis of the jurisdiction was quite unclear in the mid nineteenth century 
and, indeed, the adoption of the language of contract in many of the cases 
reveals considerable uncertainty in the minds of some of the judges as to the 
relationship of equitable principle to that of the common law.169 A good 
example of that confusion is the Lord Chancellor’s finding in Dillwyn v 
Llewelyn that, although the original promise was a gift, the promisee’s 
expenditure on the faith of it ‘supplied a valuable consideration and created a 
binding obligation.’ The basis of the jurisdiction remained unresolved at the
171beginning of this century in New South Wales. In Hamilton v Geraghty, 
Owen J observed that the interest in land which arose where the owner stood by 
while another mistakenly improved the land was ‘created either by contract or 
by estoppel.’172 Similarly, in 1931, the Privy Council suggested that the 
foundation of equity’s intervention in proprietary estoppel cases was ‘either 
contract or the existence of some fact which the legal owner is estopped from
• 17Tdenying.’
Confusion as to the boundary between proprietary estoppel and contract 
appears to have existed as recently as 1985 when, in Beaton v McDivitt,174 
Young J found that the parties had entered into a ‘Dillwyn v Llewelyn type 
contract.’175 The case was concerned with an unusual arrangement. The 
defendants expected their land to be rezoned in a way that would greatly
167 See below Chapter 7.
168 Finn, above n 83, 62-71.
169 Ibid 63-4.
170 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 ER 1285, 1287.
171 (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (Eq) 81.
172 Ibid 89.
173 Canadian Pacific Railway Co v The King [ 1931 ] AC 414, 429.
174 (1985) 13 NSWLR 134.
175 Ibid 152.
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increase the rates payable by them. Accordingly, they proposed to the plaintiff 
that, if he would work part of their land, they would transfer that part to him 
when the land was rezoned and subdivided. The plaintiff took possession of the 
land and worked it for some years, but neither the rezoning nor the transfer 
eventuated.
On those facts, Young J found that the plaintiff had provided no consideration 
in the form required by the High Court in Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v
i n/:
The Commonwealth. That is, there was no detriment suffered by the plaintiff, 
nor benefit conferred on the defendant, which could properly be regarded as the 
agreed price of the promise. The required relation of quid pro quo between the 
plaintiff’s acts and the promise did not exist. Nevertheless, Young J considered 
that the line of cases which have followed Dillwyn v Llewelyn represented ‘an 
exception to the modern requirement that a contract should be a bargain 
supported by consideration in the nature of a quid pro quo . ’ 177 On that basis, 
the plaintiff’s reliance on the promise to his detriment provided ex facto  
consideration for the promise and gave rise to a contract between the parties . 178
On appeal from the decision of Young J, a majority of the Court of Appeal 
refused to extend the bargain theory of consideration laid down by the High 
Court.179 Kirby P rejected the attempt to establish, on the basis of Dillwyn v 
Llewelyn, an exception to the bargain concept of consideration as 
‘unconceptual and unhistorical.’ Close analysis of the judgment in Dillwyn v 
Llewelyn, as Kirby P pointed out, suggests that the basis of the decision was
176 (1954) 92 CLR 424, 456-7 (Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). The doctrine 
of consideration laid down by the High Court in that case is virtually indistinguishable from the 
‘bargain theory’ of consideration applied in the United States. Section 75(1) of the Restatement 
of Contracts (2d) suggests that the US courts require consideration in the form of something 
‘bargained for and given in exchange for the promise’ in order to establish a contract.
177 Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162, 170 (Kirby P in the Court of Appeal).
178 (19 8 5) 13 NSWLR 134, 152.
179 (1987) 13 NSWLR 162, 170 (Kirby P), 182 (McHugh JA). In Waltons Stores (1988) 164 
CLR 387, 402, Mason CJ and Wilson J appeared to give their approval to a strict interpretation 
of the Australian Woollen Mills decision when they suggested that it ‘may be doubted whether 
our conception of consideration is substantially broader than the bargain theory’ developed in 
the United States. It should be noted that two members of the Court of Appeal in Beaton v 
McDivitt did find that the consideration requirement was satisfied on the facts: (1987) 13 
NSWLR 162, 175 (Mahoney JA), 183 (McHugh JA). Contra Kirby P, ibid 169.
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proprietary estoppel, rather than contract. 181 The approach taken by the Court of 
Appeal, therefore, clearly delineates the boundary between contract and 
equitable estoppel. A strict application of the bargain theory of consideration 
leaves equitable estoppel with exclusive application to gratuitous promises
i
which have been relied upon to the promisee’s detriment.
C. Unified Estoppels
A significant feature of the recent High Court decisions on estoppel by conduct 
has been the recognition by members of the High Court of a unification of the 
common law and equitable doctrines of estoppel by conduct. 183 Deane J in 
Waltons Stores, 184 Foran v Wight185 and Verwayen, ]S6 and Mason CJ in 
Verwayen, 187 recognised and applied unified principles of estoppel by conduct 
operating both at common law and in equity. Although Mason CJ and Deane J 
both recognised the unification of common law and equitable principles of 
estoppel by conduct, the unified principles they applied were fundamentally 
different. The unified doctrine recognised by Deane J was based on common law
180 Ibid 170.
181 Similarly, McHugh JA, ibid 182, held that ‘[t]he jurisprudential basis of cases such as 
Dillwyn v Llewelyn, in my opinion, is that Equity will not allow a person to insist upon his strict 
rights when it is unconscionable to do so’. Contra PS Atiyah, ‘Consideration: A Restatement’ 
in Essays on Contract (1986) 179, 211 -2; cf DE Allan, ‘An Equity to Perfect a Gift’ (1963) 79 
Law Quarterly Review 238, 243-6.
182 In Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 403, Mason CJ and Wilson J suggested that ‘there 
is an obvious interrelationship between the doctrines of consideration and promissory estoppel, 
promissory estoppel tending to occupy ground left vacant due to the constraints affecting 
consideration.’ See also AS Burrows, Contract, Tort and Restitution - A Satisfactory Division 
or Not?’ (1983) 99 Law Quarterly Review 217, 241.
183 The unification of the common law and equitable doctrines is clearly premised on the notion 
that it is appropriate for equity and the common law to constitute a single body of law, and 
represents a conscious attempt to allow the two bodies of principle to converge where 
appropriate, see: Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the 
Contemporary Common Law World’ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 238; Sir Anthony 
Mason, ‘Equity’s Role in the Twentieth Century’ (1997-8) King’s College Law Journal 1. It 
thus seems quite clear, as the Victorian Court of Appeal indicated in Riseda Nominees Pty Ltd v 
St Vincent’s Hospital (Melbourne) Ltd (Victorian Court of Appeal, Brooking, Callaway and 
Kenny JJA, 12 September 1997), that a unified doctrine can be achieved only by embracing a 
substantive fusion of law and equity of the type which Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 
25, 37-59, have famously dedicated themselves to exposing and rooting out in the interests of 
doctrinal purity.
184 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 451.
185 (1989) 168 CLR 385, 435.
186 (1990) 170 CLR 394,440.
187 Ibid 413.
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estoppel, and essentially extended the application of common law estoppel to 
assumptions relating to the future conduct of the representor. The unified doctrine 
recognised by Mason CJ, on the other hand, was based on the modem doctrine of 
equitable estoppel, and essentially involved the application of that doctrine to 
assumptions of existing fact.
A defining feature of the unified doctrine of estoppel by conduct recognised by 
Deane J was, as already noted, that it did not provide an independent cause of 
action. Such an approach to the unified doctrine flowed naturally from Justice 
Deane’s view that equitable estoppel, like common law estoppel, operated to 
establish a state of affairs by reference to which the rights of the parties were 
determined. Justice Deane’s unified doctrine is a broad doctrine of general 
application which operates where a representee has adopted an assumption of 
‘fact or law, present or future’, and has acted on the basis of the assumption so 
that he or she will be in a position of significant disadvantage if departure from 
the assumption is permitted. 188 The estoppel will arise against a person who has 
played such a part in the adoption of, or persistence of, the assumption, that it 
would be unconscionable to depart from it. The prima facie operation of the 
estoppel is to ‘fashion an assumed state of affairs’ by reference to which the 
rights of the parties are determined. As in the case of common law estoppel, 
that state of affairs may be relied on defensively, or aggressively, as the factual 
foundation of a cause of action arising under ordinary principles. 190
The prima facie entitlement to relief based on the assumed state of affairs will, 
Deane J said, be ‘qualified’ where such relief would ‘exceed what could be 
justified by the requirements of good conscience and would be unjust to the 
estopped party. ’ 191 In such cases, the court must frame relief ‘appropriate to do 
justice between the parties’ . 192 As observed above in connection with equitable 
estoppel, however, there is a conceptual difficulty in recognising that relief based
188 Ibid 444-5.
189 Ibid 445.
190 Ibid 444-5.
191 Ibid 445-6.
192 Ibid 446.
45
on the assumed state of affairs can be ‘qualified’, and some other relief 
substituted, where the estoppel itself does not constitute a cause of action. If 
estoppel by conduct does not itself provide a cause of action, but simply 
establishes the factual framework of an independent cause of action or defence, 
then it is difficult to see how the estoppel could govern the remedy granted to 
give effect to that cause of action or defence. There is also, as noted in the 
discussion of equitable estoppel above, a conceptual difficulty in applying a 
preclusionary doctrine to assumptions relating to the future conduct of the
193representor.
The unified doctrine recognised by Mason CJ in Verwayen could be raised in 
similar circumstances, but operated rather differently. That ‘one doctrine of 
estoppel’ operates where a representor has induced a representee to hold ‘an 
assumption as to a present, past or future state of affairs (including a legal state of 
affairs) ’ . 194 The estoppel arises where the representee has relied on that 
assumption, and allows a court of common law or equity to ‘do what is required, 
but not more,’ to prevent the representee from suffering detriment in reliance on 
the assumption as a result of the denial of its correctness. 195 The effect of the 
estoppel, then, is essentially the same as the doctrine of equitable estoppel: the 
estoppel raises an ‘equity’ in favour of the representee, which the court must 
satisfy by means of relief which does no more than prevent or reverse detriment 
resulting from the representee’s reliance. 196 The only differences between the 
unified doctrine recognised by Mason CJ and the equitable doctrine are: first, that 
the unified doctrine operates both at common law and in equity; and, secondly, 
that the unified doctrine clearly applies to assumptions of existing fact, as well as 
assumptions as to the legal rights of the parties and the future conduct of the 
representor.
93 It should be noted that, although Deane J said that estoppel by conduct does not itself 
constitute a cause of action, he did acknowledge, ibid 444, that it was ‘a doctrine of substantive 
law’ which could be ‘the origin of primary rights of property and of contract.’ It is difficult to see 
how a doctrine of substantive law, which is the origin of primary rights, can fall short of providing 
a cause of action.
194 Ibid 413. 
Ibid.
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It is clear from the above discussion that it is not strictly accurate t<o speak of a 
single unified doctrine, since two quite different doctrines have been proposed by 
Deane J and Mason CJ. The view that the doctrines of estoppel by conduct 
should be treated as unified in any form has not yet been accepted by a majority 
of the High Court. 197 Three members of the High Court in Verwayen proceeded 
on the basis that common law and equitable estoppel remained separate 
doctrines, 198 while at most three members of the court accepted the unification of 
those doctrines. 199 Accordingly, this thesis will deal with the common law and 
equitable doctrines of estoppel by conduct as separate doctrines, and will also 
consider, where appropriate, the unified doctrines of estoppel by conduct applied 
by Mason CJ and Deane J .200
II. THE FOCUS OF THE THESIS
Although this thesis is concerned with the philosophy of estoppel by conduct 
both at common law and in equity, the analysis will concentrate on equitable 
estoppel and the unified doctrines which have been proposed. There are several 
reasons why the questions of philosophy or guiding motive under consideration 
are more important issues in relation to equitable and unified estoppels. The 
principal reason is scope of application. Common law estoppel does not apply to 
assumptions relating to the future conduct of the representor, and operates in a 
limited way, by preventing the representor from denying the existence of facts or 
rights.
196 Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 432-3 (Brennan J).
197 See, eg: Lorimer v State Bank o f New South Wales (New South Wales Court of Appeal, 
Kirby P, Priestley JA and Handley JA, 5 July 1991), where Kirby P observed that since ‘no 
clear majority has yet emerged in the High Court for a unified doctrine of estoppel and no 
holding of that Court so requires, this Court should for the moment observe the established 
distinction between common law estoppel in pais and equitable estoppel’.
198 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 428-9 (Brennan J), 453-4 (Dawson J), 500-1 (McHugh J).
199 Gaudron J may also have accepted the existence of a unified doctrine of estoppel. In obiter 
remarks, ibid 487, she noted her agreement with Mason CJ ‘that the substantive doctrine o f  
estoppel permits a court to do what is required to avoid detriment and does not, in every case, 
require the making good of the assumption’ (emphasis added).
200 The significant differences between the two unified doctrines proposed require them to be 
considered separately, particularly in relation to the question of remedy in Chapter 7.
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Equitable estoppel and unified estoppels, on the other hand, can apply to 
assumptions relating to the future conduct of the representor. As a consequence, 
they do not simply establish a legal or factual state of affairs,201 but operate to 
create independent substantive rights. As substantive doctrines, the equitable and 
unified doctrines are of considerably more theoretical interest, because the 
remedial effect of the doctrines is an open question. The courts must therefore 
consider the most appropriate way in which to give effect to the doctrines. The 
theoretical interest of equitable and unified estoppels is enhanced by the fact that 
they can, and often do, have the effect of enforcing promises. Difficult questions 
therefore arise as to their place within the law of obligations, and their 
relationship to the law of contract.
A second reason for the greater importance of philosophical questions in 
equitable estoppel is that estoppel in equity is currently in the process of 
transformation from a number of principles of limited application to a broad, 
substantive doctrine which is capable of providing remedies in an extremely wide 
range of situations. As this thesis will show, that process of transformation is not 
complete: there remain several important aspects of the doctrine which remain 
unresolved. The principles of common law estoppel, on the other hand, have been 
quite stable for some years, save for the question whether the common law 
doctrine should be unified with its equitable counterpart.
Although the theoretical questions are of greater significance in relation to the 
equitable doctrine, a consideration of the philosophy of estoppel by conduct must 
take common law estoppel into account. That is because close analysis of the 
cases reveals fundamental similarities between common law and equitable 
estoppel, and a number of important areas in which the principles of common law 
estoppel have influenced the development of the equitable doctrine. An important 
theme in this thesis is the commonality of purpose between equitable and 
common law estoppel. That commonality of purpose provides both a rationale for 
unification of the two sets of principles, as well as a basis for resolving the 
differences between them. It is under the banner of reliance that the two sets of
201 Cf Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 445 (Deane J).
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principles can best be brought together. The consideration in this thesis of the 
central questions of liability and remedy will show that the reliance-based 
philosophy of common law estoppel has been adopted and applied in the equity 
cases to give the equitable doctrines of proprietary and promissory estoppel a 
unity of purpose and of operation. The application of principles of common law 
estoppel in the equity cases shows that the integration of common law and 
equitable principle in these areas is already well advanced.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
As noted above, the approach to be taken in this thesis is first to identify the 
philosophies by which the principles of estoppel by conduct can be argued to 
operate, and then to consider the extent to which those philosophies are 
manifested in the essential principles relating to liability and remedy. The three 
competing purposes or philosophies of estoppel will be examined in Chapter 2. 
The first of those philosophies is reliance theory, which is based on the notion 
that equitable estoppel is essentially concerned with protecting against harm 
resulting from reliance on the conduct of others. Reliance theory focuses on the 
position of the representee. The second theory to be examined is conscience 
theory, under which estoppels are seen as doctrines which operates, or should 
operate, primarily by reference to the notion of unconscionability. Conscience 
theory focuses on the knowledge and conduct of the representor. The third 
philosophy of estoppel to be examined is promise theory, under which 
estoppels are seen as doctrines essentially concerned with the enforcement of 
promises, which should be seen as, or adapted to become, part of the law of 
contract. Promise theory focuses on the nature of the representor’s promise or 
commitment.
Chapters 3-7 will then examine in detail the essential principles by which the 
doctrines of estoppel by conduct operate. That examination will reveal tensions 
between the various philosophies in the way in which the doctrinal requirements 
are framed. In other words, it will show that there are various points in the 
determination of questions of liability and remedy at which a choice must be
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made between the various philosophies. First, Chapter 3 will examine the 
threshold requirement which must be satisfied in order to make out an estoppel at 
common law or in equity. The threshold requirement essentially involves a 
choice between an ‘induced assumption’ and a particular type of conduct, such as 
a representation or a promise, as the basis of the estoppel.
The fourth chapter will examine the ‘detrimental reliance’ requirement: in other 
words, the requirement that the representee must act or refrain from acting on the 
basis of the assumption such that detriment will be suffered if the assumption is 
not adhered to. Chapter 5 will consider the ‘reasonableness’ requirement: the 
requirement that the representee must act reasonably in adopting and acting on 
the relevant assumption. That requirement will be contrasted with the 
requirement in the United States that the representor must reasonably expect 
reliance.
One of the important questions remaining unresolved in the wake of the recent 
High Court decisions on equitable estoppel is whether, in addition to the core 
elements outlined above (assumption, inducement and reasonable detrimental 
reliance), the representee must also show that it would, in the circumstances, be 
unconscionable for the representor to depart from the relevant assumption. The 
‘unconscionability’ requirement will be examined in Chapter 6. As that chapter 
will show, the unconscionability question is essentially concerned with the 
representor’s knowledge of the representee’s detrimental reliance.
Having considered all of the fundamental questions relating to establishing an 
estoppel, the important question of remedy will then be addressed in Chapter 7. 
That examination will show that the question of remedy can be approached in 
accordance with any of the three contending philosophies outlined in Chapter 2: 
remedies can be determined on a reliance-basis, a conscience-basis or a promise 
basis. The choice between the three approaches is thus an important one for the 
philosophy of estoppel.
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The analysis of questions of liability and remedy in Chapters 3-7 will then be 
drawn together in Chapter 8, which will highlight the conflicts between the 
various philosophies in the formulation of the doctrinal requirements. Chapter 8 
will show that those conflicts have in most cases been resolved, and are best 
resolved, in favour of a reliance-based approach. Chapter 8 will show that, 
although there is some equivocation between the different philosophies of 
estoppel, reliance theory best characterises the approach taken by the courts. 
Accordingly, the principles of estoppel are best seen as part of the law of wrongs, 
creating a duty to ensure that others do not suffer harm as a result of reliance on 
one’s conduct.
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Chapter 2
THE COMPETING PHILOSOPHIES OF ESTOPPEL*
The aim of this chapter is to outline, for the purposes of the analysis to follow, the 
contending theories or philosophies which appear to underlie the principles of 
estoppel by conduct. The discussion is primarily concerned with the philosophies 
of the Australian doctrines of common law and equitable estoppel, and the 
unified doctrines which have been proposed. It will, however, draw on 
discussions of the doctrines of estoppel operating in England and the United 
States. Although there are important differences between these doctrines, many 
insights can be gained from a comparison of their respective philosophies and 
modes of operation. Because of the great differences between the various 
doctrines of estoppel operating in the common law world, it is also appropriate to 
consider in the abstract what the philosophy of a doctrine of estoppel might be: 
what purpose it might serve, and how it might be shaped to achieve that purpose.
The three contending philosophies of estoppel to be explored in this chapter are 
reliance theory, conscience theory and promise theory. Those theories can be 
viewed in a number of different ways. First, they can be seen as simply 
expressing coexisting and complementary purposes of estoppel. The three 
purposes of a doctrine of estoppel could be said to be: first, protecting 
representees against the detrimental consequences of reliance on the conduct of 
representors; secondly, preventing unconscionable conduct by representors; and, 
thirdly, enforcing certain promises and representations. A comprehensive view of 
the purpose of equitable estoppel in Australia, for example, is that the doctrine is 
designed to protect against harm resulting from reliance and to prevent 
unconscionable conduct by enforcing promises and making good representations 
which have been relied upon. With some exceptions and many differences in 
emphasis, it can be said that such a pluralistic view of the purpose of equitable 
estoppel has prevailed in the cases and commentary in Australia since the High
* Parts of this chapter have been published in Towards a Unifying Purpose for Estoppel’
(1996) 22 Monash University Law Review 1-29 and ‘Situating Equitable Estoppel Within the
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Court’s decision in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher} As the following 
three chapters will show, however, a pluralistic view of the purpose of a doctrine 
of estoppel is untenable. A doctrine cannot pursue all three purposes 
simultaneously because, as this thesis will show, there are several important 
points in the determination of liability and remedy at which the various purposes 
conflict.* 12 Accordingly, a choice must be made between them, and one purpose 
emphasised at the expense of the others.
As Richard Wright has argued in relation to theories of tort law, a pluralistic 
theory suffers from a surfeit of reasons and norms.3 The problem he identifies in 
a pluralistic approach to tort theory is that:
when in a particular situation two or more of the pluralistic norms conflict 
- which will usually be the case - the theory will be normatively, 
descriptively and analytically arbitrary and indeterminate in terms of 
specifying which competing norm(s) should predominate, unless there is 
a some foundational norm that can resolve the conflict between the 
competing subnorms. Yet if such a foundational norm exists, the theory at 
its deepest level is monistic rather than pluralistic.4
That problem applies equally to a pluralistic theory of estoppel. There are several 
points at which one must choose between the reliance-based, conscience-based 
and promise-based philosophies.5 Accordingly a ‘monistic foundational theory’6 
must be developed to resolve the conflicts between the contending theories.
Law of Obligations’ (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 32-64.
1 (1988) 164 CLR 387 ( ‘Waltons Stores').
2 The principal conflicts between the three philosophies lie in the areas of the threshold 
requirement (discussed in Chapter 3 below), the way in which reliance is tested (discussed in 
Chapter 4 below), the reasonableness requirement (discussed in Chapter 5 below), the role of 
unconscionability and the knowledge requirement (discussed in Chapter 6 below) and in the 
way in which relief is determined (discussed in Chapter 7 below).
3 Richard Wright, ‘Right, Justice and Tort Law’ in David Owen (ed), Philospophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (1995) 159, 160.
4 Ibid.
5 Robert Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law (1997) 43-77 advocates a pluralistic theory of
promissory estoppel in the United States on the basis that judges pay close attention to both 
promise and reliance and ‘because the normative significance of both principles leave little 
reason to promote one and demote the other.’ Hillman does not, however, address the crucial
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The second way of looking at the contending tlheories of estoppel, then, is to see 
them as alternative philosophies. That approach will be taken in this chapter: the 
different purposes of estoppel will be presemted as separate theories, on the 
assumption that they are alternatives. That asssumption will be justified in the 
chapters to follow, which will reveal the tensions between the different 
philosophies and will show why a doctrine of (estoppel must favour one purpose 
over the others. Approaching the contending theories as alternatives has been 
more common in academic discussion of estoppel in England and the United
n
States, where different writers have cletarly supported reliance-based, 
conscience-based8 or promise-based9 theories of estoppel, either expressly or 
implicitly disapproving of competing theoriefs. Different commentators have, 
however, supported those theories in differenit ways. Some writers support a 
particular theory from a purposive point of wiew, suggesting that the theory 
expresses the essential or fundamental purpose; of a doctrine of estoppel. Others 
support a theory from an analytical point of view, suggesting that a doctrine 
operates according to a particular theory, withiout necessarily suggesting that it 
should so operate. Others make a normative ckaim that a doctrine would operate 
best according to a particular theory. Most wrriters make some combination of 
purposive, analytical and normative claims. 110 This chapter is concerned to 
examine all three aspects of the theories of estoppel by conduct: purposive, 
analytical and normative.
question of how to resolve the doctrinal conflicts that intevitably arise between the two norms.
6 Wright, above n 3.
7 Nicholas McBride, ‘A Fifth Common Law Obligation’ (1994) 14 Legal Studies 35; Michael 
Metzger and Michael Phillips, ‘The Emergence of Promiissory Estoppel as an Independent 
Theory of Recovery’ (1983) 35 Rutgers Law Review 4172.
8 Margaret Halliwell, ‘Estoppel: Unconscionability as a «Cause of Action’ (1994) 14 Legal 
Studies 15.
9 AS Burrows, ‘Contract, Tort and Restitution - A Satisfactory Division or Not?’ (1983) 99 Law 
Quarterly Review 217, 262; Randy Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 
Columbia Law Review 269; Edward Yorio and Steve Thiel, ‘The Promissory Basis of Section 
90’ (1991) 101 Yale Law Journal 111; PS Atiyah, An Imtroduction to the Law of Contract (5th 
ed, 1995) 27-34; Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern La\w: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 
University of Western Ausralia Law Review 1, 63-4; Elizabeth Cooke, ‘Estoppel and the 
Protection of Expectations’ (1997) 17 Legal Studies 2581.
10 As Tom Campbell, ‘Liberalism and the Law of Contraict’ in Alan Gamble (ed), Obligations 
in Context (1990) 111, 111 has noted in relation to theorries of contract, the various theories of 
estoppel ‘are regularly claimed to capture the essential Logic of existing bodies of legal rules 
and principles as well as to point the way towards desiraible developments... The attempt to 
combine explanatory and justificatory enterprises [makeis] for serious equivocation between the 
“is” and the “ought” within the contending theories’.
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This thesis leaves out of account two normative schools of thought which have 
been advanced in relation to promissory estoppel in the United States: relational 
contract theory and law and economic theory. Relational contract theory, founded 
on the work of Ian Macneil, 11 is based on the idea that contract law should be 
concerned with the relationships between parties dealing with one another, rather 
than assuming that all exchanges are discrete transactions. Jay Feinman has 
argued that a relational approach should replace both traditional contract doctrine 
and promissory estoppel in the United States. 12 A number of commentators in the 
United States have also argued that the doctrine of promissory estoppel should be 
reformed in the interests of economic efficiency. 13 On the assumption that the 
goal of the law is to promote economic efficiency, they have advocated new tests 
for determining liability and remedy in estoppel which will, they claim, 
encourage more efficient behaviour. Both of those approaches are strictly 
normative, rather than analytical: they propose radical change on the basis of a 
new normative framework, and do not assist in an understanding of how 
promissory estoppel operates. For that reason, they cannot logically be considered 
alongside reliance, conscience and promise-based theories, which principally 
seek to provide an understanding of how estoppels operate, and for the most part 
advocate change only in the form of a shift in emphasis. Accordingly, they will 
not be discussed further in this thesis.
I. RELIANCE THEORY
Reliance theory is based on the notion that the principal objective of estoppel 
by conduct is to protect representees from harm caused by reliance on the 
conduct of representors, when representors depart from the assumptions induced
11 Ian Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ (1983) 78 Northwestern University 
Law Review 340.
12 Jay Feinman, ‘The Last Promissory Estoppel Article’ (1992) 61 Fordham Law Review 303.
13 Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 1261; Daniel Färber and John Matheson, ‘Beyond 
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake’” (1985) 52 University of 
Chicago Law Review 903; Avery Katz, ‘When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of 
Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 1249.
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by their conduct. 14 Support for this purpose of estoppel can be found in 
statements of several Australian judges and commentators, although it is 
important to note that, in the case of the equitable doctrine at least, such 
support is not generally exclusive of the other purposes discussed below. In 
Australia, protecting against the detrimental consequences of reliance is usually 
supported as one of the purposes of equitable estoppel, along with the 
prevention of unconscionable conduct. It is not generally presented as the 
fundamental purpose around which the doctrine is or should be organised, or as 
a foundational norm to which recourse can be had in the event of conflict 
between the various sub-norms operating in estoppel.
A. Judicial Support
The notion that the purpose of a principle of estoppel is to prevent harm resulting 
from reliance on the conduct of others has its origins in the common law, and has 
only recently been adopted in the equity cases. Extremely influential in this 
regard have been the judgments of Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer 5 and Grundt 
v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd , 16 and particularly Justice Dixon’s statement 
in the latter case that the ‘basal purpose’ of the doctrine of estoppel in pais ‘is to 
avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel’ . 17 That statement 
has been invoked more recently by the High Court, not only as a ‘classical 
statement’ of the doctrine of estoppel in pais, but as the basis of both the 
common law and equitable doctrines of estoppel. 19 Brennan J said in Waltons 
Stores that the basic object of equitable estoppel, like the object of estoppel in 
pais, was the avoidance of the detriment occasioned by the conduct of the party 
against whom the estoppel is raised.20 Similarly, in Commonwealth v Verwayen,
14 This approach to promissory estoppel in the United States was described as ‘reliance theory’, 
and its adherents as ‘reliance theorists’ by Yorio and Thel, above n 9, esp at 112-5. A detailed 
analysis of the reliance theory of promissory estoppel in the United States is provided by 
Hillman, above n 5, 48-60.
15 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 529-49.
16 (1937) 59 CLR 641, 660-682.
17 Ibid 674.
18 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 430 (Mason and Deane JJ); Waltons Stores (1988) 164 
CLR 387, 414 (Brennan J).
19 Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 501 (McHugh J).
20 Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 421 & 423.
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Mason CJ said that ‘the fundamental purpose of all estoppels [is] to afford 
protection against the detriment which would flow from a party’s change of 
position if the assumption that led to it were deserted’ .21 There is, therefore, 
strong judicial support for the proposition that the fundamental purpose of 
estoppel by conduct, both in equity and at common law, is to prevent a person 
from suffering detriment as a result of reliance on the conduct of another. As will 
be seen below, however, the object of preventing unconscionable conduct has 
received equally strong support from the same judges in relation to the equitable 
doctrine.
An important feature of reliance theory as the basis of a doctrine of estoppel is 
that it serves to distinguish that doctrine from the law of contract. In developing 
the principles of estoppel in Australia, the United States and in England, the 
courts have been careful to preserve the law of contract. The courts have sought 
to ensure that the recognition of reliance based doctrines of estoppel does not ‘cut 
the doctrine of consideration up by the roots’, as Holmes J famously warned in 
Commonwealth v Scituate Savings Bank 22 A desire to preserve the law of
23contract is evident in the decision of the House of Lords in Jorden v Money. 
Their Lordships’ finding that an estoppel could not arise out of an expression of 
future intention, and must be based on a representation of existing fact, appears to 
have been based in large part on a desire to draw a clear distinction between the 
law of contract and the principle of estoppel. That influence is particularly 
evident in the judgment of the Lord Cranworth LC .24
A desire to protect the principles of contract law is also evident in the 
development of promissory estoppel. In formulating the nascent principle of 
promissory estoppel in Combe v Combe, Denning LJ observed that, since
21 (1990) 170 CLR 394,410 ( ‘Verwayen’).
22 1 37 Mass 301, 302 (1884), quoted in Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 400 (Mason CJ 
and Wilson J).
23 (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868.
24 Ibid 882. Mark Lunney, ‘Jorden v Money— A Time for Reappraisal?’ (1994) 68 Australian 
Law Journal 559, 562, has also observed that Lord Cranworth’s judgment is ‘permeated by a 
desire to defend the principle that the right to rely on an expression of future intention could 
only be enforced through contract.’ Similarly in Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App Cas 467, 
473, Lord Selborne LC said: ‘The doctrine of estoppel by representation is applicable only to 
representations as to some state of facts alleged to be at the time actually in existence, and not 
to promises defuturo, which, if binding at all, must be binding as contracts’.
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promissory estoppel never stands alone as giving a cause of action in itself, the 
principle could never do away with the doctrine of consideration. The doctrine 
of consideration was, he said, ‘too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a side-wind’, 
although principles such as promissory estoppel had largely mitigated its ill- 
effects of late.26 When, in Waltons Stores, Mason CJ and Wilson J extended the 
principle of promissory estoppel to allow it to be used to enforce a gratuitous 
promise in the absence of a pre-existing legal relationship, they were mindful of 
the objection that the enforcement of such a promise might ‘outflank the 
principles of the law of contract. ’27
The perceived need to avoid encroachment into the territory of contract has, 
therefore, been an important influence on the development of both common law 
and equitable estoppel. One aspect of that influence in recent decisions of the 
High Court has been the emphasis which some judges have placed on the reliance 
basis of equitable estoppel, as a means of distinguishing the doctrine from 
contract.28 The protection of reliance can be seen as a legitimate purpose for a 
doctrine of estoppel which operates in relation to promises, as equitable estoppel 
does in Australia, because protecting reliance is not usually seen as the primary 
purpose of contract.29 Having the protection of reliance, through the avoidance of 
detriment, as the purpose of equitable estoppel legitimises that doctrine by 
distancing it from the enforcement of promises and the fulfilment of expectations, 
which can remain the exclusive province of the law of contract.
25 [1951] 2 KB 215,220.
26 Ibid.
27 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 400. Adam Duthie, ‘Equitable Estoppel, Unconscionability and the 
Enforcement of Promises’ (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 362, 366 has noted that the 
concern with avoiding harm has allowed the emergence of a doctrine of equitable estoppel 
which has been shorn of the limitation that the promise must relate to enforceable rights, but 
which is nevertheless compatible with the law of contract.
28 See, for example, Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387,423-4 (Brennan J); Verwayen (1990) 
170 CLR 394, 455 (Dawson J).
29 The notion that the enforcement of promises is the essential rationale of contract law will be 
discussed below under heading III. PROMISE THEORY.
30 Thus, in Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 423, Brennan J said that if the object of avoiding 
detriment ‘is kept steadily in mind, the concern that a general application of the principle of 
equitable estoppel would make non-contractual promises enforceable as contractual promises can 
be allayed.’
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As well as differentiating equitable estoppel from the law of contract, reliance 
theory also allows equitable estoppel to be reconciled with the law of contract, so 
that the two bases of liability can comfortably exist side by side. Under reliance 
theory, contract and equitable estoppel can be seen as mirror images of one 
another in terms of their respective philosophies, modes of operation and effects. 
While contract is essentially concerned with the enforcement of promises, it will 
usually incidentally protect the promisee from harm resulting from reliance, and 
will occasionally operate only to prevent such harm, rather than enforcing the 
promise.31 Similarly, while equitable estoppel is, according to reliance theory, 
essentially concerned with protecting reliance, it can often do so only by 
enforcing promises.32 Protecting reliance is not the principal purpose of enforcing 
a contract, but is commonly an effect, and occasionally the only effect, of doing 
so; similarly, enforcing promises is not the purpose of equitable estoppel, but is a 
common by-product of its application. A reliance-based doctrine of promissory 
estoppel, therefore, sits comfortably alongside the law of contract and, 
importantly, does not do the same work as contract under a different name.33
B. Academic Support
While there is some support in the recent Australian commentary for the 
proposition that one of the purposes of equitable estoppel is to protect against the 
detrimental consequences of reliance,34 commentators have given far greater
n c
emphasis to the purpose of preventing unconscionable conduct. While reliance 
has tended to play a more subordinate role in the English courts than it has in the 
Australian courts, there is rather more support in the English commentary for 
reliance as the basis of equitable estoppel. Most famously, Patrick Atiyah has
31 See, eg, McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377; 
Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64.
32 See Chapter 7 below.
33 Paul Perell, The Fusion of Law and Equity (1990) 100, suggests that ‘by limiting and 
defining the territory of operation of estoppel, the element of detriment may promote the 
peaceful co-existence of estoppel with the principle that, to be enforceable, promises should be 
supported by consideration.’
34 JW Carter and DJ Harland, Contract Law in Australia (3rd ed, 1996) 132, for example, note 
that a ‘significant feature’ of estoppel is that it protects a person from the injurious 
consequences of reliance.
35 See below, n 128 and accompanying text.
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argued that both common law estoppel and promissory estoppel, ‘no matter how 
they are conceptualized, provide many illustrations of what can only be rationally 
regarded as reliance-based liability.’36 Hugh Collins has agreed that the English 
equitable estoppel cases can be seen to be based on a reliance model of contract, 
the purpose of which is to compensate for losses suffered as a result of 
‘misplaced reliance’ on the conduct of others.37 The notion of reliance can govern 
both liability and remedy under such a model. In the establishment of liability, the 
relevant harm is identified as detriment suffered as result of reliance on the words 
or conduct of the representor. In the determination of relief, the principal aim of 
such a model is restorative, to put the party who has suffered loss back in the
T O
position enjoyed prior to the acts of reliance. Nicholas McBride has also argued 
that equitable estoppel is essentially concerned with protecting reliance.39 
McBride argues that the doctrines of equitable estoppel recognised in England 
and Australia, and the doctrine of promissory estoppel recognised in the United 
States, are manifestations of an ‘as yet undefined’ duty to prevent detrimental 
reliance on a promise.40
Protecting promisees against the consequences of their reliance on promises is 
also a popular justification for promissory estoppel in the United States under s 
90 of the Restatement of Contracts (2d).41 Indeed, it has been suggested that
36 PS Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ in Essays on Contract (1986) 
21 .
37 Hugh Collins, The Law o f Contract (2nd ed, 1993) 84. Collins’ characterisation of a 
successful representee’s reliance as ‘misplaced’ is not entirely appropriate: the representee’s 
reliance can be said to be misplaced in the sense that it has ultimately been disappointed, but it 
is clearly not misplaced if it is reasonable in the circumstances and will be legally protected. As 
Chapter 5 will show, reliance which is misplaced in the sense of being unreasonable will not be 
protected.
38 Collins, ibid. Collins argues that the restorative theory of estoppel fails to account for the fact 
that the courts use the reliance theory of liability to enforce promises, and thereby put the 
person who has relied in a better position than he or she was originally. In other words, he 
suggests that reliance governs liability, but not remedy. This argument will be dealt with in 
Chapter 8.
39 McBride, above n 7, 45-50.
40 McBride’s characterisation of the duty created by equitable estoppel will be discussed in 
Chapter 8.
41 Section 90(1) provides that:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
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‘most commentators’ in the United States ‘hold that the objective of Section 90 is 
to protect promisees from loss caused by reliance on a promise’.42 A reliance 
basis for promissory estoppel in the United States has been supported in a 
number of different ways. Warren Seavey characterises promissory estoppel as 
based on the wrong of inducing detrimental reliance. He suggests that ‘[t]he 
wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the promised reward but in 
causing the plaintiff to change position to his detriment.’43 Warren Shattock, on 
the other hand, supports reliance theory from a purposive point of view, 
suggesting that ‘[t]he reason for allowing the gratuitous promisee an action is his 
injury through reliance and not the promisor’s act of promising.’44 Similarly, 
promissory estoppel is characterised by Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips as 
an independent theory of recovery or cause of action, the essential purpose of 
which is to protect a promisee’s reliance 45
It is important to note at this stage that support for reliance theory as the basis 
of promissory estoppel in the United States may be somewhat overstated. Three 
aspects of the doctrine articulated in s 90 cast doubt on the notion that the 
doctrine is organised primarily around the notion of reliance. First, the principle 
only operates where a representee relies on a promise, it does not create liability 
for simply causing another person to change his or her position to his or her 
detriment.46 Secondly, the doctrine is also limited in its application to situations 
in which the promisor should reasonably expect detrimental reliance by the 
promisee.47 Thirdly, the prima facie operation of the doctrine is to render the 
promise binding, rather than to relieve against the detrimental consequences of 
reliance.48 It can, therefore, be said to be slightly artificial to focus on reliance
42 Yorio and Thel, above n 9, 112.
43 Warren Seavey, ‘Reliance on Gratuitous Promises and Other Conduct’ (1951) 64 Harvard 
Law Review 913, 926.
44 Warren Shattuck, ‘Gratuitous Promisees - A New Writ?’ (1937) 35 Michigan Law Review 
908, 944.
45 Metzger and Phillips, above n 7, 536-43.
46 The distinction between the US threshold requirement of a ‘promise’ and the Australian 
threshold requirement of an ‘induced assumption’ will be discussed in Chapter 3.
47 The distinction between the ‘reasonable expectation of reliance’ test under s 90 and the 
‘reasonableness of reliance’ approach followed in Australia will be discussed in Chapter 5.
48 The distinction between the promise-based approach to remedy adopted in the US and the 
Australian reliance-based approach will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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as the basis of the United States doctrine. As with Australian estoppel, 
however, the question of philosophy is one of emphasis: one of the central 
questions to be addressed by this thesis is whether the various doctrinal rules 
relating to estoppel, when taken together, reveal a particular philosophical 
direction or fundamental purpose which the courts are pursuing.
C. Reliance Theory in Practice
As well as characterising the purpose of estoppel, reliance theory also 
characterises a mode by which a doctrine of estoppel can operate in order to fulfil 
that purpose. Logically, there should be a correlation between the purpose of a 
legal doctrine and the way in which it operates; otherwise the doctrine may not 
fulfil its purpose, may do so only obliquely, or may lack coherence. If the 
essential purpose of an estoppel is to prevent detriment being suffered by the 
representee as a result of his or her reliance on the representor’s conduct, then 
that purpose can best be pursued if the doctrine is primarily concerned with the 
nature and circumstances of the representee’s reliance. A reliance-based doctrine 
of estoppel would, therefore, operate primarily by reference to the concept of 
detrimental reliance, looking to the nature and circumstances of the representee’s 
reliance, and the extent of detriment suffered as a result of that reliance, in order 
to determine questions of both liability and remedy.
Common law estoppel has operated for some time as a reliance-based doctrine. 
The notion that estoppel was primarily concerned with the position of the 
representee was pioneered by the Privy Council in Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal 
Chunder Laha,49 The Judicial Committee made it clear in that case that the 
determining element in the creation of an estoppel is the representee’s reliance, 
and accordingly the court’s focus is primarily on the position of the representee: 
‘What the law and the Indian Statute [adopting it] mainly regard is the position of 
the person who was induced to act’ .50 That focus on reliance was emphasised in 
the early decisions of the High Court of Australia on common law estoppel.
49 (1892) LR 19 Ind App 203.
50 Ibid 215.
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Those cases did not require proof of wilful conduct on the part of the representor, 
nor did they require proof that the representor had knowledge of the representee’s 
detrimental reliance. The reliance basis of common law estoppel was emphasised 
in the purpose of the doctrine and its operation, both of which focussed on the 
position of the representee, to the exclusion of the representor.51 Dixon J in 
Thompson v Palmer held that ‘[t]he very foundation of the estoppel is the change 
of position to the prejudice of the party relying upon it.’52 Similarly, in Craine v 
Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd, Isaacs J distinguished common law 
estoppel from waiver by means of the fact that estoppel ‘looks chiefly at the 
situation of the person relying on the estoppel’, with the consequence that ‘the 
knowledge of the person sought to be estopped is immaterial.’53
Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, has not traditionally operated by reference 
to the representee’s reliance, but has focussed instead on the intention, knowledge 
and conduct of the representor. That emphasis is attributable to the origins of 
equitable estoppel in equitable fraud, and the traditional role of the Court of 
Chancery as a court of conscience. The doctrinal manifestations of that 
orientation in the early cases will be examined in discussion of the 
unconscionability requirement in Chapter 6. It is, however, important to note here 
that the modem rationale of protecting against harm resulting from reliance 
clearly has its origin in the common law estoppel cases. That rationale has only 
been adopted comparatively recently in the equity cases in Australia, as a result of 
the influence of the judgments of Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer5A and Grundt v 
Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd55 on the Supreme Court of South Australia in 
Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia,56 and subsequently on the High Court in 
Waltons Stores and Vem>ayen.
51 Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641, 674 (Dixon J): ‘the basal 
purpose of the doctrine ... is to avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel’.
52 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 549.
53 (1920) 28 CLR 305 ,327 .
54 (1933) 49 CLR 507.
55 (1937) 59 CLR 641.
56 (1980) 26 SASR 101, especially at 106, where King CJ found that the basic principle 
underlying both common law estoppel in pais and promissory estoppel was the injustice of 
departing from a promise or representation which has been relied upon to the detriment of the 
representee.
57 (1988) 164 CLR 387.
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In those decisions, equitable estoppel has become more focussed on reliance in 
the determination of questions of both liability and remedy. The move towards a 
reliance basis for equitable estoppel brings equitable estoppel closer to common 
law estoppel in terms of both purpose and operation. The strengthening of the 
reliance framework of equitable estoppel can thus be seen as a unifying force, 
bringing the two sets of principles closer together, and perhaps facilitating their 
eventual merger. Those goals have repeatedly been articulated in the High 
Court.59
In any doctrine of estoppel, the focus on the representee’s reliance cannot be 
exclusive. The nature of an estoppel ‘by conduct’ requires at least some threshold 
of conduct on the part of the representor, by which he or she is ultimately 
estopped. Using the language of tort law, neither common law nor equitable 
estoppel by conduct imposes strict liability. Both involve a notion of fault on the 
part of the representor, and that fault must flow from an act or omission of the 
representor. As the English Court of Appeal has said: ‘All estoppels must involve 
some statement or conduct by the party alleged to be estopped on which the 
alleged representee was entitled to rely and did rely. ’60 Whether a doctrine of 
estoppel is plaintiff-focussed or defendant-focussed is, therefore, a question of 
degree. As the following five chapters will show, however, there are a number of 
crucial points in the determination of questions of liability and remedy which can 
be resolved either by reference to the representee or the representor, allowing 
considerable scope for a doctrine to operate essentially by reference to one party 
or the other.
58 (1990) 170 CLR 394.
59 Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 447-53 (Deane J); Foran v Wight (1989) 168 CLR 385, 
411 (Mason CJ), 435-6 (Deane J); Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 409-13 (Mason CJ), 440-5 
(Deane J), 471 (Toohey J).
60 K Lokumal & Sons (London) Ltd v Lotte Shipping Co Pte [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 28, 34-5.
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D. Reliance Theory as a Tort Rationale
At the basis of reliance theory are the related goals of providing protection 
against anticipated harm, and providing compensation for harm suffered. A 
reliance-based estoppel can be said to be based on a duty to prevent harm being 
suffered, as a result of reliance on one’s conduct, when one departs from an 
assumption induced by that conduct. Estoppels enforce that duty in two different 
ways: in some cases by forcing the representor to act in accordance with the 
representee’s expectations,61 and in others by ordering the representor to repair or 
compensate a loss suffered by the representee as a result of his or her reliance on 
the representor’s conduct. “ Viewed in another way, a court can (ex ante) prevent 
the representor from committing an anticipated breach of duty or can (ex post) 
order the representor to correct or compensate a breach of duty. The two norms 
on which a reliance-based theory of estoppel is founded, protection against 
anticipated harm and compensation for harm suffered, could be said to be 
grounded in Aristotle’s notion of corrective justice ,63 which recognises a duty to 
repair the wrongful losses for which one is responsible.64 In the first case the 
representor’s freedom of action is constrained in order to protect the representee 
from harm ;65 in the second, the representor is required to pay for the loss suffered 
by the representee as a result of the representor’s breach of duty.
61 Common law estoppel by conduct invariably enforces the duty in this way, since the effect of 
an estoppel at common law is to hold the representor to the assumption the representee has been 
induced to adopt. Equitable estoppel also regularly enforces the duty in this way, as Chapter 7 
will show, because in many cases the only way to prevent the representee from suffering harm 
as a result of reliance on the representor’s conduct is to force the representor to act in 
accordance with the representee’s expectations. See, eg: Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 
333, 381-5 (Ormiston J).
62 The duty was enforced in this way in The Public Trustee, as Administrator of the Estate of 
Percy Henry Williams (dec’d) v Wadley (Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Wright, 
Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 27 June 1997). The representee in that case performed certain 
services on the faith of her father’s promise that he would leave his house to her on her death. 
When the father died intestate, the trustee of his estate was ordered to compensate or repair the 
loss suffered by the representee by payment of a sum of money.
63 Outlined in The Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Ch 4.
64 Jules Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice’ in David Owen (ed), Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (1995) 53, 72.
65 According to Wright, above n 3, protective justice is simply the ex ante preventive aspect of 
corrective justice.
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It has been argued that the tort-like motive of providing protection against harm, 
and the tort-like remedy of compensating such harm, have no role to play in an 
equitable doctrine, since they are incompatible with the basis of the equitable 
jurisdiction in an unconscionable insistence on legal rights. Margaret Halliwell 
has argued that the function of proprietary estoppel is not to protect reliance, but 
to prevent injustice resulting from unconscionable conduct.66 She relies on Lord 
Evershed’s statement that proprietary estoppel has traditionally had a negative 
characteristic of restraining injustice, rather than doing justice; in other words 
stopping ‘the unconscionable conduct of the person against whom equity 
proceeded.’ Lord Evershed argued that to succumb to the temptation of saying 
that ‘equity is able to do justice where there is no justice before’ is to venture into
/r o
the dangerous territory of ‘palm tree justice’.
Prior to the High Court’s decisions in Waltons Stores and Verwayen, Paul Finn 
also suggested that equitable estoppel was ‘designed to prevent, within its own 
proper province, an unconscionable insistence upon strict legal rights. ’69 That 
observation was, Finn suggested, as much a statement of the limitations upon 
equity’s powers as it was of the purpose of equitable intervention. Finn argued 
that the justification for continuing to confine equity to representations affecting 
rights was open to serious question, and advocated the fusion of concepts from 
common law and equity which would give qualified enforcement to voluntary 
promises.71 Giving equity the remedial capacity to make purely compensatory 
awards would free it from the ‘strict rights’ constraint on its jurisdiction and it 
would no longer need to be limited to operating on the rights of the representor.72
Two observations can be made in response to Halliwell’s suggestion that the tort 
rationale of protecting against harm resulting from reliance is an inappropriate 
basis for equitable estoppel. The first is that it is not historically accurate to say
66 Halliwell, above n 8, 17.
67 Raymond Evershed, ‘Reflections on the Fusion of Law and Equity After 75 Years’ (1954) 70 
Law Quarterly Review 326, 329.
68 Ibid.
69 PD Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985) 59, 93.
70 PD Finn, ‘Equity and Contract’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Contract (1987) 104, 116.
71 Ibid 119.
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that estoppel has traditionally had an exclusively negative operation in equity. 
Secondly, to the extent that estoppel in equity has operated negatively, to prevent 
an unconscionable insistence on strict rights, it is clear that it is no longer 
restricted in that way in Australia. In its decision in Waltons Stores, the High 
Court clearly abandoned any notion that equitable estoppel was confined to 
preventing an unconscionable insistence on a representor’s legal rights. 
Accordingly, a more fruitful question for present purposes is the extent to which 
the infiltration of reliance-based common law concepts into equitable estoppel 
have had the effect of bringing together common law and equitable principles in 
this area.
1. The Historical Argument
The notion of equity operating by reference to a tort rationale and providing 
compensation for a plaintiffs detrimental reliance on the conduct of another has 
considerable historical precedent. Three lines of cases can be cited to show that 
the Court of Chancery and other courts exercising equitable jurisdiction allowed 
tort-like actions for compensation for the detrimental consequences of reliance on 
the conduct of others, when those others departed from assumptions induced by 
their conduct. The first is the line of cases prior to 1500 identified by John Ames, 
the second is a line of nineteenth century cases concerned with making good 
representations, and the third is the line of cases known today as examples of 
proprietary estoppel. According to Ames, it was reasonably clear that equity gave 
relief before 1500 to a plaintiff who had incurred detriment on the faith of a 
defendant’s promise. The cases discussed by Ames in support of that claim 
indicate that tortious concepts and remedies were by no means foreign in early 
Chancery. The first is a case from 1378, which may well be the first recorded 
case of what is now equitable estoppel.74 The plaintiff in that case incurred 
expenditure travelling to London to consult counsel in reliance on the defendant’s
72 Ibid.
73 JB Ames, ‘The History of Assumpsit’ (1888) 2 Harvard Law Review 1, 14-15, citing three 
cases, from the years 1378, 1438 and 1468, reported at: 2 Calendar of Proceedings in Chancery 
II; 1 Calendar of Proceedings in Chancery XLI; YB 8 Ed IV 4, pi ii.
74 2 Cal Ch II.
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promise to convey land to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought a subpoena to force 
the defendant to answer for his ‘deceit’ in breaching the promise. Not only was 
the action tortious in character, but the remedy must at that time have been 
compensation for the plaintiffs wasted expenditure:
The bill sounds in tort rather than in contract, and inasmuch as even 
cestuis que use could not compel a conveyance by their feoffees to use at 
this time, its object was doubtless not specific performance, but 
reimbursement for the expenses incurred.75
The second case cited by Ames is the 1438 case of Appilgarth v Sergeantson,16 
which Ames describes as ‘savouring strongly of tort’.77 In that case the plaintiff 
successfully sought restitution against the defendant who obtained the plaintiffs
n o
money by promising to marry her, and then in ‘grete deceit’ married another. In 
the third case, the plaintiff was induced by the defendant to become the 
procurator of the defendant’s benefice by the defendant’s promise to indemnify 
the plaintiff in relation to the occupancy.79 When the defendant secretly resigned 
the benefice, the plaintiff was ‘vexed for the occupancy’ and was able to obtain 
relief against the defendant by subpoena.80
The second line of tort-like estoppel cases in Chancery is better known. It falls 
within the larger group of nineteenth century cases in which the equitable 
jurisdiction to make good representations was invoked. While some of that broad 
group of cases were analogous to contract, involving the enforcement of promises
o  1
on the basis that they had been acted upon, there were several cases in which 
defendants were ordered to pay what were, in effect, damages for relied-upon
on
misrepresentations. The leading such case is Burrows v Lock. The plaintiff 
proposed purchasing the interest of a beneficiary under a trust, and inquired of the
75 Ames, above n 73, 15.
76 1 Cal Ch XLI.
77 Ames, above n 73, 15.
78 Ibid.
79 YB 8 Ed IV 4, PI II.
80 Ames, above n 73, 15.
81 Eg: Hammersley v De Biel (1845) 12 Cl & F 45; 8 ER 1312.
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defendant trustee whether the beneficiary was absolutely entitled to his interest. 
The defendant replied that he was so entitled and had an undoubted right to make 
the assignment. The plaintiff duly went ahead with the purchase on the faith of 
that representation. It later transpired that the defendant had notice of an earlier 
assignment by the beneficiary of 10 per cent of his interest. Sir William Grant 
MR held that the defendant was liable to make good the deficiency in the fund.83 
Burrows v Lock was followed in Slim v Croucher, where the Court of Appeal in 
Chancery upheld an order for the payment of damages for misrepresentation in 
analogous circumstances.84
The existence of an equitable jurisdiction to order payment of damages for non- 
fraudulent misrepresentation was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeal in 
Low v Bouverie,85 The Court of Appeal held that, in the light of the House of 
Lords’ decision in Derry v Peek that an action for misrepresentation must be 
based on fraud,86 Burrows v Lock must be taken to have been decided on the 
basis of estoppel, and Slim v Croucher must be taken to have been wrongly 
decided.87 Although the Court of Appeal’s decision in Low v Bouverie did have 
the effect of stifling the jurisdiction, it is clear that for most of the nineteenth 
century the Court of Chancery exercised a jurisdiction to award damages to 
compensate plaintiffs for loss suffered as a result of reliance on representations
oo
made by others.
Unlike the two sets of cases discussed so far, the proprietary estoppel cases can 
be argued to involve merely the prevention of an unconscionable insistence on 
legal rights, because the effect of the estoppel was to prevent the representor from 
unconscionably asserting his or her strict legal title to property. Lord Cranworth 
LC described the principle as having a negative operation in his famous statement 
of principle in Ramsden v Dyson:
82 (1805) 10 Ves Jnr 470; 32 ER 927.
83 Ibid 929.
84 (1860) 1 De GF & J 518; 45 ER 462.
85 [1891] 3 Ch 82.
86 (1889) 14 App Cas 337.
87 [1891] 3 Ch 82, 102 (Lindley LJ), 106 (Bowen LJ), 109-10 (Kay LJ).
88 See Ian Davidson, ‘The Equitable Remedy of Compensation’ (1982) 13 Melbourne
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If a stranger builds on my land supposing it to be his own, and I, 
perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him right, and leave him to 
persevere in his error, a Court o f equity will not allow me afterwards to 
assert my title to the land on which he had expended money on the 
supposition that the land was his own.89
The effect of a proprietary estoppel was not, however, a negative one: it was to 
create new rights and to provide a cause of action where none would otherwise 
have existed. Although there have been some proprietary estoppel cases in which 
the estoppel has been asserted defensively,90 in many cases the estoppel has been 
used to provide a cause of action. In The Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking 
Association v King,91 for example, an estoppel arose against the owner of land 
who allowed his sons to expend money erecting buildings on that land on the 
basis that he would transfer the land to them at some time in the future. The effect 
of the father’s conduct and the expenditure of the sons was to raise a ‘lien and 
charge’ upon the land to the extent of the amount expended by the sons.92 The 
effect of the estoppel was not a negative one, but was clearly to create new rights 
which, though proprietary in nature, were compensatory in amount.93
Like the nineteenth century ‘making good representations’ cases, the proprietary 
estoppel cases can also be said to have had both contract-like and tort-like 
characteristics. Although there are some cases, such as Dillwyn v Llewlyn, which 
are analogous to contract,94 many examples of proprietary estoppel are more
University> Law Review 349, 356-369.
89 (1866) LR 1 HL 128, 140-1 (emphasis added).
90 In Inwards v Baker [19645] 2 QB 29, for example, a proprietary estoppel was successfully 
asserted by a defendant to prevent the plaintiffs from unconscionably asserting their title in an 
ejectment action.
91 (1858) 25 Beav 72; 53 ER 563.
92 Ibid 565.
93 A similar approach was taken by McLelland J in Morris v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61 in 
satisfying an equity which arose by virtue of the plaintiff having spent money on the 
defendant’s property in the expectation that he was to live there indefinitely. The equity was 
satisfied by granting the plaintiff an equitable charge over the property to the extent of his 
expenditure.
94 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 ER 1285. The representee’s expenditure on the faith of the 
representor’s promise was said to provide a ‘valuable consideration’, justifying the enforcement
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analogous to tort. It is the representor’s conduct and the representee’s reliance on 
that conduct which justifies the court’s intervention in such cases, and the effect 
of that intervention clearly goes beyond restraining injustice. When proprietary 
estoppel operated as it did in Unity Bank v King, it can be seen as a hybrid of 
equity and tort: the application of the doctrine was triggered by detrimental 
reliance on another’s conduct, and the effect of the estoppel was to protect or 
compensate that reliance by recognising proprietary rights of an equivalent value. 
Another hybrid case is Raffaele v Raffaele,95 in which the effect of a proprietary 
estoppel was to give rise to a ‘contract or notional contract’, the remedy for 
breach of which was an order for the payment of damages to the representee 
assessed on a restitutionary basis.96
Accordingly, it is not accurate to insist that courts of equity have historically been 
restricted to preventing an unconscionable insistence on common law rights, and 
have not been concerned with doing justice in a positive sense by relieving 
against the detrimental consequences of reliance. In any event, it is clear that the 
Australian courts have recognised the evolutionary capacity of equitable 
principles and do not adopt a narrow view of the equitable jurisdiction in relation 
to estoppel. Accordingly, it is more useful to look at the contemporary cases, and 
the extent to which those cases can be said to have begun to integrate common 
law and equitable principle.
2. The Integration of Common Law and Equitable Principles
In terms of the development of estoppel principle, it is important to recognise that 
the adoption of a reliance-based rationale in the equity cases does involve the use 
of concepts which have not been emphasised in equity jurisprudence for some 
time. The reliance-based philosophy of estoppel has its recent origins in common 
law estoppel, and its adoption, or re-adoption, as the basis of the equitable 
doctrine is a clear instance of the borrowing of principle which Somers J has
of the promise (ibid 1287). As discussed in Chapter 1, in Beaton v McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 
134, Young J regarded the case as having been decided on the basis of contract, although that 
interpretation was rejected by the Court of Appeal: (1987) 13 NSWLR 162.
95 [1962] WAR 29.
96 Ibid 33. The case will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
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suggested is taking place between common law and equity, ‘furthering the 
harmonious development of the law as a whole.’97 An important effect of the 
movement of equitable estoppel towards a reliance framework, therefore, is to 
bring the equitable doctrine into alignment with its common law counterpart.
There are at least three different ways in which equitable estoppel can be said to 
have taken on common law concepts. The first is in the abandonment of the 
artificial and historically inaccurate notion that estoppel in equity is restricted to 
preventing an unconscionable insistence on strict rights. In Waltons Stores and 
Verwayen, the High Court made it clear that the equitable jurisdiction is not 
limited to preventing an unconscionable insistence on strict legal rights, but 
extends to preventing detriment resulting from an unconscionable departure from
QO
an assumption that a person will act in a certain way. The second relevant 
development is the adoption of the common law standard of ‘reasonableness’ for 
restricting the situations in which equitable estoppel will be available, and 
requiring the representee to take some care to protect his or her own interests.99 
The third, and most significant, way in which the common law has influenced 
equitable estoppel is in the adoption in the equity cases of the common law 
rationale of protecting against harm resulting from reliance. Paul Finn has 
observed that the principle which originated in Justice Dixon’s judgment in 
Thompson v Palmer,100 and flowered in Waltons Stores,101 ‘reflects both the 
injury averting concern and the moral ethos of the neighbourhood principle in the 
law of negligence.’ “ As Chapters 3-7 of this thesis will show, the philosophy of 
protecting against harm resulting from reliance has been extremely influential in 
shaping the contemporary equitable doctrine, particularly in relation to questions
97 Elders Pastoral Ltd v Bank o f New Zealand [1989] 2 NZLR 180, 193, discussed by Sir 
Anthony Mason, The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common 
Law World’ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 238, 242.
98 This positive operation of equitable estoppel was strikingly illustrated in W v G (1996) 20 
Farn LR 49, which was discussed in Chapter 1 above.
99 The reasonableness requirement will be discussed in Chapter 5 below.
100 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547.
10‘ (1988) 164 CLR 387.
102 Paul Finn, ‘Commerce, the Common Law and Morality’ (1989) 17 Melbourne University 
Law Review 87, 96.
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of remedy. 103 These developments suggest that, through the emphasis on reliance, 
equitable estoppel is being made more compatible with common law estoppel.
Commentators such as Margaret Halliwell have raised important questions as to 
the extent to which reliance theory is appropriate in equitable estoppel. 
Essentially, the questions are whether an equitable doctrine should operate 
positively to prevent injustice, whether it should be guided by a tort-like rationale 
of protecting against harm, and whether it can appropriately focus on the victim, 
rather than the conduct of the person who is claimed to have acted 
unconscionably. As the above discussion has shown, estoppel in equity has for 
some time operated positively to prevent injustice, and has at various times in the 
past been guided by the tort rationale of protecting against harm. In more recent 
times those aspects of the doctrine have been emphasised more strongly, 
indicating a subtle integration of common law and equitable principle. 104
III. CONSCIENCE THEORY
A philosophy of estoppel which has attracted considerable support in Australia 
and England in the last fifteen years may be described as conscience theory. 105 
Conscience theory is based on the notion that equitable estoppel is essentially 
concerned with the prevention of unconscionable conduct. It is clear that the 
concept of unconscionability is relevant to an equitable doctrine of estoppel in a 
very broad sense: it is the representor’s unconscionable conduct which is said
103 As Chapter 7 will show, the remedial flexibility of the equitable doctrine means that equity 
is in fact able to fulfil this rationale far better than the common law.
104 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Equity’s Role in the Twentieth Century’ (1997-8) King’s College Law 
Journal 1 ,3 has noted that, ‘the principles of equity and the common law are steadily 
converging into one integrated coherent body of law, that outcome being a desirable and 
foreseeable consequence of the Judicature Acts’ and has elsewhere pointed to estoppel as a 
‘striking example’ of that convergence: Mason, above n 97. Fiona Burns, The “Fusion Fallacy” 
Revisited’ (1993) 5 Bond Law Review 152, 163-71 has also argued that recent developments in 
equitable estoppel raise the possibility of substantive fusion of legal and equitable principles.
105 A similar philosophy has also been attributed to promissory estoppel in some jurisdictions in 
the United States. Eric Holmes, ‘Restatement of Promissory Estoppel’ (1996) 32 Williamette 
Law Review 263, has argued that promissory estoppel is evolving towards, and in some states 
has reached, a stage where it can be seen as fundamentally equitable (rather than tortious or 
contractual). Holmes argued that in the final stage of its evolution, promissory estoppel is based 
on the principles of conscience, good faith, honesty and equity, providing the court with a very 
broad discretion in relation to remedy.
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to justify the intervention of courts of equity in estoppel cases. According to 
Brennan J in Waltons Stores, the element which ‘both attracts the jurisdiction of 
the court and shapes the remedy to be given is unconscionable conduct on the 
part of the person bound by the equity.’106 Some judges and commentators 
appear to go further, however, and regard the prevention of unconscionable 
conduct as the fundamental purpose of equitable estoppel, and as the primary 
concept by which it operates.
A. The Historical Basis of Conscience Theory
The notion that equitable estoppel is essentially concerned with unconscionable 
conduct is consistent with equity’s traditional concern with matters of 
conscience. When Edward El referred all matters within the King’s 
‘prerogative of grace’ to the Chancellor in 1349, the Chancellor was required 
by the King’s writ to base all decisions on the principles of ‘Conscience, Good 
Faith, Honesty and Equity.’107 From its earliest days the Court of Chancery was 
addressed as a court of conscience and the decisive question in most cases 
before the early Chancellors was whether the defendant could have acted as he 
did in good conscience. Thus, the duties of the parties were determined by the 
demands of ‘good conscience’.108 Sir William Holdsworth quotes an entry in 
the Close Roll of 1468 recording the fact that ‘the king willed and commanded 
... that all matters to be examined and discussed in the court of Chancery 
should be dictated and determined according to equity and conscience\ 109
The prominence of conscience in the Court of Chancery can to some extent be 
attributed to the ecclesiastical backgrounds of the pre-reformation Chancellors,
106 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 419. See also Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 428-9 (Brennan J). 
Chapter 7 will show that the remedy in equitable estoppel cases is not in fact shaped by 
unconscionable conduct.
107 George Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction o f the Court o f Chancery (1846) vol 1, 336-8 & 
407-8.
108 Helmut Coing, ‘English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law’ (1955) 
71 Law Quarterly Review 223, 223-4.
109 Sir William Holdsworth, A History o f English Law (7th ed, 1955, AL Goodhart and HG 
Hanbury eds) vol 1,406. Spence, above n 107, 408, notes that this command was contained in 
the writ by which Edward IV committed the seals to R Kirkham, Master of the Rolls.
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and the resulting influence of canon law on the emerging equitable 
jurisdiction. 110 ‘The ecclesiastical chancellors ... based their equity on the idea 
that the court ought to compel each litigant to fulfil all the duties which reason 
and conscience would dictate to a person in his situation. ’ * 111 Conscience was 
thus the means by which justice according to the law of god or nature could be 
done in each individual case. 112 The enforcement of promises which were not 
enforceable at law was one of the primary occupations of the early chancellors, 
and thus was one of the doctrines framed in the light of conscience. 113
According to George Spence, the notion of conscience as denoting a principle 
of judicial decision appears to have been of clerical invention, and invoked the 
spiritual authority of the ecclesiastical courts over the conscience of the party 
whose conduct was the subject of complaint. 114 Although the notion of 
conscience was in the middle ages based on natural law, the principle seems to 
have been secularised during the sixteenth century, when the Chancellor was 
designated the ‘Keeper of the Queen’s conscience. ’ 115 Spence suggests that the 
conscience jurisdiction embraced the notion of good faith and all departures 
from fair dealing and honesty. The early reported cases of what might now be 
described as equitable estoppel fell within that broad ‘good faith’ jurisdiction, 
although the conduct complained of tended to be described as ‘fraudulent’ 
rather than ‘unconscionable’. The notion of equitable fraud meant, in effect, 
unconscionable conduct or a violation of the standards of conduct enforced by 
equity. 116
A number of examples can be given of the characterisation as fraud of conduct 
which would now give rise to an estoppel. As mentioned above, JB Ames cites
110 Holdsworth, above n 109, 224-5.
111 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd ed, 1937) vol 5, 216.
112 Ibid.
113 OW Holmes Jnr, ‘Early English Equity’ (1885) 2 Law Quarterly Review 162, 171; Paul 
Vinogradoff, ‘Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century Jurisprudence’ (1908) 24 Law 
Quarterly Review 373, 379.
114 Spence, above n 107, 411.
115 PV Baker and PStJ Langan, Snell’s Equity (29th ed, 1990) 8.
116 Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932, 954; Patrick Parkinson, ‘The Conscience of 
Equity’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (1996) 28, 28-30.
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a 1378 case in which a plaintiff sought relief on the basis of the defendant’s 
‘deceit’ in breaching a relied upon promise to convey land. The act of 
standing by in circumstances which would now be regarded as establishing an 
estoppel by acquiescence, was regarded in the early eighteenth century as an 
‘apparent fraud’.118 In the nineteenth century case of Hammersley v De Biel, 
Lord Campbell said that representations as to future conduct were required to 
be made good when acted upon, because otherwise ‘the most monstrous frauds 
would be committed.’119 Actions relating to representations of fact which were 
acted upon were also maintained ‘upon the ground of fraud and deceit in the 
defendant.’120
Courts exercising equitable jurisdiction today are bound to apply a far more 
rigid body of principles than their medieval antecedents, and cannot, therefore, 
be regarded as courts of conscience. As will be seen below, however, there is 
a clear willingness on the part of modern judges to invoke the concept of 
unconscionability as both a rationale for equitable estoppel and as a means of 
determining liability in estoppel. That approach can be seen as a revival of 
equity’s ecclesiastical origins, and appears to draw on the medieval idea of a 
universal moral code. This notion is supported by Sir Anthony Mason’s 
suggestion that the increased reliance on the concept of unconscionability may 
be regarded as part of a transition towards a greater emphasis on natural law,
i  'j'y
and an endeavour to make morals and law coincide.
B. Support for Conscience Theory
The notion that unconscionability is the basis of the contemporary doctrine of 
equitable estoppel has its modern origins in a series of English cases prior to
117 Above n 73, 15. This equitable notion of ‘deceit’ is, of course, quite different from the 
intentional or reckless disregard for truth which subsequently came to be accepted as deceit at 
common law in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337; see Parkinson, above n 116, 28.
118 Savage v Foster (1723) 9 Mod 35; 88 ER 299, 300.
119 (1845) 12 Cl & F 45; 8 ER 1312, 1331.
120 Evans v Bicknell (1801) 6 Ves Jun 174; 31 ER 998, 1002.
121 Re Telescriptor Syndicate Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 174, 195-6 (Buckley J): This Court is not a 
Court of conscience.’
122 Mason, above n 97, 259.
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Waltons Stores. 123 Unconscionability was invoked in those cases as the 
standard by which to measure the defendant’s conduct in equitable estoppel 
cases. Although none of those judgments explicitly suggested that the purpose 
of estoppel was to prevent unconscionable conduct, such a concern is clearly 
implicit in the adoption of the unconscionability standard. In Waltons Stores 
members of the High Court adopted the concept of unconscionability used in 
the English cases, and used it to articulate a conscience-based philosophy of the 
doctrine. In their joint judgment in Waltons Stores, Mason CJ and Wilson J held 
that ‘equitable estoppel has its basis in unconscionable conduct, rather than the 
making good of representations’ . 124 Deane J found a similar basis for his general 
doctrine of estoppel by conduct, notwithstanding the fact that he saw the doctrine 
as operating at common law as well as in equity:
The doctrine of estoppel by conduct is founded on good conscience. Its 
rationale is not that it is right and expedient to save persons from the 
consequences of their own mistake. It is that it is right and expedient to
125save them from being victimised by other people.
Thus, in Waltons Stores ‘the prevention of unconscionable conduct [was] 
identified as the driving force behind equitable estoppel’. Although the 
judgments in Waltons Stores provided support for a conscience basis for 
equitable estoppel, they did not do so at the expense of a reliance basis for the 
doctrine. The two philosophies were clearly seen as complementary. Justice 
Brennan’s judgment exemplifies this most clearly. In the space of three pages, 
he says that the ‘the basic object of the doctrine’ is to avoid the detriment which 
the promisee would suffer if the promisor fails to fulfil the promise’, the ‘object
123 Notably Crabb v A run District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179; Shaw v Applegate [1977] 1 WLR 
970; Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 133; 
Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank 
Ltd [m2] 1 QB 84.
124 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 405.
125 Ibid 440.
126 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 407 (Mason CJ).
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of equity’ is to prevent unconscionable conduct and the ‘object of the equity’ is to 
avoid detriment.127
Since Waltons Stores, most Australian commentators have seen the prevention of 
unconscionable conduct as the basis or the motivating force of the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel that emerged from that case.128 Kenneth Sutton’s 1989 article 
contains perhaps the strongest statement of the unconscionability basis of 
equitable estoppel in the Australian commentary.129 That article included the 
statement that ‘the rationale behind the concept of estoppel is said to be good 
conscience and fair dealing and the object of the concept is recognised as the 
avoidance of injustice and unconscionable conduct.’ Even stronger advocacy 
of an unconscionability basis for equitable estoppel, however, comes from 
commentators in England. Mark Lunney supports conscience theory from 
purposive and normative points of view. He suggests that ‘[a]ll forms of 
estoppel have as their foundation the avoidance of unconscionable conduct’ 
and therefore advocates ‘a unified doctrine of estoppel based on 
unconscionability.’ A similar argument has been made by Margaret
127 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 421-3.
128 CNH Bagot, ‘Equitable Estoppel and Contractual Obligations in the Light of Waltons v Maher’ 
(1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 926, 928, appeared to regard the abhorrence of equity to 
unconscionable conduct as ‘the fundamental policy’ which drove the Court in that case ‘to 
interfere in situations it previously avoided’; Eugene Clark, ‘The Swordbearer has Arrived: 
Promissory Estoppel and Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher’ (1987-9) 9 University o f 
Tasmania Law Review 68 (‘unconscionability is the unifying principle which forms the basis of 
the different heads of equity incorporated under equitable estoppel’); Joshua Getzler, 
‘Unconscionable Conduct and Unjust Enrichment as Grounds for Judicial Intervention’ (1990) 
16 Monash University Law Review 283, 305-6 (the ‘unified principle of equitable estoppel’ is 
‘based on the prevention of unconscionable conduct’); JW Carter, ‘Chapter 2: Australia’ in 
Ewoud Hondius, Precontractual Liability: Reports to the XHIth Congress o f the International 
Academy o f Comparative Law (1990) 29, 37 ( ‘the main object of promissory estoppel is the 
control of unconscionable conduct’); Mark Dorney, ‘The New Estoppel’ (1991) 7 Australian 
Bar Review 19, 25 (the ‘object of equitable estoppel is to redress unconscionable conduct’); 
David Allan and Mary Hiscock, Law o f Contract in Australia (2nd ed, 1992), 517 (there is a 
“unity” of estoppel, which is now seen as based on unconscientious conduct); Kris Arjunan, 
‘Waiver and Estoppel - A Distinction Without a Difference’ (1993) 21 Australian Business 
Law Review 86, 109 ( ‘unconscionability is the undercurrent of equitable estoppel’); Carter and 
Harland, above n 34, 133 (unconscionability is ‘the touchstone for all relevant forms of 
estoppel.’); Patrick Parkinson, ‘Estoppel’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed) The Principles o f Equity 
(1996) 201, 203 (‘The justification for estoppel is to be found in the concern of the courts with 
unconscionability’).
129 Kenneth Sutton, ‘Contract by Estoppel’ (1989) 1 Journal o f Contract Law 205.
130 Ibid 221.
131 Mark Lunney, ‘Towards a Unified Estoppel: The Long and Winding Road’ [1992] The 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 239, 250.
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Halliwell, but only in relation to proprietary estoppel. 132 According to 
Halliwell, ‘[i]t is now necessary to recognise that the organising concept of 
[proprietary] estoppel is unconscionability because the function of estoppel is 
to restrain injustice resulting from unconscionable conduct. ’ 133 She argues that 
proprietary estoppel is conscience-based, because the cause of action is not a 
response to the representee’s reliance, but rather to the type of conduct engaged 
in by the representor. 134
C. Unconscionability and Contract Law
A significant feature of conscience theory as a basis for equitable estoppel is that, 
like reliance theory, it serves to distinguish equitable estoppel from contract law. 
The notion that promises are enforced only for the purpose of preventing 
unconscionable conduct, and to the extent necessary to do so, tends to legitimise 
equitable estoppel by distancing it from the law of contract. 135 Like the element 
of detrimental reliance, the element of unconscionability required to establish an 
estoppel in equity also ensures that equitable estoppel does not undermine the 
doctrine of consideration by making voluntary promises generally enforceable. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the requirement of unconscionable conduct in 
this regard by Dawson J in Verwayen:
It is the requirement of unconscionable conduct which is now seen as the 
protection against undue intrusion upon the law of contract, for a 
voluntary promise of itself will not give rise to an estoppel. An estoppel 
will occur only where unconscionable conduct on the part of one gives 
rise to an equity on the part of another. The estoppel will then operate to 
take account of that equity.
132 Halliwell, above n 8, 15 & 22-30, distinguishes proprietary estoppel, which she suggests is 
conscience-based, from promissory estoppel which, she argues, is not based on the concept of 
unconscionability, but is essentially contractual. Halliwell regards promissory estoppel as a 
limited exception to the requirement that a variation of a contract must be supported by 
consideration.
133 Ibid 15.
134 Ibid 17.
135 Ibid.
136 (1990) 170 CLR 394,453.
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The circularity of that statement reveals the limited utility of the notion of 
unconscionability in this context. Although Dawson J suggested that an estoppel 
will occur where unconscionable conduct gives rise to ‘an equity’ on the part of 
another person, an ‘equity’ means no more than a right to equitable relief, 137 
which usually arises in circumstances in which the wrongdoer’s conduct is 
characterised as unconscionable. Although the concept of unconscionability is 
invoked in order to distinguish equitable estoppel from the mere enforcement of 
voluntary promises, it does not really assist in making that distinction. As the 
following chapters will show, it is principally detrimental reliance which 
distinguishes ordinary voluntary promises from those which give rise to an 
estoppel. As Hugh Collins suggests, if unconscionability meant simply bad faith, 
then it would be unconscionable to deny all expectations one has created and a 
sanction would be available for all breaches of promise. 138 If, on the other hand, it 
is only unconscionable to breach a promise if the promisee has altered his or her 
position on the faith of the expectation, then ‘unconscionability’ is simply a very 
roundabout way of restating the reliance principle. 139
D. Conscience Theory and Common Law Estoppel
Mention must be made of the question whether unconscionability can be said to 
be the basis of common law estoppel, or of a unified estoppel which is to operate 
at common law. Michael Evans has questioned whether a notion of 
unconscionability could be incorporated into common law estoppel, since it is a 
foreign concept in the common law. 140 Unconscionable conduct in equitable 
estoppel can, however, be regarded as having its parallel in common law estoppel 
in the prevention of unjust conduct. 141 Sir Anthony Mason has argued that there 
is little justification for separate sets of principles for unjust conduct and 
unconscionable conduct since, ‘in the end, “unjust departure” in the context of
137 Marcia Neave and Mark Weinberg, ‘The Nature and Function of Equities (Part 1)’ (1978- 
1980) 6 University’ o f Tasmania Law Review 24. See also Chapter 7 below.
138 Collins, above n 37, 83-4.
139 Ibid.
140 Michael Evans, Outline of Equity and Trusts, (2nd ed, 1993) 77.
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common law estoppel is in essence describing conduct which is 
unconscionable. ’ 142 In Thompson v Palmer, Dixon J suggested that the object of 
estoppel in pais at common law was to prevent an ‘unjust departure’ by one 
person from an assumption which they have induced another to adopt. 143 The 
notion that common law estoppel could be based on the prevention of 
unconscionable conduct also appears to have been accepted by Deane J in 
Verwayen. Although the doctrine of estoppel by conduct articulated by Deane J 
operates at common law, and appears to draw heavily on common law estoppel, 
Deane J appeared to be untroubled by the notion of the representee’s conscience 
being fundamental to that doctrine. 144
E. The Nature O f A Conscience-Based Doctrine
Just as the purpose of protecting reliance is best pursued through a reliance-based 
doctrine of estoppel, or one which focuses on the representee’s reliance, the 
purpose of preventing unconscionable conduct is best pursued through a 
conscience-based doctrine, or one which operates by reference to the 
representor’s conscience. Mark Lunney145 and Margaret Halliwell146 have argued 
that estoppels should operate by reference to the concept of unconscionability, 
since their essential purpose is to prevent unconscionable conduct. There are two 
different ways in which the purpose of preventing unconscionable conduct can be 
manifested in the operation of a doctrine of estoppel. First, the doctrine could 
operate by reference to the broad standard of unconscionability. On that basis, 
liability would depend only on the question whether the representor’s conduct 
could be regarded as unconscionable in all the circumstances, and the courts 
would grant the relief necessary to prevent unconscionable conduct. Secondly, 
the requirements for liability and the considerations governing relief could be 
framed more specifically, but turning on the representor’s conscience: which 
means, in effect, the representor’s knowledge and conduct. The first approach
141 See Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 453 (Dawson J).
142 Mason, above n 97, 256
143 (1933) 49 CLR 507,547.
144 (1990) 170 CLR 394,444.
145 Above n 131,250.
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would confer a very broad discretion on the court to determine questions of 
liability and remedy, while the second might be described as a more principled 
conscience-based approach.
The notion that an equitable estoppel can be established by reference to the 
broad question whether the representor’s conduct was unconscionable in the 
circumstances has considerable support in the English cases.147 The strongest 
statement of such an approach was that of Oliver J in Taylors Fashions Ltd v 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd, who held that the only inquiry he had to 
make was whether, in all the circumstances of the case, it was unconscionable 
for the representors to seek to take advantage of the mistake which they shared 
with the representee.148 Under such an approach, the court simply applies ‘the 
broad test of whether in the circumstances the conduct complained of is 
unconscionable’.149 That broad test for establishing liability in equitable 
estoppel has not been adopted by the Australian courts. As will be discussed in 
chapter 6, the Australian courts have instead regarded unconscionability as just 
one of the elements that must be established before equitable estoppel will 
operate.
Once an estoppel has been established, a broad unconscionability test can also 
be applied to the question of remedy. As Paul Finn has suggested, the nature 
and extent of relief can be determined by reference to ‘what, in the 
circumstances it would be unconscionable for the [representor] to insist upon 
given the responsibility he bears in or for the [representee’s] actions.’150 As 
Chapter 7 will show, despite prominent judicial pronouncements that relief in 
equitable estoppel cases is determined by reference to unconscionability, a close 
examination of the cases shows that the courts do not determine remedies by 
reference to the unconscionable nature of the representor’s conduct.
146 Above n 8, 15.
147 See Chapter 6 below.
148 [1982] 1 QB 133, 155.
149 Ibid 154. See also Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179, 195 (Scarman LJ); Shaw 
v Applegate [1977] 1 WLR 970, 977-8 (Fry J); Amalgamated Property and Investment Co Ltd 
(in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 QB 4, 104 (Robert Goff J at first 
instance); Lim Teng Huan v Ang Swee Chuan [1992] 1 WLR 133, 117-8 (PC).
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An obvious problem with determining questions of liability and remedy by 
reference to the broad question of unconscionability is its indeterminacy. The 
question of what is unconscionable involves the making of an open ended moral 
judgment, and can, therefore, be seen simply as conferring a very broad discretion 
on the court in the determination of questions of liability and remedy. Others 
have, therefore, supported a more principled approach to unconscionability. 
Tadgell J suggested in Collin v Holden, for example, that ‘[w]hat is 
unconscionable must ... be defined by reference to principle and not left to 
expediency’ . 151 Kirby P has suggested that a principled approach has been 
adopted to the question of unconscionability: ‘offence to conscience being so 
much a matter of personal opinion, the notion has been tamed and classified 
according to established categories. ’ 152
A more principled conscience-based approach must turn on the knowledge and 
conduct of the representor, rather than on the effect of the representor’s conduct 
on the representee. 153 As Seddon and Ellinghaus have suggested, ‘[t]he 
unconscionability question necessarily involves a consideration of the behaviour 
of the promisor. ’ 154 Similarly, Joshua Getzler has observed that the 
unconscionability principle emphasises ‘the knowledge and conduct of the non­
innocent party’ . 155 That observation is supported by the statement of Deane J in 
Venvayen that the question whether the representor’s departure from the relevant 
assumption would be unconscionable, ‘relates to the conduct of the allegedly 
estopped party in all the circumstances. ’ 156
If the fundamental purpose of equitable estoppel is the prevention of 
unconscionable conduct, then questions of liability and remedy should be
150 Finn, above n 69, 92.
151 [1989] VR 510, 516.
152 Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 585.
153 Kenneth Sutton, ‘A Denning Come to Judgment: Recent Judicial Adventures in the Law of 
Contract’ (1989) 15 University o f Queensland Law Journal 131, 144 clearly had this type of 
doctrine in mind when he distinguished equitable estoppel from part performance, on the basis 
that: ‘part performance looks to the acts of the party pleading it while estoppel looks to the 
action or inaction of the party alleged to be estopped.’
154 NC Seddon and MP Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law o f Contract (7 th Aust ed, 1997) 69.
155 Getzler, above n 128, 323.
156 (1990) 170 CLR 394,444.
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determined either by reference to the broad test of unconscionability or by a more 
principled approach which turns on the knowledge and conduct of the person 
whose conscience is in question, namely the representor. Obviously, some 
reference to the representee’s conduct will also need to be made, but if 
unconscionable conduct is the foundational norm of equitable estoppel, then the 
doctrine should, as Margaret Halliwell suggests, be organised around the concept 
of unconscionability. That means that the key questions in the determination of 
liability and remedy must direct the court’s attention to the knowledge and 
conduct of the representor.
III. PROMISE THEORY
A. Why Consider Promise Theory?
The notion that equitable estoppel has as its purpose, or even one of its purposes, 
the enforcement of promises is not a notion that enjoys a great deal of support in 
the Australian cases or commentary. The courts in particular have taken pains to 
make it clear that the purpose of equitable estoppel is not to enforce promises. In 
Verwayen, for example, McHugh J said that ‘the enforcement of promises is not 
the object of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The enforcement of promises is 
the province of contract. ’ 157 The other two purposes of estoppel outlined in this 
chapter have been emphasised by the courts because they serve to distance 
estoppel from contract and to distinguish the operation of equitable estoppel from 
the enforcement of non-contractual promises. The object of avoiding detriment 
was claimed by Brennan J in Waltons Stores to allay concerns that ‘a general 
application of the principle of equitable estoppel would make non-contractual 
promises enforceable as contractual promises’. Dawson J in Verwayen, on the 
other hand, pointed out that when the requirement for a pre-existing contractual 
relationship for equitable estoppel was abandoned, ‘the protection of the law of
157 (1990) 170 CLR 394,501.
158 Ibid 423.
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contract was seen to lie in the requirement of unconscionable conduct and the 
discretionary nature of the re lie f.159
Although it has not been regarded by the courts as a purpose of equitable 
estoppel, it is important to consider the enforcement of promises as a competing 
philosophy of equitable estoppel for two reasons. First, the enforcement of a 
promise, or the fulfilment of expectations engendered by other conduct, is so 
often the effect of equitable estoppel that one must ask whether the doctrine is 
fundamentally concerned with achieving that result. This is essentially a legal 
realist rationale: that what the courts are doing in fact is more important than 
what they say they are doing. Two American writers, Edward Yorio and Steve 
Thel, have analysed the United States doctrine of promissory estoppel from this 
perspective.160 Yorio and Thel concluded from their examination of the cases 
that, although most judges and commentators hold that the purpose of promissory 
estoppel is to protect reliance, what the courts are actually doing is responding to 
an impulse to enforce serious promises.161 Yorio and Thel’s legal realist analysis 
suggests that the foundational norm of promissory estoppel is promise 
enforcement. Similarly, claims that the Australian doctrine of equitable estoppel 
is concerned only with protecting against harm resulting from reliance, or with 
the prevention of unconscionable conduct, must be scrutinised carefully when 
every equitable estoppel case reported in the last 7 years has resulted in the 
representee’s expectations being fulfilled. “ It is, therefore, important to consider 
whether equitable estoppel in Australia is essentially concerned with the 
enforcement of promises.
159 Ibid 455. Cf Deane J, ibid 439-40, who appeared to see the protection of contract as lying in the 
flexible nature of the relief and the fact that estoppel does not of itself provide an independent 
cause of action for compensatory damages for non-fulfilment of a promise.
160 Yorio and Thel, above n 9.
161 Hillman, above n 5, 60-77 has analysed in detail the ‘promise theory’ of promissory estoppel 
in the United States, which holds that the doctrine is based on the enforcement of serious 
promises.
162 These cases will be discussed in Chapter 7, which will also address the important question 
whether the prevalence of expectation relief suggests that the doctrine is ultimately concerned 
with the enforcement of promises, rather than with protecting against the detrimental 
consequences of reliance or the prevention of unconscionable conduct.
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The second reason for considering the possibility that promise is the basis of 
estoppel is to address the important question whether estoppel is essentially 
contractual in nature. Despite judicial pronouncements to the contrary, a number 
of English and Australian commentators have suggested that the fundamental 
concern of equitable estoppel is the enforcement of promises. If that is the 
case, then there is little justification for differentiating between estoppel and 
contract. As Peter Birks has argued, if estoppel operates according to the same 
rationale as contract, and if we are seeking a coherent structure for the law of 
obligations which avoids duplication, then we must recognise that estoppel is part 
of the law of contract. 164 Estoppel should, on that basis, be seen as, or adapted to 
become, part of the law of contract. The essential question, however, is whether 
estoppel and contract are both essentially concerned with the enforcement of 
promises.
The purpose of the law of contract is, of course, a notoriously vexed question, 
but most commentators would support the notion that contract is essentially 
concerned with the enforcement of promises. The principal argument in 
contract theory is not whether contract is concerned with the enforcement of 
promises, but rather why contract law is concerned to enforce promises or what 
purpose is served by the law in so doing. 165 Some commentators argue that 
promises are enforced to protect reliance by the promisee, 166 others see contract 
law as fulfilling promises on the basis of moral obligation, the facilitation of 
efficient exchanges, 168 or the enhancement of liberty, by giving parties the
163 Burrows, above n 9, 262; Mescher, above n 9, 547-8; Birks, above n 9, 63-4; Atiyah, above 
n 9; Elizabeth Cooke, above n 9.
164 Birks, above n 9, 9.
163 For an overview of contemporary theories of contract, see: Brian Coote, ‘The Essence of 
Contract’ (Part 1) (1988) 1 Journal of Contract Law 91; Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 154, 
876-909.
166 See, eg, LL Fuller and William Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ 
(1936) 46 Yale Law Journal 52, 60-2; Atiyah, above n 36, 10; Hugh Collins, The Law of 
Contract (1st ed, 1986) 43-7.
167 Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (1981) 41, for example, rationalises the enforcement of 
promises under contract law on the basis that contractual promises have moral force in the 
principle of autonomy: ‘the parties are bound to their contract because they have chosen to be.’
168 Many law and economics writers see the enforcement of promises as encouraging value- 
maximising resource allocation, and hence promoting allocative efficiency: see, eg, Charles 
Goetz and Robert Scott, ‘Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract’ (1980) 
89 Yale Law Journal 1261, 1265.
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freedom to bind themselves. 169 Whatever view one takes of the basis for the 
enforcement of promises, it is difficult to dispute Andrew Burrows’ claim that 
the cardinal principle of contract law is the fulfilment of expectations 
engendered by a binding promise. 170 The chapters to follow will consider 
whether that cardinal principle is shared by the doctrines of estoppel by conduct 
operating in Australia.
B. Promise Theory And Common Law Estoppel
Unlike reliance theory and conscience theory, promise theory may, at first blush, 
appear to be confined to the equitable and unified doctrines of estoppel, which 
can operate in relation to a promise to perform certain acts in the future. It may 
seem unlikely that common law estoppel, which is restricted to assumptions of 
existing fact, could be based on the enforcement of promises. As Peter Birks has 
argued, however, a representation of fact which is binding is, in substance, the 
same as a promise. 171 A person who makes a representation as to an existing fact 
can undertake an obligation in relation to that representation, in effect to warrant 
its truth, just as a person who makes a representation relating to their future 
conduct can do so in such a way as to convey a commitment to act, rather than 
simply to convey information as to their present intention to behave in a certain 
way in the future.
From that point of view, therefore, there is no difference in substance between a 
representation of existing fact, which may or may not be made in such a way as to 
commit oneself to the truth of the statement, and a representation as to the way in 
which one intends to act in the future, which similarly may or may not convey a 
commitment that one will do so. Since equitable estoppel is triggered by an 
assumption adopted by the representee, rather than a promise made by the 
representor, it is clear that equitable estoppel is no more or less likely to be 
concerned with promises than common law estoppel, which is also concerned
169 Barnett, above n 9, 300 argues that contractual obligations are enforced because the parties 
have voluntarily consented to the transfer of alienable rights.
170 Burrows, above n 9, 217-8.
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with assumptions adopted by representees. Both doctrines could potentially be 
concerned with the extent to which the representor has undertaken a 
commitment, and both could, therefore, be guided by promise theory.
C. The Nature Of A Promise-Based Doctrine
In seeking to ascertain whether equitable estoppel is essentially promise-based in 
its mode of operation, we are primarily concerned to inquire whether the doctrine 
is contractual in its operation. If a doctrine of estoppel were essentially concerned 
with the enforcement of promises, then that concern would be manifested in the 
approaches to liability and remedy, both of which would turn on the representor’s 
promise, rather than on the representee’s reliance on that promise. Under a 
promise-based doctrine, reliance is, at most, simply a reason for enforcing the 
promise. The practical importance of the distinction between promise-based 
liability and reliance-based liability has been recognised by Charles Fried:
At first glance the distinction between promissory obligation and 
obligation based on reliance may seem too thin to notice, but indeed large 
theoretical and practical matters turn on that distinction. To enforce a 
promise as such is to make a defendant render a performance (or its 
money equivalent) just because he has promised that very thing. The 
reliance view, by contrast, focuses on an injury suffered by the plaintiff 
and asks if the defendant is somehow sufficiently responsible for that 
injury that he should be made to pay compensation. 172
In the United States promise theory is a credible basis of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, since a promise is required in order to establish liability. 
The doctrine has a much closer connection with the law of contract than the 
Australian doctrine of equitable estoppel, although the nature of that connection 
is a matter of some debate. Most commentators in the United States appear to 
see promissory estoppel as separate from the law of contract; the cause of
171 Birks, above n 9, 61-2.
172 Fried, above n 167, 4.
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action is seen to be based on protecting promisees against loss resulting from 
reliance on a promise.173 In the celebrated case of Hoffman v Red Owl Stores 
Inc, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin suggested that ‘it would be a mistake to 
regard an action based on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach of 
contract action.’174 Despite strong statements such as this, promissory estoppel 
in the United States is seen by some commentators,175 and by courts in some 
jurisdictions, in the United States as a form of contractual liability, which 
exists as an alternative to traditional contractual liability based on consideration 
being given in return for a promise. That perception of promissory estoppel is, 
to some extent at least, confirmed by the description of the doctrine in s 90 of 
the Second Restatement of Contracts. Section 90 appears in the Second 
Restatement of Contracts under the heading ‘Contracts Without Consideration’ 
and stipulates a promise as the only type of conduct on which an estoppel can 
be founded. The remedy under s 90 is also contract-like, because detrimental 
reliance on a promise conditionally renders the promise binding. The only 
concessions in s 90 to a different juridical basis for liability is that the promise 
is only binding if ‘injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise’ 
and that ‘the court may alter the remedy as it thinks fit.’
Edward Yorio and Steve Thel have argued that, although s 90 was conceived 
and drafted to protect reliance, an examination of the decisions under s 90 
reveals that the true basis for liability under s 90 is promise, not reliance. On
173 Yorio and Thel, above n 9, 112.
174 133 NW 2d 267,275 (1965).
175 Eg: Mary Becker, ‘Promissory Estoppel Damages’ (1987) 16 Hoffstra Law Review 131, 133 
suggests that promissory estoppel liability ‘can be understood as contractual in the broad sense 
that the promisor intended to be legally bound under an objective standard.’
176 Black Canyon Racquetball Club Inc v Idaho First National Bank, 804 P 2d 900, 907 (1991) 
(Idaho Supreme Court): ‘Under contract law, promissory estoppel, when proven, acts as a 
consideration substitute in the formation of a contract.’ Holmes, above n 105, argues that the 
notion that promissory estoppel is a consideration substitute is adhered to in jurisdictions which 
arc at an early stage (the ‘contract phase’) in the development of promissory estoppel. He 
identifies four stages in the development of promissory estoppel: the estoppel phase (in which 
promissory estoppel has a preclusionary operation, the contract phase (in which promissory 
estoppel operates as a consideration substitute), the tort phase (in which estoppel is recognised 
as an independent doctrine which protects reasonable reliance) and the equity phase (in which 
courts apply promissory estoppel as a flexible doctrine based on equitable notions of 
conscience, good faith, honesty and equity). He suggests that sixteen jurisdictions in the United 
States are in the contract phase of development of promissory estoppel, two having remained in 
the estoppel phase, and the others having moved on to the tort phase or the equity phase.
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the question of liability, Yorio and Thel have argued that, although s 90 
requires the promise to induce action or forbearance, courts do not always 
require actual inducement.177 Nor, they argued, do the courts always insist that 
the promisee suffer a detriment as a result of reliance on the promise.178 
Equally, the courts occasionally deny recovery despite detrimental reliance by 
the promisee. This suggests, according to Yorio and Thel, that what the 
courts do in s 90 cases is to respond to an impulse to enforce serious 
promises,180 and ‘[w]hat distinguishes enforceable promises from 
unenforceable ones under Section 90 are the proof and quality of the promisor’s 
commitment.’181
Similarly, if the basis of equitable estoppel in Australia is promise, then one 
would expect the courts to look primarily to the promise itself to determine 
questions of liability and remedy. Questions of liability would turn on the 
nature of the promisor’s commitment, and the circumstances in which it was 
made. Reliance would take a limited role in determining questions of liability, 
perhaps simply providing proof of the strength of the promisor’s commitment. 
If the purpose of estoppel was the enforcement of promises, then that purpose 
could also be manifested in the formulation of relief. Relief would then involve 
the enforcement of the promise, or the fulfilment of the promisee’s 
expectations, rather than the protection of the promisee against harm resulting 
from reliance. The following chapters will consider the extent to which those 
claims can be made of equitable estoppel in Australia, and will thus assess the 
extent to which it can be regarded as a promise-based doctrine.
177 Yorio and Thel, above n 9, 155 cite Devecmon v Shaw 14 A 464 (Md 1888) as a classic 
example of a case in which inducement was not required. The plaintiffs uncle promised that he 
would pay the expenses of a trip to Europe. After taking the trip, the nephew was able to obtain 
reimbursement from the uncle’s estate for the expenses incurred. The court did not require the 
plaintiff to prove that he would not have incurred the expenses had the promise not been made, 
and in fact indicated that they would have enforced the promise had the plaintiff indicated that 
he would have taken the trip without the promise: 14 A 464, 464-5 (1888).
178 Yorio and Thel, above n 9, 152.
179 Ibid 160.
180 Ibid 114.
181 Ibid 167.
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Chapter 3
THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT
The first substantive aspect of the doctrines of estoppel by conduct to be 
addressed is the threshold requirement. That is, the need for some conduct on the 
part of the representor, some belief on the part of the representee, or both, which 
forms the basis of the estoppel. The threshold requirement can be formulated in 
two different ways, either by emphasising the conduct of the representor, or by 
emphasising the effect of the representor’s conduct on the representee. The 
threshold requirement of an estoppel relating to an existing fact can be 
formulated as a representation of fact (representor-sided) or as an assumption as 
to some existing fact which has been induced by the representor’s conduct 
(representee-sided). Similarly, the threshold requirement of an estoppel relating to 
the future conduct of a party can be formulated as a promise (representor-sided) 
or as an induced assumption as to the future conduct of the representor 
(representee-sided).
It should be made clear at the outset that the distinction between representor­
sided and representee-sided approaches to the threshold requirement is a fine one. 
They are not substantially different approaches, but reflect merely a difference in 
emphasis. The first test, which requires an induced assumption, involves a 
consideration of the conduct of the representor (the inducement) and its effect on 
the representee (the assumption). The second test, which requires a promise or a 
representation, also involves a consideration of both parties, since the promise or 
representation will not give rise to an estoppel unless it has induced some action 
on the part of the representee.
Although the distinction between the two approaches is only a question of 
emphasis, it remains an important distinction. As this chapter will show, there 
may be practical consequences resulting from the adoption of one test rather that 
the other: the requirement of a promise or representation is a stricter threshold 
test which may be more difficult to satisfy. On the other hand the adoption of the
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lower standard of an induced assumption will in some cases shift the court’s 
attention elsewhere, such as to the reasonableness of the representee’s reliance. 
More importantly, however, the choice between the two approaches has 
important philosophical consequences, helping us to determine whether the 
doctrines of estoppel operating in Australia are essentially concerned with the 
representee’s reliance or the representor’s conduct.
The following discussion will show that the tendency in Australia is toward the 
representee-sided threshold requirement of an induced assumption, which 
indicates a greater concern with the representee’s reliance than with the 
representor’s conduct. The first part of the chapter looks at the development of 
this approach, while the second part will illustrate the significance of the 
distinction.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDUCED ASSUMPTION TEST
Although both common law and equitable estoppel have at times been described 
as operating in relation to representations, 1 it is clear that neither doctrine has 
ever required an express representation. It has long been accepted both at 
common law and in equity that a representation can be conveyed by means other 
than express words, including a course of conduct and the act of remaining silent. 
Spencer Bower and Turner list three different ways in which a ‘representation’ 
can be made for the purposes of estoppel by representation:
A representation may, in the first place, be expressed in language either 
written or spoken. It may, secondly, be implied from acts or conduct. Or, 
thirdly, under certain conditions, it may be inferred from silence or 
inaction.2
1 The common law doctrine is often described as ‘estoppel by representation’, while the 
predecessor of the equitable doctrine is often described as the equitable jurisdiction to ‘make 
representations good’.
2 George Spencer Bower and Sir Alexander Turner, Estoppel by Representation (3rd ed, 1977)
45 .
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A. The Common Law Cases
On the common law side, the principle of estoppel by representation could from 
its very earliest times be invoked on the basis of a wide range of different types of 
conduct. In one of the leading early statements of the principle, Lord Denman CJ 
in Pickard v Sears held the principle to operate ‘where one by his words or 
conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of 
things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his previous position’ .3 
Pickard v Sears was itself a case of estoppel by silence. A mortgagee of certain 
goods allowed the sheriff to sell those goods under a writ of execution, giving no 
notice of his interest in the goods to the sheriff or the execution creditor. He was 
held to be estopped from asserting his title to the goods against the defendant, 
who purchased the goods from the sheriff. Lord Denman CJ held that the 
plaintiffs conduct ‘in standing by and giving a kind of sanction to the 
proceedings under the execution’ had induced the defendant to believe that he 
had no interest in the goods, and was sufficient to raise an estoppel.4 In the 
subsequent case of Gregg v Wells,5 Lord Denman CJ observed that the principle 
could be stated more broadly than it was in his judgment in Pickard v Sears. He 
said that it extended to apply to a party who ‘negligently or culpably stands by 
and allows another to contract on the faith and understanding of a fact which he 
cannot contradict’ .6
Although it has long been clear that a representation has not been required to 
establish an estoppel, the language of representations has persisted. The Privy 
Council in Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha referred to the need for a 
representation or ‘conduct amounting to a representation’ .7 Similarly, in giving 
the judgment of the House of Lords in Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd, Lord 
Tomlin held that one of the ‘essential factors giving rise to estoppel’ was a
3 (1837) 6 A & E 469; 112 ER 179, 181.
4 Ibid.
5 (1839) 10 A & E 9 0 ; 113 ER 35.
6 Ibid 38, quoted with approval by Parke B in Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 Ex 654; 154 ER 652, 
656.
7 (1892) 19 LR Ind App 203, 215.
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o‘representation or conduct amounting to a representation’. The language of 
induced assumptions, which now dominates the Australian cases, appears to have 
originated the following year in the judgment of Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer.9 
Although the judgment of the House of Lords in Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd 
was cited by Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer, he articulated the principles of 
estoppel in pais in the language of assumptions, forsaking the language of 
representations used by the House of Lords. 10 Dixon J described both the object 
of estoppel in pais and its operation in terms of assumptions:
The object of estoppel in pais is to prevent an unjust departure by one 
person from an assumption adopted by another as the basis of some act or 
omission which, unless the assumption be adhered to, would operate to 
that party’s detriment. * 11
Dixon J went on to describe the circumstances in which a person would be 
required to abide by an assumption in terms of the part played by that person in 
‘occasioning its adoption’ by the other party. 12 He set out a variety of situations in 
which the part played by the representor in occasioning the adoption of the 
assumption was sufficient to render it ‘unjust and inadmissible’ for the 
representor to depart from the assumption. The plea of estoppel in that case 
ultimately failed in the opinion of Dixon J because, although the appellant could 
establish that she had formed a belief as to the existence of a particular state of 
affairs, she failed to establish that she had acted to her prejudice on the faith of 
that belief. 14
The notion that estoppel in pais was based on the adoption of an assumption was 
reiterated in the joint judgment of Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ in Newbon v City
8 (1933) AC 51,57.
9 (1933) 49 CLR 507,547
10 The other members of the High Court, in contrast, followed the approach of the House of 
Lords and framed their discussions of estoppel almost entirely in the language of 
representations: ibid 520-1 (Rich J), 526-7 (Starke J), 551-3 (Evatt J), 558-9 (McTiernan J).
11 Ibid 547.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid 548-9.
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Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd,15 and in Justice Dixon’s influential judgment 
in Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd} 6 The principle articulated by 
Dixon J in Grundt was concerned with an assumption adopted by the representee, 
rather than a representation being made by the representor. 17 He referred to the 
representee acting on the assumption, to the harm that would result if the 
assumption were deserted, and to the court avoiding such harm by compelling the 
representor to adhere to the assumption. 18
B. The Equity Cases
On the equity side, the language of representations dominated the nineteenth 
century line of cases concerned with ‘making good representations’ , 19 but has not 
been so dominant in the modem cases of proprietary and promissory estoppel. 
Because many of the early proprietary estoppel cases concerned situations in 
which the representor stood by with knowledge of the representee’s detrimental 
reliance, the courts were generally concerned to inquire whether the representor 
had ‘encouraged an act’, rather than whether a representation had been made or 
an assumption induced. The leading early cases of Dann v Spurierp Gregory v
91 99  9*jMighell, The Duke o f Beaufort v Patrick and Dillwyn v Llewelyn all afford 
examples of such an approach.
In Ramsden v Dyson,24 on the other hand, there was a live issue as to the nature of 
the representee’s assumption or expectation. Accordingly, the House of Lords did 
define the applicable equitable principle, and did so by reference to an
15 (1935) 52 CLR 723, 734-5. Cf the approach of Starke J, ibid 738.
16 (1937) 59 CLR 641.
17 The significance of the language used by Dixon J was noted by Priestley JA in Waltons 
Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1986) 5 NSWLR 420, when he pointed out that ‘neither in 
Thompson nor in Grundt did Dixon J use the word “representation” as indicating a necessary 
element in his formulation of estoppel in pais.’
18 (1937) 59 CLR 641,674.
19 Eg: Evans v Bicknell (1801) 6 Ves 174; 31 ER 998, 1002; Burrowes v Lock (1805) 10 Ves 
470; 32 ER 927 929; Hammersley v De Biel (1845) 12 Cl & F 45; 8 ER 1312, 1320; Low v 
Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch 82 (discussed below, text accompanying nn 78-85).
20 (1802) 7 Ves 231; 32 ER 94.
21 (1811) 18 Ves Jun 328; 34 ER 1211, 1211.
22 (1853) 17 Beav 59; 51 ER 955, 960.
23 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 ER 1285, 1287.
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assumption or expectation. Lord Cranworth LC and Lord Wensleydale defined 
the principle narrowly, confining it to a situation where ‘a stranger begins to build 
on my land supposing it to be his own, and I, perceiving his mistake, abstain from 
setting him right’ .25 Lord Kingsdown stated the applicable principle in much 
broader terms. The principle articulated by Lord Kingsdown depended on a 
person laying out money on land on the faith of an agreement for an interest in 
the land or on the faith of ‘an expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord, 
that he shall have a certain interest’ in the land. Although Lord Kingsdown’s 
was a dissenting judgment, his statement of principle was quoted with approval 
by the Privy Council in Plimmer v Mayor o f Wellington27 and has proved more 
influential in subsequent cases, on the explicit assumption that Lord Kingsdown 
differed from the majority judges only on the inferences to be drawn from the 
facts.28 Accordingly, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel can be seen to be based 
on the representee-sided notion of an assumption or ‘expectation’ which has been 
‘created or encouraged’ by the representor’s conduct.
The foundational promissory estoppel cases were also more concerned with the 
effect of the representor’s conduct on the representee, rather than the nature of 
that conduct itself. That is no doubt attributable to the fact that the two cases on 
which the principle of promissory estoppel is based, Hughes v Metropolitan
29Railway Cop and Birmingham and District Land Co v London and North
o n
Western Railway Co, did not involve express promises, but rather assumptions 
induced by a course of conduct or silence. In each case one of the parties to an 
agreement had a limited period of time in which to perform certain acts (in
24 (1866) LR 1 HL 128.
25 Ibid 140 (Lord Cranworth LC) (emphasis added); 168 (Lord Wensleydale to similar effect). 
Lord Cranworth’s narrow definition of the applicable principle may be attributed to a concern 
not to offend the principle he laid down in Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, 
881-2, that an estoppel can only arise in relation to a representation of existing fact and not a 
representation of future intention. The broader statement of Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v 
Dyson seems quite inconsistent with Jorden v Money: see Mark Lunney, ‘Jorden v Money - A 
Time for Reappraisal’ (1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 559, 572.
26 (1866) LR 1 HL 129, 170.
27 (1884) 9 App Cas 699,710.
See, eg: Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29, 36-7 (Lord Denning MR), 38 (Danckwerts LJ); 
Pascoe v Turner [1979] 2 All ER 945, 949 (Cumming-Bruce LJ for the Court of Appeal); 
Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179, 188 (Lord Denning MR), 193-4 (Scarman LJ). 
29 (1877) 2 App Cas 439 (‘Hughes').
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Hughes, the making of repairs to demised premises, in Birmingham the 
completion of building works) on pain of a penalty or forfeiture. In neither case 
was an express promise or representation made that those obligations would be 
suspended, but rather the parties entered into correspondence which led the 
representee to believe that the obligation in question would be superseded by 
events. The principle articulated by Lord Caims LC in Hughes applied where 
parties to a contract involving a penalty or forfeiture had entered into negotiations 
which ‘had the effect of leading one o f the parties to suppose that the strict rights 
under the contract will not be enforced’ .31 The broader statement of principle by 
Bowen LJ in Birmingham was not restricted to cases involving a forfeiture, but 
applied wherever ‘persons who have contractual rights induce by their conduct 
those against whom they have such rights’ to believe that those rights would not 
be enforced or would be suspended.32 Neither principle was dependent on the 
representor engaging in a particular type of conduct: each depended on the 
broader, representee-sided requirement that some conduct on the part of the 
representor has induced the adoption of an assumption by the representee.
The principle extracted from those cases and others by Denning J in Central 
London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd was of quite a different 
nature, however, since it was based on a particular type of conduct being engaged 
in by the representor.34 The label ‘promissory estoppel’ is particularly apt to 
describe the principle outlined by Denning J, since the foundation of the doctrine 
was clearly the representor’s conduct itself, rather than the representee’s reliance 
on that conduct. As Don Greig and Jim Davis have observed, although it was
30 (1888) 40 Ch D 268 {'Birmingham').
31 (1877) 2 App Cas 439, 447 (emphasis added).
32 (1888) 40 Ch D 268, 286 (emphasis added).
33 Fenner v Blake [1900] 1 QB 426; In re Wickham (1917) 34 TLR 158; Re William Potter & 
Co Ltd [1937] 2 All ER 361; Buttery v Richard [1946] WN 25; Salisbury (Marquess) v 
Gilmore [1942] 2 KB 38.
34 [1947] 1 KB 130.
35 Denning LJ articulated the principle more clearly in his judgment in the Court of Appeal in 
Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215, 220:
The principle, as I understand it, is that, where one party has, by his words or conduct, 
made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations 
between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at 
his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be 
allowed to revert to the previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance has
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difficult to escape the conclusion that the principle did represent a form of 
estoppel, Denning J attempted to distil from the earlier decisions a principle 
based on promise, intention and reliance. As will be seen in the next chapter, 
the ‘reliance’ aspect of the principle was extremely weak, leaving the principle 
based essentially on promise and intention.
When the principle of promissory estoppel was applied in Je Maintiendrai Pty 
Ltd v Quaglia,37 the South Australian Supreme Court was strongly influenced by 
the approach formulated by Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer and Grundt v Great 
Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd in relation to estoppel in pais. The equitable 
principle applied in Je Maintiendrai, like the common law principle outlined by 
Dixon J, emphasised the representee’s reliance, rather than the representor’s
T O
conduct and intentions. King CJ in particular emphasised the similarity 
between estoppel in pais and promissory estoppel, and said he could see no 
valid reason for making a distinction between them .39 Both types of estoppel, 
he said, rest on the injustice to the representee or promisee of allowing a 
representor or promisor to depart from the representation or promise where the 
representee or promisee would suffer detriment as a consequence.40
C. The Contemporary Australian Approach
The tendency in the modem High Court estoppel cases has been toward applying 
Justice Dixon’s approach to both common law and equitable estoppel, treating 
both as based on the threshold requirement of an assumption induced by the 
representor’s conduct.41 In the first of those cases, Legione v Hateley42 the court
been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification 
which he himself has introduced, even though it is not supported in point of law by any 
consideration but only by his word.
36 DW Greig and JLR Davis, The Law of Contract (1987) 141-2.
37 (1980) 26 SASR 101.
38 Ibid 105-6 (King CJ), 113-5 (White J), 120 (Cox J).
39 Ibid 106.
40 Ibid.
41 A similar approach has been taken in New Zealand. In Prudential Building and Investment 
Society o f Canterbury v Hawkins [1997] 1 NZLR 114, 121, Hammond J held it to be the 
conventional view that three elements must be established for equitable estoppel to arise: ‘the 
creation or encouragement of a belief or expectation; reliance by the other party; and detriment
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was decisively split between the two different approaches to the threshold 
requirement for promissory estoppel. The minority favoured the ‘induced 
assumptions’ approach of Dixon J, while the majority required a clear 
representation or promise by the representor. That case provides a very good 
illustration of the practical significance of the choice between the two 
approaches, and will be discussed in detail below. In contrast with those in 
Legione v Hate ley, the judgments in the more recent cases have tended to 
emphasise the effect of the representor’s conduct on the representee, rather than 
the nature of the conduct engaged in by the representor.
In Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher,43 both the equitable estoppel applied 
by the majority and the common law estoppel applied by the minority were based 
on the threshold requirement of an assumption induced by the representor’s 
conduct. Waltons had negotiated to lease land from Mr and Mrs Maher, on 
terms which required the Mahers to demolish the existing building and 
construct a new building on the land. Waltons required the lease to be 
completed by a particular date. When negotiations were close to completion, 
the Mahers told Waltons’ representatives that the agreement would have to be 
concluded within a day or two to allow the building works to be completed by 
that date. On the same day, Waltons’ solicitors sent engrossed copies of the 
lease to the Mahers’ solicitors, noting that they were awaiting formal approval 
of some last-minute amendments requested by the Mahers, which had been 
verbally approved. Waltons’ solicitors agreed to inform the Mahers’ solicitors 
on the following day if any of the amendments were not agreed to. The 
engrossed copies of the lease were then duly signed by the Mahers and returned 
‘by way of exchange’. The Mahers heard nothing further from Waltons or their 
solicitors for over two months. Because of the urgency about completing the 
building works in time for the commencement of the lease, the Mahers began 
to demolish the existing building on the site. Waltons knew of this, but 
instructed their solicitors to ‘go slow’ on the transaction with the Mahers, since
as a result of that reliance.’ Those three elements had been articulated by Richardson J in 
Gillies v Keogh [19891 2 NZLR 327, 346.
42 (1983) 152 CLR 406, 421 (Gibbs CJ and Murphy J).
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Waltons was conducting a review of its retailing strategy in country areas 
which could, and ultimately did, make the new store redundant. It was only 
when the demolition was complete, and the building works had commenced, 
that Waltons informed the Mahers that it did not intend to proceed with the 
transaction because of a change in retailing policy.
The joint judgment of Mason CJ and Wilson J proceeded on the footing that 
the threshold requirement of both common law and equitable estoppel is that 
one party must have been induced to adopt an assumption, or encouraged to act 
on the basis of an assumption, by the conduct of another party. They found that 
the relevant assumption adopted by the Mahers was that an exchange of 
contracts would take place as a matter of course, and the facts did not justify the 
inference that they assumed that exchange had taken place or that a binding 
contract had been formed. Accordingly, there was no assumption of existing 
fact on which a common law estoppel could be founded.44 They did, however, 
find that a promissory estoppel arose, based on Waltons’ inaction in the 
circumstances, which ‘constituted clear encouragement or inducement’ to the 
Mahers to continue to act on the basis of the assumption that an exchange 
would take place 45
Brennan J also regarded an induced assumption as the threshold requirement of 
both common law and equitable estoppel. A common law estoppel in pais 
arises, he said, where a party ‘induces another to make an assumption that a 
state of affairs exists, knowing or intending the other to act on that 
assumption’ .46 Similarly, to establish an equitable estoppel, it is necessary for a 
plaintiff to prove, first, that he or she assumed that a particular legal 
relationship existed or would exist between the plaintiff and the defendant and, 
secondly, that the defendant induced the plaintiff to adopt that assumption or 
expectation.47 Like Mason CJ and Wilson J, Brennan J held that the Mahers
43 (1988) 164 CLR 387 (‘ Waltons Stores').
44 Ibid 397-9.
45 Ibid 407.
46 Ibid 413.
47 Ibid 428-9.
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had assumed that Waltons would complete the exchange of contracts, and 
Waltons’ silence in the circumstances induced the Mahers to continue to act on 
that assumption.48
The principle of ‘estoppel by conduct’ applied by Deane J also depended on one 
party being induced by another to adopt an assumption. Deane J found that 
Waltons’ ‘retention of the executed counterpart and its deliberate silence and 
inaction’ caused the Mahers to adopt an assumption that a binding agreement 
existed, and to act on that assumption to their detriment.49 The principle of 
estoppel by conduct applied by Deane J operated equally at common law and in 
equity and applied to an assumed future state of affairs in the same way as to an 
assumed fact.50 Accordingly, Deane J said that the result would have been the 
same if the assumption that Waltons led the Mahers to adopt was an assumption 
relating to its future conduct; namely, that Waltons would exchange contracts in 
due course.51
Gaudron J also adopted the language of assumptions, differentiating between 
common law and equitable estoppels on the basis that the former ‘operate by 
reference to an assumption of fact’, while the latter ‘operate by reference to an 
assumption as to rights.’52 Gaudron J found that the Mahers had assumed that 
exchange had taken place, which was an assumption of fact, raising the potential 
application of common law estoppel. The relevant issue was, therefore, whether 
Waltons had ‘so contributed to the assumption ... that it would be unjust or 
unfair if it were left free to ignore it. ’53 She found that Waltons’ failure to inform 
the Mahers that its attitude had changed was a ‘proximate cause’ of the Mahers’ 
adoption of the assumption.54 Thus, the threshold requirement for common law 
estoppel was met.
48 Ibid 429.
49 Ibid 444.
50 Ibid 446-52.
51 Ibid 446.
52 Ibid 458.
53 Ibid 461 (emphasis added).
54 Ibid 463.
103
The importance of Waltons Stores in the development of the threshold 
requirement for estoppel is that all varieties of estoppel applied by members of 
the High Court (equitable estoppel, a unified doctrine and common law estoppel) 
were based on the need for the representee to have adopted an assumption as a 
result of the representor’s conduct. As the High Court moved in Commonwealth v 
Verwayen towards a substantive doctrine of equitable estoppel, the assumptions- 
based approach adopted in Waltons Stores was clearly favoured by a majority of 
the court both in abstract formulations of the applicable principles and in the 
applications of those principles to the facts.55 The relevant facts were as follows.
Mr Verwayen was injured in 1964 in the collision of the naval vessels HMAS 
Voyager and HMAS Melbourne. Along with other sailors injured in the 
collision, Verwayen did not institute proceedings against the Commonwealth 
for some twenty years, assuming he was not owed a duty of care in those 
circumstances. A High Court decision in 1982 cast doubt on that assumption.56 
Following that decision, Verwayen instituted proceedings against the 
Commonwealth in 1984, claiming damages for negligence. The 
Commonwealth did not plead the limitations defence which was open to it, and 
nor did it deny that it owed a duty to Verwayen. Representations were made on 
behalf of the Commonwealth that a policy decision had been made not to plead 
those defences in any actions brought by survivors of the collision. In reliance 
on those representations, Verwayen continued to prosecute his action against 
the Commonwealth until 1986, when the Commonwealth sought leave to 
amend its defence to plead the relevant defences. The nature of the detriment 
Verwayen stood to suffer if the Commonwealth was allowed to depart from the 
assumption was not identified with precision because of the way in which the 
matter came before the Court,57 but it included at least wasted expense and 
inconvenience in prosecuting the action, and may also have included increased
55 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 413 (Mason CJ, unified doctrine), 444-5 (Deane J, unified doctrine), 
460 (Dawson J, equitable estoppel), 487 (Gaudron J, substantive doctrine of estoppel), 500 
(McHugh J, equitable estoppel).
56 Groves v Commonwealth (1982) 150 CLR 113.
57 See (1990) 170 CLR 394, 416 (Mason CJ) and 449 (Deane J).
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stress, anxiety and increased ill health.58 Verwayen claimed that the 
Commonwealth had irrevocably waived its right to plead the defences in 
question, or that an estoppel arose which prevented the Commonwealth from 
relying on those defences.
Mason CJ decided the case on the basis of a unified doctrine of estoppel which 
operates at common law and in equity and applies where a person ‘has relied 
upon an assumption as to a present, past or future state of affairs’ which has been 
induced by the party estopped.59 The Chief Justice’s application of that doctrine 
to the facts was also based on an induced assumption as the threshold 
requirement. Mason CJ found that the Commonwealth’s conduct induced 
Verwayen ‘to assume that the Commonwealth had made a decision not to plead 
the limitation defence or the Groves defence and that that decision would not be 
changed. ’60 He also found that assumption was a reasonable assumption for a 
person in Verwayen’s position to make.61 Since Verwayen continued his action 
against the Commonwealth on the faith of that assumption, an estoppel did arise 
against the Commonwealth, but an order for costs was a sufficient recompense 
for the detriment suffered by Verwayen. Accordingly, the estoppel did not 
prevent the Commonwealth from relying on the defences in question. “
Deane J also decided the case on the basis of a unified doctrine of estoppel by 
conduct and, like Mason CJ, articulated the principles of that doctrine on the 
basis of an induced assumption. The threshold requirement for the doctrine was 
an assumption adopted by a party as the basis of some action or inaction which 
would operate to that party’s detriment if the assumption was not adhered to by 
the representor. Deane J spelt out in some detail the circumstances in which a 
representor is regarded as playing such a part in the ‘adoption of, or persistence in 
the assumption’ that departure from it would be unconscionable. He held that 
the Commonwealth induced Verwayen’s assumption that ‘his action for damages
58 Ibid 448-9 (Deane J).
59 Ibid 413.
60 Ibid 414.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid 416-7.
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for negligence would proceed against the Commonwealth and be determined on 
the basis that liability was admitted.’64 Deane J found that Verwayen had suffered 
substantial detriment on the faith of that assumption, which was of such a nature 
that it was not unjust to hold the Commonwealth to the assumed state of affairs 
on the basis of which it had induced Verwayen to act.65
Dawson J also decided the case in favour of Verwayen, but on the basis of 
equitable estoppel. In formulating the principles of that doctrine, Dawson J drew 
on the principles of estoppel by conduct articulated by Dixon J in Thompson v 
Palmer and Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd, regarding Justice 
Dixon’s notion of ‘unjust departure from an assumption’ as equally relevant to an 
assumption with respect to future conduct.66 In his application of the principles of 
equitable estoppel to the facts, Dawson J spoke consistently of the assumption 
adopted by Verwayen. Verwayen was, he said, led by the Commonwealth’s 
conduct to assume that the latter would not raise a defence of limitation.67
McHugh J also analysed the principles of common law and equitable estoppel in 
terms of an induced assumption. The equitable doctrine, he said, creates new 
rights where one party has ‘induced the other party to assume that a different
£  Q
legal relationship exists or will exist between them’. Although, like Mason CJ, 
he found that the evidence of detriment was insufficient, he was prepared to 
assume that the first of the elements listed by Brennan J in Waltons Stores had 
been made out. That was a requirement that the plaintiff had assumed that a 
particular legal relationship existed or would exist between the plaintiff and the 
defendant.69
In contrast to the approach adopted by the other members of the Court in 
Verwayen, and in contrast to his own approach in Waltons Stores, Brennan J
63 Ibid 444. 
w Ibid 447.
65 Ibid 449.
66 Ibid 453.
67 Ibid 460.
68 Ibid 500.
69 Ibid 502.
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discussed equitable estoppel exclusively in terms of promises and 
representations. Equitable estoppel, he said, ‘ensures that a party who acts in 
reliance on what another has promised or represented suffers no unjust detriment 
thereby.’ He characterised the Commonwealth’s conduct as a promise, and 
considered the application of the principles of estoppel in terms of the detriment 
Verwayen would suffer as a result of his reliance on the Commonwealth’s 
promise. Brennan J did not consider that the Commonwealth was estopped 
from pleading the relevant defences, but would have ordered the matter to be 
remitted to the trial judge to ascertain the extent of Verwayen’s detriment.72
The judgments in Waltons Stores and Verwayen reveal a strong tendency towards 
a focus on induced assumptions, rather than representations or promises, in the 
formulation and application of the principles of common law estoppel, equitable 
estoppel and the unified doctrines. Thus, the representee-sidcd approach to the 
threshold requirement, which was developed by Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer 
in relation to common law estoppel, has come to dominate all manifestations of 
estoppel by conduct.73 Although there were occasional references in Waltons 
Stores, Foran v Wight, /4 and Verwayen to the representor-sided requirements of 
promises and representations, the main focus in each case was not on the type of 
conduct engaged in by the representor, but rather its effect on the representee.
70 Ibid 423 (emphasis added).
71 Ibid 428-30.
72 Ibid 431.
73 The ‘induced assumption’ approach to the threshold requirement has also dominated the 
cases since Verwayen, see, eg: Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling 
Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 324; Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines 
(1993) 177 CLR 485, 506 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); S & E 
Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637, 651-656 (Neaves,
Gummow and Higgins JJ); Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333, 361-84 (Ormiston J); 
Morris v FAI General Insurance Company Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Ins Cas 61-258, 75,884-5; W v G
(1996) 20 Farn LR 49, 66 (Hodgson J); Lyndel Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd
(1997) 37 IPR 599, 627-8 (Wilcox J), although the language of representations continues to be 
used occasionally, see, eg: Standard Chartered Bank Aust Ltd v Bank of China (1991) 23 
NSWLR 164, 177-81 (Giles J); Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd v Walker Nominees Pty Ltd 
(1992) 26 NSWLR 524, 538-41 (Handley JA); Territory Insurance Office v Adlington (1992) 
109 FLR 124, 127 (Mildren J).
74 (1989) 168 CLR 385, 411-2 (Mason CJ), 435-6 (Deane J), 449 (Dawson J).
75 Most notably in the judgment of Brennan J (1990) 170 CLR 394, 423, 429-30, in which the 
language of promises and representations was consistently used.
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Kevin Lindgren has also observed the movement towards a foundation for 
estoppel which requires an assumption, rather than a particular type of conduct on 
the part of the representor. He has noted that this movement has a tendency 
towards unifying the various types of estoppel operating at common law. Equally, 
it can be said that the movement has a tendency towards unifying common law 
and equitable estoppel, since it renders less important the distinction between 
promissory conduct and representational conduct. After Waltons Stores and 
Verwayen, it is clear that both the equitable and common law doctrines are 
founded on the adoption of an assumption by the representee, rather than on a 
particular type of conduct being engaged in by the representor.77 The requirement 
of an assumption does not, however, remove the most fundamental difference 
between common law and equitable estoppel, since we are left with the 
distinction as to the nature of the assumption adopted: between assumptions of 
existing fact and assumptions relating to the representor’s future conduct.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION
A. Induced Assumptions and Representations
Although the courts have not sought to draw any distinction between the 
‘representation’ approach and the ‘induced assumption’ approach, there is a 
philosophical difference, and potentially also a practical difference, between the 
two approaches. From a philosophical point of view, the choice illustrates the 
basic dichotomy in estoppel by conduct between, on the one hand, a concern with 
the conduct of the representor and, on the other, a concern with the position of the 
representee. A representation requirement is consistent with the notion that the 
doctrines are conscience-based, and are concerned with preventing a certain type 
of conduct. The representation requirement helps to define the type of conduct
76 Kevin Lindgren, ‘Estoppel in Contract’ (1989) 12 University o f New South Wales Law 
Journal 153, 156.
77 The position may be different in England. In Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P & CR 196, 207 
Hobhouse LJ suggested that the emphasis in estoppel by representation is on the representation, 
which must be clear and unequivocal, and ‘provided there is reliance, the detriment element 
may be limited.’ In proprietary estoppel, he suggested, the emphasis is the other way around, 
and while the detriment ‘must be distinct and substantial’, the conduct of the representor ‘may
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regarded as unconscionable. A representor-sided approach is also consistent with 
the notion that the doctrines are essentially concerned with the enforcement of 
promises and representations, and that liability stems primarily from the promise 
or the representation itself. An induced assumption requirement, on the other 
hand, is more consistent with the notion that the doctrines are reliance-based, and 
are essentially concerned with protecting against a certain type of harm. The role 
of the threshold requirement in a reliance-based doctrine is simply to help to 
define the type of harm against which the law provides protection.
There is also a significant difference in emphasis between the representation 
requirement and the induced assumption requirement, which may well have 
practical consequences. The importance of the distinction can be illustrated by 
reference to two cases, Low v Bouverie and Legione v Hateley, each of which 
turned on a failure on the part of the representee to fulfil a strict, representor­
sided threshold requirement. The plaintiff in Low v Bouverie proposed lending 
money to a borrower on the security of the borrower’s beneficial life interest in 
certain property. The plaintiffs solicitors wrote to the defendant, who was one of 
the trustees of the property, to inquire whether the borrower had mortgaged or 
parted with his life interest in the property. In his reply, the defendant disclosed 
the existence of two encumbrances on the property, but failed to disclose the 
existence of several others of which he had received notice, but forgotten. On the 
faith of that assurance, the plaintiff entered into the proposed transaction. The 
borrower was subsequently declared bankrupt and, as a result of the prior 
mortgages, the plaintiffs security was worthless.
The trial judge held that the defendant was liable to pay damages to the plaintiff 
for misrepresentation, on the authority of Burrowes v Lock and Slim v 
Croucher,80 both cases in which representations had been ordered to be made 
good in equity. The decision of the trial judge was overturned by the Court of 
Appeal on the basis that, following the decision of the House of Lords in Derry v
be no more than acquiescence.’
78 [1891] 3 Ch 82.
79 (1805) 10 Yes 470; 32 ER 927.
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Peek,81 an action for damages for misrepresentation could not be maintained in 
the absence of fraud. The Court of Appeal therefore approached the matter on 
the basis of estoppel. Had the plaintiff been able to make out an estoppel, the 
plaintiff would have been entitled to recover the value of the life interest from the 
defendant as trustee, subject only to the encumbrances disclosed by the 
defendant. The defendant would have been estopped from asserting the existence 
of the undisclosed prior encumbrances.83
The Court of Appeal found that no estoppel could be made out because there was 
no clear and unambiguous statement that the borrower’s interest in the property 
was not subject to encumbrances other than those disclosed. The requirement of 
precise and unambiguous language could not be fulfilled because the words used 
by the defendant could be understood to mean that the encumbrances disclosed 
were all he remembered at the time.84 In other words, they could be construed as 
a statement of his belief, without an assertion that what he believed was in fact 
true.
If one were to approache the question of estoppel in Low v Bouverie from the 
perspective of what the plaintiff assumed, rather than what the defendant 
represented, the pivotal inquiry would be an altogether different one. It seems to 
have been accepted that the plaintiff did assume that the property was not subject 
to any encumbrances other than those disclosed by the defendant. That 
assumption was clearly induced by the defendant’s conduct. It also seems clear 
that the plaintiff acted, by lending the money, on the faith of the assumption, and 
suffered a substantial loss as a result of that action when the assumption proved 
to be untrue. If the court had looked at what the plaintiff assumed, rather than 
what the defendant represented, therefore, the central question for the court 
would have been whether the plaintiff acted reasonably in adopting and acting
80 (1860) 1 De GF & J 518; 45 ER 462.
81 (1889) 14 App Cas 337.
82 The Court of Appeal held that Slim v Croucher had been wrongly decided, and that Burrowes 
v Lock could only be supported on the basis of estoppel: [1891] 3 Ch 82, 102 (Lindley LJ), 106 
(Bowen LJ), 109 (Kay LJ).
83 Ibid 103 (Lindley LJ), 106 (Bowen LJ), 113 (Kay LJ).
84 Ibid 103 (Lindley LJ), 106 (Bowen LJ), 114 (Kay LJ).
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upon the relevant assumption, rather than whether a clear and unambiguous 
statement had been made by the defendant. It must be conceded that the result in 
the case would be unlikely to have been different, since all three members of the 
court appeared to be of the opinion that the plaintiff ‘too hastily inferred’ that no 
other encumbrances existed.85 The case would, however, have turned on 
considerations quite different from those that occupied the court, and the court’s 
attention would have been focussed squarely on the conduct of the plaintiff, 
rather than on that of the defendant.
The difference between an assumption-based approach and a representation- 
based approach may well have affected the result of the High Court’s decision in
oz:
Legione v Hateley. The former approach was adopted by Gibbs CJ and Murphy 
J, who found that an estoppel did arise, while the latter was followed by Mason 
and Deane JJ, who held that no estoppel arose. The case concerned a contract for 
the sale of land. The purchasers failed to complete the purchase on the due date. 
The vendors then served a notice of intention to rescind the agreement if the 
purchase was not completed by 10 August. On 9 August, the purchasers’ solicitor 
telephoned the vendors’ solicitors and informed a Miss Williams, the secretary 
dealing with the matter, that the purchasers would be able to complete the 
purchase on 17 August. Miss Williams responded that she thought that would be 
all right, but would have to get instructions. As a consequence of that assurance, 
the purchasers did not attempt to tender the purchase price before the notice of 
rescission expired. The relevant issue for the court was whether an estoppel arose 
which prevented the vendors from insisting on the deadline and thus treating the 
contract as rescinded on 11 August.
Gibbs CJ and Murphy J did not require a particular type of conduct on the part of 
the representor, but held that an estoppel would arise if it were established that 
Miss Williams, by saying she would get instructions, had induced the purchasers’ 
solicitors to believe that the vendors’ right to rescind the contract would be kept
85 Ibid 104 (Lindley LJ); see similarly 106 (Bowen LJ) and 115 (Kay LJ).
86 (1983) 152 CLR 406, 421 (Gibbs CJ and Murphy J).
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in abeyance until instructions were obtained.87 The threshold question for the 
establishment of the estoppel was not whether the representor had made a 
promise or a representation, but whether the representor’s conduct had led the 
representee to believe that some right of the representor’s would not be enforced. 
Gibbs CJ and Murphy J found that that such a belief had been induced by Miss 
Williams’ conduct, and the purchasers had altered their position on the faith of 
that belief by failing to tender the purchase moneys, which were available on 9 
August.88 Accordingly, the vendors were estopped from treating the contract as 
rescinded.89
Although Mason and Deane JJ quoted liberally from the judgments of Dixon J in 
Thompson v Palmer and Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd, the 
principle of promissory estoppel which they applied was not based on the 
‘induced assumptions’ approach laid down by Dixon J in those cases. Instead, 
Mason and Deane JJ held that a promissory estoppel could only result from a 
clear representation made by the representor as to his or her future conduct.90 
They found that Miss Williams did not, by her words or conduct, make any clear 
and unequivocal representation to the effect that the purchasers could disregard 
the time fixed by the notice of rescission.91 Accordingly, no estoppel arose 
against the vendors, despite the finding that the purchasers had acted to their 
detriment on the faith of Miss Williams’ representation. The fifth member of 
the Court, Brennan J, held that the vendors’ solicitors had no actual or implied 
authority to vary the effect of the notice of intention to rescind, and thus could not 
extend the time for completion. Since the purchasers’ solicitors must be taken to 
have known of the limit of Miss Williams’ authority, no promise or
87 Ibid 421.
88 Ibid 422.
89 Ibid 423. Gibbs CJ and Murphy J did not name the type of estoppel which arose, but referred 
to the principles articulated by Lord Cairns LC in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 
App Cas 39, 448 and Bowen LJ in Birmingham and District Land Co v London and North 
Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268, 286, as developed in Central London Property Trust 
Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 and affirmed by the House of Lords in Tool Metal 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 2 All ER 657 and by the Privy 
Council in Ajayi v RTBriscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 3 All ER 556, 559.
90 (1983) 152 CLR406, 438.
91 Ibid 440.
92 Ibid 438.
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representation that the time for completion was to be extended could be inferred 
from Miss Williams’ conduct.93 The finding that no estoppel arose thus 
commanded a majority.
The difference between the conclusions reached by the minority and majority 
judges in Legione v Hateley appears to be entirely attributable to the approaches 
taken. Mason and Deane JJ focussed on the conduct engaged in by the 
representor, and required a particular type of conduct, namely a clear and 
unequivocal representation.94 Gibbs CJ and Murphy J, on the other hand, 
focussed on the effect of the representor’s conduct on the representee and, 
accordingly, required only that the conduct of the representor had induced a belief 
in the representee. The difference between the two judgments is that the doctrine 
applied by Mason and Deane JJ appeared to one based on promise, in which the 
obligation arose from the promise itself. Such a doctrine must require an 
unequivocal promise. Gibbs CJ and Murphy J, on the other hand, appeared to be 
applying a doctrine of estoppel which was essentially concerned with the 
representee’s reliance, rather than the representor’s conduct.
Greig and Davis have also observed a philosophical difference between the two 
judgments.95 They see the judgment of Mason and Deane JJ as exemplifying the 
philosophy of those who regard promissory estoppel as an extraordinary means of 
giving effect to promises made without consideration. On such a view it is 
necessary to require a higher standard of proof than is the case with a contractual 
promise, since the latter is supported by consideration. The judgment of Gibbs CJ 
and Murphy J, on the other hand, embodies the philosophy of judges and 
commentators who more readily accept promissory estoppel ‘as a normal part of 
the law’ and are, therefore, ‘content to state its requirements in terms of what a 
reasonable person in the position of the promisee would understand from the 
words or conduct of the promisor. ’96 Greig and Davis suggest that the difference
93 Ibid 453-5.
94 Although Brennan J did not discuss the requirements of an estoppel, the relevant inquiry he 
made was whether a promise or representation could be inferred, ibid 454.
95 Greig and Davis, above n 36, 149-157.
96 Ibid 149.
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between the two approaches should be resolved in favour of the objective 
approach of Gibbs and Murphy JJ, ‘based on the overriding concept of reasonable 
reliance. ’97
Greig and Davis’ interpretation of the philosophical divide in Legione v Hateley 
is consistent with the above analysis of the case in terms of a divergence between 
a promise-based, representor-sided approach and a reliance-based, representee­
sided approach to the threshold requirement. As the above discussion shows, later 
decisions of the High Court have tended to favour the reliance-based approach 
advocated by Greig and Davis. If that approach had been favoured by the High 
Court in Legione v Hateley then, since the representor’s conduct clearly induced a 
belief on the part of the representees, and the representees clearly relied on that 
assumption to their detriment, the crucial issue should have been whether it was 
reasonable for the representees to adopt and act upon the assumption as they did.
B. Induced Assutnptions and Promises
There are two distinct aspects to the induced assumption requirement. The first 
relates to the state of mind of the representee in adopting the relevant assumption, 
while the second relates to the role of the representor in inducing the adoption of 
the assumption. The induced assumption requirement is concerned with both the 
position of the representee and the responsibility of the representor for that 
position. To that extent, the threshold requirement could be said to be consistent 
with both a reliance basis and a conscience basis for the doctrine. The induced 
assumptions approach does, however, focus on the representee rather more than 
might otherwise be the case. Any doctrine of estoppel must require a particular 
threshold of conduct on the representor’s side, and the requirement of an induced 
assumption is a relatively weak requirement in that regard, establishing a low 
threshold of conduct on the part of the representor to found an estoppel. A 
doctrine of estoppel which is principally concerned with the representor, whether 
promise-based or conscience-based, might establish a threshold which looks for a
97 Ibid 155.
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particular type of conduct on the part of the representor, requiring a 
representation or a promise as the foundation of the estoppel.
A useful comparison can be drawn in this regard between equitable estoppel in 
Australia, and the equivalent doctrine in the United States, in which a promise is 
required to establish liability. The United States doctrine of promissory estoppel 
is the equivalent of equitable estoppel in Australia, protecting reliance on 
assumptions relating to the future conduct of a representor. The principle of 
‘equitable estoppel’ operating in the United States is essentially the same as 
common law estoppel in Australia. It is said that equitable estoppel can apply 
only in relation to representations of existing fact, and can only be raised 
defensively to prevent the representor from asserting contrary facts 98
What appears at first blush to be a significant difference between promissory 
estoppel in the United States and Australian equitable estoppel is that promissory 
estoppel in the United States must, as its name suggests, be based on a promise. 
Liability depends on the making of a promise which is, or may be,99 gratuitous, 
in the sense that consideration which can properly be regarded as the price of 
the promise has not been given in return for the promise.100 Section 90 of the 
Restatement of Contracts (2d) describes promissory estoppel as follows:
98 Tiffany Inc v WMK Transit Mix Inc 56 ALR 1028, 1224-5 (Arizona Court of Appeals, 1972) 
and American Jurisprudence (2nd ed, 1965), vol 28, 625 ff. It seems that, like Anglo-Australian 
common law estoppel, the US principle of equitable estoppel may at times be extended to apply 
to representations relating to existing legal rights, and the principle will then prevent the 
representor from asserting contrary rights.
99 There have been suggestions that promissory estoppel is being relied on in the United States, 
in lieu of traditional contract theory, in cases where bargained for consideration has been given: 
DA Färber and JH Matheson, ‘Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the Invisible 
Handshake’ (1985) 52 University o f Chicago Law Review 903, 908; PN Pham, ‘The Waning of 
Promissory Estoppel’ (1994) 79 Cornell Law Review 1263, 1267-8. That situation should not 
arise in Australia because a plaintiff who has enforceable contractual rights arising from a 
promise should not be regarded as suffering detriment as a result of their reliance on that 
promise. In Lyndel Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1997) 37 IPR 599, however, 
Wilcox J considered whether the promise in question was enforceable on the basis of equitable 
estoppel (which it was not) before considering whether it was enforceable on the basis of 
contract (which it was).
100 The bargain theory of consideration applied in the US is encapsulated in ss 17 and 71 of the 
Restatement of Contracts (2d).
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A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action 
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which 
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for 
breach may be limited as justice requires.
Section 2 of the second Restatement defines a promise as a ‘manifestation of 
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a 
promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.’ Jay Feinman has 
observed that the US courts have in some cases adopted a flexible 
interpretation of the ‘promise’ requirement, which has allowed them to infer 
promises in cases in which no explicit promise has been made. 101 It is perhaps 
significant in this regard that the requirement of an ‘undertaking’, which 
appeared in the first Restatement, was abandoned in the second. “ In other 
cases a strict approach has been taken, which requires a definite promise, rather 
than a mere representation or statement of intention. Michael Metzger and 
Michael Phillips advocate a liberal approach to the ‘promise’ requirement on 
the basis that it is the promisee’s reliance, rather than the promise itself, that is 
fundamental.103
The fact that a promise is not required to establish liability in Australia indicates 
that the court’s concern is not with the type of conduct engaged in by the 
representor, but with the impact that conduct has on the representee.104 A 
promise is just one way in which a representor can induce a representee to
101 Jay Feinman, ‘Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method’ (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 
678, 690-4
102 John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy o f Language (1969) has argued that 
the undertaking of an obligation to perform an act is the essential feature of a promise. Neil 
MacCormick, ‘Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers F (1972) Supp Vol 46 The 
Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society 59, 62 and Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice, Police, 
Revenue and Arms (Edwin Cannan ed, 1896) 130-1, on the other hand, have suggested that the 
intention on the part of the speaker to induce reliance is the hallmark of a promise.
103 Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips, ‘The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an 
Independent Theory of Recovery’ (1983) 35 Rutgers Law Review 412, 537-9.
11)4 It is interesting to note, however, that Stanley Henderson, ‘Promissory Estoppel and 
Traditional Contract Doctrine’ (1969) 78 Yale Law Journal 343, 361 has justified the US 
requirement for a ‘genuine promise’ on a reliance basis, suggesting that ‘promissory estoppel 
protects reasonable reliance, and ... reliance is only reasonable if it is induced by an actual
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adopt an assumption as to the representee’s legal rights or the future conduct of 
the representor. Such an assumption can also be induced by a course of conduct 
which indicates that the representor will act in a certain way or that the parties 
have certain rights, 105 a representation as to the representor’s intention to act in 
a certain way or as to the existing legal rights of the parties, 106 or even silence
107in certain circumstances.
As Hugh Collins has observed, it is difficult to judge whether there is any 
substantive difference between the US and Australian approaches, since 
promises can be implied from statements and other conduct. The Australian 
doctrine does, however, appear to have a greater potential for application to a 
case of reckless or inadvertent conduct by a representor. Much of the US 
commentary appears to be based on the assumption that promissory estoppel 
will arise only in relation to promises deliberately made. 109 The Australian 
doctrine, on the other hand, appears to have the potential to catch careless 
conduct by a representor which leads a representee to assume the representor 
will act in a certain way, but which could not be regarded as conveying a 
promise or commitment by the representor to act in that way.
A promise is, therefore, just one of several different types of conduct on which 
an estoppel can be founded in Australia. Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips 
have suggested that, in the United States, ‘estoppel’s reliance component may 
eventually so come to dominate its “promissory” aspect as to render the latter 
nugatory. ’ 110 In Australia, it could be argued that the reliance aspect already so 
dominates the promise aspect. If the relatively low threshold of an induced 
assumption is all that is required to found an estoppel, then that suggests that 
the fundamental concern of the doctrines is elsewhere. The chapters to follow
promise.’
105 See, eg, S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637.
106 See, eg, Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394.
107 See, eg, Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387.
108 Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (2nd ed, 1993) 71-2.
109 As Feinman, above n 101, 687, has noted, ‘the typical doctrinal formulation of promissory 
estoppel holds out as its paradigmatic case a clear promise manifesting a commitment to future 
action’.
110 Above n 103, 537.
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will show that the focus of both the common law and equitable doctrines 
appears to be on the detrimental reliance of the representee, rather than the 
representor’s conduct.
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Chapter 4
DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
A feature of both common law and equitable estoppel in Australia is the 
requirement that a representee must rely on the relevant assumption, by acting 
or refraining from acting in such a way that the representee will suffer 
detriment if the representor is allowed to depart from that assumption. That 
requirement of detrimental reliance by the representee is a central element of 
both common law and equitable estoppel in Australia. This chapter will trace 
the development of the detrimental reliance requirement in the common law 
and equitable doctrines. It will reveal the importance of the requirement in the 
Australian doctrines, and the strictness with which it is applied in most cases. It 
will also emphasise the theoretical implications of the adoption of a strict 
detrimental reliance requirement, comparing different promise-based and 
conscience-based alternatives which have been proposed in England.
I. ENGLISH ORIGINS
A. The Early Cases
The need for a representee to change his or her position on the faith of a 
representation has long been a requirement of estoppel at common law and in 
equity. Although the language has been refined in modem times with the 
advent of the expression detrimental reliance, and even the drawing of 
distinctions between different types of detriment, the requirement has not 
fundamentally changed. The courts in the early cases at common law and in 
equity tended to be concerned with the question whether the representee had 
acted on the representation or had changed his or her position on the faith of the 
representation. Looking first at estoppel by representation of fact, the leading 
early cases at common law and in equity required a change of position. In 
Pickard v Sears, a case described as the first enunciation in England of estoppel
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by representation as a distinct branch of estoppel,1 the court held that the 
representee must be induced to ‘act on that belief [which the representor has 
caused the representee to adopt], so as to alter his own previous position’ 
before an estoppel will arise.2 Similarly, in equity, an estoppel by 
representation of fact was said to arise where ‘a representation is made to 
another person going to deal in a matter of interest upon the faith of that 
representation,’3 and where the representee has ‘acted on the faith of such 
representation.’4
It appears that a test of similar strictness was applied in those cases falling 
within equity’s jurisdiction to make good representations of intention. Even in 
the 1378 case discussed by Ames, the modern requirement would have been 
satisfied. There, the plaintiff laid out money in travelling to London to consult 
counsel on the faith of the defendant’s promise to convey land to him. The 
detriment incurred by the plaintiff in that case is similar to that suffered by the 
representee in Re Neal,5 where the detriment consisted of the legal costs 
incurred by a debtor in making arrangements for a payment which the creditor 
represented would be accepted in satisfaction of the debtor’s obligations. In the 
leading 19th century case of Hammersley v De Biel,6 the court was concerned 
only with the question whether the plaintiff had ‘acted on’ the defendant’s 
representation of an intention to make a gift. The more stringent modern tests 
would appear to have been satisfied, however, since the plaintiff acted on the 
faith of the relevant assumption by marrying, thereby incurring significant 
financial obligations according to the law and custom of the day.
By the end of the 19th century it was clear that both an alteration of position 
(including a failure to act)7 on the faith of a representation,8 and loss or
1 Lancelot Everest, Everest and Strode's Law o f Estoppel (2nd ed, 1907) 325.
2 (1837) 6 Ad & E 469; 112 ER 179,
3 Evans v Bicknell (1801) 6 Ves 174; 31 ER 998, 1002.
4 West v Jones (1851) 1 Sim (NS) 205; 61 ER 79, 81 (Lord Cranworth VC).
5 Re Neal; ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 659.
6 (1845) 12 Cl & F 45; 8 ER 1312.
7 McKenzie v British Linen Co (1881) 6 App Cas 82, 91 (Lord Selborne LC).
8 Cases in which estoppels failed on that ground before the turn of the century include Howard 
v Hudson (1853) 2 E & B 1; 118 ER 669 (Ct of Ex Chamber); Carr v London and North
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prejudice resulting from that alteration of position,* 9 were required to establish 
an estoppel at common law and in equity. It was clearly insufficient then, as it 
is today, merely to show that the representee has acted on the faith of the 
representation. The representee must show that he or she will suffer some harm 
as a result of taking such action if the representor is allowed to deny the truth of 
the representation, as the speech of Lord Robertson in George Whitechurch Ltd 
v Cavanagh10 demonstrates. Lord Robertson held that no estoppel arose in that 
case because, although the representee had clearly altered his position in 
reliance on the representation, he did not establish that he had suffered 
detriment as a result. The case was concerned with a transfer of shares in the 
appellant company, made by way of security to the respondent. The 
respondent’s case was that, on the faith of representations made on behalf of 
the appellant that he was getting a good transfer of shares, the respondent 
released the debtor from two forms of French legal process called, respectively, 
an ‘opposition’ and a ‘saisie’. Nether of those forms of process, however, gave 
the respondent any priority over any other creditor. Accordingly, in Lord 
Robertson’s view, no estoppel arose because it was not shown that the 
representee had lost money as a result of his actions ‘which he would have got 
if he had not so acted’.11
B. Proprietary Estoppel
The requirement of detrimental reliance developed somewhat later in 
proprietary estoppel, no doubt as a result of confusion as to the juridical basis 
of the court’s intervention in the early cases. That confusion is evident in the
Western Railway Co (1875) LR 10 CP 307, 317 (Brett and Denman LJJ); Simm v Anglo-
American Telegraph Co (1879) 5 QBD 188, 211 (Brett LJ); Horsfall v Halifax & Huddersfield
Union Banking Co (1883) 52 LJ Ch 599, 602 (Pearson J). See further George Spencer Bower
and Sir Alexander Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation (3rd ed, 1977) 101-
9.
9 Carr v London and North Western Railway Co (1875) LR 10 CP 307, 317 (Brett and Denham 
JJ). Subsequently, in Greenwood v Martin’s Bank Ltd [1933] AC 51, 57 Lord Tomlin said that 
an act or omission resulting from the representation and consequent detriment are essential 
factors giving rise to an estoppel.
10 [1902] AC 117.
11 Ibid 136.
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approach taken by Lord Westbury LC in Dillwyn v Llewelyn} 2 The plaintiffs 
father offered him a farm so that the plaintiff could build a house on it and live 
near his father. The plaintiff accepted the offer, and the father signed a 
memorandum ‘presenting’ the farm to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then took 
possession of the farm and expended a large sum of money in building a house 
on it. The land was not effectively conveyed to the plaintiff and, on the father’s 
death, passed under his will to others. The Master of the Rolls declared the 
plaintiff entitled to a life interest in the property. On appeal, the Lord 
Chancellor held that ‘the son’s expenditure on the faith of the memorandum 
supplied a valuable consideration and created a binding obligation’ on the 
father to transfer the fee simple to the son in accordance with the 
memorandum. 13 The plaintiffs expenditure in Dillwyn v Llewelyn would 
clearly satisfy the modem detriment requirement. Uncertainty as to the basis of 
the court’s intervention led Lord Westbury LC to describe the plaintiff’s 
detriment as a ‘consideration’, perhaps using the term in the broad sense of a 
reason for enforcement of the promise. 14
Unlike estoppel by representation, proprietary estoppel operated within a 
narrow factual scope, and consequently its elements did not need to be defined 
in abstract terms. It was confined in its operation to assumptions relating to 
interests in property, and the facts of the early cases were such that detriment 
was not an issue. In Ramsden v Dyson, for example, Lord Cranworth LC 
stipulated that the doctrine arose where ‘a stranger builds on my land supposing 
it to be his’ , 15 while Lord Kingsdown’s formulation required a person to lay out 
money upon the relevant land on the faith of the relevant promise or 
expectation. 16 The requirement was stated more broadly in Willmott v Barber,
12 (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 ER 1285.
13 Ibid 1287.
14 As discussed in Chapter 1, Lord Westbury’s characterisation of the plaintiffs expenditure as 
a ‘valuable consideration’ led some to believe that the plaintiff succeeded in Dillwyn v Llewelyn 
on the basis of contract, rather than an equity arising by way of estoppel, see, eg: Beaton v 
McDivitt (1985) 13 NSWLR 134 (Young J). That reading of Dillwyn v Llewelyn was rejected 
by the Court of Appeal in Beaton v McDivitt: (1987) 13 NSWLR 162, 170 (Kirby P), 182 
(McHugh JA).
15 (1866) LR 1 E & I App 129, 140.
16 Ibid 170.
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where Fry J held that ‘the plaintiff must have expended some money or done 
some act (not necessarily upon the defendant’s land) on the faith of his 
mistaken belief. Notwithstanding the different forms in which the principle 
was stated, it is clear that the notion of expenditure on the faith of a promise or 
expectation of an interest in land is equivalent to the modern requirement of 
detrimental reliance, as Dunn LJ made clear in Greasley v Cooke: ‘There is no 
doubt that for proprietary estoppel to arise the person claiming must have 
incurred expenditure or otherwise have prejudiced himself or acted to his 
detriment.’18
C. Promissory Estoppel
1. The Approach of the Courts
The position is somewhat different in the case of promissory estoppel. The two 
nineteenth century cases on which the modern principle was founded, Hughes v 
Metropolitan Railway Co19 and Birmingham & District Land Co v London & 
North-Western Railway Co, did not require detrimental reliance, although 
indirect references to a change of position can be found in the each case. In 
Hughes, the reference to a change of position may be found in the requirement 
that it must be inequitable for the representor to assert his or her legal rights 
before the relevant principle will operate. Lord Cairns LC required that, for the 
principle to operate, the course of negotiations between parties to a contract 
should lead one of them to suppose that certain rights involving a forfeiture will
17 (1880) 15 Ch D 96, 105.
18 [1980] 1 WLR 1306, 1313-4. Cf the dictum of Lord Denning MR, ibid 1311-2, that it was 
not necessary for the representee in that case to prove that she acted to her detriment or to her 
prejudice, but was sufficient if she acted on the faith of the assurance in such circumstances that 
it would be unjust for the representor to go back on the assurance. PV Baker and PSÜ Langan, 
Snell’s Equity (29th ed, 1990) 574, fn 74, suggest that Lord Denning’s dictum should be 
confined to disputing that expenditure on the faith of the representation is essential. More 
recently, in Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P & CR 196, 207, Hobhouse LJ suggested that the 
detriment suffered by a representee must be ‘distinct and substantial’ before a proprietary 
estoppel will be made out. Lord Denning’s suggestion that detriment is not required has been 
somewhat more influential in the promissory estoppel cases, see below, text accompanying nn 
26-40.
19 (1877) 2 App Cas 439 {’Hughes').
20 (1888) 40 Ch D 268 {'Birmingham').
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not be enforced. A court of equity would then prevent those rights from being 
enforced.21 He did not require that the representee should have acted on the 
faith of that belief, but held that the representor would not be allowed to 
enforce the rights in question ‘where it would be inequitable having regard to 
the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties.’ There was no 
intimation in the judgment as to the particular factors which Lord Cairns saw as 
rendering it inequitable for the representor to enforce his or her rights. As will 
be discussed below, the requirement that it must be ‘inequitable’ to enforce 
rights before a promissory estoppel will arise has more recently been 
interpreted as incorporating a change of position requirement. The principle 
laid down in Hughes was applied by the High Court of Australia in Bams v 
Queensland National Bank Ltd, apparently on the basis that the representee had 
established that he had acted or refrained from acting on the faith of the
9 0
arrangement made with the representor.
In Birmingham, Bowen LJ broadened the Hughes principle beyond cases of 
forfeiture. According to Bowen LJ, the principle operated where persons 
having contractual rights induced those against whom they had those rights to 
believe that they would not be enforced. Interestingly, however, Bowen LJ held 
that a court of equity would not allow the representor to enforce the rights in 
question, ‘without at all events placing the parties in the same position as they 
were before.,24 Presumably, therefore, if a representee had not altered his or her 
position on the faith of his or her belief that the rights in question would not be 
enforced, the representor would be free to enforce his or her strict legal rights. 
Viscount Simonds in Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electrical 
Co Ltd emphasised the importance of those last words of Bowen LJ because, he 
said, ‘the gist of the equity lies in the fact that one party has by his conduct led 
the other to alter his position. ’25
21 (1877) 2 App Cas 439, 447.
22 Ibid.
23 (1906) 3 CLR 925, 939. The doctrinal basis of the decision was not made clear by the Court, 
on the footing that it did not matter whether the representation was enforced on the basis of 
estoppel by representation or as a contract for valuable consideration: ibid 940.
24 (1888) 40 Ch D 268, 286 (emphasis added).
23 [1955] 1 WLR 761, 763-4. The importance of the words in question was also emphasised by
124
If the judgments of Lord Cairns and Bowen LJ can be interpreted to require a 
change of position before the principle can be invoked, such a requirement was 
clearly not adopted by Denning J in his formulation of the principle of 
promissory estoppel in Central London Property Trust v High Trees House26 
and subsequent cases. In that case, Denning J articulated the principle that a 
promise is binding if ‘intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon and in 
fact acted upon\ Lord Denning reiterated the principle in essentially that 
form in a number of subsequent decisions in the Queens Bench Division of the 
High Court28 and in the Court of Appeal.29 In WJ Alan & Co v El Nasr Export 
and Import Co, Lord Denning explicitly distinguished between the 
requirement of acting on the faith of the relevant promise or assurance and the 
requirement of detriment, holding the former to be all that was required to 
establish a promissory estoppel.
The case was concerned with the currency of payment under a contract for the 
sale of coffee. Although the agreed price was denominated in Kenyan shillings, 
the buyers set up a confirmed letter of credit in pounds sterling, the Kenyan 
shilling and the sterling shilling at that time being of equal value. That letter of 
credit was accepted by the Kenyan sellers, who in due course submitted 
invoices expressed in sterling and were paid in sterling under the credit. Before 
the sellers presented the final invoice, sterling was devalued. The sellers 
claimed that the currency of account was Kenyan shillings, and that they were
White J in Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101, 110-111, who noted that 
the suggestion that there must be some restoration of the altered position before the promisor 
will be allowed to go back on his promise suggests in turn that there has been some suffering of 
detriment by the promisee.
26 [1947] 1 KB 130.
27 Ibid 136. Although it is not clear from the passage quoted, the principle applied only in 
relation to a promise not to enforce existing legal rights and could only be relied upon 
defensively, to prevent the promisor from acting in a manner inconsistent with the promise (ibid 
134).
28 Foot Clinics (1943) Ltd v Cooper’s Gowns Ltd [1947] 1 KB 506, 510-11; Robertson v 
Minister o f Pensions [1949] 1 KB 227, 230.
29 Charles Rickards Ltd v Oppenhaim [1950] 1 KB 616, 623; Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 
215, 220; Plasticmoda Societa Per Azione v Davidsons (Manchester) Ltd [1952] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
527, 539; WJ Alan & Co Ltd v El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 QB 189, 213; Wallis’s 
Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and BP Ltd [1974] 3 All ER 575, 580; Brikom 
Investments Ltd v Carr [1979] 2 All ER 753, 758.
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entitled to payment of an additional amount sufficient to bring the price up to 
the agreed price in Kenyan shillings. That claim was accepted by the trial 
judge, Orr J, who rejected the buyers’ claim that the sellers had lost their right 
to be paid in Kenyan shillings. Orr J held that a promissory estoppel was not 
established because there was no evidence of any representation by the sellers, 
and no evidence that the buyers had acted to their detriment in reliance on any
' j  i
such representation.
The Court of Appeal, by majority, overturned Justice Orr’s decision, on the 
basis that the sellers had waived their right to payment in Kenyan shillings. 
Lord Denning MR appeared to regard waiver as a part of the principle of 
promissory estoppel.'“ Referring to the trial judge’s rejection of the High Trees 
doctrine on the basis that there was no evidence of detriment, Lord Denning 
said that he could find no support in the authorities cited by the trial judge that 
there must be a detriment. All that was required, he said, was that ‘one should 
have “acted on the belief induced by the other party.’” 33 Lord Denning MR 
held, therefore, that by accepting a letter of credit denominated in pounds 
sterling the sellers had waived their right to payment in Kenyan currency.34 
Megaw LJ also found that the buyers were entitled to rely on the principle 
stated by Lord Cairns LC in Hughes, but preferred not to formulate the nature 
of that principle.35 Stephenson LJ agreed that the appeal should succeed on the 
ground of ‘waiver or variation’, but chose to leave open the question whether 
detriment was required. He said that the buyers in this case had acted to their 
detriment on the seller’s waiver, although he did not specify what constituted 
that detriment.36 It is, with respect, difficult to see what detriment had been
30 L1972] 2 QB 189.
31 Ibid 193.
32 Ibid 212 (citations omitted):
It is an instance of the general principle which was first enunciated by Lord Cairns LC 
in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co and rescued from oblivion by Central London 
Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd. The principle is much wider than waiver 
itself: but waiver is a good instance of its application.
33 Ibid 213-4, quoting Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 1 
WLR 761,799 (Lord Cohen).
34 [1972] 2 QB 189,214.
35 Ibid 218.
36 Ibid 221.
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suffered by the buyers. The only detriment they could claim to have suffered 
was the cost of setting up the sterling credit, but any such cost was incurred 
before the sellers represented that they would accept payment in that form, and 
was not suffered as a result of reliance on that representation. Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeal’s decision appears to stand as authority for the proposition 
that detriment is not required to establish a promissory estoppel in England.38
Stronger requirements have, however, been applied in subsequent cases. The 
Privy Council in Ajayi v RT Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd stipulated that the 
representee must have ‘altered his position’ on the faith of the faith of the 
promise.39 In the Court of Appeal in James v Heim Gallery (London) Ltd, 
Buckley LJ held that the representee must have altered his or her position to his 
or her disadvantage, while Oliver J held that a representee must ‘alter his 
position in reliance upon the representation’ in such a way that it would be 
inequitable to permit the representor to depart from it.40
2. Commentators’ Interpretations
Lord Denning has, in his extra-judicial writings, sought to draw a distinction 
between deliberate promises that one’s legal rights will not be enforced and 
conduct which induces another party to adopt an assumption that one’s legal 
rights will not be enforced.41 The approach articulated by Lord Denning makes 
it clear that he regarded detriment as unnecessary in the case of a deliberate
37 Malcolm Clarke, ‘Bankers’ Commercial Credits Among the High Trees’ (1974) 33 
Cambridge Law Journal 260, 286-7, has suggested that, in reliance on the sellers’ acceptance 
of the credit, the buyers lost the opportunity to acquire substitute goods, and thereby exposed 
themselves to a breach of a contract to on-sell the goods. But since the sellers did not terminate 
the contract for the buyers’ breach in relation to the credit, but delivered the goods in 
accordance with the contract, no such detriment would have been suffered as a result of the 
sellers’ enforcement of their legal right to payment in Kenyan currency. The detriment must be 
assessed at the time the representor seeks or attempts to resile from the assumption: Je 
Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101, 114 (White J), 117 (Cox J).
38 In his subsequent judgment in Brikom v Carr [1979] 2 All ER 753, 758, Lord Denning 
observed that suggestions that a party must have altered his position on the faith of a promise or 
representation, meaning that he must have acted differently from what he would otherwise have 
done, gives too limited a scope to the principle of promissory estoppel.
39 [1964] 3 All ER 556, 559.
40 (1980) 256 EG 819, 821 (Buckley LJ), 825 (Oliver LJ).
41 AT Denning, ‘Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Consideration’ (1952) 15 Modern
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promise. That is because the requirement of an intention to affect the parties’ 
legal relations stands as a substitute for detriment in what is an essentially 
contractual source of rights. In the case of a promise not to enforce certain legal 
rights, which promise is intended to affect the parties’ legal relations and to be 
acted upon by the promisee, Lord Denning suggested that detriment is not 
required:
In those cases the promise is binding as soon as the other party has 
acted on it, and the only question then that can arise is as to the true 
interpretation of the promise. These cases seem to fall more naturally 
under the law of contract, rather than the law of estoppel.42
Lord Denning distinguished between those cases and cases in which there was 
no promise, but only conduct by a representor which has led a representee 
reasonably to believe that the representor will not enforce his or her strict legal 
rights against the representee. In that latter category of case an intention to 
affect the parties’ legal relations is not required, and the right of the representor 
to insist on his or her legal rights is lost only if the representee has acted to his 
or her prejudice. Lord Denning thought those cases were best characterised as 
cases of estoppel.43
Lord Denning conceded that the distinction he sought to draw had not up to 
that time been drawn in the cases, and more recent cases do not show any signs 
of adopting it. Nevertheless, Lord Denning’s analysis is interesting because it 
clearly articulates two notions which appear to emerge from his judgments. 
First, that he sees an ‘intention to affect legal relations’ requirement as an 
alternative to detrimental reliance in the case of promissory estoppel. Secondly, 
that he sees promissory estoppel as based on the promisor’s intention and, 
therefore, as an essentially contractual source of obligation. Being ultimately 
based on intention, that source of obligation can be distinguished from
Law Review 1.
42 Ibid 9.
43 Ibid.
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obligations arising from estoppel proper, which are founded on the 
representee’s reliance.
Although Lord Denning’s approach does not represent the law in Australia, it is 
important in the current discussion to bear in mind the notion that an intention 
to create legal relations requirement could be regarded as an alternative to 
detrimental reliance, particularly if one sees promissory estoppel as an 
essentially contractual form of obligation based on the enforcement of 
promises. This distinction will be raised again in Chapter 6, in the context of 
the unconscionability requirement, in response to suggestions that an ‘intention 
to affect legal relations’ is one of the requirements of equitable estoppel in 
Australia.
Like Lord Denning, Gunter Treitel has also placed great emphasis on the fact 
that detriment is not required to found a promissory estoppel. He sees it as a 
factor which, along with the fact that promissory estoppel suspends, rather than 
extinguishes rights, distinguishes promissory estoppel from the common law 
principle of estoppel by representation.44 It is arguable, however, that detriment 
is required to establish a promissory estoppel, the notion being hidden in the 
requirement that it must be ‘inequitable’ for the promisor to go back on the 
promise before a court of equity will prevent the rights in question from being 
enforced. Treitel suggests that it is ‘inequitable’ to resile from a promise where 
the promisee has acted in reliance on it so that he cannot be restored to the 
position he was in before he took such action.45
Mark Lunney has suggested that the distinction drawn by Treitel appears to be 
a distinction without a difference.46 The issue is whether a valid distinction can 
be drawn between the concept of detrimental reliance and the concept of
44 GH Treitel, The Law o f Contract (9th ed, 1995) 109-10.
4:1 Ibid. Cf Lord Denning’s statement in D & C Builders Ltd v Rees [1965] 2 QB 617, 625, that 
it would be inequitable for the creditor in that case to insist upon his legal right to recover a 
debt where there has been a true accord which the debtor acts upon by paying a lesser sum in 
satisfaction.
46 Mark Lunney, Towards a Unified Estoppel—The Long and Winding Road’ [1992] The 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 239, 243.
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irrevocably altering one’s position on the faith of a promise in such a way that 
it would be inequitable to resile from that promise.47 While it is possible to 
envisage non-detrimental changes of position on the faith of promises,48 it is 
difficult to see how it could be regarded as inequitable to depart from a promise 
unless the change of position on the faith of that promise was detrimental.49 
Certainly it will not be so if the irrevocable change of position was clearly 
favourable.50 For the purposes of English promissory estoppel, therefore, it may 
be that it will be inequitable for a promisor to resile from a promise only when 
the promisee has acted on the promise to his or her detriment. Thus, it may be 
that detriment, albeit by another name, is required to establish a promissory 
estoppel as well as a common law and proprietary estoppel in England.51
II. DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE IN AUSTRALIA
The greater unity recognised in Australia between the various estoppels is at 
least partly attributable to a more consistent approach to the detriment
47 Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 8, 111 suggest that the test of detriment for the purposes 
of common law estoppel ‘is whether it appears unjust or inequitable that the representor should 
now be allowed to resile from his representation, having regard to what the representee has 
done, or refrained from doing, in reliance on that representation.’
48 An example is provided by the case of George Whitechurch Ltd v Cavanagh [ 1902] AC 117, 
discussed above, text accompanying nn 10-11. The representee in that case failed to make out 
an estoppel where he had, on the faith of the relevant assumption, released certain forms of 
French legal process which did not give him any priority over other creditors. It is significant 
that that the representee’s position was not irrevocably changed by his actions.
49 Cf the statement of Lord Denning in D & C Builders Ltd v Rees [ 1965] 2 QB 617, 625, above 
n 45 and that of Robert Goff J in Societe Italo-Beige Pour Le Commerce Et L ’Industrie v Palm 
and Vegetable Oils (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (The “Post Chaser”) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 695, 701.
In order to illustrate the difference between merely acting on a representation and detrimentally 
relying on it, KE Lindgren and KG Nicholson, ‘Promissory Estoppel in Australia’ (1984) 58 
Australian Law Journal 249, 157 cite the example of a purchaser of land who is unable to 
complete by the agreed settlement date. The purchaser is promised an extension of time by the 
vendor and, in reliance on that promise, sells another property to fund the purchase. If the 
vendor then rescinds the contract before the agreed extension expires, Lindgren and Nicholson 
suggest, the purchaser has suffered a change of position which is not sufficiently detrimental to 
establish an estoppel. Since the purchaser cannot resume his or her original position, however, 
the courts might well regard the change of position as detrimental. Cf the suggestion of Spencer 
Bower and Turner, above n 8, 104 that the detriment required to establish an estoppel must 
consist of ‘actual or temporal damage,—some loss of money or money’s worth, which admits 
of quantification and assessment.’
50 Baker and Langan, above n 18, 571, n 35: ‘an equity could hardly be raised by a man altering 
his position to his advantage.'
51 As discussed above, however, the decision of the English Court of Appeal in WJ Alan & Co v 
El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 QB 189 appears to stand as authority for the contrary 
proposition: that detriment is not required to establish a promissory estoppel.
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requirement. The modem formulation of the detrimental reliance requirement 
in Australia emerged from the judgments of Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer52 
and Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd, ' and has since been applied 
in forms of estoppel by conduct at common law and in equity. The origin of the 
Australian courts’ emphasis on detrimental reliance is in the joint judgment of 
the High Court in Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd.54 In that 
case the High Court quoted Lord Shand’s statement in Sarat Chunder Dey v 
Gopal Chunder Laha, that the foundation of estoppel is the injustice in 
allowing a person to deny or repudiate a former statement to the loss and injury 
of a person who has acted on it.55
The failure of a representee to fulfil the detrimental reliance requirement 
formed the basis of the High Court’s rejection of a plea of estoppel in 
Thompson v Palmer. The question before the court in Thompson v Palmer was 
whether the vendor of certain mortgages could assert a vendor’s lien over the 
mortgages for the unpaid purchase price. Whether such a lien could be asserted 
depended on a question of estoppel: whether the vendor was estopped from 
denying receipt of the purchase price from the purchaser. Both the vendor and 
purchaser had invested money through a rogue solicitor, Clegg, and the transfer 
of the mortgages arose out of Clegg’s attempts to cover up his misappropriation 
of much of the money invested through him. The purchaser expected that the 
purchase price of the mortgages would be paid from moneys owed to her by 
Clegg. The purchaser was able to establish that, as a result of representations 
made by the vendor, she was led to believe that the vendor’s claims in relation 
to the sale had been satisfied by Clegg.56 The court held, however, that the 
purchaser had failed to establish that she had acted to her detriment in reliance 
on that belief. Some of the justices were prepared to accept that the purchaser 
remained inactive in reliance on the assumption that the vendor’s claim was
52 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547: ‘in each case [the representee] is not bound to adhere to the 
assumption unless, as a result of adopting it as the basis of action or inaction, the other party 
will have placed himself in a position of material disadvantage if departure from the assumption 
be permitted.’
53 (1937) 59 CLR 641 (‘Grundt’).
54 (1920) 28 CLR 305, 327 (Isaacs J, delivering the judgment of the court).
55 (1892) 19 LR Ind App 203, 215-6.
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satisfied. Since Clegg was insolvent, however, the purchaser could not establish 
that she could have done anything to improve her position had she not been put 
to sleep.57 Dixon J said that the ‘very foundation of the estoppel is the change 
of position to the prejudice of the party relying upon it, and I think the burden 
of proving the issue must lie upon him. ’58
Dixon J reiterated the importance of detrimental reliance in his judgment in 
Grundt, holding that, in establishing an estoppel in pais, it is an indispensable 
condition that the representee must have acted or refrained from acting on the 
basis of the assumed state of affairs, so that he or she would suffer a detriment 
if the representor were allowed to set up rights inconsistent with that 
assumption.59 That famous statement has since come to dominate the approach 
taken by the Australian courts in relation to both common law and equitable 
estoppel. In the common law estoppel case of Newbon v City Mutual Life 
Assurance Society Ltd, Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ explained that what makes it 
unjust to depart from an assumption one has induced is that if such departure 
were permitted ‘the party so induced would through making the assumption 
find himself in a position occasioning material detriment to himself. Without 
this element there is no estoppel. ’60
Consistent with the approach of the English courts,61 the Australian courts have 
accepted and applied a strict requirement of detrimental reliance in proprietary 
estoppel cases. An early example was Donaldson v Freeson, in which the 
High Court overturned a decision of the Full Court of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court that a proprietary estoppel arose on the facts. The High Court
56 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 520-1 (Rich J), 548 (Dixon J). Cf 527 (Starke J) and 559 (McTiernan J).
57 Ibid 521 (Rich J), 527-8 (Starke J), 548-9 (Dixon J), 559 (McTiernan); cf 553 (Evatt J).
58 Ibid 549.
59 (1937) 59 CLR 641, 674. It was clear from Justice Dixon’s judgment that the words ‘acting 
on the footing o f  an assumption were intended to convey the notion of reliance on the 
assumption.
60 (1935) 52 CLR 723, 734-5. It was clear from the judgment that the words ‘through making 
the assumption’ were intended to convey the notion of reliance.
61 Leaving to one side the aberrant approach of Lord Denning, discussed above, n 18.
62 (1934) 51 CLR 598.
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found that no proprietary estoppel arose because no detriment had been 
suffered as a result of the denial of the relevant assumption.63
The strict detriment requirement laid down by Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer 
and Grundt was also applied in early promissory estoppel cases in South 
Australia and Queensland. In Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia,6A the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia applied the requirement strictly, 
although members of the court differed on the question whether it was satisfied 
on the facts. The issue on appeal was whether an estoppel arose from a 
landlord’s gratuitous promise to accept a reduced amount of rent from the 
tenants. The tenants rented a shop in the landlord’s shopping centre from which 
they conducted a hairdressing business. The landlord agreed to a rent reduction 
because of financial difficulties faced by the tenants, and because the landlord 
was experiencing difficulties in filling vacant shops in the shopping centre. The 
landlord accepted the reduced rent for a period of eighteen months, until the 
tenants sought to leave the premises, at which time the landlord demanded the 
amount unpaid.
The Full Court upheld the decision of the court below that a promissory 
estoppel arose which prevented the landlord from claiming the unpaid portion 
of the rent. The court held unanimously that, contrary to the opinion expressed 
by Lord Denning in WJ Alan Ltd v El Nasr Export and Import Co,65 a 
promissory estoppel could only arise if the promisor had altered his or her 
position on the faith of the promise and would thereby suffer detriment if the 
promisor was subsequently allowed to assert his or her strict legal rights.66 
King CJ and White J relied on the approach taken by Dixon J in Grundt, on the 
basis that promissory estoppel rests on the same basic principle as estoppel in
fCJpais. While acknowledging that the evidence as to detriment was sparse, King 
CJ and White J accepted the finding of the trial judge that, in view of their
63 Ibid 610 (Gavan Duffy CJ and Starke J).
M (1980) 26 SASR 101 (7e Maintindrai’).
65 [1972] 2 QB 189,213.
66 (1980) 26 SASR 101, 105-6 (King CJ), 113-5 (White J), 117 (Cox J).
67 Ibid 106 (King CJ), 113-5 (White J).
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financial position, it would be a detriment to the tenants to be forced to pay the
/: o
arrears in a lump sum. Cox J dissented on the basis that, although it was 
possible to speculate about detriment the tenants might have suffered, the 
tenants had not discharged the burden of establishing affirmatively that they 
had acted to their detriment on the faith of the assumption.69
The decision of the majority in Je Maintiendrai was based on the notion that 
the detriment suffered by a representee must be assessed at the time the 
representor seeks to resile from the relevant assumption.70 That important 
principle was crucial to the outcome in Je Maintiendrai because, until the 
landlord attempted to resile from the assumption that the full rent was not 
payable, the tenants actually obtained a benefit in paying a reduced amount of 
rent. That benefit would have become a detriment had the landlord been able to 
claim the unpaid amount, however, because it was clearly easier for 
impecunious persons such as the tenants to make small periodical payments 
rather than a lump sum.71 Presumably no estoppel would have arisen had the 
tenant been a wealthy person for whom payment of the unpaid rent in a lump 
sum would have presented no difficulty. That is, unless the wealthy tenant had, 
on the faith of the rent reduction, incurred expenditure which would not
7 9otherwise have been incurred.
68 Ibid 107 (King CJ), 115-6 (White J).
69 Ibid 120-1.
70 White J, ibid 114-5, quoted the following statement of principle from Spencer Bower and 
Turner, above n 8, 110, which he observed was in line with Justice Dixon’s analysis in Grundt:
But it is of the utmost importance to notice that the ‘detriment’ which the representee 
must be shown to have suffered is judged only at the moment when the representor 
proposes to resile from his representation. So long as the assumption continues to be 
regarded by the parties as true, the question of estoppel does not arise. It is only when 
the representor wishes to disavow the assumption contained in his representation that 
an estoppel arises ...
The proposition was also articulated by Cox J: (1980) 26 SASR 101, 117. The principle is not 
always borne in mind when detriment is being assessed, see Re Ferdinando; ex parte Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 42 FCR 243 and 
the discussion of that case in Andrew Robertson, ‘Limits on the Recovery of Secured Debts: 
Estoppel and Section 52’ (1994) 5 Journal o f Banking and Finance Law and Practice 211.
71 (1980) 26 SASR 101, 106-7 (King CJ). As King CJ noted, the case would have been more 
satisfactory from an evidentiary point of view had the tenants provided clear evidence of their 
financial difficulties or evidence that the money had been spent in other ways. There was some 
evidence of the tenants’ financial difficulties, however, and King J noted that the trial judge was 
in a better position to assess the financial position of the tenants and to judge the effect of the 
accumulation of arrears on them: ibid 107.
72 The potential detriment to a tenant who receives a gratuitous rent reduction is analogous to
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The model of promissory estoppel applied by the Full Court of the South 
Australian Supreme Courts in Je Maintiendrai was essentially the same as that 
adopted by the Full Court of the Queensland Supreme Court in a decision 
handed down at approximately the same time.73 Those judgments 
foreshadowed the approach which was to be adopted by the High Court. In 
Legione v Hateley,14 the element of detriment was not emphasised by the two 
members of the Court who held that a promissory estoppel arose. The estoppel 
arose, according to Gibbs CJ and Murphy J, because, after receiving an 
assurance that the time for completion would be extended, the inaction of the 
purchasers had altered their position, rendering it inequitable to allow the 
vendors to treat the contract as rescinded. The purchasers’ inaction altered 
their position because they lost the right to tender the purchase price within the 
time fixed by the notice for completion. Mason and Deane JJ articulated the 
requirement of detrimental reliance more clearly, and held that the rule 
formulated by Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer and Grundt was applicable to a 
doctrine of promissory estoppel. Despite the unsatisfactory evidence on the 
question, Mason and Deane JJ also found that the requirement was satisfied on 
the facts, since the purchasers relied on the representation in failing to arrange a 
settlement within the time required. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, 
Mason and Deane JJ held that no estoppel arose because no clear representation
that which can be suffered by a payee who receives money to which they are not entitled, as in 
Avon County Council v Howlett [19831 1 All ER 1073. As discussed in Chapter 1, part of the 
detriment suffered by the representee in Avon County Council v Howlett was caused by incurring 
expenditure which he would not otherwise have incurred, such as the purchase of clothes and the 
hire purchase of a motor car.
73 In Gollin & Co Ltd v Consolidated Fertilizer Sales Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 435 the Full Court 
of the Supreme Court of Queensland also approved a strict requirement of detrimental reliance 
in promissory estoppel. Those members of the court who decided the case on the basis of 
estoppel, WB Campbell and Andrews JJ, preferred the stricter approach articulated by Dixon J 
in Grundt to that advocated by Lord Denning in relation to promissory estoppel: ibid 448-55. It 
was not strictly necessary to decide whether detriment was required, however, because the Full 
Court upheld the decision of trial judge that the plaintiff had failed to establish that it had 
altered its position in reliance on any conduct of, or promise made by, the representor: ibid 457.
74 (1983) 152 CLR 406.
75 Ibid 422-3.
76 Ibid 415 & 422.
77 Ibid 437.
78 Ibid 438.
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had been made on behalf of the vendors that the time for completion would be
79extended.
The element of detrimental reliance was emphasised more strongly by the High
80Court in its subsequent decision in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher. 
Mason CJ and Wilson J observed that in a case of promissory estoppel the 
elements of reliance and detriment attract equitable intervention on the basis 
that it is unconscionable to depart from a promise where doing so would result
O 1
in detriment to the promisee. The common thread which links together the 
doctrines of promissory and proprietary estoppel was said to be the principle 
that equity will come to the relief of a plaintiff who has acted to his or her
89
detriment on the basis of an assumption induced by the defendant’s conduct.
The detriment element was also emphasised by Brennan J, who held that a 
plaintiff must prove that he or she has acted or abstained from acting in reliance 
on the assumption or expectation induced by the defendant, which action will 
occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled. ' Deane J 
also regarded it as necessary to establish an estoppel by conduct that the
o \
representee has acted to his or her detriment. On the facts, the court 
unanimously held that the Mahers had suffered detriment on the faith of the 
assumption that Waltons had entered or would enter into the lease.85 That 
detriment resulted from the costly building work undertaken by the Mahers in 
partly demolishing an existing building on their land and commencing the 
construction of a building designed specifically for use by Waltons.
79 Ibid 440.
80 (1988) 164 CLR 387.
81 Ibid 401. NC Seddon and MP Ellinghaus Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law o f Contract (7th Aust 
ed, 1997) 59 see some importance in the link between detrimental reliance and 
unconscionability. They suggest that ‘in that reliance is to be found the inequity (or 
unconscionability) which moves a court to prevent the promisor from reneging on the promise 
or assurance.’ No doubt reliance by another party on one’s conduct is essential to make resiling 
from an assumption induced by that conduct actionable. Analysis of the detrimental reliance 
requirement is not, however, greatly illuminated by invoking the concept of unconscionability. 
As will be argued in Chapter 6, it is the representor’s knowledge of the representee’s 
detrimental reliance that is central to the question of unconscionability.
82 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 404.
83 Ibid 428-9.
84 Ibid 446.
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The leading authority on the question of detrimental reliance in Australia is the 
decision of the High Court in Commonwealth v Verwayen,86 Like Je 
Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia, it was a case in which evidence of detriment 
before the court was scarce and, accordingly, the nature of the requirement 
came under close scrutiny. One of the central issues before the court was 
whether Verwayen had acted on the faith of the Commonwealth’s assurance 
that it would not plead the relevant defences, such that he would suffer 
detriment if those defences were relied upon. Mason CJ held that the unified 
doctrine of estoppel allows a court of common law or equity to do what is 
required to prevent a person from suffering detriment as a result of reliance on 
an assumption which another party has induced him to hold.87 Accordingly, in 
order to invoke that doctrine, Verwayen was required to establish that he would 
suffer detriment in reliance on the assumption if the Commonwealth were to 
depart from it.88
Mason CJ identified two different types of detriment which might be suffered 
by a person seeking to establish an estoppel. First, there is detriment ‘in the 
broad sense’, which results from the denial of the correctness of the relevant 
assumption. Secondly, there is detriment ‘in the narrow sense’, which a 
representee suffers as a result of his or her reliance on the assumption. In the
OQ
nomenclature of Fuller and Perdue, detriment in the broad sense is 
expectation loss, and detriment in the narrow sense is reliance loss. Mason CJ 
said that detriment in the broad sense is required to found an estoppel, but the 
relief by which the court gives effect to the estoppel will be closer in scope to
85 Ibid 407 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 429-30 (Brennan J), 446 (Deane J), 464 (Gaudron J).
86 (1990) 170 CLR 394 (‘ Verwayen’).
87 Ibid 413.
88 It is important to note that neither the common law nor the equitable doctrine requires that 
detriment has actually been suffered by the representee: the prospect of detriment is sufficient 
in each case. The notion of prospective detriment is particularly important in a case where the 
representor has not yet departed from the assumption in question, but has simply threatened to 
do so. As Ormiston J explained in Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333, 369-81, unless the 
representor has actually departed from the assumption, the representee will not have suffered 
any detriment. Accordingly, the relevant question in most cases is whether the representee will 
or would suffer detriment if the representor were allowed to do so.
89 LL Fuller and William Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ (1936) 46
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the detriment suffered in the narrow sense.90 With respect, it is difficult to see 
how detriment in the wide sense, or the loss of an expectation, is relevant to 
estoppel at all.91 As this chapter has shown, it is detriment resulting from the 
representee’s change of position, or reliance loss, which is required to found an 
estoppel, and it is the same detriment which shapes the remedy in the case of
• 92the equitable doctrine.
Unfortunately, the concept of detriment in the broad sense has caused some 
confusion in subsequent cases, where it has been assumed that the loss of an 
expectation is sufficient detriment to establish an estoppel. The concept was 
applied by Wright J in Blazely v Whiley, a case in which the representor led his 
nephew and his nephew’s wife to believe that he would sell a house to them for 
a modest price.93 Referring to the two dimensions of detriment identified by 
Mason CJ, Wright J observed that in the broad sense the detriment suffered by 
the representees included the deprivation of the opportunity to purchase the 
house at considerably less than market value.94 Such a loss is, with respect, 
simply the loss of an expectation and is not a detriment which is relevant to the 
establishment of an estoppel.95 Detriment in that sense is suffered every time a 
promisor breaches a gratuitous promise to confer a valuable benefit on the 
promisee, whether it is a promise to make a gift, or a promise not to enforce 
rights against the promisee.
Similarly, in W v G, Hodgson J made the following remarks about the 
detriment question:
Yale Law Journal 52.
90 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 415-6. The suggestion that detriment in the broad sense is enough to 
establish an estoppel does not sit comfortably with Chief Justice Mason’s own judgment with 
Wilson J in Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 400-8, which seemed to require detriment in 
the narrow sense to establish an equitable estoppel.
91 Lunney, above n 46, 246-7, has also queried the helpfulness of the distinction between 
detriment in the broad sense and detriment in the narrow sense.
92 See Chapter 7.
93 (1995) 5 Tas R 254.
94 Ibid 275.
95 It should be noted that Wright J identified several other types of detriment suffered by the 
representees which did result from their reliance on the relevant assumption and which may, on
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On the question of detriment, I do not believe that it is necessary in this 
case to find that the plaintiff is worse off having had the children than 
she would have been if she had not had them, all things considered, 
thereby raising both difficult public policy issues as well as difficult 
issues of balancing benefits and detriments. In my opinion, it is 
sufficient that the plaintiff is now faced with the expensive and onerous 
task of bringing up two children on her own, as a result of her reliance 
on an assumption encouraged by the defendant, whereas if the 
defendant had acted in accordance with that assumption, the plaintiff 
would have had the defendant’s assistance in that task. In my opinion, 
that is a sufficient detriment.96
Again, with respect, the detriment relied upon was simply the loss of an 
expectation, in this case the assistance promised by the defendant, which is not 
a sufficient detriment to establish an estoppel. It was necessary for Hodgson J 
in that case to address the difficult policy issue as to whether bearing and 
raising children could be considered a detriment, because that was the only 
detriment suffered by the representee as a result of her reliance on the relevant 
assumption. The need to focus on detriment in the narrow sense was made clear 
by Brennan J in Verwayen. Referring to the judgments of Rich and Dixon JJ in 
Thompson v Palmer, Brennan J distinguished between ‘relevant detriment’ 
and detriment resulting merely from the failure to fulfil a promise:
The relevant detriment in a case of equitable estoppel is detriment 
occasioned by reliance on a promise, that is, detriment occasioned by 
acting or abstaining from acting on the faith of a promise that is not 
fulfilled. The relevant detriment does not consist in a loss attributable
their own, have been sufficient to raise the estoppel.
96 (1996) 20 Fam LR 49, 66. The facts of the case were discussed in Chapter 1.
97 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 520 (Rich J), 547 (Dixon J). Both judgments emphasised that to 
establish an estoppel in pais it is necessary for the representee to show that he or she has 
suffered detriment as a consequence of an act or omission resulting from the representation.
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merely to non-fulfilment of the promise. The principle is analogous to 
the principle of estoppel in pais: see Thompson v Palmer.9*
Applying that principle to the facts, Brennan J held that the exacerbation of 
Verwayen’s ill health and the loss of a chance of success in the action flowed 
from the Commonwealth’s failure to fulfil its promise, and not from any act 
done by Verwayen in reliance on that promise. Accordingly, like the detriments 
in the broad sense identified in Blazely v Whiley and W v G, they were not 
relevant detriments. The only relevant detriment that Verwayen suffered, in the 
view of Brennan J, was the financial cost of continuing with the action until the 
defence was amended. Accordingly, Brennan J would have remitted the matter 
to the trial judge so that that financial cost could be quantified.
In formulating the principles of his unified doctrine of estoppel by conduct, 
Deane J took a similar approach to Brennan J on the requirement of detriment. 
Deane J held that an estoppel will not arise unless the representee ‘has adopted 
the assumption as the basis of action or inaction and thereby placed himself in a 
position of significant disadvantage if departure from the assumption be 
permitted’ .99 The word ‘thereby’ makes it clear that it is reliance loss, rather 
than merely the loss of an expectation that is required to invoke the doctrine. 
Although the principle applied by Deane J was the same as that applied by 
Brennan J, Deane J took a different view of what constituted relevant detriment 
on the facts. Deane J held that Verwayen continued the action on the faith of 
the assumption induced by the Commonwealth, and suffered increased stress, 
anxiety and inconvenience as well as increased ill-health as a result of that 
action. 100 ‘[T]he relevant detriment to Mr Verwayen would extend far beyond 
any question of legal costs’ . 101
Applying the principles of equitable estoppel, Dawson J viewed the detriment 
requirement, and the available evidence on the point, in a similar way to Deane
98 (1990) 170 CLR 394,429.
99 Ibid 444 (emphasis added).
100 Ibid 448-9.
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J. He held that an estoppel would arise if the Commonwealth caused Verwayen 
to assume that it would not rely on its right to insist that the action was statute 
barred, and departure from that assumption would operate to Verwayen’s 
detriment ‘by reason of his having acted or omitted to act upon the basis of the 
assumption’. Like Deane J, Dawson J held that the Commonwealth’s 
conduct led Verwayen to continue the litigation, ‘thereby subjecting himself to 
a prolonged period of stress’ . 103 Accordingly, he regarded the estoppel as 
established.
The other member of the Court to discuss estoppel in detail, McHugh J, also 
approached the case on the basis of equitable estoppel. Such an estoppel will, 
he said, result in new rights between the parties where a representor has led a 
representee to assume that a particular legal relationship exists between them, 
knowing that the reprcsentce ‘would act or refrain from acting on that 
assumption and if, as a result [the representee will] suffer detriment unless the 
assumption is maintained. ’ 104 The italicised words make it clear that the 
detriment required by McHugh J is the same as that which Brennan, Deane and 
Dawson JJ held to be prerequisites to the establishment of an estoppel. 
McHugh J held on the facts that any detriment suffered by Verwayen as a result 
of his reliance on the Commonwealth’s conduct could be avoided by an order 
for costs. 105
Although the requirement of detriment resulting from reliance has generally 
been applied strictly by the Australian courts in cases of both common law106 
and equitable estoppel, problems have occasionally arisen in its application.
101 Ibid 449 (Deane J).
102 Ibid 455-6.
103 Ibid 462.
104 Ibid 500 (emphasis added).
105 Ibid 504.
106 See, eg: Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507; Newbon v City Mutual Life Assurance 
Society Ltd (1935) 52 CLR 723; Chin v Miller (1981) 56 FLR 359; Territory Insurance Office 
v Adling ton (1992) 109 FLR 124.
107 See, eg, Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101, 106-07, 113-6; Gollin & 
Co Ltd v Consolidated Fertiliser Sales Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 435, 448-55; Corumo Holdings 
Pty Ltd v C Itoh Ltd (1991) 5 ASCR 720, 737; Re Heal, ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty 
Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 659, 669; S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122
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First, in Blazely v Whiley, W v G and Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation
//re, 108 expectation losses were identified as the detriment required to establish
an estoppel. 109 Secondly, in Tasita v Papua New Guinea, an estoppel was held
to arise although no evidence of relevant detriment appears in the reported
judgment. 110 Thirdly, in McCraith v Fraser, an estoppel was held to arise even
though there was no more than a speculative possibility of detriment. * 111 The
courts are, however, generally consistent in denying recovery where the
representee cannot point to a detrimental change of position in reliance on the
relevant assumption, and many claims of estoppel have failed on that basis both
112at common law and in equity.
ALR 637, 652; Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333, 367-81.
108 (1996) 131 FLR 241, discussed in Chapter 7 below.
109 In contrast with those cases, in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic 
(1990) 21 FCR 193, the Full Federal Court overturned a finding of estoppel on the ground, 
inter alia, that an expectation loss did not suffice as detriment. The respondent claimed that an 
estoppel arose against the Minister as a result of an intimation that the respondent would not be 
deported if he gave no further cause for being deported. Gummow J said that counsel for the 
respondent:
pointed only to alleged “emotional or psychological” detriment which the respondent 
would suffer if the deportation order were to be implemented, but that in my view 
could not suffice. It would not flow from any change o f position which occurred on 
the faith o f the alleged representation.
Ibid 218 (emphasis added). The case was distinguishable from Verwayen, because the 
emotional or psychological detriment suffered by Verwayen resulted from the action he took in 
reliance on the Commonwealth’s promises (continuing the litigation), rather than from the 
Commonwealth’s breach of those promises alone: (1990) 170 CLR 394, 448-9 (Deane J), 462 
(Dawson J); contra 429 (Brennan J).
110 (1991) 34 NSWLR 691. Young J held that an equitable estoppel arose as a result of a 
landlord’s representation to the tenant that it would accept a surrender of the lease. The effect 
of the estoppel was to prevent the landlord from denying that the lease had come to an end. 
There was, however, no evidence in the reported judgment that the tenant had acted on the faith 
of the representation, since they had amalgamated their operations with another travel agent 
prior to the representation being made. That amalgamation ‘had the consequence that the 
premises leased were too small for the combined operation’ and left the tenant with no 
alternative but to seek other premises (ibid 693).
111 (1991) 104 FLR 227. An estoppel was held to arise where an insured was induced to believe 
that he would be indemnified by his insurer against liability to the plaintiff. Following Hansen v 
Marco Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd [1948] VLR 198, Gray J held that the insured acted to his 
detriment by allowing the insurer to conduct the defence of the litigation on his behalf. The 
decision was overturned by the Northern Territory Court of Appeal on the basis that, in the 
absence of testimony that he would have conducted the litigation differently, there was no 
evidence that the insured had suffered material detriment on the faith of the assumption: 
Territory Insurance Office v Adlington (1992) 109 FLR 124.
112 See, eg: Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507; Donaldson v Freeson (1934) 51 CLR 
598; Trenorden v Martin [1934] SASR 340; Newbon v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd 
(1935) 52 CLR 723; Collin & Co Pty Ltd v Consolidated Fertilizer Sales Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 
435; Thomas Australia Wholesale Vehicle Trading Co Pty Ltd v Marac Finance Australia Ltd 
[1985] 3 NSWLR 452; Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v 
Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193; Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter Charter Pty Ltd (1991) 22 
NSWLR 298, 305 & 307-8; Chin v Miller (1981) 56 FLR 359; Territory Insurance Office v
142
One final aspect of the detriment requirement which must be mentioned is that 
the detriment suffered or to be suffered by the representee as a result of reliance 
on the relevant assumption must be material, 113 significant, 114 or substantial. 115 
This requirement is exemplified by the decision of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal in Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter Charter Pty Ltd, 116 In that case 
the representor induced the representee to believe that the representor would 
pay a certain sum of money to the representee in settlement of a disputed claim. 
On the faith of that assumption, employees of the representee made a number 
of trips to the representor’s premises to collect a cheque in payment of the sum 
due. The Court of Appeal held that no equitable estoppel arose, in part because 
the detriment resulting from these ‘fruitless visits’ did not ‘constitute a material 
or significant disadvantage or detriment sufficient to support an estoppel. ’ 117
Adlington (1992) 109 FLR 124, 127-136; Reg Russell & Sons Pty Ltd v Buxton Meats Pty Ltd 
[1996] ATPR 41-476. See also Patrick Parkinson, ‘Estoppel’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The 
Principles o f Equity (1996) 201,244, n 229.
113 Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547 (Dixon J); Newbon v City Mutual Life 
Assurance Society Ltd (1953) 52 CLR 723, 734 (Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ); Chin v Miller 
(1981) 37 ALR 171 (Fisher J); Territory Insurance Office v Adlington (1992) 109 FLR 124,
136 (Mildren J).
114 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 444 (Deane J). In Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P & CR 
196, 207, Hobhouse LJ suggested that the extent of detriment required may be different for 
different types of estoppel. In estoppel by representation, he suggested, the detriment element 
may be limited provided the representation is clear and unequivocal and there is reliance, 
whereas in proprietary estoppel the emphasis is on the detriment, which must accordingly be 
‘distinct and substantial’. This attempt to differentiate the detriment requirements seems 
unlikely to be followed in Australia, where the courts have recognised a greater commonality of 
principle between common law and equitable estoppel. Cf Mark Howard and Jonathan Hill,
‘The Informal Creation of Interests in Land’ (1995) 15 Legal Studies 356, 367-8, who argue 
that the attitude of the courts to detriment varies according to the strength of the representation. 
Where the representation or understanding between the parties is strong, they suggest, the 
courts take a ‘fairly relaxed attitude’ to the representee’s detriment. Where the understanding is 
weak, as in cases of acquiescence, an equity will only arise if the representee’s reliance is 
strong.
115 Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v Quaglia (1980) 26 SASR 101, 117 (Cox J): ‘The detriment need 
not be great but it must be substantial, not merely speculative or conjectural.’ Benjamin Boyer, 
‘Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine’ (1950) 98 University o f 
Pennsylvania Law Review 459, 475 suggests that the equivalent requirement in the United 
States can be justified on the basis of the de minimus doctrine.
116 (1991) 22 NSWLR 298.
117 Ibid 308 (Handley JA). Priestley JA, ibid 305 (with whom Clarke JA agreed), made a 
finding to similar effect. As Handley JA observed, ibid 308, a clear distinction can be drawn 
between the valuable consideration required to support a contract, for which a single 
peppercorn will suffice, and the material detriment required for an estoppel, which would not 
be established by the loss of a peppercorn. The distinction is justified on the basis that the 
consideration has been accepted as the price of a bargain, whereas estoppels lack the elements 
of acceptance and mutuality.
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An even more stringent detriment requirement was imposed in Lyndel
118Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd, where Wilcox J held that that
the detriment suffered by the representee must be proportional to the value of
the representee’s expectation. The case involved an incentive scheme operated
by the Mobil oil company for its franchisees. The franchisees were told that any
franchisee who met certain performance targets over a period of six years
would be granted a nine year renewal of their franchise without charge. After
four years, Mobil unilaterally abandoned the scheme by which the franchisees’
performance was judged. Wilcox J held that, in order to make out a claim of
promissory estoppel, a franchisee would need to show, inter alia, that ‘the
degree of detriment suffered by it was such as to make it necessary, in order to
avoid Mobil acting unconscionably, for the court to require it to adhere to the
assumption’ that the franchise would be renewed. 119 The promissory estoppel
claims failed because, although the franchisees incurred some additional costs
in attempting to achieve the targets, Wilcox J was not satisfied that the total
detriment suffered by any of them ‘would exceed the value of the “reward”
promised by Mobil’ . 120 The degree of detriment was not proportional to ‘the
121relief claimed by them.’
The rejection of the franchisees’ pleas of estoppel seemed to based on a 
requirement either that a representee’s detriment must be proportional to the 
value of his or her expectation, or that it must be proportional to the value of 
the relief claimed. Both of these notions are inconsistent with the discretion and 
flexibility enjoyed by a court of equity in giving effect to an estoppel. It seems a 
curious interpretation of the judgments of the High Court in Waltons Stores and 
Venvayen to suggest, first, that the court is bound either to grant the relief 
claimed by the representee, or to grant expectation relief, and, secondly, that an 
estoppel is only made out only if the representee can establish that he or she has
118 (1997) 37 IPR 599.
119 Ibid 628.
120 Ibid 629.
121 Ibid.
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suffered detriment which is proportional to such relief. 122 The case tends to 
confirm Patrick Parkinson’s suggestion that there is a close connection between 
the detriment requirement and the approach taken in relation to relief. 123 
Parkinson has suggested that a greater focus on what is an adequate detriment 
to found an estoppel can be expected if expectation relief is taken as the 
starting point. The Lyndel Nominees case shows that, if the courts take 
expectation relief as the necessary finishing point, then the detriment 
requirement must clearly be even more stringent.
III. PROOF OF RELIANCE
The element of detrimental reliance in estoppel effectively requires three causal 
links. First, it requires a causal link between the conduct of the representor and 
the assumption adopted by the representee. Secondly, it requires a causal link 
between the assumption adopted by the representee and the action taken by him 
or her. Thirdly, it requires a causal link between the action taken by the 
representee and the detriment he or she has suffered, or would suffer if the 
representor were allowed to depart from the assumption. These causal links are 
usually abbreviated into more simple formulae. 124 We are concerned here with 
the first and second of those requirements. Clearly, it is not sufficient for the 
representee simply to prove that he or she took action after being induced to make 
the relevant assumption. The representee must prove that he or she took action 
because he or she was induced by the representor to make the relevant
i 7 c
assumption. In many cases proving reliance will be a simple matter of the
122 The notion that the remedy can govern liability in this way appears to misconceive the 
proper order of analysis: the estoppel dog is being wagged by its remedial tail.
123 Above n 112, 248.
124 In Wayling v Jones (1995) 69 P & CR 170, 173, Balcombe LJ abbreviated the three 
requirements when he observed that there ‘must be a sufficient link between the promises relied 
upon and the conduct which constitutes the detriment’. Mason CJ abbreviated the second and 
third requirements when he said in Venvayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 415 that ‘the detriment must 
flow from the reliance upon the assumption’.
125 In Thomas Australia Wholesale Vehicle Trading Co Pty Ltd v Wlarac Finance Australia Ltd 
[1985] 3 NSWLR 452, the representee was unable to establish an estoppel because its 
detrimental action was not taken in reliance on the representor’s conduct. Although the 
representor had failed to register its interest in a motor vehicle, the representee had failed to 
search the register before it purchased the vehicle. Thus ‘the evidence established that [the 
representor’s conduct] had no causal connection with the [representee’s] loss’: ibid 468 (Glass
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representee giving evidence that he or she took particular action in reliance on the 
assumption in question, which was induced by the representor’s conduct. There 
will often be no basis on which the representor can challenge such evidence and 
it will be accepted without more. In Waltons Stores, for example, the evidence of 
reliance cited by Mason CJ and Wilson J was that given by Mr Maher that he 
would not have ‘gone ahead and done the work’ had he been aware of the true 
state of affairs. 126 Similarly, in Verwayen, Mason CJ found that ‘there is no 
reason to doubt the respondent’s assertion that he made the assumption and 
continued his action against the Commonwealth in reliance on it. ’ 127
A. The Burden of Proving Reliance
There are two central doctrinal questions relating to proof of reliance. The first is 
who bears the onus of proof: does it lie on the representee to prove reliance in 
order to make out an estoppel, or need the representor disprove reliance? The 
second question is what test the courts should apply to determine whether the 
reliance has been sufficiently causative. In relation the first question, it seems that 
while the burden of proving reliance will prima facie rest with the representee, 
that burden will shift to the representor where reliance is a natural consequence of 
the assumption which the representee is induced to adopt. As noted above, in 
Thompson v Palmer Dixon J held that the burden of proving reliance lay upon the 
representee, and found that no estoppel arose in that case because the representee
1 98had not discharged that burden.
That approach is consistent with the subsequent decision of the High Court in 
Nexvbon v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd, in which a plea of estoppel 
failed on the ground that the representee had failed to establish a causal link
JA). The principle is analogous to that applied in deceit cases. In Smith v Chadwick (1882) 20 
Ch D 27, 67 (Jessell MR), 74-5 (Cotton LJ), 80 (Lindley LJ), the English Court of Appeal held 
that an action for deceit could not be maintained where the representee established that he had 
taken detrimental action after the representation, but did not establish a causal link between the 
representation and his detrimental action.
126 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 386.
127 (1990) 170 CLR 394,414.
128 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 548-9.
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between the detriment he suffered and the representor’s conduct. 129 The case was 
concerned with the enforceability of a life assurance policy. Under its terms, the 
policy became voidable if a premium remained unpaid for more than one month 
after its due date. After the assured had failed to pay an instalment, the Society 
gave notice of its intention to treat the policy as void, but continued to send the 
assured annual bonus certificates for some years thereafter. When the assured 
died, the administrator of his estate sought to enforce the policy on the basis that 
the Society was estopped from denying that it remained on foot. The plaintiff 
argued that the receipt of the annual bonus certificates up until one month before 
his death had induced the assured to believe that the policy was on foot, and he 
took no steps toward reviving his policy or obtaining life assurance elsewhere. 
The High Court unanimously held that no estoppel arose, the majority on the 
ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish a causal connection between the 
assumption and the position of detriment. 130 Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ suggested 
that a prima facie inference may be drawn in favour of such a causal connection 
in a case where ‘inaction is the natural consequence of the assumption in
i o  1
question’. In the present circumstances, however, there was no reason to draw 
such an inference and no reason to believe that the representee’s failure to obtain 
insurance on his life was caused by the belief, if it existed, that the policy with the
1 T9representor was still on foot.
The notion that a prima facie inference in favour of reliance arises in certain 
circumstances is supported by a long line of English cases. In the promissory 
estoppel case Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr, Lord Denning MR linked the 
burden of proof to the intention that could be imputed to the representor: ‘Once it 
is shown that a representation was calculated to influence the judgment of a 
reasonable man, the presumption is that he was so influenced. ’ 134 The principle
(1935) 52 CLR 723.
130 Ibid 735 (Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ). The other member of the Court, Starke J, held that it 
was impossible to impute to the Society a representation that the policy was on foot, or to 
conclude that the assured acted on any such representation: ibid 738.
131 Ibid 735.
132 Ibid.
133 [1979] QB 467.
134 Ibid 482-3.
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has been employed regularly in proprietary estoppel cases. In Greasley v Cook,135 
the Court of Appeal overturned the decision at first instance on the basis that the 
trial judge had erred in relation to the burden of proving reliance. The defendant 
in that case had been employed as a housekeeper by Arthur Greasley, a widower 
who had four children, Hedley, Kenneth, Clarice and Howard. After Arthur 
Greasley died, the defendant continued to live in the family home caring for 
Kenneth, with whom she lived as de facto husband and wife, and Clarice, who 
was mentally ill. That arrangement, under which the defendant received no 
wages, continued for some 27 years until Kenneth and Clarice died. The then 
owners of the house, Hedley and one of Howard’s daughters, then brought 
proceedings to evict the defendant from the house. The defendant claimed she 
was entitled to relief by way of proprietary estoppel, and established that Hedley 
and Kenneth had, when they were the owners of the house, assured her that she 
would be able to remain there for the rest of her life.
The trial judge held that for the defendant to succeed she would have to prove 
that she had acted to her detriment ‘as a result o f  or ‘because o f  her belief that
i oz :
she would be entitled to remain in the house. ' He held that the burden lay on the 
representee to establish reliance as a fact, and the defendant had failed to 
discharge that burden. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was in error 
in the way he put the onus of proof, and found that an estoppel was made out. 
Lord Denning MR applied the principle he articulated in Brikom Investments Ltd 
v Carr, that where representations are ‘calculated to influence the judgment of a 
reasonable man’ then the burden shifts to the representor to show that the 
representee did not rely on them. He held that the statements made by 
Kenneth and Hedley Greasley were calculated to influence the defendant, she 
had acted to her detriment by staying on to look after the family rather than 
seeking paid work and, accordingly, a presumption of reliance arose. The onus 
lay on the plaintiffs to prove that she did not rely on the assurances. Waller 
LJ, on the other hand, adopted an approach which is more consistent with that
135 [1980] 1 WLR 1306.
136 Ibid 1310.
137 [1980] 1 WLR 1306, 1311.
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applied by the High Court in Newbon v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd. 
He held that the court would infer reliance where the statement was of such a 
nature as would naturally tend to induce a person into a course of conduct.
Applying that principle to the present facts, Waller LJ found that the assurances 
made to the defendant were such that they would naturally tend to induce a 
course of conduct on her part, and accordingly the trial judge was wrong to find 
against the defendant on the basis that reliance was not proved. The third 
member of the Court of Appeal in Greasley v Cook, Dunn LJ, agreed with Lord 
Denning, 140 and accordingly the approach that focused on the intention or 
imputed intention of the representor can be said to have commanded majority 
support. Lord Denning’s approach is clearly different from that applied by 
Waller LJ, which is concerned with the question whether reliance flowed 
naturally from the assumption in question. In some subsequent cases judges 
have been content to apply the principle in Greasley v Cook, without making 
clear whether they are applying Lord Denning’s version of the principle or that 
of Waller LJ. 141 The approaches adopted in Combes v Smith142 and Wayling v 
Jones'*3 were different again.
In Coombes v Smith, Jonathan Parker QC held that where the representee 
shows that he or she adopted a prejudicial course of conduct following a 
promise or assurance, then a rebuttable presumption of reliance arises. 144 That 
presumption did not seem to depend on the representor’s intention or on 
whether the conduct flowed naturally from the promise or assurance. In 
Wayling v Jones, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal adopted an approach
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid 1313, applying a principle articulated in the deceit case Smith v Chadwick (1882) 20 Ch 
D 27, 44 (Jessel MR).
140 Ibid 1313-4.
141 Hamp v By grave (1983) 266 EG 720; Re Basham (dec’d) [1986] 1 WLR 1506-7; Grant v 
Edwards [1986] 1 Ch 638, 657 (where Browne-Wilkinson VC applied the principle in the 
context of the establishment of a constructive trust).
142 [1986] 1 WLR 808.
143 (1985) 69 P & CR 170.
144 [1986] 1 WLR 808, 821.
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to the burden of proof that looks to the nature of the conduct engaged in by the 
representee:
Once it has been established that promises were made, and that there 
has been conduct by the plaintiff of such a nature that inducement may 
be inferred then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to establish 
that he did not rely on the promises. 145
In that case the representee had worked for the representor, with whom he was 
in an emotional relationship of cohabitation, following a promise by the 
representor that he would leave his hotel business to the representee. The Court 
of Appeal held that the representee’s conduct in helping to run the business, 
receiving only a small amount of pocket money in return, was conduct from 
which his reliance on the representor’s promises could be inferred. 146 Although 
it is not entirely clear, that approach appears to be essentially the same as that 
applied by the High Court in Newbon v City Mutual Life and by Waller LJ in 
Greasley v Cook.
In summary, it seems that while the burden of proving reliance rests with a 
person seeking to establish an estoppel, a rebuttable presumption of reliance 
will quite readily be made. 147 Unfortunately, the circumstances in which the 
presumption will be made are far from clear. It may depend on the representor 
having an intention to induce reliance, 148 it may depend on the acts of reliance 
flowing naturally from the assumption adopted, 149 or it may depend simply on
145 (1985) 69 P & CR 170, 173 (Balcombe LJ, with whom Hoffmann LJ agreed).
146 Ibid.
147 It is also clear that reliance can be inferred from the relevant circumstances: Habib Bank Ltd 
v Habib Bank AG Zurich [1981] 1 WLR 1265, 1287 (Oliver LJ for the Court of Appeal).
I4S This approach finds support in Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr [1979] QB 467, 482-3 (Lord 
Denning MR); Greasley v Cook [1980] 1 WLR 1306, 1311 (Lord Denning MR) and, by 
analogy with actionable misrepresentation, in Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215, 236 
(Wilson J) and Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1,21 (Jessell MR).
149 This approach finds support in Newbon v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 52 
CLR 723, 735 (Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ); Greasley v Cook [1980] 1 WLR 1306 (Waller LJ) 
and, by analogy with the tort of deceit, in Smith v Chadwick (1882) 20 Ch D 27, 44 (Jessel MR) 
and Reynell v Sprye (1852) 1 D M & G 660; 42 ER 710, 728-9 (Lord Cranworth).
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detrimental action following the promise or assurance. 150 The better view, at 
least in Australia, seems to be that the acts of reliance must flow naturally from 
the relevant assumption before a presumption of reliance will be made.
B. Reliance and Causation
Of more importance to this thesis is the situation in which detrimental action is 
taken by a representee for a number of reasons, only one of which involves 
reliance upon the actions of the representor. The interesting issue is the approach 
that should be taken in testing whether the reliance caused the detrimental 
conduct in question. Where more than one reason motivated the representee to 
take the relevant action or inaction, what test should the court apply to determine 
whether the assumption induced by the representor’s conduct was sufficiently 
causative?
Although the courts have not explored in any great detail the approach to be taken 
to this question, it seems to be quite well accepted that a representee need only 
establish that the assumption was one of the factors motivating the detrimental 
action. In Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas 
Commerce International Bank Ltd, Robert Goff J said at first instance that it was 
no bar to an estoppel that the representee’s detrimental conduct did not derive its 
origin only from the encouragement or representation of the representee. 151 The 
Court of Appeal in Wayling v Jones cited that statement in support of the 
proposition that ‘the promises relied on do not have to be the sole inducement for 
the conduct - it is sufficient if they are an inducement.’ “ That principle was 
applied in Re Basham (dec’d), a case in which Edward Nugee QC upheld a 
proprietary estoppel where he was satisfied that one reason why the representee
153acted as she did was the belief induced by the representor’s conduct.
150 Coombes v Smith [1986] 1 WLR 808, 821 (Jonathan Parker QC).
151 [1982] QB 84, 104 ( ‘Texas Bank').
152 (1995) 69 P & CR 170, 173 (Balcombe LJ, with whom Hoffmann LJ agreed).
153 [1986] 1 WLR 1498, 1507.
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A similar approach has been taken in Australia. In Austral Standard Cables Pty 
Ltd v Walker Nominees Pty Ltd , 154 Handley JA applied the principle that ‘an 
estoppel by representation may be established where the representor’s conduct is 
a cause, though not necessarily the cause of the representee’s reliance.’155 The 
principle was also recognised by Kirby P.156 As Handley JA observed, this is 
consistent with the principles governing actionable representations.157 It is also 
consistent with the approach adopted and applied by the majority of the Privy 
Council in Barton v Armstrong in relation to the question whether duress to the 
person was sufficiently causative to vitiate a contract. Their Lordships held 
that it was sufficient if the relevant threats were ‘a’ reason for the plaintiff 
entering into the contract or if they contributed to the decision, even if the 
contract may have been signed anyway.159 An identical approach has been taken 
to causation in relation to economic duress, that it is sufficient if the illegitimate 
pressure was ‘one of the reasons for the person entering into the agreement’.160 
The same principle applies in relation to proving reliance on misleading or 
deceptive conduct in breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act.161
154 (1992) 26 NSWLR524.
155 Ibid 540 (emphasis added), citing the statement of Brennan I in Forcin v Wight (1989) 168 
CLR 385, 427 that where a contract involves mutually dependent obligations, and a party to 
that contract (A) intimates that they will not perform the contract and that it will be useless for 
the other party (B) to tender performance, and B is not ready and willing to perform B’s 
obligations because B has relied ‘(at least in part)’ on A’s intimation, then the usual 
requirement that B must be ready and willing to perform the contract before B can rescind for 
A’s breach is dispensed with.
156 (1992) 26 NSWLR 524, 526. The approach is also supported by the statement of Franklyn J 
in Osborne Park Cooperative Building Society’ Ltd v Wilden Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 77, 100 
that: ‘The assumption ... must be a cause of [the representee’s] alteration of position’
(emphasis added).
157 Handley JA quoted the statement from his joint judgment with Meagher JA in Demetrios v 
Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 561, 569-70 that ‘a fraudulent 
misrepresentation may be only one of a number of causes which together induced the plaintiff to 
act to his detriment and suffer the losses for which compensation is sought.’ The notion that a 
fraudulent misrepresentation need not be the sole inducement to enter into a contract is also 
supported by Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459, 481 (Cotton LJ), 483 (Bowen LJ),
485 (Fry LJ) and Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215, 236 (Wilson J), 250-1 (Brennan J).
158 [1976] AC 104.
159 Ibid 118-20.
160 Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40, 46 
(McHugh JA).
161 The principles articulated by Wilson J in Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215, 236 have 
been adopted for the determination of the question of reliance under s 82 of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth), where a person claims they are entitled to be compensated for loss or damage 
suffered ‘by’ conduct in contravention of s 52 of the Act, as a result of reliance on such 
conduct: Sutton v AJ Thompson Pty’ Ltd (in liq) (1987) 73 ALR 233, 240; Argy v Blunts and 
Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 112, 135-6; Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd
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It seems quite clear, and quite consistent with analogous doctrines, that reliance 
on the relevant assumption need not be the sole reason for the detrimental course 
of conduct taken by the representee, but can be one of a number of contributing 
factors, and perhaps even a minor one at that. After noting this principle in 
Texas Bank, Robert Goff J went on to discuss the principles for determining 
causation where a person has proceeded initially on the basis of a belief derived 
from a source independent of the representor, but subsequently has that belief 
confirmed by the representor’s representation or encouragement. The question for 
the court in that situation is whether the representor’s conduct is sufficiently 
causative. 163 According to Goff J, that question should be determined by 
reference to the representor’s conscience:
In such a case, the question is not whether the represcntee acted, or 
desisted from acting, solely in reliance on the encouragement or 
representation of the other party; the question is rather whether his 
conduct was so influenced by the encouragement or representation ... that 
it would be unconscionable for the representor thereafter to enforce his 
strict rights. 164
v Karmot Auto Spares Pty Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 471, 482-3; Clyde Industries Pty Ltd v Golden 
West Refineries Corp Ltd (1996) ATPR (Digest) 46-160, 53,374; Leda Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Oraka Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-601,40,515. See further Nick Seddon, ‘Misleading Conduct: 
The Case for Proportionality’ (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 146, 148-51.
162 A similar question arises in determining relief to give effect to equitable estoppel. In The 
Public Trustee, as Administrator o f the Estate of Williams (dec’d) v Wadley (Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Tasmania, Wright, Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 21 June, 1997), a question 
arose relating to the amount of domestic work performed by the plaintiff in reliance on her 
father’s promise that he would leave his house to her when he died. Crawford J considered that 
the court should compensate only that work which was done on the faith of the promise, 
disregarding work which would have been performed in any event. Zeeman J, on the other 
hand, did not think it was appropriate to adopt a ‘but for’ approach, and thought it irrelevant 
that some of the work may have been done even if no promise had been made. The approach of 
Zeeman J appears to be more consistent with the approach taken to proving reliance in the cases 
discussed above.
163 Although it is interesting to note that in Australian Steel & Mining Pty Ltd v Corben [1974]
2 NSWLR 202, 209, Hutley JA approved a passage from HLA Hart and AM Honore,
Causation in the Law (1959) 177, that liability can be based on a false representation that 
induces the representee Jo persevere in a decision already reached' (emphasis added).
164 [1982] QB 84, 104-5.
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The approach proposed by Goff J is an unusual way to approach a question of 
causation. The court is concerned here with the factual question of what 
motivated the representor to adopt a detrimental course of action. 165 It is well 
accepted in the tort of negligence that causation is a question of fact to be 
determined by reference to common sense and experience. 166 In the passage 
quoted above, however, Goff J appears to have suggested that in estoppel this 
factual question should be determined by reference to the representor’s 
conscience. While the manner in which a representor has encouraged the 
adoption of an assumption may be relevant to the question whether it is 
unconscionable for the representor subsequently to depart from that 
assumption, it is difficult to see what role that encouragement should play in 
the question of reliance, other than an evidentiary one. 168 The extent of the 
representor’s influence is clearly an important question in such a case, and the 
conduct of the representor must clearly be disregarded if it is not sufficiently 
causative. But it is equally clear that the question of causation is a factual 
question which must be concerned with the party taking action in reliance on that 
representation. Accordingly, attention should be focussed on the representee for 
this purpose, testing from the representee’s perspective the extent to which the 
representor’s conduct was causative, as Fry LJ made clear in Seton, Laing, & Co 
v Lafone:
In order to ascertain whether a statement by one person has brought about
the action of the other, you must look at the condition of mind and
165 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459, 483 (Bowen LJ): the question whether a 
representation caused the representee to act in a particular way ‘resolves itself into a mere 
question of fact.’
166 March v EM  &H Stramere Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 505, 515 (Mason CJ), 523 (Deane J), 
524 (Toohey J); Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408, 412-3 (Mason 
CJ, Deane and Toohey JJ), 418-9 (Gaudron J), 428 (McHugh J); Medlin v State Government 
Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1, 6 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). See 
further Hart and Honore, above n 163, Jane Stapleton, ‘Law, Causation and Common Sense’ 
(1988) 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 111 and ‘Symposium on Causation in the Law of 
Torts’ (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent Law Review 397.
167 See Chapter 6.
168 Its evidentiary role may be important, since testimony from the representee as to his or her 
state of mind may regarded as unreliable: see Roy Williams, ‘Proof of Inducement in Actions 
for Deceit and Contravention of Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act’ (1987) 3 Australian Bar 
Review 170, 172-3.
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circumstances of the person to whom the statement was made not of the 
person who made the statement. 169
The authorities support Justice G offs statement that the relevant question in 
relation to causation is not whether the representor acted solely in reliance on the 
representor’s conduct. Nor is the relevant question a ‘but for’ question: it is clear 
from the authorities that the court is not concerned to inquire how the representee 
would have acted had it not been for the adoption of the relevant assumption, or 
had it not been for the representor’s conduct. 170 In the fraudulent 
misrepresentation case Demetrios v Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Ltd,xlx 
Handley and Meagher JJA approved a statement from Spencer Bower and Turner 
that whether the representee would have acted differently had full disclosure been 
made is ‘a question to which the law does not require an answer. It is enough if 
the full and exact revelation of the material facts might have prevented him from 
doing so.’ “ Similarly, in Barton v Armstrong the majority of the Privy Council 
held that Barton was entitled to relief on the ground of duress if the threats 
contributed to his decision to enter into the contract, even though ‘he might well 
have entered into the contract if Armstrong had uttered no threats to induce him 
to do so. ’ 173
It is clear from the cases discussed above that the conscience-based approach to 
reliance articulated by Goff J in Texas Bank has not been embraced by either the 
English or Australian courts. The proper approach to the question of reliance is to
169 (1887) 19 QBD 68, 74.
170 In Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr [1979] 2 All ER 753, 758-9, Lord Denning MR 
disavowed suggestions that his judgment in Alan & Co v El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 
2 QB 189, 213 could be read as supporting a ‘but for’ approach to reliance.
171 (1991) 22 NSWLR 561, 569-70.
172 George Spencer Bower and Sir Alexander Turner, The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation 
(3rd ed, 1974) 139-40 (emphasis added).
173 [1976] AC 104, 119. The position is less clear in relation to reliance on negligent 
misstatements. In Parramatta City Council v Lutz (1988) 12 NSWLR 293, 235, McHugh JA 
appeared to apply a but for test when he held, in a dissenting judgment, that an action for 
negligent misrepresentation must fail where the probabilities were such that the plaintiff would 
not have taken any action to avoid the relevant damage apart from the action she did take. The 
High Court has since held, however, that a ‘but for’ test is not an appropriate means of 
assessing causation in a negligence case in which there are two or more events that could be 
said to have brought about the plaintiffs injury: March v E &M H Stramere Pty Ltd (1991)
171 CLR 506.
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address it as a factual question of causation. If the assumption induced by the 
representor’s conduct contributed in any way to the detrimental course of conduct 
embarked upon by the representee, then the causal link between the assumption 
and the detriment is effectively established.
IV. THE THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REQUIREMENT
The strict detrimental reliance requirement imposed by the Australian courts has 
significant theoretical implications for estoppel by conduct. The first point to note 
is that it helps us to draw a clear distinction between a doctrine of estoppel based 
on promise and one based on reliance. As Lord Denning’s judgments have 
indicated, and as his extra-judicial observations have made clear, a doctrine of 
estoppel based on promise looks to the nature and circumstances of the promise 
itself, rather than its effect on the promisee. Accordingly, the court’s attention is 
focussed on the intentions of the person making the promise, rather than on the 
effect of the promise on the promisee. As Lord Denning has said, such a doctrine 
is more accurately described as a contractual source of rights than as an estoppel. 
The strict detrimental reliance requirement imposed in Australia can, therefore, 
be seen as an alternative to the contractual ‘intention to affect legal relations 
requirement’ applied by Lord Denning in relation to promissory estoppel. The 
adoption of that alternative as the central requirement of the Australian doctrines 
of estoppel marks those doctrines as fundamentally concerned with issues of 
reliance, rather than promise.
The second observation that can be made is that the adoption of detrimental 
reliance as the focal doctrinal requirement, or as the central ingredient leading 
to the establishment of an estoppel, lends a unity to the various types of 
estoppel by conduct operating in Australia. The influence of Justice Dixon’s 
comments in Thompson v Palmer and Grundt as to the centrality of detrimental 
reliance has been observed in relation to estoppel by representation, promissory 
estoppel and proprietary estoppel, as well as each of the unified estoppels that 
have been proposed. The Australian position can be contrasted with the 
position in England, where it is arguable that promissory estoppel is essentially
156
contractual in nature, and thus has entirely different conceptual foundations 
from those supporting proprietary estoppel. 174
The third question of theoretical significance is the approach taken by the 
courts to the establishment of reliance. The approach articulated by Robert Goff 
J in Texas Bank is most consistent with a conscience basis for estoppel. If a 
doctrine of estoppel is essentially concerned with preventing unconscionable 
conduct, then it may be appropriate to test reliance by reference to the influence 
which the representor’s conduct had on the representee and the extent to which 
the representor can, given that influence, depart from the relevant assumption 
in good conscience. If, on the other hand, the court is essentially concerned 
with protecting against the detrimental consequences of reliance, then the court 
should focus on the reliance itself, and the extent to which that reliance is 
causative. There may not, in the end, be any great difference between the 
results produced by the two approaches, but there is a significant difference in 
terms of the philosophy of estoppel.
174 Margaret Halliwell, ‘Estoppel: Unconscionability as a Cause of Action’ (1994) 14 Legal 
Studies 15, 22-30.
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Chapter 5
THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT*
An important limit on the availability of both common law and equitable estoppel 
is the requirement that, for an estoppel to arise, the representee must act 
reasonably in both adopting and acting on the relevant assumption. This 
‘reasonableness’ requirement is closely connected with the other elements 
required to establish an estoppel. It is linked to the threshold requirement because 
the reasonableness of adopting a given assumption will often depend on the type 
of conduct engaged in by the representor which is claimed to have induced that 
adoption. If a doctrine of estoppel required a particular type of conduct as the 
threshold requirement, such as a clear promise or a clear representation, then 
there would be less emphasis on the reasonableness requirement. The 
reasonableness requirement can thus be seen to occupy ground left vacant by the 
low threshold requirement discussed in Chapter 3.* 1
If one were framing an estoppel doctrine in the abstract then an important 
question would be whether reasonableness should be considered from the point 
of view of the representor or the representee, or both. That choice is extremely 
important both from the point of view of highlighting the conflicts between the 
different philosophies of equitable estoppel, and in illustrating the orientation of 
the Australian doctrine towards reliance. We are concerned here with the 
imposition of an objective test which limits the availability of a plea of estoppel. 
An objective test can be imposed from the point of view of the representee, with 
an estoppel arising only if the representee’s reliance was reasonable in the 
circumstances. Alternatively, the objective test can be imposed from the point of
* Parts of this chapter have been published in ‘Situating Equitable Estoppel Within the Law of 
Obligations’ (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 32-64 and ‘The “Reasonableness” Requirement in 
Estoppel’ (1995) 1 Canberra Law Review 231-235.
1 This connection between reasonableness and the threshold requirement is implicit in the 
argument made by DW Greig and JLR Davis, The Law of Contract (1987) 149-55 that the 
alternative to a restrictive threshold requirement, requiring an unequivocal promise or 
representation, is an objective approach, ‘based upon the overriding concept of reasonable 
reliance.’ (Ibid 155). A restrictive threshold requirement is unnecessary in a doctrine that requires
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view of the representor, with an estoppel arising only where the representor 
should reasonably have expected reliance by the representee.
In Australia and England, reasonableness is usually considered from the point of 
view of the representee, who must act reasonably in adopting and acting upon the 
relevant assumption. In the United States, on the other hand, reasonableness is 
usually considered from the point of view of the representor, who must 
reasonably expect reliance before liability will arise. It has also been suggested in 
some cases that, under English and Australian law, the question whether a 
representor should reasonably have expected reliance is relevant to the 
establishment of an estoppel. That question of knowledge or an expectation of 
reliance links the reasonableness question with the unconscionability question 
which, as Chapter 6 will show, turns primarily on questions of notice or imputed 
notice of reliance.
The Australian reasonableness of reliance requirement has also been justified on 
the basis that it is not unconscionable to depart from an assumption unless the 
assumption was reasonably adopted and reasonably relied upon.“ In other words, 
it has been justified as an conscience-based requirement. This chapter will argue, 
however, that the reasonableness of reliance requirement, given its focus on the 
representee, is in fact a reliance-based requirement. That reliance-based limit on 
the availability of a plea of estoppel will be contrasted in this chapter with the 
requirement in the United States that the representor must reasonably foresee 
reliance, which can more accurately be said to evidence a concern with 
unconscionable conduct.
I. THE NATURE OF THE REASONABLENESS INQUIRY
The first aspect of the reasonableness requirement to be considered is the nature 
of the requirement itself. The nature of the reasonableness inquiry has not been
a representee to act reasonably in adopting and acting upon the relevant assumption.
2 Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 445 (Deane J); Australian Securities 
Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Pty Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485, 506 (Mason CJ, Brennan,
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considered in any detail in the estoppel cases or literature, but assistance can be 
derived from the law of negligence which is, of course, structured around the 
norm of ‘reasonable care’. It is generally accepted in the law of negligence that 
the reasonableness question requires the court to make a policy decision as to 
what is prudent and sensible behaviour, taking into account the behavioural 
norms of the time and place.* 34 Although evidence as to the standard practice of 
those engaged in a particular activity may be relevant,5 the question of 
reasonableness is clearly not exclusively a factual question, because standard 
practice may itself be regarded by the court as deficient.6 As Francis Trindade and 
Peter Cane have observed, it is a function of the law of negligence to identify 
which risks are socially acceptable, and this is a ‘social question’ which must 
ultimately be answered by the courts.7
Similarly, the reasonableness requirement in estoppel requires the courts to 
determine the circumstances in which reliance on another person’s conduct is
Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
3 Assistance can also be derived from the reasonable person standard in the rule in Hadley v 
Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341; 156 ER 145. LL Fuller and William Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest 
in Contract Damages: 1’ (1936) 46 Yale Law Journal 52, 86 suggest that stating the remoteness 
of damage problem in terms of the reasonable person ‘creates a bias in favour of exempting 
normal or average conduct from legal penalties.’ Similarly, it could be said that restricting the 
availability of estoppel by reference to reasonableness creates a bias in favour of protecting 
those who engage in normal or average conduct from the particular harm with which estoppel is 
concerned. For a detailed examination of the use of the reasonable person standard in contract 
law and its ecclesiastic and philosophical foundations, see Larry DiMatteo, ‘The Counterpoise 
of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment’ (1997) 48 
University o f Southern California Law Review 293.
4 MA Millner, ‘Tort: Cases and Materials by BA Hample’ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 
131, 133.
5 Neill v NSW Fresh Food and Ice Pty Ltd (1963) 108 CLR 362, 368 (Taylor and Owen JJ).
6 Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) (1936) 56 CLR 580, esp at 
589 (Latham CJ). In F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189, 194, King CJ said that the ultimate question is 
whether the defendant’s conduct conforms to the standard of care required by the law, not 
whether it accords with the practice of the defendant’s profession. Without explicitly refering 
to the reasonableness question, Jules Coleman, ‘The Practice of Corrective Justice’ in David 
Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations o f Tort Law (1995) 53, 69-72 has provided a 
justification for this approach from a philosophical point of view, arguing that corrective justice 
is a moral duty which is neither entirely independent of human practices, nor entirely fixed by 
the practices existing at any given time.
7 Francis Trindade and Peter Cane, The Law o f Torts in Australia (2nd ed, 1993) 428. Peter 
Cane, The Anatomy o f Tort Law (1997) 42 has expanded on this point:
Reasonableness is not a question of what people actually do but of what courts think is 
a reasonable standard of conduct for society to enforce against its citizens through the 
mechanism of tort law. What people actually do provides a starting point for this 
inquiry, but it is only a starting point. The courts have a constitutional responsibility to 
establish standards of conduct for society.
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socially acceptable, and the extent of reliance that is socially acceptable in 
particular circumstances. The reasonableness standard imposes responsibility on 
a representee to take care to protect his or her own interests, and defines the 
standard of care that must be taken.8 As Patrick Atiyah has observed, reliance on 
a promise alone cannot justify the imposition of liability on the promisor; 
something extra is required.9 The reasonableness standard provides that extra 
element, ensuring ‘compliance with some socially acceptable values which 
determine when ... [reliance is] sufficiently justifiable to give some measure of 
protection. ’ 10 The application of the reasonableness standard thus involves a 
sophisticated policy question which requires the court, while taking into account 
community standards, to establish norms of conduct. * 11 In defining the limits of 
the neighbourhood responsibility of representors for harm resulting from the 
reliance of others on their conduct, the reasonableness standard implicitly 
imposes a level of individual responsibility on representees to take care to prevent 
harm to themselves. 12 The development of those standards of acceptable 
behaviour and acceptable reliance necessarily involve the allocation of risk and 
responsibility.
If it is accepted that the reasonableness standard is essentially a policy question, 
then it is important to ask whether that policy question is better framed as a 
question of reasonableness than as a question of unconscionability. It might be 
argued that the policy work performed by the reasonableness question could 
equally well be done by asking whether it was ‘unconscionable’ for the 
representor to act as he or she did. The essential reason why the reasonableness
8 The plaintiffs failure to take care to take care to protect his own interests was one of the 
reasons for the failure of the plea of estoppel by acquiescence in Dann v Spurier (1802) 7 Ves 
231; 32 ER 94. The plaintiff expended a considerable sum of money in repairing demised 
premises after he had been told by the landlord that his acceptance as a tenant was not assured. 
Eldon LC held that ‘the plaintiff has not used the degree of circumspection and caution, that the 
Court can act upon the latter part of the prayer of this bill, consistently with the reasonable 
security of the affairs of mankind’ (ibid 95).
9 PS Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (1981) 68.
10 Ibid.
11 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard 
Law Review 1685, 1688 describes reasonableness as a standard, the application of which 
‘requires the judge both to discover the facts of a particular situation and to assess them in 
terms of the purposes or social values embodied in the standard.’
12 Paul Finn, ‘Commerce, the Common Law and Morality’ (1989) 17 Melbourne University
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requirement is a better way to approach the policy question is that it is a more 
sophisticated and more precisely defined inquiry.
The reasonableness inquiry is not an open-ended question whether liability 
should be imposed in the circumstances. Rather, the court’s attention is directed 
to the position of the representee for the purposes of a two-part inquiry. The first 
question relates to the adoption of the relevant assumption by the representee. 
The question whether it was reasonable for the representee to adopt the 
assumption in question directs the court’s attention to the conduct of the 
representor, and to the relationship between the parties. The second question 
relates to the reasonableness of the representee’s reliance. Assuming it was 
reasonable for the representee to adopt the relevant assumption, the court then 
needs to consider whether it was reasonable for the representee to act on the faith 
of that assumption in the way he or she did. This will depend on the nature of the 
action taken by the representee in reliance on the relevant assumption, in the 
context of the relationship between the parties and the other circumstances of the 
case. The court may regard it as reasonable in certain circumstances to adopt a 
certain assumption, and reasonable to act on the faith of the assumption in a 
limited way, but not reasonable in the circumstances to take such detrimental 
action as that taken by the representee. In such a case the reasonableness 
requirement must be linked to the question of remedy, at least if one accepts a 
reliance-based approach to determining relief. If only reasonable reliance is 
protected by a doctrine of estoppel, and only some of the representee’s acts of 
reliance were reasonable, then only the detriment flowing from the reasonable 
acts of reliance should be prevented or compensated by the court.
The important questions relating to the nature and appropriateness of the 
reasonableness requirement will be taken up again at the end of this chapter, in a 
discussion of criticism of reasonableness as a basis of promissory liability.
Law Review 87, 97- 8.
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II. ORIGINS OF THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
The requirement that the representee’s reliance must be reasonable before an 
estoppel will arise could be said to have been implicit in the very earliest estoppel 
cases at common law and in equity.13 The requirement only emerged as an 
express requirement, however, in the common law estoppel cases in the middle 
of the 19th century, as a means of softening the requirement that the representor 
must intend reliance. The first clear articulation of the reasonableness 
requirement was in the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in Freeman 
v Cooked  where Parke B qualified Lord Dennman CJ’s statement in Pickard v 
Sears15 that the representor must ‘wilfully’ induce the representee’s assumption. 
Parke B suggested that reasonableness of reliance on the part of the representee 
was an adequate substitute for an intention to induce reliance on the part of the 
representor. It was, he said, sufficient if the representor conducted himself so that 
a reasonable man would take the representation to be true and believe he was 
meant to act upon it as true.16
The representee’s failure to fulfil the reasonableness requirement was in fact one 
of the principal reasons for the failure of the defendant’s plea of estoppel in 
Freeman v Cooke. The plaintiffs in that case were the assignees of a bankrupt, 
William Broadbent, who brought an action in trover against a sheriff in 
connection with the seizure of goods under a writ of fieri facias. The relevant 
issue was whether an estoppel arose to prevent William Broadbent from asserting 
his ownership of the goods, since he had represented to the sheriffs officers that 
the goods were owned by his brother Benjamin. William represented that the
13 See, eg, the discussion of Dann v Spurier, above n 8.
14 (1848) 2 Ex 352; 154 ER 652.
15 (1837) 6 A & E 469; 112 ER 179, 181.
16 (1848) 2 Ex 352; 154 ER 652, 663:
By the term “wilfully,” however, in that rule, we must understand, if not that the party 
represents that to be true which he knows to be untrue, at least, that he means his 
representation to be acted upon, and that it is acted upon accordingly; and if whatever a 
man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the 
representation to be true, and believe that it was meant that he should act upon it as true, 
the party making the representation would be equally precluded from contesting its truth; 
and conduct by negligence or omission, where there is a duty cast upon a person, by 
usage of trade or otherwise to disclose the truth, may often have the same effect.
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goods were Benjamin’s in the belief that the officers were executing a writ 
against William himself, but when he found that they were in fact executing a 
writ against Benjamin, he said the goods were owned by another brother, Joseph. 
When he found the writ was also against Joseph, William truthfully claimed the 
goods as his own. The goods were then seized by the sheriffs officers and sold 
under the writ as the goods of Benjamin.
The Court of Exchequer Chamber overturned the decision of Alderson B at first 
instance and held that no estoppel in pais was made out, and William was entitled 
to sue in trover. Although the jury found that the sheriffs officers had been 
induced by the false representation to seize the goods, that was held to be 
insufficient to establish an estoppel. The Court held that there was no proof that 
William intended to induce the officers to seize the goods as those of Benjamin, 
as required by Pickard v Sears. If any such intention existed, it was negatived by 
William’s withdrawal of the representation before the seizure took place. ‘Nor 
could it be said that any reasonable man would have seized the goods on the faith 
of the bankrupt’s representation, taken altogether. ’ 17 The finding of the jury was, 
therefore, insufficient to invoke the rule, either on the terms enunciated in 
Pickard v Sears, or as expounded in Baron Parke’s judgment. Accordingly, it was 
clear from the judgment that an estoppel in pais could be made out in two ways: 
first, on the basis that the representation in question was made with the intention 
that it be acted upon by the representee or, secondly, in the absence of such 
intention, on the basis that it was reasonable in the circumstances for the 
representee to act upon the representation.
The approach laid down in Freeman v Cooke was applied in Pierson v 
Altrincham Urban Council. The appellant in that case represented himself to be 
the executor of his father’s will in discussions with the respondent Council in 
relation to his father’s statutory liability for the cost of certain works. The Council 
sought to hold the representor liable as executor for the cost of the works even 
though the Council knew that the Public Trustee was in fact the executor. The
17 Ibid 657.
18 (1917) 86 LJ KB 969.
165
finding of an estoppel by the Court of Quarter Sessions was overturned by three 
members of the King’s Bench Division sitting in banc on the basis that, although 
the representor’s conduct had induced reliance, there was no finding that the 
representor intended the representation to be acted upon, and nor was there a 
finding that the representee’s reliance was reasonable. Viscount Reading CJ was 
concerned with the reasonableness of the representee’s adoption of the relevant 
assumption: he held that the court should infer an intention that a representation 
be acted upon where the representee’s assumption that a particular state of affairs 
existed was reasonable. No such inference should, the Chief Justice said, be 
drawn here.19 Lush J, on the other hand, was concerned with the reasonableness 
of the representee’s reliance: he held that no estoppel was established on the basis 
that there was no finding that the representation was made with the intention that 
it should be acted upon, and no inference that it was reasonably acted upon.20
The early text book writers adopted the notion that reasonableness of reliance on 
the part of the representee was an effective substitute for an intention to induce 
reliance on the part of the representor. Writing in 1888, Michael Cababe 
suggested that it was unnecessary that the representor should intend reliance, and 
that his or her conduct could establish an estoppel if a reasonable outsider looking 
at the conduct would take the representation to be true, and believe that it was 
meant that it should be acted upon.21 The explanation for the rule, according to 
Cababe, was that a person is taken to intend the ordinary consequences of his or 
her actions. This, Cababe said, was exemplified by the principle of agency by 
estoppel, which remains a useful illustration today. It is clear in such cases that 
the principal does not intend the agent to act in contravention of the powers 
conferred by the principal, but the estoppel arises from reasonable reliance on the 
principal’s representation that the agent has greater powers than he or she in fact 
has.22
19 Ibid 972.
20 Ibid 973.
21 Michael Cababe, The Principles of Estoppel (1888) 61-4.
That approach articulated by Cababe was echoed by Spencer Bower and Turner, 
who maintained that an intention on the part of the representor that the 
representation be acted upon was required to establish an estoppel by 
representation. They suggested, however, that such an intention must generally be 
inferred from the use of conduct which was of such a nature as to induce a 
normal person in the circumstances to act as the representee acted.23 In addition 
to Freeman v Cooke and Pierson v Altrincham Urban Council,24 the approach 
outlined by Spencer Bower and Turner is also supported by the statement of 
Lord Esher MR in Seton, Laing, & Co v Lafone, that it is not necessary that the 
representor intended the representee to act in a particular way upon the 
statement: ‘it is enough if it was reasonable, as a matter of business, for the 
plaintiff to do what he did as a result of his belief in the defendant’s 
statement. ’25
Although the equity judges did not explicitly require that the representee’s 
reliance be reasonable, Francis Dawson has suggested that the requirement was 
inherent in the early cases where relied upon representations were made good. 
The doctrine was made workable, he said, because equity judges carefully 
defined the sort of conduct in reliance which was to be protected. He suggests 
that Maunsell v Hedges“ provides ‘a particularly good illustration of a 
representation being couched in such terms that the representee could not be said
97to have reasonably placed reliance upon it.’
23 George Spencer Bower and Sir Alexander Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by 
Representation (3rd ed, 1977) 94-5.
24 (1917) 86 LJ KB 969, 972 (Lord Reading CJ), 973 (Lush J): that an intention to induce 
reliance may be inferred as a fact if the representation was such as would reasonably have the 
effect of inducing the representee to believe and act upon it as true.
25 (1887) 19 QBD 68, 72.
26 (1854) 4 HLC 1039; 10 ER 769. The representee in that case married in reliance on his 
uncle’s representation that ‘my county of Tipperary estate will come to you at my death, unless 
some unforseen occurrence should taken place’. The House of Lords upheld the decision of the 
court below that, although the representee had acted on the faith of it, the representation was 
not capable of giving rise to an enforceable obligation.
27 Francis Dawson, ‘Making Representations Good’ (1982) 1 Canterbury Law Review 329, 
334-5.
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The notion of reasonableness was expressly referred to in the Court of Appeal in 
the equity case of Low v Bouverie,28 First, Bowen U  held that the representee’s 
interpretation of the language used by the representor must be reasonable. Bowen 
LJ qualified his statement that the language on which estoppel is founded must be 
‘precise and unambiguous’ by explaining that the language need not be open to 
only one construction, but must be ‘such as will be reasonably understood in a 
particular sense by the person to whom it is addressed. ’29 On the facts, Bowen LJ 
found that the representor’s language would be reasonably understood as a 
representation of his belief that there were no encumbrances on the property in 
question other than those disclosed, rather than as an assertion that there were in 
fact no other encumbrances. Similarly, Kay LJ held that where no fraud is 
alleged, the representee must show ‘that the statement was of such a nature that it 
would have misled any reasonable man’. The representee in Low v Bouverie 
failed to discharge that onus since the ‘only fair meaning’ which could be 
attributed to the representor’s statements was that the encumbrances disclosed 
were all the representor was aware of at the time of writing. The approaches of 
Bowen and Kay LJJ to the question of reasonableness are consistent with the 
finding of Lindley LJ that the representee ‘too hastily inferred’ that no 
encumbrances existed other than those disclosed by the representor.
Although the reasonableness of the representee’s adoption of the relevant 
assumption was called into question in Pierson v Altrincham Urban Council and 
Low v Bouverie, Spencer Bower and Turner have asserted that:
‘It will not lie in the mouth of the representor to say that the 
representation was one which should not reasonably have been believed 
by the representee ... the representor cannot offer as a defence the
28 [1891] 3 Ch 82. The facts of the case were discussed above in Chapter 3.
29 Ibid 106.
30 Ibid 113.
31 Ibid 115.
32 Ibid 104.
168
contention that the representee should not have believed his 
representation, or was negligent in doing so. ’33
When one looks at the cases on which that statement is based, however, it is clear 
that the relevant principle is considerably narrower. A more accurate statement of 
the principle, which is consistent with Freeman v Cooke, is that where an express 
representation is made with the intention that it be acted upon, then the 
representor cannot avoid the estoppel on the basis that the representee should not 
reasonably have believed the representation. That principle was first applied by 
the House of Lords in Bloomenthal v Ford?A which was followed by Astbury J in 
Gresham Life Assurance Society v Crowther, and by the High Court of 
Australia in Western Australian Insurance Co Ltd v Dayton. In Bloomenthal v 
Ford Lord Halsbury LC made it clear that the principle was limited to situations 
where a representation was made with the intention of inducing reliance.37 That 
restriction must necessarily have been accepted by Isaacs ACJ in Western 
Australian Insurance Co Ltd v Dayton, when he quoted with approval the 
statement of Kay LJ in Low v Bouverie that: ‘It is essential to show that the 
statement was of such a nature that it would have misled any reasonable man, and 
that the plaintiff was misled by it.’
III. THE CONTEMPORARY AUSTRALIAN APPROACH
Despite the explicit consideration of the reasonableness of the representee’s 
reliance in such well known cases as Freeman v Cooke and Low v Bouverie, the 
notion of reasonableness traditionally has not played an important role in estoppel 
cases at common law or in equity.39 The reasonableness requirement has,
33 Above n 23, 96.
34 [18971 AC 156, 161-2 (Lord Halsbury LC), 168 (Lord Herschell).
35 [1914] 2 Ch 219, 228.
36 Western Australian Insurance Co Ltd v Dayton (1924) 35 CLR 355, 375-6 (Isaacs ACJ, with 
whom Gavan Duffy J agreed).
37 [1897] AC 156, 161-2.
38 [1891] 3 Ch 82, 113, quoted in Western Australian Insurance Co Ltd v Dayton (1924) 35 
CLR 355, 375 (Isaacs ACJ).
39 As Lord Hailsham LC said in Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce 
Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741,756, the proposition for which Low v Bouverie is ‘rightly 
cited as authority’ is that the language on which an estoppel is founded must be precise and
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however, become far more prominent in the contemporary Australian cases.40 
This increased emphasis on reasonableness may well be the result of the 
relaxation of other barriers to the establishment of an estoppel. First, the lower 
threshold requirement of an ‘induced assumption’ applied in Australia makes it 
easier to establish the basic elements of an estoppel than if a promise or 
representation were required. Accordingly, the availability of a plea of estoppel 
must be limited in another way. A second, and more significant, extension of 
estoppel in Australia has been the relaxation of the principle that a promissory 
estoppel can only arise where the parties are in a pre-existing contractual 
relationship. Since an estoppel based on an assumption as to the representor’s 
future conduct is now available in the absence of a pre-existing legal relationship, 
a limit must be imposed to ensure that such estoppels do not arise too frequently. 
In each case, close scrutiny of the reasonableness of the representee’s reliance 
provides a means by which the applicability of a potentially broad principle can 
be circumscribed.
In Standard Chartered Bank Aust Ltd v Bank o f China, Giles J observed that the 
question of reasonableness was ‘inherent in reliance, although not always 
enunciated’ .41 His Honour indicated in that judgment that there were two separate 
requirements: first, that it must have been reasonable for the representee to adopt 
the assumption and, secondly, that it must have been reasonable for the 
representee to take the relevant action in reliance on the assumption.42 Both
unambiguous.
40 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, the reasonableness question appeared to play a 
role in the rejection of a plea of equitable estoppel by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland in Valbairn Pty Ltd v Powprop Pty Ltd [1991] 1 Qd R 295, 297. The Full Court 
upheld the finding of the trial judge that no equitable estoppel arose from the appellant’s 
assumption that a lease would be entered into between the parties. The decision appeared to be 
based in part on the conclusion that ‘neither party could reasonably have believed that a lease 
was likely’ given the lack of agreement between the parties on certain crucial matters.
41 (1991)23 NSWLR 164, 180.
42 Ibid 180-1. Giles J referred to questions of ‘the reasonableness of the conduct of the representee 
in adopting and acting upon the assumption’ (ibid 180, emphasis added) and ‘whether the 
representee reasonably adopted and relied upon the representation’ (ibid 181, emphasis added). 
Quite a different requirement was put forward by Jordan CJ in Franklin v Manufacturers Mutual 
Insurance Ltd (1935) 36 SR NSW 76, 82: ‘In order that [estoppel by representation] may arise, it 
is necessary that... a representation of fact should be made ... in such circumstances that a 
reasonable man would regard himself as invited to act on it in a particular way.’
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requirements find support in the early cases discussed above.43 The distinction 
between the two requirements may well be important. The first question involves 
a consideration of the conduct engaged in by the representor, and the impression 
it would have on a reasonable person in the representee’s situation. The second 
question involves a consideration of the action taken by the representee, and 
whether it was reasonable for the representee, having adopted the relevant 
assumption, to have taken the (ultimately detrimental) action which was taken. It 
is possible to envisage a situation in which it is reasonable to adopt an 
assumption, but not to act on it to the extent to which the party claiming the 
benefit of an estoppel has done. If, for example, one of the parties to a contract 
indicates to another that he or she does not intend to enforce a particular term of 
the contract, then it may be reasonable to assume that the term will not be 
enforced. It may not, however, be reasonable to expend a large amount of money 
on the basis of that assumption without formally varying the contract.44
Recent statements in the High Court support the notion that the reasonableness of 
the representee’s reliance is a relevant consideration in estoppel cases, both at 
common law and in equity. The failure of the respondents to satisfy the 
reasonableness requirement was one of the reasons Mason CJ and Wilson J gave 
in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher45 for rejecting the respondents’ claim 
to an estoppel based on assumption of existing fact. Even if the respondents could 
establish that they had assumed that contracts had been exchanged or a binding
43 The notion that the representee’s assumption must be reasonable is supported by the 
statement of Bowen LJ in Low v Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch 82, 106 that the representor’s language 
‘must be such as will reasonably be understood in a particular sense by the person to whom it is 
addressed.’ That statement was quoted with approval in George Whitechurch Ltd v Cavanagh 
& Co [1902] AC 117, 145 (Lord Brampton); Canada & Dominion Sugar Co Ltd v Canadian 
National (West Indies) Steamships Ltd [1947] AC 46 (PC). Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 
23, 83-4 observe that the dictum was subjected to searching re-examination, but ultimately left 
untouched, by the House of Lords in Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce 
Marketing Co Ltd [1972] 2 All ER 271. Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 23, 82-3, suggest 
that the onus of proof is on a person seeking to set up an estoppel to show ‘that the 
representation was reasonably understood by the representee in a sense, whether primary or 
secondary, materially inconsistent with the allegation against which the estoppel is now set up.’ 
The second requirement is supported by statements of principle in Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 
Ex 352; 154 ER 652, 657; Pierson v Altrincham Urban Council (1917) 86 LJ KB 969, 972 & 
973; Seton, Laing, & Co v Lafone (1887) 19 QBD 68, 72.
44 Cf Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd 
[1982] QB 84, 106-107 (Robert Goff J).
45 (1988) 164 CLR 387 (‘ Waltons Stores’).
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contract had come into existence, such a belief ‘could scarcely be described as a 
reasonable belief in the absence of confirmation from their solicitors.46 Mason 
CJ and Wilson J also observed in obiter dictum that a voluntary promise was 
generally unenforceable because the promisee may reasonably be expected to 
appreciate that a promise will only be binding if it forms part of a contract.47 
Although a reasonableness requirement was not discussed in any detail in 
Commonwealth v Verwayen, Mason CJ noted that the assumption adopted by 
Verwayen was a reasonable assumption for a person in his position to make, 
since the circumstances pointed to the existence of a definitive government policy 
which had been followed to the point of judgment on other occasions 48 The 
relevance of that observation was, however, restricted to the question whether 
there was reason to doubt the veracity of Verwayen’s assertions as to his adoption 
of, and reliance upon, the relevant assumption.
The existence of a reasonableness requirement in Australian law was confirmed 
when it formed the basis of the High Court’s rejection of a plea of estoppel in 
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd .49 The 
decision is important for two reasons. First, the reasonableness requirement has 
never before formed the basis of a decision of the High Court on estoppel.50 
Secondly, the approach taken by the Court lends support to the notion that the 
‘reasonableness of reliance’ approach is to be followed in Australia, rather than
46 Ibid 397. The facts of the case were discussed in Chapter 3 above. While Mason CJ and Wilson 
J regarded it as unreasonable for the respondents to believe that contracts had been exchanged, 
they did see it as reasonable for the respondents to assume that contracts would be exchanged.
This assumption was a reasonable assumption because the terms of [a letter from the appellant’s 
solicitors] coupled with the failure to communicate any refusal by the appellant to agree to the 
amendments justified the inference that the appellant agreed to the amendments with the result that 
exchange would follow as a matter of course.’ (Ibid). Thus, while a common law estoppel could 
not arise from any assumption of existing fact made by the respondents, an equitable estoppel did 
arise from the respondents’ assumption relating to the appellants’ future conduct.
47 Ibid 403. This statement is discussed further below, n 114.
48 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 414 ('Verwayen').
49 (1993) 177 CLR 485, 506 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (‘ASC v 
Marlborough Gold Mines').
50 As discussed in Chapter 3 above, the High Court’s rejection of the plea of estoppel in 
Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 could have been based on a finding that the representee 
did not act reasonably in adopting and acting upon the relevant assumption, but instead was 
based on the failure to meet a strict threshold requirement. That is, that no clear and 
unequivocal representation was made on behalf of the representor: ibid 440 (Mason and Deane 
JJ).
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the ‘reasonable expectation of reliance’ approach which is taken in the United 
States.51 The relevant issue in that case was whether ‘an equitable estoppel of the 
kind upheld in Verwayen'52 arose where the Australian Securities Commission, 
having indicated by letter that it would not oppose an application for court 
approval of a scheme of arrangement under s 411 of the Corporations Law, 
subsequently sought to oppose the application. The attitude of the Commission 
changed when it became aware of a decision of the Full Federal Court which 
indicated that the Corporations Law did not authorise the approval of the 
arrangement, which involved the conversion of a limited liability company to a 
no liability company. In those circumstances, the High Court held that the 
Commission’s departure from the position it had originally taken was neither 
‘unjust’ nor ‘unconscionable’ to use the expressions found in Thompson v 
Palmer53 and Verwayen,54 because ‘[i]t would have been unreasonable for the 
Company to assume that the Commission would continue to maintain the same 
attitude once the [Full Federal Court’s] interpretation of the [Corporations] Law 
came to its attention.’55 Accordingly, the decision in ASC  v Marlborough Gold 
Mines Ltd seems to be based on the principle that it is not unconscionable for a 
representor to depart from an assumption in circumstances in which it was 
unreasonable for the representee to adopt that assumption. The decision therefore 
raises the important philosophical question of the connection between the 
reasonableness requirement and the unconscionability of the representor’s 
departure from the relevant assumption. That question is taken up below.
A final point to note about the application of the reasonableness requirement in 
Australian law is that, in W v G, Hodgson J suggested that it was not necessary 
for a representee to establish affirmatively that his or her conduct was reasonable
51 The Restatement of Contracts (2d), s 90(1) provides that:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
52 (1993) 177 CLR 485, 506 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
53 (1933) 49 CLR 507,547.
54 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 410-1 (Mason CJ), 429 (Brennan J), 436 and 440-1 (Deane J), 453-4 
(Dawson J), 500-1 (McHugh J).
55 (1993) 177 CLR 485, 506.
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or for a judge to make a positive finding that the representee’s reliance was 
reasonable:
I do not understand it to be an independent part of the plaintiffs cause of 
action that she establish that her reliance was reasonable and I do not 
consider it necessary for me to make a positive finding that the plaintiffs 
conduct was reasonable. However, I do not consider that there was any 
such element of unreasonableness as to prejudice the finding that there 
was reliance and this was intended by the defendant.56
Those remarks are interesting for two reasons. First, since reasonableness seems 
clearly to be a policy question, rather than a factual question, Hodgson J must 
certainly be right to say that it is not an independent part of the plaintiffs cause of 
action. Secondly, it is rare to see a modem judgment in which the question of 
reasonableness is linked with the representor’s intention, as Hodgson J did in the 
last sentence of the above passage. Hodgson J appears to be alluding to the 
approach taken in Pierson v Altrincham Urban Council, where the 
reasonableness of the representee’s reliance was regarded as a basis on which the 
representor’s intention to induce reliance could be established. In the other 
contemporary Australian cases in which the reasonableness question has arisen, it 
appears to have lost its tenuous connection with the question of the representor’s 
intention to induce reliance.
IV. REASONABLENESS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ESTOPPEL 
A. Reasonableness and Unconscionability
The connection between the reasonableness of the representee’s reliance and 
unconscionability which emerged from the joint judgment in ASC v Marlborough 
Gold Mines Ltd was also emphasised by Deane J in Verwayen:
56 (1996) 20 Fam LR 49, 66.
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Ultimately, however, the question whether departure from the assumption 
would be unconscionable must be resolved ... by reference to all of the 
circumstances of the case, including the reasonableness of the conduct of 
the other party in acting upon the assumption.57
From a philosophical point of view, the judgment of Deane J in Verwayen and 
the joint judgment in ASC v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd indicate that the 
reasonableness requirement is justified on the basis of unconscionability and is, 
therefore, consistent with the notion that estoppels are conscience-based 
doctrines. An inquiry into the reasonableness of the representee’s reliance is not, 
however, a good indicator of whether departure from the assumption in question 
would offend the conscience of the representor. The reasonbleness test adopted 
the United States, whether a reasonable person in the position of the representor 
would have expected reliance upon the relevant assumption, is more directly 
concerned, although in an objective way, with the representor’s conscience. A 
‘reasonable expectation’ inquiry would seem to have more bearing on the 
question whether it was or would be unconscionable for the representor to depart 
from that assumption, and would seem to be more consistent with the notion that 
estoppels are conscience-based doctrines.
B. Reasonable Expectation of Reliance
In the United States, s 90 of the Restatement of Contracts (2d) provides that a 
voluntary promise is binding only if the promisor should reasonably expect the 
promise to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee. The focus 
on the reasonable expectations of the promisor tends to indicate that s 90 is more 
concerned with the position of the promisor than with that of the promisee. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the primary focus of a doctrine of estoppel which is 
‘founded upon good conscience’59 should be on the knowledge and conduct of 
the representor, whereas a doctrine based on reliance should primarily direct
57 (1990) 170 CLR 394,445.
58 See above, n 51.
59 Venvayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 440 (Deane J).
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attention to the representee. Indeed, in Waltons Stores, Mason CJ and Wilson J 
examined the reasonable expectation requirement of s 90 and observed that the 
requirement ‘makes it clear that the promise is enforced in circumstances where 
departure from it is unconscionable’.60
The focus on the promisor under s 90 can be contrasted with the requirement in 
Australia that reliance by the representee on the relevant assumption must be 
reasonable. In each case the state of mind, or the interpretation of events, of one 
of the parties is tested against objective standards; in Australia it is the state of 
mind of the representee and in the United States it is the state of mind of the 
representor. As Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips have suggested, under s 
90 ‘foreseeability is tested from the viewpoint of the promisor, in light of all of 
the circumstances as they were known to him.’61 It is interesting to note that one 
American commentator, Melvin Eisenberg, has criticised the s 90 requirement 
that the promisor should reasonably expect reliance, and has advocated its 
replacement with a requirement that the representee’s reliance be reasonable. 
Eisenberg has proposed that change on the ground that the reasonable reliance 
requirement:
is cleaner, does not embody a questionable distinction between donative 
promises as a class and those on which reliance can reasonably be 
expected, and properly focuses attention on the reasonableness of the 
innocent promisee’s reliance rather than on the contours of the promise
ATbreaker’s expectation.
Eisenberg does not explain why he regards a focus on the promisee’s reliance as 
preferable to a consideration of the promise breaker’s expectation. Certainly it is 
preferable if one regards the purpose of a doctrine of estoppel as the prevention of 
harm resulting from reliance on the conduct of others, rather than the prevention
60 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 402.
1 Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an 
Independent Theory of Recovery’ (1983) 35 Rutgers Law Review 472, 539.
62 Melvin Eisenberg ‘Donative Promises’ (1979) 47 University o f Chicago Law Review 1,20-2.
63 Ibid 22.
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of unconscionable conduct. The distinction between the two requirements has 
considerable significance in highlighting the fact that s 90, as presently drafted, 
does not have the protection of reliance as its primary goal, as Yorio and Thel 
make clear:
If the objective of Section 90 is to protect reliance, then reasonable 
reliance alone justifies a remedy. But if ... the goal of Section 90 is to 
enforce certain non-bargain promises, it is critical to provide standards for 
determining which promises should be enforced.64
The contrast between a conscience-based doctrine and a requirement that 
complainants act reasonably was clearly appreciated by Paul Finn, when he 
suggested that more attention should be paid to the question whether 
complainants have taken reasonable steps to protect their own interests:
Unconscionability based doctrines are now being used to thwart 
exploitative conduct. But, as their reach is extended, we must inevitably 
confront the question of the level of responsibility a complainant must 
have to take reasonable steps to protect his or her own interests or else 
suffer the consequences of a failure to do so.65
The Australian ‘reasonableness of reliance’ requirement ensures that estoppel 
only protects reasonable reliance, and only protects against detriment suffered as 
a result of reasonable changes of position. It is an objective test which focuses on 
the matrix of circumstances as seen from the perspective of a reasonable person 
in the position of the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel. Both it and the 
‘reasonable expectation’ test applied in the United States serve to limit the 
circumstances in which an estoppel claim will be available, but the American test 
is based on conscience, while the Australian test is based on reliance.
64 Edward Yorio and Steve Thel, ‘The Promissory Basis of Section 90’ (1991) 101 Yale Law 
Journal 111, 124.
65 Paul Finn, ‘Unconscionable Conduct’ (1994) 8 Journal o f Contract Law 37, 45.
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C. Reasonable Expectation o f Reliance in Anglo-Australian Law
The ‘reasonable expectation’ and ‘reasonable reliance’ requirements can be seen 
as alternatives, since each provides an objective test which limits the 
circumstances in which a plea of estoppel can be made. Although the 
reasonableness of reliance approach has been favoured, there is some support for 
the reasonable expectation of reliance test in Anglo-Australian law .66 In Jorden v 
Money, Lord Cranworth LC indicated that, where an ‘intention to mislead’ is 
absent, then the representor must reasonably expect reliance:
But if the party has unwittingly misled another, you must add that he has 
misled another under such circumstances that he had reasonable ground 
for supposing that the person whom he was misleading was to act upon
finwhat he was saying.
Earlier, Lord Cranworth VC had said in West v Jones68 that a representor will be 
bound by a statement ‘if it be made in order to induce another to act upon it, or 
under circumstances in which the party making it may reasonably suppose it will 
be acted on.’ More recently, statements in the High Court have indicated that a 
reasonable expectation of reliance may be relevant to the question of 
unconscionability. That argument finds support in the dictum of Mason CJ and 
Wilson J in Waltons Stores that the requisite unconscionability can be found in 
the representor’s reasonable expectation of detrimental reliance by the 
representee69 In Verwayen, Deane J said that a critical consideration in 
determining whether departure from an assumption would be unconscionable 
‘will commonly be that the allegedly estopped party knew or intended or clearly
66 PS Atiyah, ‘Misrepresentation, Warranty and Estoppel’ (1971) 9 Alberta Law Review 347, 
380, also suggests that the reasonable expectation of reliance requirement is part of English 
law, but cites no authority for the proposition.
67 (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, 881. This can be contrasted with the approach taken in 
Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 Ex 252; 154 ER 652 and Pierson v Altrincham Urban District 
Council (1917) 86 KB 969. In each of those cases the relevant consideration was whether 
reliance by the representee was reasonable (not whether it was reasonably to be expected) if the 
representor did not intend reliance.
68 (1851) 1 Sim (NS) 205; 61 ER 79, 81.
69 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 406.
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ought to have known that the other party would be induced by his conduct to 
adopt, and act on the basis of, the assumption’.70
In a recent article, Sir Anthony Mason also indicated that the ‘reasonable 
expectation’ requirement may have a role to play in Australian law. Sir Anthony 
suggested that the concept of unconscionability, which is at the heart of estoppel, 
may have its origin in, inter alia, ‘the reasonable expectation on the part of the 
promisor that the promise will induce action or forbearance in circumstances 
where injustice can only be avoided by holding the promisor to the promise.’71 
Although the question has not been addressed squarely by the courts, the 
reasonableness of the representee’s reliance does appear to have been treated in 
the cases to date as the principal limit on the availability of an estoppel. If the 
reasonable expectation of reliance approach does have a role to play in Australian 
law, then it is as a means of satisfying the unconscionability requirement: that is, 
the requirement that it must be unconscionable in the circumstances for the 
representor to depart from the relevant assumption. If the circumstances are such 
that the representor should reasonably expect reliance by the representee, then 
that fact may render it unconscionable for the representor to depart from the
79assumption.
Although Melvin Eisenberg saw the reasonable expectation of reliance and the 
reasonableness of reliance requirement as alternatives, one of the comments to s 
90 indicates that the reasonableness of the promisee’s reliance is a relevant 
question for the United States courts. Section 90 insists that a relied-upon 
promise is only binding ‘if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.’ Comment b to s 90 notes that whether enforcement of the promise is 
necessary to avoid injustice may depend, inter alia, ‘on the reasonableness of the 
promisee’s reliance’. Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips have observed that 
while some courts have, in accordance with comment b, treated the 
reasonableness of the promisee’s reliance as a factor to be taken into account
70 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 445 (emphasis added).
71 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary 
Common Law World’ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 238, 254.
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under the broad ‘injustice’ heading, other courts have gone further and treated 
the reasonableness of the promisee’s reliance as a separate element of promissory 
estoppel.74 It appears that the two requirements may operate side by side, at least 
in some states.75 Larry Di Matteo has suggested that s 90 ‘filters reliance recovery 
through the prism of the reasonable person in the position of the promisee and the 
promisor’. The reasonable person is, he says, called upon to determine whether 
the promisee’s reliance was reasonable, and whether it was foreseeable by a 
reasonable person in the position of the promisor.
Similarly, the reasonableness of reliance requirements and reasonable expectation 
of reliance requirements may in certain cases be applied side by side in Australia. 
In Chapter 6, I will argue that, in cases of estoppel by silence, the representor’s 
departure from an induced assumption can only be regarded as unconscionable 
where the representor had knowledge of the representee’s reliance. If the courts 
are prepared to accept constructive knowledge of reliance for that purpose, then 
such an approach is virtually indistinguishable from a requirement that the 
representor must reasonably expect reliance in order for an estoppel to arise from 
silence on the part of the representor. If that is accepted, then we have in effect 
two reasonableness requirements in Australian estoppel: in all cases the 
representee must reasonably adopt and reasonably rely upon the relevant 
assumption. Where the representor has not induced the assumption by positive
72 See Chapter 6 below.
73 This refers to the stipulation in s 90 that a relevant promise ‘is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’
74 Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips, ‘The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an 
Independent Theory of Recovery’ (1983) 35 Rutgers Law Review A ll, 541-2.
75 Joseph Weinstein, ‘Promissory Estoppel in Washington’ (1980) 55 Washington Law Review 
795, 805 (n 66), has identified both foreseeable reliance (a reasonable expectation of reliance) and 
justifiable reliance (reasonable reliance) requirements applied by the Washington courts, although 
he notes that some formulations of the doctrine require only foreseeable reliance. Eric Holmes, 
‘Restatement of Promissory Estoppel’ (1996) 32 Williamette Law Review 263, 288-9, has 
suggested that reasonable reliance is required in jurisdictions in which promissory estoppel is at 
the tort stage of development, at which courts recognise a promisor’s duty to prevent 
reasonable, and reasonably foreseeable, detrimental reliance. As noted in Chapter 2, this is the 
third of four stages in the development of promissory estoppel identified by Holmes: the 
estoppel phase (in which promissory estoppel has a preclusionary operation), the contract phase 
(in which promissory estoppel operates as a consideration substitute), the tort phase (in which 
both liability and remedy turn on reliance) and the equity phase (in which courts apply 
promissory estoppel as a flexible, characteristically equitable doctrine).
76 DiMatteo, above n 3, 303.
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conduct, then it is also required that the representor must reasonably expect 
reliance before an estoppel can arise.77
D. Reasonableness as a Common Law Concept
As well as revealing the orientation of both common law and equitable estoppel 
towards a concern with reliance, rather than conscience, the fact that the 
‘reasonableness’ requirement is applied in equitable estoppel cases is also 
evidence of the infiltration of common law concepts into equitable estoppel. In 
other words, it reveals the extent to which the merger of common law and 
equitable estoppel has already begun. Prior to Waltons Stores, Paul Finn wrote 
that:
Outside of cases of invitation, authorisation or encouragement, the 
finding of a responsibility in the representor for the representee’s actions 
inevitably raises questions of the “reasonable” - if only because reliance 
of itself could not be allowed as of course to found liability. But once one 
begins to ask such questions as: should the representor have reasonably 
anticipated reliance? was the reliant action itself reasonable? then one has 
moved beyond the province of equity, no matter how elastic one’s
70
conception of “fraud”, of “unconscionability”.
Finn went on to say that if we are to aspire to a jurisdiction giving qualified 
enforcement to voluntary promises, then some fusion of common law and 
equitable concepts is inevitable. It is clear that the reasonableness requirement 
had its origin in the common law estoppel cases, although as long ago as 1891 the 
Court of Appeal was prepared to consider questions of reasonableness in an
on
equity case. As Finn has suggested, however, the importation of common law 
concepts such as reasonableness has been an essential part of the development of 
a broad jurisdiction which protects reliance on the conduct of others. Although
77 See Chapter 6 below.
78 PD Finn, ‘Equity and Contract’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Contract (1987) 104, 119.
79 Ibid.
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the common law and equitable compartments of that jurisdiction are notionally 
separate, it is clear from the borrowing of the concept of reasonableness that 
some substantive unification has already taken place.
V. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
There are two ways in which the reasonableness requirements have, or can be 
argued to have, manifested themselves in recent cases and a third situation in 
which the reasonableness requirement may be of considerable practical 
importance. First, the reasonableness requirement was found by Giles J in 
Standard Chartered Bank v Bank o f China to subsume any question of the defeat
Q 1
of an estoppel by constructive notice. Secondly, the reasonableness requirement 
may provide a justification for the courts’ reluctance to find estoppels arising 
during negotiations between well-advised commercial parties. Thirdly, the 
question of reasonableness may be important in preventing estoppels from arising 
between strangers, without the need to define the types of relationship in which 
an estoppel can arise.
A. Constructive Notice
In Standard Chartered Bank v Bank o f China, Giles J observed that the cases ‘do 
not show much support for a doctrine of constructive notice operating to defeat 
an estoppel.’82 Where a person claiming the benefit of an estoppel was aware of 
facts which should have caused him or her to suspect the accuracy of the relevant 
representation, then, according to Giles J, it is preferable not to ask whether the 
promisee has constructive notice that the representation is untrue. Rather, account 
should be taken of the promisee’s actual knowledge in asking whether he or she 
reasonably adopted and relied upon the representation.83 The plaintiff in that case 
had lent money on the faith of a forged letter of credit purportedly issued by the 
Hong Kong branch of the defendant. After receiving the letter of credit, and
80 Low v Bouverie [ 1891 ] 3 Ch 82.
81 (1991) 23 NSWLR 164.
82 Ibid 180.
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before agreeing to lend the money, the plaintiff asked the Sydney branch of the 
defendant to verify the signatures on the letter of credit. Officers in the 
defendant’s Sydney branch verified the signatures by conduct which, Giles J held, 
amounted to a representation that the letter of credit was authentic. The plaintiff 
then lent the money, which it later sought to recover under the terms of the letter 
of credit. The principal issue before Giles J was whether the defendant was 
estopped by its conduct from denying that the letter of credit was authentic, and 
was therefore liable to make payment according to its terms.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff could not claim the benefit of an estoppel 
because it had been put on notice that the letter of credit was a forgery. Three 
facts were claimed to have put the plaintiff on notice. First, an earlier draft copy 
of the letter of credit sent to the plaintiff by facsimile was signed and dated two 
days after the transmission, and was accompanied by a confirmatory letter which 
was dated five days thereafter. Those features of the transaction were said to be 
‘unheard o f  in such dealings. Secondly, where the issuing bank and the 
beneficiary of a letter of credit were not in a correspondent relationship, the 
issuing bank could be expected to use an advising bank to convey the letter of 
credit to the beneficiary, which did not occur. Thirdly, the plaintiff had issued 
warning bulletins to its staff stating that forged Bank of China letters of credit had 
been reported.
Giles J noted that actual knowledge that a representation is untrue will defeat an 
estoppel ‘because the representee cannot be found to have reasonably adopted 
and acted in reliance upon the truth of the representation.’ Accordingly, he said, 
all knowledge which the representee possesses should be treated it the same way:
‘the preferable approach is to take account of the representee’s actual
knowledge in asking whether the representee reasonably adopted and
83 Ibid 181.
84 Ibid 180-1.
relied upon the representation, rather than ask whether the representee had 
constructive notice that the representation was untrue. ’85
On the facts, Giles J found that the unusual circumstances known to the plaintiff 
did not make it unreasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the representation.86 
Accordingly, an estoppel arose which prevented the defendant from denying the 
authenticity of the letter of credit, and allowed the plaintiff to enforce it against 
the defendant.
Ultimately, the answer to the two questions, whether the known facts made it 
unreasonable to adopt the assumption, and whether the representee had 
constructive notice of the falsity of the representation, should be the same. In 
each case, the promisee’s conduct is tested against objective standards. If the 
issue was whether the promisee had constructive notice of the untruth, the 
relevant question would be whether, given what was actually known, a 
reasonable person in that position would have conducted further inquires.87 It is 
difficult to see how the result would be any different if the relevant question was 
whether a reasonable person in that position would have adopted the relevant 
assumption. In each case all of the circumstances would be taken into account to 
determine whether a reasonable person would have adopted the assumption in 
question as the basis of action.
The approach taken by Giles J does, however, have the benefit of involving a 
principle long acknowledged as one by which an estoppel can be defeated. It also 
sits more comfortably with the approach of the High Court towards the 
simplification of estoppel doctrine. The reasonableness requirement is clearly 
sufficiently broad to obviate the need for a separate question of constructive 
notice, and can be applied consistently at common law and in equity. The 
reasonableness of reliance test is also a more sophisticated test than the 
constructive notice test because it is not just concerned with the circumstances of
85 Ibid 181.
86 Ibid.
87 See, for example, RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and
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reliance, but also the nature and extent of reliance. In other words, a constructive 
notice question equates to only half of the reasonableness test, namely the 
reasonableness of the adoption of the relevant assumption, and does not take 
account of the second part of the reasonableness test: the reasonableness of the 
action taken in reliance on that assumption.
B. Well-Advised Commercial Parties
The reluctance of courts to uphold pleas of estoppel by well advised commercial 
parties can also be seen as a manifestation of the reasonableness requirement.88 
Although the connection has not been articulated in the way in which Giles J 
linked constructive notice and the reasonableness requirement, the connection 
was adverted to by Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores. After referring to 
the ‘problem identified in Texas Bank that a voluntary promise will not 
generally give rise to an estoppel because the promisee may reasonably be 
expected to appreciate that he cannot safely rely on it’, they went on to say that 
‘[t]his problem is magnified in the present case where the parties were 
represented by their solicitors.’90 The problem of well advised commercial parties 
was also discussed by Kirby P in Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self serve Pty Ltd ,91 
although not in the context of the reasonableness requirement. Kirby P observed 
in that case that where ‘[t]he Court has before it two groupings of substantial 
commercial enterprises, well resourced and advised, dealing in a commercial 
transaction having a great value’ then that was a reason ‘for scrutinising carefully 
the circumstances which are said to give rise to the conclusion that an insistence 
by the appellants on their legal rights would be so unconscionable that the Court 
will provide relief from it.’92 Rather than being dealt with on the basis of 
unconscionability, such considerations could be taken into account in considering 
whether the representee’s reliance was reasonable in the circumstances.
Remedies (3rd ed, 1992) 253.
88 Alec Leopold, ‘Estoppel: A Practical Appraisal of Recent Developments’ (1991) 7 Australian 
Bar Review 47, 63-4.
89 Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] 
QB 84, 107.
90 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 406.
91 (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 584-6.
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When an estoppel is claimed to have arisen in the course of a commercial 
transaction, then the nature of the transaction and the availability of legal advice 
are clearly circumstances a court should take into account in determining whether 
it was reasonable for the representee to adopt the relevant assumption, and to take 
the relevant detrimental action in reliance on that assumption. Obviously the 
nature of an assumption will have considerable bearing on the reasonableness of 
making it, and acting upon it, when legal advice is available. On the one hand, it 
may be reasonable for a well-advised party to make an assumption as to a fact 
underlying a transaction or as to the intentions of the other party in relation to the 
transaction. It is worthy of note that, in all four of the recent decisions in which 
claims of estoppel were upheld by members of the High Court,94 the party 
claiming the benefit of the estoppel was advised by solicitors both at the time of 
making the relevant assumption, and at the time of acting on it. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which it would be reasonable for 
such a party to make, and act to their detriment on, an assumption as to the legal 
effect of a transaction. Had the applicants in Re Ferdinando,95 for example, had 
the benefit of independent legal advice, then it would presumably have been 
unreasonable for them to have assumed that the financial obligations secured by 
the mortgage given by them were limited in the way represented to them by the 
mortgagee 96
92 Ibid 585.
93 Justine Munro, ‘The New Law of Estoppel’ (1993) 23 Victoria University o f Wellington Law 
Review 271, 288 has suggested that the courts should ‘adjust their judgments concerning 
responsibility commensurate with the positions of the parties, be they substantial commercial 
enterprises or vulnerable individuals.’ While the question of reasonableness clearly requires the 
court to take into account the circumstances of reliance, the cases do not support the 
proposition that the courts should impose different standards of responsibility for different 
parties.
94 Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387; Foran v Wight 
(1989) 168 CLR 385; Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394.
95 Re Ferdinando; Ex parte Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v The Official 
Trustee in Bankruptcy (as Trustee o f the bankrupt estate o f Maurice Christie Ferdinando) (1993) 
42 FCR 243. The representor bank induced the representee guarantors to believe that the 
guarantee they were providing for the debts of their company was not linked to an ‘all moneys’ 
mortgage they had previously given to secure other debts. See Andrew Robertson, ‘Limits on the 
Recovery of Secured Debts: Estoppel and Section 52’ (1994) 5 Journal o f Banking and Finance 
Law and Practice 211.
96 The availability of legal advice could also, as Deane J indicated in Waltons Stores (1988) 164 
CLR 387, 444, prevent the promisor’s conduct from being the proximate cause of the promisee 
adopting and acting upon the assumption.
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C. Estoppels Between Strangers
A third situation in which the reasonableness requirement may be important is in 
preventing estoppels from arising between strangers. In Waltons Stores, the High 
Court relaxed the rule that a promissory estoppel could only arise between 
contracting parties: ‘a pre-existing contractual relationship was held not to be a 
prerequisite to the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. ’97 Despite 
the paucity of explicit discussion of the issue in the judgments, on its facts the 
case provides authority for the proposition that promissory estoppel can arise in 
the absence of a pre-existing legal relationship.98 If any pre-existing relationship 
was required, then that between parties involved in pre-contractual negotiations 
was sufficient. Mason CJ and Wilson J expressed the opinion that the doctrine 
could operate in circumstances where a person attempts to depart from a 
representation that he or she would not enforce a nön-contractual right.99 They 
did not, however, consider whether a promissory estoppel could arise so as to 
create rights between parties who were not in a pre-existing legal relationship of 
any kind. 100 Brennan J, on the other hand, indicated that there could be no limit 
on the availability of a plea of promissory estoppel if it was seen to based on the 
same equity as proprietary estoppel. The enforcement of promises to create new
97 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 455 (Dawson J). The question whether promissory estoppel 
could apply outside a pre-existing contractual relationship had explicitly been left open in 
Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 435 (Mason and Deane JJ).
98 Leopold, above n 88, 65.
" (1988) 164 CLR 387, 399.
100 The New Zealand Court of Appeal has gone a step closer to recognising that an equitable 
estoppel can arise between strangers. In Burbery Mortgage Finance & Savings Ltd v 
Hindsbank Holdings Ltd [1989) 1 NZLR 356, the Court of Appeal held that an equitable 
estoppel arose between parties whose only relationship was that they had interests in the same 
subject matter. The representee refrained from taking possession of farm machinery over which 
it held security on the faith of an assurance, given by a receiver appointed by a mortgagee of the 
farm land on which it was situated, that the machinery would be used only to assist in the sale 
of the farm. The receiver subsequently discovered that he had a right of distress against the 
chattels for unpaid rent. The Court of Appeal held that an equitable estoppel arose which 
prevented the receiver from distraining against the chattels without first giving the representee 
the opportunity of resuming its former position. At common law, estoppels commonly arise 
between parties connected only by virtue of having an interest in the same subject matter: see, 
eg, Thomas Australia Wholesale Vehicle Trading Co Pty Ltd v Marac Finance Australia Ltd 
[1985] 3NSWLR 452.
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proprietary rights could not, he said, be reconciled with a limitation on the 
enforcement of other promises under the rubric of promissory estoppel. 101
In Verwayen, Dawson J regarded as unresolved the question whether a pre­
existing legal relationship was required before a promissory estoppel could arise, 
but held the relationship between litigating parties to be sufficient for this 
purpose. As Dawson J noted, while the parties were not in a contractual 
relationship, they ‘were in a legal relationship which began at least with the 
commencement of the action’ by Mr Verwayen against the Commonwealth. 102 
There was, he said, no reason why an estoppel could not arise where the legal 
relationship between the parties was a non-contractual one. 103 The estoppel that 
arose in Verwayen was in sense quite conventional, since it arose to prevent the 
Commonwealth from exercising pre-existing rights which the Commonwealth’s 
representatives had promised not to exercise. W v G, on the other hand, involved 
an innovative use of the doctrine, since the estoppel itself provided a source of 
rights where none existed before. 104 The parties in W v G were, however, in a pre­
existing relationship as co-habitees. The question that remains, then, is whether a 
representee must be able to establish a legal relationship between the parties, or 
whether an estoppel can potentially arise between parties who are not in any sort 
of legal relationship. It seems from the remarks made by Brennan J in Waltons 
Stores quoted above, and from the broad terms in which the doctrines of 
equitable estoppel were described in Waltons Stores and Verwayen, that the better 
view must be that no particular type of pre-existing relationship is required. This 
view is supported by the decision in Lee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty 
Ltd . ' 05
(1988) 164 CLR 387,426:
If it be unconscionable for an owner of property in certain circumstances to fail to fulfil a 
non-contractual promise that he will convey an interest in the property to another, is there 
any reason in principle why it is not unconscionable in similar circumstances to fail to 
fulfil a non-contractual promise that he will confer a non-proprietary legal right on 
another? It does not accord with principle to hold that equity, in seeking to avoid 
detriment occasioned by unconscionable conduct, can give relief in some cases but not in 
others.
102
103
104
105
(1990) 170 CLR 394, 455.
Ibid.
(1996) 20 Farn LR 49. The facts of the case were discussed in Chapter 1 above.
(1991) 23 NSWLR 571 (‘Lee Gleeson'). As noted in Chapter 1, equitable estoppel provided
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The question of reasonableness is an appropriate means, and perhaps the only 
means, by which a relationship between the parties can be required, while 
retaining sufficient flexibility in the doctrine to account for the decisions in 
Waltons Stores, Verwayen, W v G and Lee Gleeson. The relationship between the 
parties should be a crucial factor in determining whether it is reasonable to adopt 
and rely upon an assumption on the basis of the conduct of another.106 Where the 
pre-existing relationship between the parties is tenuous, then it will be less likely 
that any substantial action on the faith of the assumption would be regarded as 
reasonable. Assume, for example, that A feels that B needs a holiday, and 
promises to give her $5000 the following day to pay for it. On the faith of that 
promise, B books and incurs liability for a holiday she can not afford. If A and B 
were merely acquaintances, then no estoppel would arise because, even if it were 
considered reasonable for B to assume that the money would be paid, it would 
certainly not be reasonable for B to incur expenditure on the faith of that 
assumption. If, on the other hand, A was a close friend of B’s, was very wealthy, 
and was in the habit of giving extravagant gifts to B, then the situation may well 
be different. Although A and B are not in any sort of legal relationship, even such 
as existed in Waltons Stores, Verwayen or W v G, it may well be reasonable in the 
circumstances for B to assume the gift will be made and to incur expenditure on 
the faith of it.108
a cause of action which enabled the enforcement of a gratuitous promise made by a bank to a 
person with whom it was not in a contractual relationship. The representee was a builder who 
completed certain building works for a property owner in financial difficulties on the faith of a 
promise that the builder would be paid by the owner’s bank from the sale proceeds of the 
property. Brownie J held that an equitable estoppel arose against the bank, the effect of which 
was to prevent the bank from denying the existence or the binding quality of its representation 
to the builder.
106 The reasonableness of the representee’s reliance was unsuccessfully challenged by the 
representor in W v G, ibid 66, on the basis that it was highly unlikely the relationship between 
the parties would endure.
107 Michael Spence, ‘Australian Estoppel and the Protection of Reliance’ (1997) 11 Journal o f 
Contract Law 203, 206-7 & 216-7 also sees the length of the relationship between the parties as 
relevant to the establishment of an estoppel, although he sees it as one of the criteria for 
determining whether the unconscionability requirement has been satisfied.
108 The example of an estoppel arising from reliance on a promise to fund an overseas trip was 
used by Joseph Weinstein, above n 75, 810, who observed that the reasonableness of reliance 
will depend on the sincerity of the promise and the setting in which it was made, as well as the 
relationship between the parties.
189
VI. CRITICISM OF THE REASONABLENESS TEST
Whether the reasonableness question is considered from the point of view of 
the representor (the reasonable expectation of reliance test) or from the point of 
view of the representee (the reasonableness of reliance test), it is clear that 
reasonableness is an important aspect of any source of legal obligation which 
depends on reliance on the unintentional conduct of others. Randy Barnett has 
criticised reliance as a basis for imposing promissory obligations, on the basis 
that a focus on reliance does not present us with a clear choice as to which 
promises should be enforced. 109 He draws on Morris Cohen’s comment that not 
all cases of reliance on the words or conduct of another are actionable, and 
reliance theory offers no clue as to what distinguishes those that are enforceable 
from those that are not. 110 The way in which actionable reliance is 
distinguished from non-actionable reliance is by reference to the question 
whether the representee’s reliance was, in the circumstances, reasonable. 
Equitable estoppel in Australia, for example, can potentially operate in all cases 
in which one person has relied on a promise made by a second person, where 
that second person subsequently seeks to resile from the promise. An estoppel 
will only arise, however, where that reliance is reasonable.
Barnett suggests that the reasonableness question is somewhat circular and fails 
to address the essential question in a reliance-based source of obligation, which 
is when reliance should be protected. * 111 The question whether reliance in a 
given situation is reasonable is not, according to Barnett, an assessment we can 
make independently of the legal rule in the relevant community, because the 
question whether a reasonable person would rely is affected by their perception 
of whether or not the promise is enforceable. Enforceablity, therefore, depends 
on reasonableness, while reasonableness depends on enforceability. Barnett
109 Randy Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 269,
274-6.
110 Morris Cohen, ‘The Basis of Contract’ (1933) 46 Harvard Law Review 533, 579.
111 Similar arguments have been made by PS Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises, and the Law of 
Obligations’ in Essays on Contract (1986) 10, 33 and Avery Katz, ‘When Should an Offer 
Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations’ (1996) 105 Yale 
Law Journal 1249, 1254.
190
suggests that the consequence of that circularity is that a reliance theory of 
promissory liability ultimately does no more than re-state the crucial question, 
which is whether a promise should be enforced.
Barnett’s discussion is not directly applicable in the Australian context, because 
here reliance-based obligations do not just result from reliance on promises, 
and reliance does not strictly result in the promise being ‘enforceable’. Barnett 
does, however, show us that the reliance basis of equitable estoppel does not 
tell us when reliance by one party on an assumption induced by another should 
give rise to an obligation in equity to prevent detriment resulting from that 
reliance. It is equally clear that a reliance basis of common law estoppel does 
not tell us when reliance by one party on an assumption of fact induced by 
another should result in the second party being held to the assumed facts. By 
focussing on reliance, we can determine factual matters such as whether an 
assumption has been induced by the conduct of another party, we can establish 
the fact of reliance on that assumption, we can determine what detriment has 
resulted from reliance, and, in the case of the equitable doctrine, appropriate 
relief can be framed by reference to that detriment. But the only answer to the 
question: ‘when should reliance be protected?’ is ‘when it is reasonable.’
It is clear that, as Barnett observes, the question of reasonableness assumes 
great importance in a reliance-based doctrine of estoppel: it determines when 
reliance should be protected, and requires a representee to act with 
circumspection when relying on the conduct of others. As Hugh Collins has put 
it, ‘the real meat of the reliance model lies in the requirement that the reliance 
must have been reasonable.’ " Barnett’s claim that the reasonableness test is 
circular does not withstand scrutiny, however, because it is not true to say that 
reasonableness depends on enforceability. It would in fact be quite artificial to 
decide the question of reasonableness on the basis of enforceability, because 
most lay-people would not know when reliance on the conduct of another 
person is legally protected. Barnett seems to assume that a promisee’s decision
112 Hugh Collins, The Law o f Contract (1st ed, 1986) 38.
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as to whether to rely on a promise will be based solely on his or her perception 
of his or her legal rights. One could argue, however, that the fundamental 
consideration for most promisees is not whether their reliance will be protected 
by the courts, but whether the promisor can be expected to make good the 
promise. That argument is supported by Stewart Macaulay’s finding that 
business people often do not act on the basis of legal sanctions which might be 
available to them in the event of a breakdown in their relationship with the 
party with whom they are dealing, but will prefer to rely on ‘common honesty 
and decency’ . 113 No doubt that tendency is even more prevalent outside the 
commercial arena.
Accordingly, the question of reasonableness cannot depend on 
enforceability. 114 Instead, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, it is a 
policy question, which requires judges to set and apply standards of acceptable 
behaviour. As Atiyah suggests, the question of reasonableness is a community 
judgment, which draws on ‘collective moral ideas and even customary practices 
and redistributive ideologies. ’ 115 Deciding when to protect reliance will 
inevitably involve a policy decision as to whether reliance should be protected 
in the circumstances in question. 116 That is so whether the policy question is in 
the guise: first, of a question whether the representee’s reliance was reasonable; 
secondly, of a question whether the representor should reasonably have 
expected reliance; or thirdly, of a question whether it was unconscionable or
113 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 
American Sociological Review 55, 58. See also Hugh Beale and Tony Dugdale, ‘Contracts 
Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’ (1975) 2 British 
Journal of Law and Society 45, 48-50.
114 This statement contradicts the dictum of Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores (1988) 
164 CLR 387, 403 that voluntary promises are generally unenforceable because the promisee 
may reasonably be expected to appreciate that a promise will only be binding if it forms part of 
a binding contract. If a reasonable person could be taken to know that a promise is binding only 
if it forms part of a binding contract, and to rely only on biding promises, then it is difficult to 
see how an estoppel could ever arise from a promise. As Kenneth Sutton, ‘A Denning Come to 
Judgment: Recent Judicial Adventures in the Law of Contract’ (1989) 15 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 131, 138 has observed, the reasonable lay person might be surprised 
to hear that a promise is only binding if it forms part of a binding contract, since business 
people still regard a ‘firm’ offer as binding.
115 PS Atiyah, ‘Fuller and the Theory of Contract’ in Essays on Contract (1986) 73, 87.
116 Joseph Weinstein, above n 75, 809-10 has suggested that justifiable reliance is nothing less 
than a policy choice as to when the law should provide a remedy for reliance without a contract.
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inequitable for the representor to depart from the assumption in question. As 
Hugh Collins suggests, these vague standards simply ‘alert us to the fact that 
the court is balancing competing policies when determining the province of 
legal enforceability. ’ 118
A second deficiency in Barnett’s critique of ‘reasonableness’ as a legal standard 
is his failure to make a compelling case for an alternative basis for liability. 
Barnett suggests that reliance should be protected only when it is reliance on ‘a 
manifested intent to be legally bound. ’ 119 The problem with that formulation is 
that, as innumerable estoppel cases have shown us, people who make informal 
promises and representations tend not to indicate whether they intend to be 
legally bound. It is doubtful in most cases whether they even put their minds to 
the question. One must, therefore, choose between an inherently unreliable 
subjective approach, and an objective approach which destroys the rationale for 
looking at intention in the first place, which is to-implement the will of the
190parties, rather than to impose obligations on them.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
117
The choice between a ‘reasonable expectation’ approach and a ‘reasonable 
reliance’ approach goes to the heart of the doctrines of estoppel. Each involves 
the imposition of an objective limit on the potential application of a doctrine of 
estoppel. The former involves an objective determination from the perspective of 
the representor, which is consistent with a conscience-based doctrine, while the 
latter imposes an objective standard from the perspective of the representee,
117 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, a reasonableness of reliance test is preferable 
because the policy question under such a test is more sophisticated, better defined and more 
clearly circumscribed. Under a reasonableness of reliance test, the court’s attention is directed to 
the circumstances of the representee’s reliance, and to the extent of that reliance, rather than to the 
broad question whether liability should be imposed in all of the circumstances.
118 Above n 112, 38.
119 Barnett, above n 109, 315.
120 See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (1981) 61; Clare Dalton, ‘An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine’ (1985) 94 Harvard Law Review 991, 1039-1066; PS 
Atiyah, ‘An Introduction to the Law of Contract’ (5th ed, 1995) 150. These problems with the 
intention to create legal relations requirement as the primary basis for imposing promissory 
obligations are discussed in more detail Chapter 8 below.
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which is consistent with a reliance-based doctrine. Although the reasonable 
expectation test may have a role to play in connection with the question of notice, 
it seems clear that the principal limit on the availability of a plea of estoppel in 
Australia is the reasonableness of reliance test, which focuses attention on the 
representee’s reliance, rather than on the representor’s conscience. That focus on 
the representee, rather than the representor, indicates that the primary concern of 
estoppel in Australia is to protect reliance, rather than to prevent unconscionable 
conduct.
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Chapter 6
THE UNCONSCIONABILITY REQUIREMENT*
Up to this point, the establishment of an estoppel appears to be almost entirely 
concerned with the position of the representee, who must adopt the relevant 
assumption, must act in reliance on it so that he or she will suffer detriment if it is 
not adhered to, and must act reasonably in doing so. If that were all that were 
required to establish an estoppel, then one could conclude that both the common 
law and equitable doctrines had a very strong reliance focus. A number of judges 
have suggested, however, that, before the equitable doctrine can be invoked, 
‘something more’ is required on the representor’s side. That ‘something more’ is 
often referred to as the unconscionability requirement: an estoppel will arise only 
where it is unconscionable for the representor to resile from, or act inconsistently 
with, the relevant assumption. * 1
The prevailing wisdom in the Australian commentary is that ‘unconscionability’ 
is a key element required to establish an equitable estoppel.2 The inclusion of this 
undefined element distinguishes equitable estoppel from its common law 
counterpart, the elements of which have always been clearly defined. That 
difference is clearly a significant barrier to the unification of the two sets of 
principles. This chapter will attempt to uncover what is involved in the
* A version of this chapter has been published as ‘Knowledge and Unconscionability in a 
Unified Estoppel’ (1998) 24 Monash University Law Review 115-144.
1 In Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241, 287, for example, 
Santow J held that ‘it is an essential element of the principle of [equitable) estoppel, that the 
conduct of the parties sought to be estopped must properly be characterised as 
“unconscionable”’.
2 See, eg: Kenneth Sutton, ‘Contract by Estoppel’ (1989) 1 Journal of Contract Law 205, 212; 
Kenneth Sutton, ‘A Denning Come to Judgment: Recent Judicial Adventures in the Law of 
Contract’ (1989) 15 University o f Queensland Law Journal 131, 143; Mark Dorney, ‘The New 
Estoppel (1991) 7 Australian Bar Review 18, 24-5; Alec Leopold, ‘Estoppel: A Practical 
Appraisal of Recent Developments’ (1991) 7 Australian Bar Review 47, 60; JW Carter, 
‘Contract, Estoppel and Unconscionability’ (1993) 1 Judicial Review 129, 131; Des Butler, 
‘Equitable Estoppel: Reflections and Directions’ (1994) 6 Corporate and Business Law 
Journal 249, 250; JW Carter and DJ Harland, Contract Law in Australia (3rd ed, 1996) 133; 
GE Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers, Equity and Trusts in Australia and New Zealand (1996) 212- 
7; NC Seddon and MP Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (7th Aust ed, 1997) 
64-5, 68-70.
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unconscionability element, will attempt to reconcile the common law and 
equitable doctrines of estoppel in this regard and will address the philosophical 
implications of different approaches to the question of unconscionability.
Although a number of eminent jurists have suggested that unconscionability is a 
concept that cannot, and should not, be defined,* 3 it is important to do so for three 
reasons.4 First, if the doctrines of common law estoppel and equitable estoppel 
are to be unified, then this difference between them must be resolved. It is only 
by defining the concept of unconscionability that we can determine whether there 
is any real difference between the elements required to establish estoppels at 
common law and in equity. Secondly, leaving aside the question of unification, 
the concept should be defined for reasons of certainty. The open ended inquiry as 
to whether it is unconscionable to depart from an assumption adopted by another 
person is not a basis for a legal doctrine that is capable of yielding predictable 
results.5 As Chief Justice Gleeson has observed, ‘it has an alarming capacity to 
provoke disagreement as to its application to the facts of even fairly 
straightforward cases. ’6 Thirdly, and most importantly in the context of this 
thesis, it is important to attempt to understand how equitable estoppel operates in 
order to identify its conceptual foundations. Those conceptual foundations help
? Taylors Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133, 154 (Oliver J), ‘the 
broad test of whether in the circumstances the conduct complained of is unconscionable [can be 
asserted] without the necessity of forcing those incumbrances into a procrustean bed 
constructed from some unalterable criteria’; National Westminster Bank v Morgan [1985] 2 
WLR 588, 602 (Lord Scarman), ‘Definition is a poor instrument when used to determine 
whether a transaction is or is not unconscionable: this is a question which depends upon the
particular facts of a case’; Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 445 (Deane J):
‘the question whether departure from the assumption would be unconscionable must be 
resolved not by some preconceived formula framed to serve as a universal yardstick but by 
reference to all of the circumstances of the case’; Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and 
Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World’ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly 
Review 238, 254: ‘unconscionability ... is a concept not readily susceptible of precise 
definition’.
4 There is also judicial support for a principled approach to unconscionability: Collin v Holden 
[1989] VR 510, 516 (Tadgell J), ‘What is unconscionable must, however, be defined by 
reference to principle and not left to expediency’; Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd 
(1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 585 (Kirby P), ‘offence to conscience being so much a matter of 
personal opinion, the notion has been tamed and classified according to established categories.’
5 GH Treitel, The Law o f Contract (9th ed, 1995) 136.
6 AM Gleeson, ‘Individualised Justice —  The Holy Grail’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 
421,426.
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us to appreciate the nature of the doctrine we are dealing with, and its relationship 
to other parts of the law of obligations.
Identifying the nature of the unconscionability requirement is not easy because, as 
Stephen Parker and Peter Drahos have observed, ‘the justices are vague when it 
comes to suggesting what the “extra” requirements must be to make a breach [of 
promise] unconscionable. ’7 As this chapter will show, the central question that 
needs to be resolved is whether, in addition to the four core elements of 
assumption, inducement, detrimental reliance and reasonableness, a representor 
must be shown to have certain knowledge or a certain state of mind before the 
representor’s departure from the relevant assumption will be regarded as 
unconscionable.8 In other words, the key question is whether an element of 
knowledge or intention must be made out by a representee in order to establish an 
equitable estoppel.
The central argument to be made in this chapter is that the unconscionability 
requirement is fulfilled in most cases by the core elements discussed in the 
preceding chapters: assumption, inducement, detrimental reliance and
reasonableness. It is only in cases where the representor has not actively induced 
the adoption of the relevant assumption that questions of knowledge or intention 
become relevant. In cases of estoppel by silence or acquiescence, the representor 
must know of the representee’s adoption of the relevant assumption, and must 
have knowledge of the representee’s detrimental reliance, or intend to induce 
such reliance. As this chapter will show, that approach in equity is mirrored in the 
common law estoppel cases, which have also required knowledge only in cases 
where the representor has remained passive.
On that basis, all that is required to reconcile common law and equitable estoppel 
in this regard is for the courts to make the elements of equitable estoppel explicit.
7 Peter Drahos and Stephen Parker ‘Critical Contract Law in Australia’ (1990) 3 Journal of 
Contract Law 30, 45.
8 Dal Pont and Chalmers, above n 195, 214, suggest that ‘the principal hallmarks of 
unconscionable conduct entail inducement, knowledge and intention on behalf of the 
representor’.
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If the unconscionability element is defined, it will become clear that the elements 
required to establish an estoppel at common law and in equity are the same: 
assumption, inducement and reasonable detrimental reliance are required in cases 
where the representor has actively induced the relevant assumption, with the 
additional element of knowledge or intention required in cases where the 
representor has remained passive. The chapter will pursue that argument in three 
sections. The first part of the chapter will look at the common law estoppel cases 
to determine the extent to which the concept of unconscionability, and its 
essential ingredient of knowledge, are reflected in the common law doctrine. The 
second part looks at the nature and the role of the unconscionability element in 
equitable estoppel, and attempts to determine what is required to satisfy the 
requirement. The third part of the chapter suggests a way in which those 
approaches might be reconciled in a unified doctrine.
I. COMMON LAW ESTOPPEL
A. English Origins
If it is unconscionable conduct that motivates a court of equity to intervene in 
equitable estoppel cases, then it is ‘inequitable’ or ‘unjust’ conduct that underlies 
the common law doctrine. Common law estoppel is said to be based on the 
principle that it is ‘most inequitable and unjust’ for a person, having made a 
representation that is acted upon by another party, subsequently to deny the truth 
of that representation to the loss and injury of the person who acted on it.9 Sir 
Anthony Mason has suggested that the concept of unjust departure underlying 
common law estoppel is in essence describing conduct regarded in equity as 
unconscionable. 10 Two important differences can, however, be discerned in the 
cases. First, unlike the concept of unconscionability, the notion of conduct which 
is inequitable or unjust is not at large in the common law cases, but is very clearly 
defined. Secondly, questions relating to the representor’s knowledge or intention 
have played a far less prominent role in determining whether conduct is unjust or
9 Samt Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha (1892) 19 LR Ind App 203, 214-5 (PC).
10 Mason, above n 3, 256.
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inequitable at common law than they have in determining whether conduct is 
unconscionable in equity.
A number of the early cases at common law did stipulate that the representor 
must intend the representee to act on the representation in question before an 
estoppel will arise.11 The requirement is given some prominence by Spencer 
Bower and Turner, who suggest that it has been taken for granted in those cases 
in which it was not mentioned. " The nature and strength of the requirement are, 
however, dramatically altered by the concession that the representor’s intention 
need not be established directly and generally must be inferred from the use of 
language or conduct which was of such a nature as to induce a reasonable person 
to act as the representee did.13 As discussed in Chapter 5, there is, in fact, 
considerable support for the proposition that proof of the representor’s intention 
is not required; it is enough for the representce to prove that he or she acted 
reasonably in adopting and acting on the representation.14 The most famous of 
such statements is Baron Parke’s statement in Freeman v Cooke, which clarified 
the proposition of Lord Denman CJ in Pickard v Sears15 that the representor must 
“wilfully” induce the representee’s assumption. As noted in Chapter 5, Parke B 
said that it was sufficient if the representor conducts himself so that a reasonable 
man would take the representation to be true and believe he was meant to act 
upon it as true.16
11 Pickard v Sears (1837) 6 A & E 469; 112 ER 179; De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286,
315; Pierson v Altrincham Urban Council (1917) 86 LJ KB 969; Greenwood v Martins Bank 
Ltd [1933] AC 51, 57.
12 George Spencer Bower and Sir Alexander Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by 
Representation (3rd ed, 1977) 94.
13 Ibid 95.
14 Spencer Bower and Turner, ibid, citing Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 Ex 654; 154 ER 652,
663; Seton, Laing, & Co v Lafone (1887) 19 QBD 68, 72 (CA); Pierson v Altrincham Urban 
Council (1917) 86 LJ KB 969, 972 (Lord Reading CJ), 973 (Lush J). Similarly Patrick 
Parkinson, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (1996) 201, 
259-60, citing also De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286, 315 (Thesiger LJ for the Court of 
Appeal) and Spiro v Lintern [1973] 3 All ER 319, 328 (Buckley LJ for the Court of Appeal).
15 (1837) 6 Ad & E 469, 474; 112 ER 179, 181.
16 (1848) 2 Ex 654, 681; 154 ER 652, 663.
199
The Privy Council in Sarat Chunder Dey v Gopal Chunder Laha11 later said that, 
in order to create estoppel, the law does not require that the representor ‘must 
have been under no mistake himself or must have acted with intention to mislead 
or deceive.’18 The Judicial Committee made it clear that the determining element 
is the representee’s detrimental reliance, and that the court’s attention is focussed 
on the representee: ‘What the law and the Indian Statute [which adopted it] 
mainly regard is the position of the person who was induced to act.’19 Thus, it is 
clear that, while judges in some of the early cases were concerned to limit the 
application of common law estoppel to those cases in which the representor 
intended the representation to be relied upon, the reasonableness of the 
representee’s conduct quickly became an alternative basis for establishing an 
estoppel.
Despite the clarity of the judgments in Freeman v Cooke and Sarat Chunder Dey 
v Gopal Chunder Laha, we still find Lord Tomkins insisting in the House of 
Lords in 1933 that an ‘intention to induce a course of conduct’ was one of the 
‘essential factors giving rise to an estoppel’. That is perhaps partly 
attributable to the fact that their Lordships were dealing with a case of estoppel 
by silence. Nevertheless, the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court 
in Trenorden v Martin suggested that, in applying this statement from Lord 
Tomkins’ speech:
it is necessary to remember that the intention can be implied, that is to 
say, “a man is taken to intend the natural and probable consequences of 
his acts, and cannot evade civil responsibility for these consequences by 
saying that he never intended any such result to ensue.”21
17 (1892) 19 LR Ind App 203.
18 Ibid 215. Their Lordships also approved, ibid 217, an earlier statement of Lord Esher MR that a 
fraudulent intention is not required, and observed that Lord Esher mentions ‘other cases or classes 
of cases in which the determining element is not the motive with which the representation has been 
made, nor the state of knowledge of the party making it, but the effect of the representation as 
having caused another to act on the faith of it.’
19 Ibid 215.
20 Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd [1933] AC 51, 57.
21 [1934] SASR 340, 343, quoting M Cababe, The Principles o f Estoppel (1888) 64.
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Michael Cababe suggested in 1888 that the actual intention of the representor is 
irrelevant, and his or her conduct can establish an estoppel if a reasonable 
outsider looking at the conduct would take the representation to be true, and 
believe that it was meant that he should act upon it.22 The reasonableness of the 
representee’s reliance has, in the modem cases, become the primary basis for 
limiting the application of the doctrine.23 The abandonment of questions of 
intention, even implied intention, is evident in Avon County Council v Howlett,24 
in which the Court of Appeal articulated the circumstances in which an estoppel 
by representation can be raised as a defence to a restitutionary claim. The court 
held that a plaintiff will be estopped from asserting a claim to restitution of 
moneys if three conditions are satisfied: first, the plaintiff must have made a 
representation of fact which led the defendant to treat the money as his or her 
own; secondly, the defendant must have, bona fide and without notice of the 
plaintiffs claim, changed his or her position; and, thirdly, the payment must not 
have been primarily caused by the fault of the defendant." The court’s focus was 
on the representee’s detrimental reliance on the faith of the assumption induced 
by the representation, and no element of intention was required to be established 
or implied.
B. Common Law Estoppel in the Australian Courts
The trend in the English cases toward a focus on reasonable detrimental reliance 
and away from questions of intention was reflected in the early High Court 
decisions on common law estoppel, which were primarily concerned with the 
position of the representee. Those cases did not require proof of wilful conduct 
on the part of the representor or knowledge of the representee’s detrimental 
reliance. The High Court emphasised the reliance basis of common law estoppel 
in statements of the purpose of the doctrine and in descriptions of its operation, 
both of which focussed on the position of the representee, to the exclusion of the 
representor. The leading statement of the purpose of the doctrine was that of
22 Cababe, ibid.
23 See, eg, Standard Chartered Bank Aust Ltd v Bank of China (1991) 23 NSWLR 164.
24 [1983] 1 A11ER 1073.
25 Ibid 1085 (Slade LJ, with whom Cumming-Bruce LJ and Eveleigh LJ agreed).
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Dixon J in Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd that ‘the basal purpose 
of the doctrine ... is to avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the 
estoppel’. On the operation of the doctrine, Isaacs J in Craine v Colonial 
Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd distinguished common law estoppel from waiver 
by means of the fact that estoppel ‘looks chiefly at the situation of the person 
relying on the estoppel’ with the consequence that ‘the knowledge of the person 
sought to be estopped is immaterial. ’27 The focus of the Australian courts on the 
position of the representee was reflected in the influential list of criteria laid 
down by Jordan CJ in Franklin v Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Ltd, which 
contained no reference to the representor’s intention or knowledge.28
An important aspect of the principle of common law estoppel applied in the early 
Australian cases was that it did not include an undefined element equivalent to 
the notion of unconscionability in equitable estoppel. If an element of 
unconscionability, or its common law equivalent, unjust conduct, was required in 
the early cases, it was satisfied by the representor inducing the adoption of the 
relevant assumption by the representee, as Dixon J made clear in Thompson v 
Palmer? 0 It is interesting to note that, in stark contrast with the statements in
26 (1937) 59 CLR 641,674.
27 (1920) 28 CLR 305,327.
28 (1935) 36 SR (NSW) 76, 82 (emphasis added):
(1) by word or conduct (2) reasonably likely to be understood as a representation of fact, 
(3) a representation of fact, as contrasted with a mere expression of intention, should be 
made to another person, either innocently or fraudulently, (4) in such circumstances that 
a reasonable man would regard himself as invited to act upon it in a particular way, (5) 
and that the representation should have been material in inducing the person to whom it 
was made to act on it in that way (6) so that his position would be altered to his detriment 
if the fact were otherwise than as represented.
29 It is important to note that the unjust or unconscionable conduct is the departure from the
assumption. Departure from an assumption is only regarded as unjust or unconscionable,
however, if the representor bears responsibility for its adoption.
30 (1933) 49 CLR 507,547:
Whether a departure by a party from the assumption should be considered unjust and 
inadmissible depends on the part taken by him in occasioning its adoption by the other 
party. He may be required to abide by the assumption because it formed the conventional 
basis of the assumption upon which the parties entered into contractual or other mutual 
relations ... or because he has exercised against the other rights which would exist only if 
the assumption were correct... or because knowing the mistake the other laboured under, 
he refrained from correcting him when it was his duty to do so; or because his 
imprudence, where care was required of him, was a proximate cause of the other party’s 
adopting and acting upon the faith of the assumption; or because he directly made 
representations upon which the other party founded the assumption.
Dixon J reiterated the statement in Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR
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relation to unconscionability mentioned above,31 Dixon J was adamant in Grundt 
v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd that the question of injustice or unfairness 
was not left at large. “ It depended on the part played by the representor in the 
representee’s adoption of the assumption, and the law ‘defines with more or less 
completeness the kinds of participation in the making or acceptance of the 
assumption that will suffice’. Given the influence which Justice Dixon’s 
judgments34 have had on the development of equitable estoppel in recent 
decisions of the High Court,35 it is surprising that his obvious opposition to 
undefined notions of injustice has been ignored.36
While the representor’s knowledge and intention have for some time been 
regarded as irrelevant to a common law estoppel arising from an express 
representation, those factors have played an important role in the case of an 
estoppel arising by silence. The High Court has reiterated on a number of 
occasions the principle articulated by Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer that an 
estoppel may arise where a party refrains from correcting another party 
‘knowing the mistake he laboured under'. While that principle turned on the 
representor’s knowledge of the representee’s mistake, the representor’s 
knowledge of the action taken by the representee in reliance also came into
641, 676. Similarly, in Newbon v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 52 CLR 723, 
734, Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ observed that ‘the injustice of allowing [the representor] to 
disregard the assumption must arise from the circumstances attending its adoption by the other 
party.’ They went on to say, however, that material detriment resulting from reliance was also 
necessary to make it unjust to permit the departure from the assumption.
31 Above n 3.
32 Mason and Deane JJ noted in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, 431 that ‘the 
reference to an “unjust” departure was not seen by Dixon J as a charter for idiosyncratic 
concepts of justice and fairness.’
33 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 676-7.
34 In Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 and Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd 
(1937) 59 CLR 641.
35 See, eg, Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 404 (Mason CJ and 
Wilson J), 419 & 427 (Brennan J), 458 (Gaudron J); Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 
CLR 394, 429 (Brennan J), 453 (Dawson J), 501 (McHugh J).
36 Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 2, 68 have observed that some of the statements of Dixon J 
‘may be thought to preclude the use of a broad concept of unconscionability as a basis for 
determining whether the promisor may resile.’
37 (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547 (emphasis added). See, to similar effect, Grundt v Great Boulder 
Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641,676 (Dixon J); West v Commercial Bank o f Australia 
Ltd (1935) 55 CLR 315, 322 (Rich, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ); Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563, 570, (Gibbs J).
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consideration in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher. Only two judges, 
namely Deane and Gaudron JJ, found an estoppel arising from an assumption 
of existing fact in that case, but they took quite different approaches to the 
question of knowledge.
Deane J applied the principle that a representor will be prevented from 
departing from an assumption of existing fact induced by silence ‘where the 
party estopped has knowingly and silently stood by and watched the other party 
act to his detriment. ’39 That principle appears to require knowledge of the 
representee’s detrimental action as well as knowledge of the representee’s 
adoption of a mistaken assumption. Deane J found that Waltons knew the 
mistake which the Mahers laboured under, and its silence was deliberate and 
intended to produce the effect which it in fact produced.40 It may be possible to 
infer from this that Deane J saw intention to induce reliance as an alternative to 
knowledge of reliance. Gaudron J, on the other hand, did not insist on 
knowledge in all cases of estoppel by silence. She found that no estoppel could 
arise by virtue of Waltons’ ‘failure to correct what it knew to be the mistaken 
belief’ of the Mahers, because the evidence was not capable of supporting an 
inference that the appellant knew of the Mahers’ mistaken belief.41 Gaudron J 
did, however, find an estoppel arising by virtue of Waltons’ imprudence, which 
was ‘a proximate cause of [the Mahers’] adopting and acting on the faith of the 
assumption. ’42 The notion of estoppel by imprudence was drawn from the 
statement of Dixon J in Thompson v Palmer43 which, Gaudron J said, required 
no knowledge as to the representor’s state of mind.44
38 (1988) 164 CLR 387.
39 Ibid 443 (emphasis added).
40 Ibid 444.
41 Ibid 461.
42 Ibid 463.
43 (1933) 49 CLR507, 547.
44 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 463.
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In Lorimer v State Bank of New South Wales,45 the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal took rather a different view of what was necessary to establish an 
estoppel by imprudence. The case involved an unsuccessful attempt by a farmer 
to establish an estoppel after he had acted to his detriment on the faith of an 
assumption that a bank had agreed to fund the expansion of his farm. All 
members of the Court of Appeal regarded the representor’s knowledge as 
relevant to the question whether it had acted imprudently. In his dissenting 
judgment, Kirby P proceeded on the basis that estoppel by silence or negligence 
requires a finding that the representor knew of the representee’s mistaken 
assumption and knew that the representee was acting to his or her detriment on 
the faith of that assumption.46 Kirby P found that the representor’s imprudence 
was a cause of the representee’s adoption of the relevant assumption and 
detrimental action. He accepted that there was no finding that the representor 
had actual knowledge that the representee was acting on the faith of the 
assumption,47 but appeared to regard a form of constructive knowledge as 
sufficient. His conclusion that the representor acted imprudently was based on 
the finding that the representor ‘ought to have been aware that there was a real 
possibility or likelihood’ that the representee was acting to his detriment on the 
faith of the relevant assumption.48 Prudence in those circumstances required the 
representor to disabuse the representee of the assumption.
Priestley JA also saw the question of the representor’s imprudence as bound up 
with the question whether it knew or should have known of the representee’s 
assumption. If the representor ‘neither knew nor had reason to know’ of the 
representee’s assumption, according to Priestley JA, then the representor’s 
conduct could not be said to be imprudent.49 Handley JA held that estoppel by 
negligence or by silence depends upon findings that the representor knew that 
the representee was acting to his or her detriment on the faith of the relevant
45 New South Wales Court of Appeal, Kirby P, Priestley JA and Handley JA, 5 July, 1991.
Page numbers refer to the judgment transcript.
46 Ibid 34.
47 Ibid 34-7.
48 Ibid 30 (emphasis added).
49 Ibid 53 (emphasis added).The italicised words indicate that actual knowledge is not required.
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assumption.50 He therefore regarded both knowledge of the representee’s 
mistake, and knowledge of the representee’s reliance, as necessary to establish 
an estoppel in circumstances where the representor remained silent, whether the 
estoppel was characterised as an estoppel by silence or by imprudence. Handley 
JA also appeared to regard a form of constructive knowledge as sufficient: he 
found that a mistake cannot found an estoppel unless the representor was aware 
'or should have been aware’ of the representee’s mistake.51
While it seems clear that the representor’s knowledge is relevant in cases of 
estoppel by silence at common law, the differences between the various 
approaches leave considerable doubt as to what the representor must know, and 
whether that knowledge is required in all such cases. One approach focuses on 
the representor’s knowledge of the mistaken assumption adopted by the 
representee,52 while another seems to require knowledge of both the mistaken 
assumption and the detrimental action taken by the representee.53 A third view 
was articulated by Gaudron J in Waltons Stores: she appeared to regard the 
representor’s knowledge as irrelevant in cases where the representee’s adoption 
of the relevant assumption, and action on the faith of that assumption, can be 
attributed to the representor’s imprudence. The judgments of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal in Lorimer v State Bank o f New South Wales indicate that 
actual knowledge on the part of the representor is not required in cases of 
estoppel by silence, provided it can be established that the representor ought to 
have known of the representee’s adoption of, and reliance upon, the relevant 
assumption.
50 Ibid 69.
51 Ibid 70 (emphasis added).
52 Thompson v Palmer ( 1933) 49 CLR 507, 547 (Dixon J); Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold 
Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641, 676 (Dixon J); West v Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd 
(1935) 55 CLR 315, 322 (Rich, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ); Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563, 570, (Gibbs J); Lorimer v State Bank of New South Wales 
(Priestley JA).
53 Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 443-4 (Deane J); Lorimer v State Bank of New South 
Wales (Kirby P, who regarded constructive knowledge as sufficient).
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In summary, it can be seen that the principles of common law estoppel are not 
readily susceptible to the introduction of an unconscionability element. The 
common law courts have always attempted to provide a clear definition of the 
circumstances in which an estoppel arises and the court’s attention, in Australia at 
least, has been focussed almost exclusively on the representee. Although some of 
the early English cases were concerned with the representor’s intention, that 
concern appears to have been transformed into a question of the reasonableness 
of the representee’s reliance. It does seem clear, however, that the central 
ingredients of unconscionability, the representor’s knowledge and intention, do 
have a role to play in cases where the representor has not made an express 
representation but has, by his or her silence, induced the adoption of, or reliance 
upon, an assumption of fact.
II. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
A. Origins o f the Unconscionability Question
There are two different ways in which the question of unconscionability has been 
used to determine liability in equitable estoppel cases. In the recent Australian 
cases discussed below, unconscionability has been seen as one of the elements 
that must be made out by a representee in order to establish an equitable estoppel. 
The approach in some of the modem English cases, on the other hand, has been 
to adopt the question of unconscionability as the only inquiry that needs to be 
made in order to establish an estoppel: the courts have applied ‘the broad test of 
whether in the circumstances the conduct complained of is unconscionable’ .54 In 
most of the early proprietary55 and promissory56 estoppel cases the representee 
was not required to show that the representor had behaved unconscionably in
54 Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [19821 1 QB 133, 154.
55 Gregory v Mighell (1811) 18 Ves Jun 328; 34 ER 1211; The Duke of Beaufort v Patrick 
(1853) 17 Beav 59; 51 ER 954; The Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking Association v King 
(1858) 25 Beav 72; 53 ER 563; Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 ER 1285.
30 Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439; Birmingham and District Land Co 
v London and North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268, 286. In Hughes v Metropolitan 
Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439, 448, Lord Cairns LC did use the expression ‘inequitable’ to 
describe the conduct of a party who sought to enforce rights which he or she had led another 
person to believe will not be enforced.
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order to make out an estoppel. In Dann v Spurier, however, Eldon LC held that 
the onus was on the plaintiff to prove ‘bad faith and bad conscience’ against the 
defendant in order to make out an estoppel by encouragement.57
The broad unconscionability approach was developed in a series of proprietary 
estoppel cases in the 1970s, apparently as a reaction to the formulaic approach 
adopted in the influential case of Willmott v Barber, where Fry J laid down five 
elements that must be established in order to make out a plea of estoppel by 
acquiescence.58 The unconscionability test appears to have its origins in the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Shaw v Applegate where, after doubting 
whether all of the five elements set out by Fry J must be satisfied in each case, 
Buckley LJ said:
The real test, I think, must be whether upon the facts of the particular 
case the situation has become such that it would be dishonest or 
unconscionable for the plaintiff, or the person having the right sought to 
be enforced, to continue to seek to enforce it.59
The unconscionability question was also referred to by Scarman LJ in Crabb v 
Arun District Council,60 but not as a definitive test. Scarman LJ held that, in 
order to invoke equitable estoppel, ‘the plaintiff has to establish as a fact that the 
defendant, by setting up his right, is taking advantage of him in a way which is 
unconscionable, inequitable or unjust.’61 The analysis of equitable estoppel on the 
basis of unconscionability reached its high point in the judgment of Oliver J in 
Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd. Responding to
57 Dann v Spurier ( m 2 )  7 Ves Jnr 232; 32 ER 94, 95-6.
58 (1880) 15 Ch D 96, 105-6. Fry J held that where: (1) a plaintiff has made a mistake as to his 
or her legal rights, (2) the plaintiff has expended money or done an act on the faith of that 
mistaken belief, (3) the defendant knows of his or her own rights, (4) the defendant knows of 
the plaintiffs belief, and (5) the defendant has encouraged the expenditure, then the defendant 
is guilty of such fraud as will entitle the court to restrain the defendant from exercising his or 
her rights.
59 [1977] 1 WLR 970, 977-8. Goff LJ agreed, ibid 980, ‘that the test is whether, in the 
circumstances, it has become unconscionable for the plaintiff to rely on his legal right.’
60 [1976] 1 Ch 179.
61 Ibid 195.
62 [1982] 1 QB 133.
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counsel’s attempt to separate equitable estoppel into rigidly defined categories 
with strict requirements, Oliver J held that the only inquiry he had to make was 
whether, in all the circumstances of the case, it was unconscionable for the 
representors to seek to take advantage of the mistake they shared with the 
representees. As will be discussed below, the ‘unconscionability’ approach 
formulated by Oliver J was adopted with some modification by the High Court in 
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher.64
B. Origins of the Knowledge Requirement
In both the early proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel lines of cases are 
to be found inconsistent views on the questions of whether and when the court 
should be concerned with the representor’s knowledge or intention. Turning first 
to proprietary estoppel, the requirement of knowledge has generally been 
imposed only in cases of estoppel by acquiescence, where the conduct 
complained of is standing by while the representee acts to his or her detriment on 
the faith of an assumed or anticipated interest in the representor’s land. In most of 
the early cases the courts focussed on the question whether the representor knew 
of the mistaken belief adopted by the representee as to his or her rights, and 
appear to have assumed that the representor knew of the detrimental action taken 
by the representee.65 The issue of knowledge assumes central importance in cases 
of estoppel by acquiescence. Where the representor has not engaged in any active 
conduct that induces the adoption of the relevant assumption, responsibility for 
any detriment suffered by the representee can only be attributed to the representor 
if the representor has stood by with knowledge that the representee was acting to
63 Ibid 155. For subsequent applications of the approach, see Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG 
Zurich [1981] 1 WLR 1265, 1285-7 (Oliver LJ); Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd 
(in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 QB 84, 104 (Robert Goff J at first 
instance); British Leyland Motor Corporation v Armstrong Patents Co Ltd [1982] FSR 481,
495 (Foster J); Hoover PLC v George Hulme Ltd [1982] FSR 565, 585-8 (Whitford J); Wham- 
O MFG Co v Lincoln Industries Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 641, 671-6 (Davidson CJ for the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal); Lim Teng Huan v Ang Swee Chuan [1992] 1 WLR 113 at 117-8 
(PC). See also Patrick Milne, ‘Proprietary Estoppel in a Procrustean Bed’ (1995) 58 Modern 
Law Review 412. Cf Gillies v Keogh [1989] 2 NZLR 327, 345-7 (Richardson J).
64 (1988) 164 CLR 387.
65 Although in Dann v Spurier (1802) 7 Ves Jnr 232; 32 ER 94, one of the reasons for the 
plaintiffs failure to establish an estoppel by acquiescence was that Eldon LC was not satisfied 
that the defendant knew of the repairs effected by the plaintiff to the property in question.
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his or her detriment on the faith of that assumption.66 In Ramsden v Dyson Lord 
Cranworth LC made it clear that in cases where one person builds on another’s 
land, the latter’s knowledge of the former’s mistake is an essential ingredient in 
establishing liability. Lord Kingsdown went further, suggesting that such 
knowledge was even required in cases where the representor had promised the 
representee an interest in the land in question or had created or encouraged an 
expectation on the part of the representee that he or she would have a certain 
interest.68
The element of knowledge was given the greatest prominence in Justice Fry’s 
statement in Willmott v Barber of the five essential elements required to establish 
estoppel by acquiescence.69 Justice Fry’s five probanda included requirements 
that the representor must know of the existence of the representor’s own rights 
and must know of the representee’s mistaken belief as to his or her rights. There 
has been considerable discussion as to whether Fry J intended his five probanda 
to apply to all cases of proprietary estoppel, or just those in which the assumption 
adopted by the representee was induced by the representor’s silence. Although 
there was some ambiguity in the judgment, it appeared that Fry J was only setting 
out the elements of ‘the acquiescence which will deprive a man of his legal 
rights’. The elements of knowledge were required because, if the representor 
does not have such knowledge, ‘there is nothing which calls on him to assert his 
own rights. ’72 Clearly, that explanation justifies the knowledge requirement only
66 In Brand v Chris Building Co Pty Ltd [1957] VR 625, the defendant failed to make out a case 
of estoppel by acquiescence because the plaintiff was aware of neither the defendant’s mistake 
nor the defendant’s acts of reliance. Hudson J held, ibid 629, that no estoppel arose because 
there was nothing ‘in the nature of a fraud’ to raise an equity against the plaintiff. Similarly, in 
KM A Corporation Pty Ltd v G & F Productions Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 243, Eames J held that 
an estoppel by silence could not arise without, inter alia, knowledge of the mistaken 
assumption made by the representor.
67 (1866) LR 1 HL 129, 140-1.
68 Ibid 170-1, cited with approval by the Privy Council in Plimmer v Wellington Corporation 
(1884) 9 HLC 699,710.
69 (1880) 15 Ch D 96, 105-6.
70 See, eg, Shaw v Applegate [1977] 1 WLR 970, 977-8; Amalgamated Investment & Property 
Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 QB 84, 104; Taylors 
Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 133 at 155-6; MP Thompson, 
‘From Representation to Expectation: Estoppel as a Cause of Action’ [1983] Cambridge Law 
Journal 257, 267-272; Milne, above n 63, 416.
71 (1880) 15 Ch D 96, 105 (emphasis added).
72 Ibid.
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in cases where the representor remains silent; the requirement should not, 
therefore, apply in cases where the representor has actively led the representee to 
believe that his or her legal rights will not be asserted. As Evershed MR said in 
Hopgood v Brown, Justice Fry’s formulation ‘was addressed to and limited to 
cases where the party is alleged to be estopped by acquiescence, and it is not 
intended to be a comprehensive formulation of the necessary requisites of any 
case of estoppel by representation.’73 Despite the statement of Lord Kingsdown 
in Ramsden v Dyson mentioned above, the better view is that the requirement of 
knowledge applies only in cases of mere acquiescence.74
In the promissory estoppel cases, the contentious question has not been whether 
the representor must have had knowledge of the representee’s reliance, but 
whether the representor must have intended reliance or must have intended his or 
her promise to be binding. No such element of intention is to be found in Lord 
Cairns’ statement of principle in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co,15 or that of 
Bowen U  in Birmingham and District Land Co v London and North Western 
Railway Co. The principle extracted from those two cases by Denning J in 
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd,11 however, required 
that a promise be ‘intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon and in fact
no
acted upon’ before it would be binding in equity. That intention on the part of 
the representor was not an element of the principle of promissory estoppel 
adopted by the Privy Council in Ajayi v RT Briscoe (Nigeria) L td 19 which was 
held to apply where a party to a contract agrees not to enforce his or her rights 
and the other party to the contract alters his or her position on the faith of that
73 [19551 1 WLR213, 223.
74 Kammitxs Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 871, 895 
(Lord Diplock); Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 133, 
155-6; Thompson, above n 70, 267-70; PV Baker and PStJ Langan, Snell’s Equity (29th ed, 
1990) 576. It also appeared to be implicit in the statement of Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank v 
Rossett [1991] 1 AC 107, 132 that, once an agreement to share a property beneficially is found, 
it is only necessary for the party asserting a beneficial interest to show that he or she has acted 
to his or her detriment in reliance on the agreement in order to give rise to a proprietary 
estoppel.
75 (1877) 2 App Cas 439, 448.
76 (1888) 40 Ch D 268, 286.
77 [1947] 1 KB 130.
78 Ibid 136.
79 [1964] 3 All ER 556.
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promise.80 Nevertheless, Denning J continued to assert the requirement of 
intention in subsequent promissory estoppel cases,81 and it was taken up by Lord 
Diplock in the House of Lords in Kammins Ballroom Co Ltd v Zenith 
Investments (Torquay) Ltd. In New Zealand, it has also been held that the 
representor must both intend to affect the relations between the parties and intend 
to induce reliance.83
A significant difference between the promissory estoppel cases and the 
proprietary estoppel cases, therefore, is that, while the proprietary estoppel cases 
have been concerned with the representor’s knowledge of the representee’s 
assumption or acts of reliance, the promissory estoppel cases have tended to 
focus on the representor’s intention to affect the legal relations between the 
parties or to induce reliance by the promisee.84 In The “Kanchenjunga” the 
House of Lords went so far as to say that, in establishing a promissory estoppel, 
‘no question arises of any particular knowledge on the part of the representor’ .85 
There has, however, been at least one promissory estoppel case which was 
concerned with the representor’s knowledge. In James v Heim Gallery (London) 
Ltd the Court of Appeal held that, in order to found a promissory estoppel, a 
promise ‘must have been made in circumstances in which, to the promisor’s
oz:
knowledge, the promise would be acted upon by the promisee’. In bringing 
together the principles of promissory estoppel with those of proprietary estoppel,
80 Ibid 559.
81 Foot Clinics (1943) Ltd v Cooper’s Gowns Ltd [1947] 1 KB 506, 510-11; Robertson v 
Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 KB 227, 230; Charles Rickards Ltd v Oppenhaim [1950] 1 KB 
616, 623 (CA); Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215, 220 (CA); Plasticmoda Societa Per Azione 
v Davidsons (Manchester) Ltd [1952] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 527, 539 (CA); WJ Alan & Co Ltd v El 
Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 QB 189, 213 (CA); Brikom Investments Ltd v Carr 
[1979] 2 All ER 753, 758 (CA). Cf Wallis’s Cayton Bay Holiday Camp Ltd v Shell-Mex and 
BP Ltd [1974] 3 All ER 575, 580 (CA).
82 [1970] 2 All ER 371, 895. See also Braithwaite v Winwood [1960] 1 WLR 1257, 1262, 
where Cross J rejected a plea of promissory estoppel on the basis that there was no evidence 
that what was said by the representor ‘was intended to effect (sic) the legal relations between 
the parties’.
83 In Barbery Mortgage Finance & Savings Ltd v Hindsbank Holdings Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 356, 
361, Richardson J held that the promise or assurance must be ‘intended to affect the relations 
between [the parties] and to be acted upon accordingly.’
84 In Cameron v Murdoch [1983] WAR 321, 360, Brinsden J held that the intention to affect 
legal relations requirement did not apply in proprietary estoppel cases, and doubted whether it 
was even satisfied in all of the promissory estoppel cases.
85 Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v Shipping Corporation of India (The 
“Kanchenjunga”) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391, 399.
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the Court of Appeal in Crabb v Arun District Council appeared to retain the 
element of knowledge from the proprietary estoppel cases, at least in the case of 
estoppel by silence. The case involved a difficult question as to whether the 
representor induced the representee’s adoption of the relevant assumption by 
direct conduct or by silence.88 That question ultimately did not need to be 
resolved because the Court of Appeal held unanimously that the representor knew 
of the representee’s intention to act on the faith of the relevant assumption. In 
an interesting combination of the approaches in the proprietary and promissory 
estoppel cases, Lord Denning MR held that in all cases of equitable estoppel the 
representor must, at the time of inducing the relevant assumption, know or intend 
that the representee will act on the faith of the belief.90 Rejecting the trial judge’s 
stipulation that the representor must have known of the action taken by the 
representee on the faith of the assumption, Lord Denning held that it was 
sufficient that the representor knew of the representee’s intention to rely, and 
engaged in positive conduct which confirmed the relevant assumption.91 
Similarly, Scarman LJ held that an equity arose against the defendant because of 
the positive actions by which it induced the adoption of the relevant assumption,
0 7
and because it knew of the plaintiffs intended detrimental reliance.
Unfortunately, the adoption of a broad unconscionability approach to determining 
liability appears to have reopened the possibility that inquiries as to the 
representor’s knowledge may not be confined to cases of estoppel by silence. In 
Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd, Oliver J held that, in
86 (1950) 256 EG 819, 823 (Buckley LJ, with whom Shaw and Oliver LJJ agreed).
87 [1976) 1 Ch 179. Lord Denning MR, ibid 187-8, and Scarman LJ, ibid 193, recognised that the 
principles of estoppel recognised in courts of equity could be seen as emanations of the same 
broad principle, which prevent a person from insisting upon his or her legal rights where it is 
inequitable to do so in the light of the dealings which have taken place between the parties.
88 Ibid 197 (Scarman LJ).
89 Ibid 189 (Lord Denning MR), 192 (Lawton LJ), 198 (Scarman LJ).
90 Ibid 188. The statement of Lord Denning MR was cited by Brennan J in Waltons Stores
(Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 423, who went on to say that the knowledge or 
intention that the assumption or expectation will be acted upon may be easily inferred in the 
case of a promise, but may be more difficult to draw in the case of encouragement or 
acquiescence.
91 [1976] 1 Ch 179, 189. The relevant assumption adopted by the representee was that he would 
have a right of access over the representor’s land. That assumption was confirmed by the 
representor putting up gates at the point of access.
92 Ibid 196.
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deciding whether the representor’s conduct is unconscionable, knowledge is only 
one of the relevant factors to be taken into account in the overall inquiry.93 Oliver 
J did, however, appear to recognise that knowledge of the representee’s mistake 
would be necessary in cases involving ‘acquiescence pure and simple’, where all 
the representor has done is to stand by without protest.94
In summary, there is considerable inconsistency in the English cases as to 
whether knowledge of the representee’s reliance, or an intention to induce 
reliance, on the part of the representor is required to establish an equitable 
estoppel. The better view, which is supported by a coherent rationale, is that 
knowledge of the representee’s reliance or an intention to induce reliance should 
only be required in cases of mere acquiescence. As Oliver J explained in Taylors 
Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd, ‘in a case of mere passivity, 
it is readily intelligible that there must be shown a duty to speak, protest or 
interfere which cannot normally arise in the absence of knowledge or at least a 
suspicion of the true position. ’95 Where the representor, by a promise, a 
representation or other unequivocal conduct, induces the representee to adopt an 
assumption, then the representor bears responsibility for the representee’s loss by 
reason of that conduct alone.
C. The Approach o f the High Court
1. Legione v Hateley
Although the concept of unconscionability had begun to dominate the decisions 
of the English courts by the time the High Court came to hear Legione v 
Hateley,96 the concept was not part of the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
accepted by the Court. The only members of the Court to uphold the plea of 
equitable estoppel, Gibbs CJ and Murphy J, did not invoke the requirement of
93 [1982] 1 QB 133, 152.
94 Ibid at 155-6. See Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 QB 84, 104 (Robert Goff J at first instance).
95 [1982] 1 QB 133, 147.
96 (1983) 152 CLR 406.
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unconscionability, but did require conduct which was inequitable before an 
estoppel would arise.97 They held that an estoppel would arise if it was 
inequitable for the representors to depart from the induced assumption without
QO
first notifying the representees of their intentions. No question of knowledge of 
the representees’ reliance appeared to arise. The representors’ conduct was held 
to be inequitable on the basis that the representors had induced the belief that 
their legal rights would not be enforced and the representees had altered their 
position to their detriment on the faith of that belief.99 The requirement of 
inequitable conduct was, therefore, satisfied by the core elements of assumption, 
inducement and detrimental reliance.
2. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher
The concept of unconscionability reached its high point in Australia in the 
decision of the High Court in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher which, it is 
important to recall, was a case of an estoppel arising by silence. 100 Mason CJ and 
Wilson J suggested that courts of equity intervene in equitable estoppel cases to 
prevent unconscionable conduct. A mere failure to fulfil a promise does not 
amount to unconscionable conduct and, accordingly, detrimental reliance on an 
executory promise does not bring promissory estoppel into play. ‘Something 
more would be required. ’ 101 They suggested two different ways in which that 
‘something more’ could be established. First, it may be found in the creation of 
an assumption that a contract will come into existence or a promise will be 
performed, and detrimental reliance on that assumption to the knowledge o f the 
other party. “ Secondly, it may be found in the representor’s reasonable 
expectation of detrimental reliance by the representee. 103 On the facts, Mason CJ
97 The notion that conduct must be inequitable before it could give rise to a promissory estoppel 
was supported by D & C Builders Ltd v Rees [1965] 2 QB 617, 625, where Lord Denning held 
that a promissory estoppel would only prevent the creditor from asserting his legal rights 
‘where it would be inequitable for him to insist upon them.’
98 (1983) 152 CLR 406, 421.
99 Ibid 422-3.
100 (1988) 164 CLR 387 ( ‘Waltons Stores').
101 Ibid 406.
102 Ibid, drawing on Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Humphrey’s Estate Ltd [1987] 1 AC 114 
(PC).
103 Ibid, drawing on the doctrine of promissory estoppel applied in the United States, as
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and Wilson J found the necessary element in the representor’s knowledge that the 
representees were acting to their detriment on the basis of a false assumption, and 
the representor’s inaction in those circumstances. 104 If one looks at 
unconscionability as an element that must be established in addition to the core 
elements of equitable estoppel discussed in the preceding chapters, then the 
essence of the unconscionability requirement, on the interpretation of Mason CJ 
and Wilson J, is knowledge or a reasonable expectation of the representee’s 
detrimental action or inaction.
Brennan J conveniently reduced his understanding of what is required to establish 
an equitable estoppel to a list of six elements that a plaintiff must prove. 105 
Element one requires the adoption of an assumption by the representee, element 
two requires the representor’s inducement of that assumption, elements three and 
five require the representee’s detrimental reliance on that assumption and element 
six requires that the representor has failed to act to avoid the detriment. The 
equivalent of the ‘something extra’ required by Mason CJ and Wilson J is to be 
found in element four: that the representor must have known of or intended the 
representee’s detrimental action or inaction in reliance on the relevant 
assumption. 106
Mark Domey has suggested that there is a significant difference between the 
approaches of Mason CJ and Wilson J and Brennan J to this issue. Domey 
suggests that while Brennan J would treat knowledge ‘as a necessary 
precondition to the exercise of the jurisdiction ... Mason CJ and Wilson J would 
view knowledge simply as one factor to be weighed in balancing the equities 
involved in the particular case’ . 108 In other words, while Brennan J saw 
knowledge as one of the factors that a plaintiff must establish in each case, 
Mason CJ and Wilson J saw it as one of the factors which can make it 
unconscionable for the representor to resile from his or her representation.
described in s 90 of the Restatement of Contracts (2d).
104 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 407-8.
105 Ibid 428-9.
106 Cf Butler, above n 2, 250.
107 Dorney, above n 2, 27.
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Ultimately, however, if one leaves to one side the fundamental and indisputable 
requirements of assumption, inducement and detrimental reliance, it is difficult to 
see what the unconscionability element can be, other than knowledge or imputed 
knowledge. 109 That seemed to be the approach adopted by Kenneth Sutton, when 
he suggested that the element of unconscionability can be met by establishing 
knowledge by the representor of the representee’s reliance or a reasonable 
expectation of reliance. 110 The ‘something extra’ required by Mason CJ and 
Wilson J is equivalent to, and differed only slightly from, Justice Brennan’s 
fourth element. What is required is knowledge of the representee’s detrimental 
reliance; while Brennan J appeared to require actual knowledge, Mason CJ and 
Wilson J would impute knowledge where it was reasonable to expect reliance. 
The question whether constructive or imputed knowledge will suffice is an 
important one: as Peter Drahos and Stephen Parker have suggested, once 
constructive knowledge is accepted, it becomes difficult to deny that the courts 
are simply protecting reasonable reliance.
Once the door to constructive knowledge is opened, one slides towards 
the position that a promisor is deemed to know of detriment when it was 
reasonably incurred by the promisee. So one just enforces reasonable 
reliance and outflanks consideration. * 111
The notion that reasonable reliance alone should be protected is not too far from
the position taken by Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores, when they said
that the reason mere reliance on a promise to do something did not bring
promissory estoppel into play was because a promisee should reasonably be
112expected to know that to be binding it must form part of a binding contract. 
When the circumstances are such that the representee’s reliance on the relevant 
assumption is reasonable, then it could be argued that the representor’s departure
108 Ibid.
109 See Drahos and Parker, above n 7, 46.
110 Sutton, above n 2.
111 Drahos and Parker, above n 7, 46.
112 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 417, citing Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas 
Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] 1 QB 84, 107.
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from that assumption should be regarded as unconscionable and, therefore, 
actionable.
The High Court’s approach to equitable estoppel in Waltons Stores was clearly 
shaped by the fact that the estoppel arose in that case by way of silence. The 
court’s profound concern with questions of knowledge and unconscionability is 
justified by the fact that the representor in that case had not actively induced the 
adoption of the relevant assumption. The imposition of a knowledge requirement 
in those circumstances is consistent with the cases at common law and in equity 
in which knowledge has been held to be an essential element of estoppel by 
silence. 113 As Spencer Bower and Turner have said:
The necessity for actual knowledge on the part of the representor is a 
characteristic of all estoppels by silence, and in this respect such estoppels 
differ from estoppels based on representations by words or positive 
conduct, in which the effect on the representee, not the state of mind of 
the representor, is the aspect of the matter with which the court is 
principally concerned. 114
A final aspect of the Waltons Stores decision which is of considerable importance 
to the unconscionability question was Justice Brennan’s inclusion of an ‘intention 
to affect legal relations’ requirement in equitable estoppel. Brennan J held in 
Waltons Stores that the doctrine of equitable estoppel ‘has no application to an 
assumption or expectation induced by a promise which is not intended by the 
promisor and understood by the promisee to affect their legal relations. ’ 115 The 
requirement was imposed, as Brennan J explained, to solve the problem of
113 In addition to the cases discussed elsewhere in this chapter, it is also consistent with the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal’s refusal to find a representor’s ‘lack of action’ unconscionable in 
circumstances where the representee’s reliance had not been brought to its attention: Gold Star 
Insurance Co Ltd v Gaunt (1992) 7 ANZ Ins Cas 61-097, 77,397.
114 Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 12, 288.
115 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 421, adopting a statement of Denning LJ in Combe v Combe [1951] 2 
KB 215, 220. In Gollin & Co Ltd v Consolidated Fertiliser Sales Pty Ltd [1982] Qd R 435, 453 
WB Campbell J also appeared to accept that an intention on the part of the promisor to affect 
the legal relations between the parties was required to establish a promissory estoppel. As noted 
above, the requirement was also articulated in Burbery Mortgage Finance & Savings Ltd v 
Hindsbank Holdings Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 356, 361 (Richardson J).
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estoppel being used in a pre-contractual context where parties expected to be able 
to agree to terms. 116 Where two parties expect to reach an agreement, but each 
recognises that the other is free to withdraw from the negotiations before a 
binding agreement is concluded, then ‘it cannot be unconscionable for one of the 
parties to do so.’ There are, however, other ways in which the requirements of 
estoppel already deal with that problem. First, the nature of the assumption 
should be scrutinised carefully, as Deane J did in Waltons Stores. A 
representation as to a party’s present intention cannot found an estoppel, unless 
that party also indicates that they do not intend to change their mind in the future, 
because it is clear that a change of mind is possible. 119 Even if the representee 
does assume that the representor will not change his or her mind, the representee 
must act reasonably in adopting and acting upon that assumption. It would 
rarely be reasonable for a party involved in contractual negotiations to assume 
that terms will be agreed and a contract concluded, and even more rarely be 
reasonable to act on such an assumption. 121
Justice Brennan’s requirement that a representor must intend to affect the parties’ 
legal relations did not receive support from any of the other judges in Waltons 
Stores and, perhaps more importantly, was not referred to by any members of the 
High Court in Commonwealth v Verwayen. The facts of Verwayen show that 
the contractual ‘intention to affect legal relations’ requirement is inappropriate 
outside the contractual context. In Verwayen, there was no suggestion that the 
Commonwealth intended to be bound by its statement that it would not plead the
116 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 422-3.
117 Ibid 423.
118 Ibid 450.
119 Reliance on such a representation was found not to give rise to an estoppel in Maunsell v 
Hedges (1854) 4 HLC 1039; 10 ER 769. As noted in Chapter 5, Francis Dawson, ‘Making 
Representations Good’ (1982) 1 Canterbury Law Review 329, 335, has suggested that the 
representation in Maunsell v Hedges was ‘couched in such terms that the representee could not 
be said to have reasonably placed reliance upon it.’
120 See Chapter 5 above.
121 KE Lindgren and KG Nicholson, ‘Promissory Estoppel in Australia’ (1984) 58 Australian 
Law Journal 249, 258-9 have advocated an objective approach to the question of intention, by 
analogy with the objective approach to contract formation. They argued that an objective 
question of intention to affect legal relations covers the same ground as an objective inquiry as 
to the representor’s intention to induce reliance.
122 (1990) 170 CLR 394 (‘ Verwayen’). It is also impossible to reconcile the existence of such a 
requirement in Australian law with the decision of Hodgson J in W v G (1996) 20 Farn LR 49,
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limitation defence or the defence of no duty of care. The assumption adopted by 
Mr Verwayen was not that the Commonwealth was bound not to plead the 
relevant defences, but simply that it had made a decision not to do so, and that the 
decision would not be changed.123 Such an assumption was reasonable in the 
unusual circumstances of the case.124
The principle that a promisor must intend to be legally bound before an estoppel 
can arise originated from the judgments of Lord Denning relating to promissory 
estoppel. It is clear from Lord Denning’s extra-judicial writings that he thought 
the intention to affect legal relations requirement should be imposed only in those 
cases involving deliberate promises.125 The requirement of an intention to affect 
legal relations stood as an alternative to detrimental reliance in such cases, which, 
he said, ‘seem to fall more naturally under the law of contract, rather than the law 
of estoppel.’ The source of obligation in such cases was the promise itself, 
rather than the representee’s detrimental reliance. The requirement that a 
promisor must intend to affect the legal relations between the parties flows 
naturally from such a view of promissory estoppel.
This raises the philosophical question, which will be addressed in Chapter 8 of 
this thesis, whether the broader, substantive doctrine of equitable estoppel applied 
by the Australian courts is based on promise, as the principle of promissory 
estoppel applied by Lord Denning clearly was. The argument will be advanced in 
Chapter 8 that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied in Australia is not 
contractual, and is not based on the notion of the assumption of obligation 
through promise. If that is so, then it should be irrelevant to the establishment of 
such an estoppel whether the representor intended to be bound by his or her 
promise or intended, by his or her actions, to affect the legal relations between the 
parties. It is not necessary to impose a requirement that the representor must 
intend to be bound by his or her promise because there are other factors, notably
discussed in Chapter 1 above.
123 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 414 (Mason CJ).
124 Ibid.
125 AT Denning, ‘Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Consideration’ (1952) 15 Modern 
Law Review 1, 9.
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the reasonableness requirement, which serve to limit the availability of equitable 
estoppel.
3. Commonwealth v Verwayen
A feature of Chief Justice Mason’s judgment in Commonwealth v Verwayen, 
which has attracted considerable comment, is that the Chief Justice joined Deane 
J in accepting a unification of common law and equitable estoppel. More 
interesting for present purposes, however, is the fact that, in applying the 
principles of that unified doctrine to the facts, Mason CJ seems to have 
abandoned both the ‘unconscionability’ element and the requirement of 
knowledge which were so prominent in his joint judgment with Wilson J in 
Waltons Stores. In applying the principles of the unified doctrine to the facts in 
Verwayen, the Chief Justice considered only the need to establish that the 
Commonwealth induced the adoption of the relevant assumption by Mr 
Verwayen, 127 the element of detriment128 and the nature of the relief appropriate 
to satisfy the estoppel. 129 Neither the element of unconscionability, nor the need 
for the representor to have knowledge or a reasonable expectation of the 
representee’s reliance were mentioned in Chief Justice Mason’s application of the 
doctrine to the facts. The abandonment of those concepts is evident in the Chief 
Justice’s description of the operation of the single doctrine of estoppel in terms 
which focused on the elements of assumption, inducement and detrimental 
reliance, and which did not include elements of unconscionability or 
knowledge. 130
126 Ibid.
127 (1990) 170 CLR 394 ,414 .
128 Ibid 415-6.
129 Ibid 416-7.
130 Ibid 413:
[I]t should be accepted that there is but one doctrine o f estoppel, which provides that a 
court of common law or equity may do what is required, but not more, to prevent a 
person who has relied upon an assumption as to a present, past or future state of affairs 
(including a legal state of affairs), which assumption the party estopped has induced him 
to hold, from suffering detriment in reliance upon the assumption as a result o f the denial 
of its correctness. A central element of that doctrine is that there must be a 
proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is its purpose to avoid.
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Two important conclusions can be drawn from Chief Justice Mason’s apparent 
abandonment of the concept of unconscionability and the requirement of 
knowledge in Verwayen. First, both developments can be seen as a means of 
reconciling equitable estoppel with the common law doctrine. In other respects, 
Chief Justice Mason’s version of a unified estoppel can be seen as an extension 
of equitable estoppel to cover representations of existing fact. The extent to 
which Chief Justice Mason’s unified doctrine draws on equitable estoppel is 
particularly apparent in his approach to relief, which allows the court a discretion 
to fashion relief which is proportional to the detriment suffered. 131 Common law 
estoppel, in contrast, operates simply by holding the representor to the truth of the 
assumption which his or her conduct has induced, 132 allowing the court no 
flexibility in the granting of relief. 133 In abandoning the unconscionability 
element, and with it the requirement that the representor must have knowledge of 
the representee’s detrimental reliance, however, Mason CJ can be seen to be 
rationalising the unified estoppel with the strongly reliance-based approach of the 
common law doctrine. The emphasis on reliance was particularly marked in the 
early Australian High Court decisions on common law estoppel. 134 As discussed 
above, the approach adopted in those cases focussed attention on the position of 
the representee, and did not involve any inquiry into the knowledge of the 
representor. The second conclusion that can be drawn from Chief Justice 
Mason’s abandonment of the knowledge requirement is that it is consistent with 
the notion that knowledge is not required, at common law or in equity, where the 
representor has induced the relevant assumption by means of positive conduct. 
The relevant assumption in Verwayen was, unlike that in Waltons Stores, induced 
by a clear representation on the part of the Commonwealth. The fact that Mason 
CJ imposed a knowledge requirement in Waltons Stores, but did not do so in 
Verwayen, is explicable on the basis that that knowledge is only required to 
establish estoppels by silence.
131 Ibid.
132 Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507, 547; Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd 
(1937) 59 CLR 641,674.
133 Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 414 (Brennan J). This question is addressed in detail 
in Chapter 7 below.
134 Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305; Thompson v Palmer 
(1933) 49 CLR 507; Newbon v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1935) 52 CLR 723;
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Chief Justice Mason’s omission of the element of knowledge in Verwayen is 
particularly interesting when one looks at his later, extra-judicial attempt to 
rationalise the unification of equitable and common law estoppel on the basis that 
conduct which is regarded as ‘unconscionable’ in equitable estoppel is equivalent 
to the ‘unjust’ conduct which was at the basis of common law estoppel in cases
I T  C
such as Thompson v Palmer and Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines 
Ltd. ' The approach taken in Verwayen moves the concept of unconscionable 
conduct closer to that of unjust conduct: it was more clearly defined, more 
focussed on the representee’s reliance, and did not involve the element of 
knowledge of the representee’s detrimental reliance.
While Brennan J did not discuss the elements of knowledge or unconscionability 
in Verwayen, those elements were discussed by Deane J at some length. The 
unified doctrine of estoppel applied by Deane J was based on the notion that the 
law will not permit an unconscionable departure from an assumption which has 
been adopted and acted upon by another party. Although Deane J said that the 
question whether departure would be unconscionable could not be resolved by 
some preconceived formula serving as a universal yardstick, it appeared that he 
regarded the question as having two elements: first, the part played by the 
representor in the adoption of or persistence of the assumption and, secondly, 
some additional element rendering the representor’s conduct unconscionable in 
the circumstances. 139
The representor would bear sufficient responsibility for the representee’s 
assumption to establish the first element where the representor:
(a) has induced the assumption by express or implied representation; (b) 
has entered into contractual or other material relations with the other party
Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641.
135 (1933) 49 CLR 507.
136 (1937) 59 CLR 641.
137 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 440-1 & 444-5.
138 Ibid 444.
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on the conventional basis of the assumption; (c) has exercised against the 
other party rights which would exist only if the assumption were correct; 
(d) knew that the other party laboured under the assumption and refrained 
from correcting him when it was his duty in conscience to do so. 140
It is more difficult to categorise the circumstances in which Deane J envisaged 
the second element being made out. It may depend on:
(a) the reasonableness of the conduct of the representee in acting upon the 
assumption;
(b) the nature and extent of the detriment the representee would suffer if 
departure from the assumption were permitted; or
(c) where the assumption has been induced by an express or implied 
representation, ‘whether the allegedly estopped party knew or intended or 
clearly ought to have known that the other party would be induced by his 
conduct to adopt, and act on the basis of, the assumption. ’ 141
Like the unconscionability element required by Mason CJ and Wilson J in 
Waltons Stores, Justice Deane’s unconscionability element can ultimately be 
reduced to the question of knowledge. If we leave aside the core elements of 
assumption, inducement and reasonable detrimental reliance, the only element 
remaining is the question of the representor’s knowledge or imputed knowledge 
of the potentially detrimental action being taken by the representee. Of particular 
significance is Justice Deane’s suggestion that actual knowledge may not be 
required. His description of the second element leaves open the possibility that 
either the reasonableness of the representee’s conduct, or the nature and extent of 
the detriment, alone may satisfy the unconscionability requirement, without any 
inquiry as to knowledge on the part of the representor. Imputed knowledge may 
also suffice, perhaps even in cases of estoppel by silence. Even more than the 
approach to unconscionability articulated by Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons
139 Ibid 444-5
140 Ibid 444.
141 Ibid 445.
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Stores, Justice Deane’s definition admits of the possibility that the court may 
simply protect reasonable reliance.
Dawson J did not discuss the unconscionability requirement in any detail, but did 
advert briefly to the question whether the Commonwealth’s departure from the 
relevant assumption was unconscionable in the circumstances. His conclusion 
that the Commonwealth’s departure was unconscionable appeared to be based 
exclusively on the part played by the Commonwealth in inducing Verwayen’s 
adoption of the relevant assumption. 142 The only other member of the Court to 
discuss the doctrine of equitable estoppel in any detail was McHugh J, who 
conveniently spelt out the circumstances in which it will be unconscionable for a 
party to insist on his or her strict legal rights. 143 Three elements are required: 
inducement, detrimental reliance and knowledge on the part of the representor of 
the representee’s detrimental action or inaction.
Justice McHugh’s approach follows that of Mason CJ and Wilson and Brennan 
JJ in Waltons Stores in requiring knowledge, in addition to the core elements of 
equitable estoppel, in order to satisfy the unconscionability element. Interestingly, 
however, McHugh J was the only member of the High Court in Verwayen to 
impose such a requirement. Mason CJ appeared to leave it out of his unified 
estoppel deliberately, Brennan J did not raise it, Deane J seemed to contemplate a 
range of situations in which it was not required, or could be imputed, and 
Dawson J also did not seem to require it.
Unfortunately, the only conclusion one can draw from those decisions is that 
there is little agreement as to what is required to satisfy the unconscionability 
element. No doubt many would regard that as a good thing, on the basis that the 
element of unconscionability should not be defined, but should, by some 
mysterious process, be divined from the facts of each case. The element of 
mystery is, however, unsatisfactory from the point of view of a person who 
wishes to know whether they are free to resile from an assumption which they
142 Ibid 460.
143 Ibid 500.
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have induced another party to adopt or whether, having resiled from such an 
assumption, they have incurred liability to that other party. It is equally 
unsatisfactory from the point of view of a person who has relied to their detriment 
on the conduct of another party, and wishes to know whether they have a cause of 
action against that party. The High Court has recently removed one element of 
mystery from this area of the law by articulating the principles by which relief is 
framed to give effect to an equitable estoppel. 144 While that clarification is a 
positive development, it also serves to highlight how unfortunate it is that this 
important question in relation to the establishment of an equitable estoppel 
remains so elusive.
III. RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCES 
A. When is a Representor’s Conduct Unconscionable?
If the common law and equitable doctrines of estoppel are to be reconciled, then 
the courts must abandon the notion of an undefined ‘unconscionability’ element, 
and must clearly articulate the circumstances in which an estoppel will arise. 
Despite the diversity of views examined in this chapter, there is now considerable 
agreement as to the central elements required to establish both common law and 
equitable estoppel. At the heart of both the common law and equitable doctrines 
are the elements of an assumption, inducement and detrimental reliance. A 
number of alternatives have been suggested as to what else, if anything, is 
required to make the representor’s conduct unconscionable in the case of the 
equitable doctrine. They include the reasonableness of the representee’s reliance, 
an intention to induce reliance, actual knowledge of reliance, imputed knowledge 
of reliance or a reasonable expectation of reliance. Reasonableness of reliance 
can, however, be left to one side, since it is clearly required in all cases of 
common law estoppel and equitable estoppel. 145 The only remaining question, 
then, is when knowledge of the representee’s detrimental reliance, or an intention 
to induce reliance, are required to make departure from an assumption
144 Verxvayen (1990) 170 CLR 394; see further Chapter 7 below.
145 See Chapter 5 above.
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unconscionable. The answer to that question must be: only in cases of estoppel by 
silence.
The proposition that knowledge of, or an intention to induce, reliance should be 
required only in cases where the representor has remained inactive is consistent 
with most of the cases at common law and in equity. It is clear that the 
representor must bear some responsibility for the representee’s adoption of the 
relevant assumption, or for the action taken by the representee on the faith of that 
assumption. 146 Where the representor has engaged in some active conduct which 
clearly indicates that a particular factual or legal state of affairs exists, or clearly 
indicates that the representor will engage in some conduct in the future, then the 
representor bears responsibility for the representee’s adoption of the assumption 
by reason of that conduct alone. Such responsibility exists regardless of the 
representor’s knowledge or intention; in those cases, therefore, reasonable 
reliance alone warrants protection. On the other hand, where the representor has 
not engaged in any positive conduct which induces the adoption of the 
assumption, then the representor can only be held liable if he or she has culpably 
remained silent. 147 The representor’s silence is only blameworthy if the 
representor is under a duty to speak arising from custom or trade usage, or
146 As Kerr LJ said on behalf of the English Court of Appeal in K Lokumal & Sons (London) Ltd v 
Lotte Shipping Co Pte (The ‘‘August Leonhardt”) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 28, 34-5: ‘All estoppels 
must involve some statement or conduct by the party alleged to be estopped on which the alleged 
representee was entitled to rely and did rely.’
147 Ettershank v Zeal (1882) 8 VLR (E) 333, 343 (FC): ‘It is considered [in equity and at law] 
that a man is bound to disclose his rights if he knows that another man will be injuriously 
misled by their concealment.’ See also Brand v Chris Building Co Pty Ltd [1957] VR 625, 628- 
9, where the defendant failed to make out a case of estoppel by acquiescence because the 
plaintiff was not aware of the defendant’s mistake or acts of reliance; Marvon Pty Ltd v Yulara 
Development Co Ltd (1989) 98 FLR 358, 351, where Kearney J held that, even if the facts did 
not establish that there was an active inducement by the defendant, the defendant should be held 
to have induced the assumption because it knew of the plaintiffs detrimental reliance and 
remained silent; and KM A Corporation Pty Ltd v G & F Productions Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 
243, where Eames J held that an estoppel could not arise by silence unless, inter alia, the 
representor knew of the representee’s mistaken assumption.
148 Parke B observed in Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 Ex 654; 154 ER 652, 663 that ‘a duty cast 
upon a person, by usage of trade or otherwise, to disclose the truth, may often have the same 
effect’ as a representation. An example of such a duty is that owed by customers to their 
bankers to disclose forgeries: Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd [1933] 1 AC 51. See further 
Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 12, 55-79, Thomas Australia Wholesale Vehicle Trading 
Co Pty Ltd v Marac Finance Australia Ltd [1985] 3 NSWLR 452. It seems that in such cases 
the representor need not necessarily know of or intend reliance by the representee (as the 
representor did in Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd), but must know or believe that the 
representee labours under a mistake: West v Commercial Bank o f Australia Ltd (1935) 55 CLR
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remains silent with the intention of the representee acting upon the faith of a 
mistaken assumption, with knowledge of the representee’s intention to act upon 
the faith of such an assumption, or with knowledge of the representee’s acts of 
reliance.149 The representor’s knowledge and intention should, therefore, be 
relevant only in a case where the representor has not actively induced the 
adoption of the relevant assumption by the representee.
An analogy can be drawn here between estoppel and misleading or deceptive 
conduct under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act (Cth) 1974.150 The act of remaining 
silent is only regarded as ‘conduct’, and hence can only breach s 52, if it is 
‘otherwise than inadvertent’.151 In other words, silence can only breach s 52 if it 
is conscious or deliberate. Similarly, the act of remaining silent can be said only 
to found an estoppel if it is engaged in consciously, with the knowledge that the 
representee is acting on the faith of a false assumption to his or her detriment, or 
with the intention or expectation that he or she will do so. If the representor 
remains silent, but does not have actual or constructive knowledge of the 
representee’s reliance, then the representor cannot be regarded as bearing any 
responsibility for the loss suffered by the representee as a result of that reliance.
As a result of the difference between the treatment of positive conduct and that of 
silence under s 52, the question whether it was positive conduct or silence which 
led the plaintiff into error assumes great importance. “ Similarly, if the requisite 
knowledge or intention is required only in the case of estoppels by silence, then,
515, 322 (Rich, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ); Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507, 
547 (Dixon J).
149 Note that knowledge of the representee’s acts of reliance will not suffice if the representor 
does not also have knowledge of the assumption adopted by the representee and there are other 
plausible explanations for the representee’s actions: Wilson v Stewart (1889) 15 VLR 781, 802 
(Higinbotham J).
150 It is also interesting to note that the ‘reasonable expectation’ test recently adopted by the 
Full Federal Court for determining whether silence in a particular situation is misleading or 
deceptive (Warner v Elders Rural Finance Ltd (1992) 113 ALR 517) is essentially the same as 
the test applied in Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1977] AC 890, 903, Pacol Ltd v 
Trade Lines Ltd (the ‘Herick S if ) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 456, 465 and KM A Corporation Pty 
Ltd v G & F Productions Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 243, 249 for determining whether silence in a 
particular situation is capable of forming the basis of an estoppel.
151 Trade Practices Act (Cth) 1974, s 4(2); see Andrew Robertson, ‘Silence as Misleading 
Conduct: Reasonable Expectations in the Wake of Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky’ (1994) 2 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal 1, 12-14.
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as under s 52, it is crucial for the courts to determine whether it is positive 
conduct or silence on the part of the representee which induced the representee to 
adopt or act on the relevant assumption. In Crabb v Arun DC, for example, had 
the representor’s positive conduct been regarded as insufficient on its own to 
have induced reliance, then it would have been critical for the representee to 
establish the requisite knowledge or intention on the part of the representor.
B. The Nature and Type o f Knowledge or Intention Required
If one accepts the view outlined above, that knowledge or intention is only 
required in the case of an estoppel by silence, then the final question that needs to 
be addressed is the nature and type of knowledge or intention required. The 
relevant questions are, first, what must the representor know or intend and, 
secondly, must actual knowledge or intention be proved, or will it be imputed to 
the representor by the court?
Knowledge of three different matters may be relevant: first, knowledge of the 
assumption adopted by the representee, secondly, knowledge that the assumption 
is false (ie: knowledge that the representee is mistaken as to the state of affairs, as 
to the representee’s existing legal rights or as to the intentions of the representor); 
and, thirdly, knowledge of the representee’s acts of detrimental reliance. It 
seems clear that in all cases the representor must know of the assumption adopted 
by the representee. If the representor did not, by his or her conduct, induce the 
adoption of the relevant assumption, and did not know of the assumption adopted 
by the representee, then the representor cannot be said to bear any responsibility 
for the loss suffered by the representee as a result of reliance on the assumption.
The time for assessing the representor’s knowledge is a difficult question. Since 
the representor is said to act wrongfully or unconscionably only in resiling from 
the assumption, it could be argued that there is no reason to require knowledge of 
the true position at any time prior to the representor’s attempt to resile from the
152 See Robertson, ibid.
153 Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 133, 146.
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assumption. On the other hand, if the representor only learns of the representee’s 
assumption after the detrimental action has been taken, then the representor is 
powerless to prevent the detrimental action. If the representor has not induced the 
adoption of the relevant assumption by positive conduct, and did not know of it 
before it was acted upon, then the representor cannot be said to bear 
responsibility for the consequences of the representee’s actions.154 Accordingly, it 
seems clear that in a case of estoppel by silence, the representor must know of the 
representee’s assumption at the time detrimental action is taken. Accordingly, 
what the representee must establish is that, at the time the representee acted on 
the assumption, the representor:
1. knew of the assumption adopted by the representee; and
2. (a) knew that the representee was acting in reliance on the assumption, (b) 
knew of the representee’s intention to act in reliance on that assumption,155 or 
(c) intended the representee to act in reliance on the assumption.
The final question is whether the requisite knowledge or intention must be proved 
by direct evidence, or whether constructive or imputed knowledge will suffice. 
There is authority in the common law cases for the proposition that direct proof 
of the requisite knowledge or intention is not required, and it will be inferred 
from the facts. The leading case is Laws Holdings Pty Ltd v Short,156 where 
Gibbs J was prepared to infer knowledge where ‘it was so obvious’ that the 
representee would have adopted the assumption in question that the representor 
must have believed this was the case. As to the question of the representor’s 
intention to induce a course of conduct, there is clear authority at common law
154 As Spencer Bower and Turner, above n 12, 64 have observed, an owner of property is under 
no duty to protest against an invasion of his or her rights where the owner has no reason to 
believe that the invader mistakenly believes himself or herself to be acting lawfully. In such a 
case there is no ‘delusion’ which the owner is fostering or encouraging, and accordingly, there 
is nothing to preclude the owner from subsequently asserting his or her rights against the 
invader.
155 See Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179, 189 (Lord Denning MR), 197-8 (Scarman 
LJ) and Laws Holdings Pty> Ltd v Short (1972) 46 ALJR 563, 570 (Gibbs J).
156 (1972) 46 ALJR 563, 571 (Gibbs J), applied in Ampol Ltd v Matthews (Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of South Australia, Millhouse, Zelling and Legoe JJ, 15 April 1992), 164 LSJS 
78, 11 (Millhouse J), 21 (Zelling J).
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that such intention can also be implied from the facts. 157 Brennan J confirmed in 
Waltons Stores that the requisite knowledge or intention can also be inferred for 
the purposes of equitable estoppel, but suggested that such an inference may be 
more difficult to draw in a case of estoppel by silence. 158
The question whether some notice other than actual notice suffices for the 
establishment of an estoppel is an important one for the philosophy of estoppel. 
That is because a more stringent approach to notice involves a focus on the 
representor and indicates a concern with matters of conscience. A less strict 
approach to notice, on the other hand, tends to suggest that the court is more 
concerned with the position of the representee and is simply protecting 
reasonable reliance. 159 The importance of the standard of notice required has also 
been recognised by Tony Duggan in relation to the equitable doctrine of 
unconscionable dealing. Duggan suggests that:
Attenuation of the knowledge requirement in this way [to allow 
constructive notice] marks an important shift in the philosophical 
underpinnings of the unconscientious dealing doctrine. Relief of A’s 
misfortune replaces prevention of B’s wrongdoing as the basis for 
intervention. 160
A person is said to have constructive notice of a fact or state of affairs which 
would have been revealed by inquiries. There are two ways in which a person can 
be deemed to have such notice. 161 Constructive notice in the narrow sense is 
wilful ignorance: deliberately abstaining from inquiry in order to avoid 
knowledge. Constructive notice in the broad sense involves a mere failure to 
make the inquiries that a reasonable person would have made in the situation in 
question. It seems clear that constructive notice in the narrow sense should be
157 Trenorden v Martin [1934] SASR 340, 343; see above nn 13-22 and accompanying text.
158 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 423.
159 See above n 111 and accompanying text.
160 Tony Duggan, ‘Unconscientious Dealing’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of 
Equity (1996) 121, 139.
161 Duggan, ibid 138; RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and 
Remedies (3rd ed, 1992) 253.
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sufficient to establish an estoppel. Wilful ignorance is, as Tony Duggan has 
observed, a type of dishonesty; it therefore clearly affords a sufficient basis for 
attributing responsibility to the representor for the representee’s reliance. Justice 
Oliver’s suggestion in Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd 
that ‘a suspicion of the true position’ may give rise to a duty to speak arguably 
provides support for the notion that constructive notice in the narrow sense will 
be accepted for the purposes of equitable estoppel.
For the purposes of the equitable doctrine, a strong case can also be made for 
allowing constructive knowledge in the broad sense of a mere failure to make 
reasonable inquiries, or a finding that the representor ought to have known of the 
representee’s assumption and detrimental reliance. The authors of Cheshire and 
Fifoot’s Law o f Contract argue that an objective test should be applied, as it is in 
the area of unconscionable dealing, 164 so that it is enough to show that ‘a 
reasonable person would have realised that there would be detrimental 
reliance. ’ 165 That argument finds support in the dictum of Mason CJ and Wilson J 
in Waltons Stores that the requisite unconscionability can be found in the 
representor’s reasonable expectation of detrimental reliance by the representee. 166 
It is also supported by the approach taken by the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal in Lorimer v State Bank o f New South Wales, which was discussed earlier 
in this chapter. 167 As the above statement from Cheshire and Fifoot suggests, a
162 Duggan, above n 160, 138.
163 [1982] 1 QB 133, 17.
164 Commonwealth Bank o f Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 462 & 467 (Mason 
J), 474 & 477-9 (Deane J), discussed by Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 2, 560-1. Cf Duggan, 
above n 160, 138.
165 Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 2, 66.
166 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 406. Deane J also commented in Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 445, 
that ‘a critical consideration [in determining whether departure from the assumption would be 
unconscionable] will commonly be that the allegedly estopped party knew or intended or clearly 
ought to have known that the other party would be induced by his conduct to adopt, and act on the 
basis of, the assumption’ (emphasis added). In two 19th century cases Lord Cranworth regarded a 
form of constructive notice of reliance as sufficient, but he was referring to cases in which the 
assumptions were induced by positive representations. In West v Jones (1851) 1 Sim (NS) 205; 61 
ER 79, 81 Lord Cranwoth VC held that a representor will be bound by a statement ‘if it be made 
in order to induce another to act upon it, or under circumstances in which the party making it may 
reasonably suppose it will be acted on’. In Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HLC 185; 10 ER 868, 881, 
Lord Cranworth LC reiterated that ‘if the representee has unwittingly misled another, you must add 
that he has misled another under such circumstances that he had reasonable ground for supposing 
that the person whom he was misleading was to act upon what he was saying.’
167 Above nn 45-51 and accompanying text.
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knowledge requirement which allows constructive knowledge in the broad sense 
is almost indistinguishable from a requirement that the promisor must reasonably 
expect reliance by the promisee. Framing it as a ‘reasonable expectation of 
reliance’ requirement, rather than as a knowledge requirement which can be 
satisfied by constructive notice, is simpler, and allows a consistent approach to be 
taken at common law and in equity. Accordingly, if constructive notice in the 
broad sense is accepted, then we have two different ‘reasonableness’ 
requirements for estoppel. Where the estoppel is claimed to arise from positive 
conduct on the part of the representor, then it is only required that the representee 
must act reasonably in adopting and acting upon the assumption. Where the 
estoppel is claimed on the basis of the representor’s silence, then it must also be 
shown that a reasonable person in the position of the representor would have 
expected reliance.
If that approach is accepted, then the above list of elements169 can be restated as 
follows. In the case of an estoppel by silence, in addition to the basic elements 
required to establish an equitable estoppel by positive conduct, the onus should 
be on the representee to establish that, at the time the representee took the 
detrimental action, the representor:
1. knew (or ought to have known) of the assumption adopted by the representee; 
and
2. (a) knew (or ought to have known) that the representee was acting in reliance 
on that assumption, (b) knew (or ought to have known) of the representee’s 
intention to act in reliance on the assumption, or (c) intended the representee 
to act in reliance on the assumption.
If emphasis is to be placed on the representee’s reliance, rather than the 
representor’s conduct, and a consistent approach is to be taken at common law
168 The notion that liability should be imposed on a person who ‘ought to have realised’ that 
their actions would induce reliance has been justified from a philosophical point of view by 
Neil MacCormick, ‘Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers I’ (1972) Supp Vol 46 The 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59, 66-7.
169 Above, text accompanying n 155.
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and in equity, then the knowledge and intention requirements could be simplified. 
In the case of any estoppel by silence, then, the only extra requirement imposed 
on a representee would be to show that a reasonable person in the position of the 
representor would have expected the representee to adopt the relevant assumption 
and to act in reliance upon it.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The role and nature of the unconscionability requirement are important issues 
which must be resolved if the unification of common law and equitable estoppel 
is to proceed. There are considerable similarities between equitable and common 
law estoppel in this regard. First, knowledge has played an important role in each 
doctrine in attributing responsibility to the representor in cases where he or she 
has not made a clear representation or promise. There is, in that respect, a unity of 
principle between the common law and equitable doctrines. Secondly, the notion 
of unconscionable conduct in the equitable doctrine can be seen to be reflected in 
the common law concept of unjust departure from an assumption. Each depends 
primarily on the elements of inducement on the representor’s side, and reasonable 
detrimental reliance on the part of the representee. The similarity between those 
two concepts, however, masks a fundamental difference. While the notion of 
unjust departure under the common law doctrine has always been defined clearly, 
the concept of unconscionability in the equitable doctrine has deliberately been 
left undefined. This is a significant difference between the common law and 
equitable doctrines which must be resolved if a unified doctrine is to be accepted.
The nature of the unconscionability requirement is closely connected with the 
philosophy of estoppel. There are different ways of interpreting the 
unconscionability requirement and a choice between those different 
requirements appears to depend, in turn, on a choice between the contending 
philosophies. If estoppels by conduct are indeed seen to be based on 
conscience, then the unconscionability requirement should be a demanding one, 
which requires actual knowledge of the representee’s reliance. If, on the other 
hand, estoppels by conduct are seen to be based on reliance, then an objective
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approach, such as requiring a reasonable expectation of reliance, should be 
regarded as sufficient. As Parker and Drahos have suggested, 170 the apparent 
tendency of the Australian courts toward the acceptance of constructive 
knowledge in the establishment of both common law and equitable estoppel 
suggests that estoppels by conduct in Australia are founded on, or moving 
towards, a reliance-based philosophy. If the essence of the unconscionability 
requirement, the question of knowledge, is determined objectively, then it 
seems clear that the principles of estoppel by conduct are not based on 
conscience.
170 Parker and Drahos, above n 111 and accompanying text.
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Chapter 7
REMEDIES*
The final aspect of estoppel doctrine to be examined is the way in which the 
courts give effect to common law, equitable and unified estoppels. In the case 
of the equitable and unified doctrines this is properly described as a discussion 
of remedies, since those doctrines create substantive rights. The remedy is 
therefore at large, and the court must fashion relief by which to give effect to 
the estoppel. In the case of the common law doctrine, on the other hand, judges 
and commentators do not normally speak of remedies, since the effect of the 
estoppel is merely preclusionary: it is to hold the parties to the assumed state of 
affairs and to determine their rights by reference to that state of affairs. 
Although the effect of common law estoppel is in this sense fixed, it is 
important to pay close attention to the ‘remedy’ provided by common law 
estoppel, particularly in the light of moves towards a unification of the common 
law and estoppel doctrines of estoppel.
This chapter will consider the question of remedies in four parts. The first part 
of the chapter will examine in the abstract the different types of remedies that 
can be provided to give effect to an estoppel, and the different approaches that 
can be taken to the question of relief. The remainder of the chapter will 
consider the way in which the courts give effect to the different types of 
estoppel: part two deals with common law estoppel, part three equitable 
estoppel, and part four a unified estoppel.
* Substantial parts of this chapter have been published in ‘Satisfying the Minimum Equity: 
Equitable Estoppel Remedies after Verwayen' (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 
805-847 and ‘Towards a Unifying Purpose for Estoppel’ (1996) 22 Monash University Law 
Review 1-29.
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I. APPROACHES TO THE DETERMINATION OF RELIEF
There are essentially three different types of relief which can be granted to give 
effect to an estoppel: a court can grant reliance-based relief, expectation-based 
relief or restitutionary relief. These three types of relief coincide with the reliance, 
expectation and restitution interests identified by Fuller and Perdue in their 
classical exposition of contract damages. 1
In granting damages to a plaintiff for breach of contract, a court is said to 
protect the plaintiffs reliance interest when those damages are calculated to 
undo the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of his or her reliance on the 
defendant’s promise.2 In protecting the reliance interest, the court seeks to put 
the plaintiff in the position he or she would have occupied had the contract not 
been entered into. Similarly, in giving effect to an estoppel, the court grants 
reliance-based relief when the remedy granted reverses the detriment the 
representee has suffered as a result of the representee’s reliance on the 
representor’s conduct. The most direct means of protecting the representee’s 
reliance interest is to order the payment of monetary compensation for the 
detriment suffered by the representee in reliance on the relevant assumption.3 
The court can also protect the reliance interest by granting a lien or charge over 
the representor’s property to the value of expenditure incurred by the 
representee in reliance on the relevant assumption.4
The expectation interest is protected in an award of contract damages which 
gives the plaintiff the value of the expectancy created by the promise.5 The 
award is calculated to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he or she would
1 LL Fuller and William Perdue The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ (1936) 46 Yale 
Law Journal 52.
2 Ibid 54.
3 As proposed in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 431 (Brennan J), 504 
(McHugh J) and granted in Adore Pty Ltd v Blenkinsop Nominees Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of 
Western Australia, Malcolm CJ, 1 September 1993) and The Public Trustee, as Administrator 
of the Estate of Williams (dec’d) v Wadley (Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, 
Wright, Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 27 June 1997).
4 As, for example, in the proprietary estoppel cases The Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking
Association v King (1858) 25 Beav 72; 53 ER 563 and Morris v Morris [1982] 1 NSWLR 61.
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have occupied if the defendant had performed his or her promise. The 
expectation interest can also be protected by an order for specific performance 
of a contractual obligation, giving the plaintiff the expectancy in specie, rather 
than its monetary equivalent. The representee’s expectation interest is also 
commonly protected in estoppel cases, when the court grants relief which has 
the effect of fulfilling the representee’s assumptions or expectations. In the case 
of an estoppel arising from an assumption as to an existing fact, the court can 
do this by holding the representor to the assumed state of affairs and 
determining the rights of the parties by reference to those assumed facts, rather 
than the facts as proved. Where the assumption on which the estoppel is based 
relates to the future conduct of the representor, the court can grant expectation- 
based relief in a number of different ways. The expectation interest is protected 
when the court orders specific performance, or payment of damages in lieu of 
specific performance, of an unexecuted agreement which the representee 
promised would be executed.5 6 It is also protected where the court refuses to 
allow the representor to depart from a representation as to future conduct,7 
orders the representor to transfer to the representee a promised or expected 
interest in land,8 or orders the representor to pay monetary compensation to the 
representee calculated by reference to the value of the expectancy.9
An important point to note about the reliance and expectation interests is that 
they are often overlapping, in the sense that protection of the expectation 
interest will usually also protect the reliance interest. The granting of full 
expectation relief ensures that no detriment is suffered as a result of the 
representee’s reliance, because the representee receives the benefits that he or
5 Fuller and Perdue, above n 1,5.
6 As, for example, in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, where 
damages were awarded in lieu of specific performance of a lease which the representor had led 
the representee to believe would be executed.
7 As, for example, in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, where the representor 
was prevented from pleading defences which the representee was led to believe would not be 
pleaded.
8 As, for example, in Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 ER 1285, where the
representor was ordered to transfer to the representee the land which the representee was led to 
believe would be transferred to him.
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she was counting on receiving. 10 Indeed, as Fuller and Perdue have observed in 
the contractual context, the value of the expectancy offers ‘the measure of 
damages most likely to reimburse the plaintiff for the (often very numerous and 
difficult to prove) individual acts and forbearances which make up his total 
reliance on the contract. ’ * 11
The third interest the court can protect in granting contract damages is the 
restitution interest. The plaintiffs restitution interest is protected in an award of 
contract damages when the court forces the defendant to disgorge or pay for a 
gain received at the expense of the plaintiff. 12 Restitutionary remedies are not 
often granted in estoppel cases. Courts giving effect to estoppels almost 
invariably fashion relief with a view to fulfilling the representee’s expectations 
or protecting the representee’s reliance interest, rather than with a view to 
disgorging gains made by the representor. Restitutionary remedies have 
occasionally been granted in promissory estoppel cases in'the United States, 13 
and have been awarded to give effect to equitable estoppels in at least two cases 
in Canada, 14 and one in Australia. 15 The Australian decision has rightly been
9 As, for example, in Baker v Baker (1993) 25 HLR 408, where the representee was held to be 
entitled to compensation equivalent to the value of the accommodation he expected to receive, 
which was less valuable than the expenditure he incurred on the faith of that expectation.
10 While it will often be double counting to protect both the reliance and expectation interests 
of the representee, the protection of the expectation interest will not cover reliance loss if the 
expectation is calculated as the net benefit which the representee expected to receive. An 
estoppel might, for example, arise where a representee expends money in reliance on the 
assumption that the representor will award the representee a contract for which the representee 
has tendered. If the representee’s expectations are fulfilled by means of an award of 
compensation for lost net profit, then such an award will not cover the representee’s reliance 
loss.
11 Fuller and Perdue, above n 1, 60. There are, however, rare cases such as Baker v Baker 
(1993) 25 HLR 408, in which the value of the representee’s detrimental reliance (giving up 
rented accommodation and contributing £33,950 towards the defendants’ purchase of a house) 
was of greater value than his expectancy (that he would have a right to reside in a room in the 
defendants’ house rent-free for the rest of his life).
12 Fuller and Perdue, above n 1,53-4.
13 LL Fuller and William Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2’ (1936) 46 
Yale Law Journal 373, 405; Edward Yorio and Steve Thel, ‘The Promissory Basis of Section 
90’ (1991) 101 Yale Law Journal 111, 132 (n 129).
14 McBride v McNeil (1912) 9 DLR 503 (representee allowed a lien for the ‘increased selling 
value’ of improved property); The Queen v Smith (1980) 113 DLR (3d) 522 (representee 
awarded compensation for the amount by which the value of land was enhanced by 
improvements).
15 In Raffaele v Raffaele [1962] WAR 29 the defendants promised their son that, if he would 
build a house on a block of land adjacent to the one on which they lived, they would transfer
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criticised, however, 16 and can properly be regarded as anomalous because the 
prevention of unjust enrichment is not regarded as the purpose of equitable 
estoppel. 17 Although equitable estoppel, particularly proprietary estoppel, can at 
times have the effect of preventing unjust enrichment, 18 doing so has not been 
seen as the one of the functions of equitable estoppel in England or Australia. 19 
In many estoppel cases there will be no restitutionary interest to protect, 
because the representor will not have made a gain at the representee’s 
expense.20
As well as characterising different types of remedies which can be granted to 
give effect to an estoppel, the concepts of reliance, expectation and restitution 
can also be used to describe the approaches a court can take in giving effect to 
an estoppel, indicating the interest which is given primacy in the determination 
of relief. As this chapter will show, the application of a particular approach to 
relief does not necessarily lead to the granting of a particular type of remedy, 
but simply provides a purpose to be pursued in granting relief, and a starting
that block to him. Applying Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 ER 1285, D’Arcy 
J held that the son’s expenditure on the strength of the promise gave rise to a ‘notional 
contract’. He awarded damages for breach of that contract, calculated on a restitutionary basis, 
representing the value of the house acquired by the defendants exclusive of the land on which it 
was built.
16 Two commentators have suggested that D’Arcy J erred in awarding damages on a 
restitutionary basis in Raffaele v Raffaele and that damages should have been assessed on a 
reliance basis or an expectation basis: D Allan, ‘An Equity to Perfect a Gift’ (1963) 79 Law 
Quarterly Review 238, 239 (n 7); KCT Sutton, Consideration Reconsidered (1974) 67 (n 118).
17 The connection between the purpose of a doctrine and its remedial consequences will be 
discussed in Chapter 8 below.
18 In Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P & CR 196, 208, Hobhouse LJ noted that the element of 
restitution is often present in proprietary estoppel, in contrast to common law estoppel.
19 See Joshua Getzler, ‘Unconscionable Conduct and Unjust Enrichment as Grounds for 
Judicial Intervention’ (1990) 16 Monash University Law Review 283, 309-314. Sir Anthony 
Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law 
World’ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 238, 255 has indicated, however, that unjust 
enrichment may have a role to play in proprietary estoppel, and Mark Lunney, ‘Towards a 
Unified Estoppel: The Long and Winding Road’ [19921 The Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 239, 244 has suggested that the element of unjust enrichment may be a factor that could 
be taken into account in proprietary estoppel cases in deciding whether a representor’s conduct 
is unconscionable.
20 Unjust enrichment does appear to play a limited role in the determination of relief in the 
United States, in those cases where the promisor has been unjustly enriched at the expense of 
the promisee: see below n 177.
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point or prima facie position in relation to remedy.21 Relief is determined on a 
reliance-basis when the court, in fashioning a remedy, seeks to reverse any 
detriment suffered by the representee as a result of his or her reliance on the 
assumption induced by the representor. Relief is determined on an expectation 
basis when the purpose pursued by the court is to make good the assumption 
adopted and acted upon by the representee. Relief would be determined on a 
restutitionary basis if a court sought to reverse any gains made by the 
representor as a result of the representee’s reliance on the representor’s 
conduct.
A fourth approach to giving effect to an estoppel is to fashion relief which is 
appropriate in the circumstances to assuage the representor’s conscience. Relief 
is determined on a conscience basis when the court’s primary concern is to 
grant relief which reflects the unconscionability of the representor’s conduct. A 
conscience-based approach to relief has occasionally been advocated in 
connection with equitable estoppel in Australia, in order to give greater 
prominence to the role of unconscionability in the doctrine. In an essay written 
prior to the High Court’s decision in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher,22 
Paul Finn outlined an unconscionability-based approach to relief in equitable 
estoppel.23 Finn argued that, in moulding relief, the courts must have regard to 
the conduct of the representor, in addition to concerns with the detriment suffered 
by the representee.24 According to Finn, therefore, the remedy revolves around 
‘what, in the circumstances it would be unconscionable for the [representor] to
21 So, for example, a reliance-based approach to relief will not necessarily result in the granting 
of relief framed by reference to the reliance interest, such as damages or compensation for loss 
suffered as a result of the representee’s reliance. Other factors, such as the difficulty in 
quantifying loss, may require the granting of a different type of relief (such as expectation 
relief) in order to achieve the stated purpose of preventing harm. Similarly, if an expectation- 
based approach is adopted, there will be cases in which the representee’s expectations cannot 
be fulfilled, such as in Baker v Baker (1993) 25 HLR 408, where the representee’s assumption 
that he could reside in a house with the representors for the rest of his life could not be made 
good because of a breakdown in the relationship between the parties.
22 (1988) 164 CLR 387 ( ‘Waltons Stores').
23 PD Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays in Equity (1985) 57, 90-3.
24 Ibid 91-2.
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insist upon given the responsibility he bears in or for the [representee’s] 
actions. ’25
On that basis, Finn made some ‘tentative suggestions’ to explain the granting of 
relief, which divided the cases into three categories, essentially on the basis of the 
extent of the representor’s responsibility for the assumption adopted by the 
representee. So, if the representor positively encourages the adoption of the 
assumption, according to Finn, the assumption should be made good. Where the 
representor stands by with knowledge of the mistaken assumption, the court’s 
concern should be to ensure that the representor does not obtain any benefit from 
the representee’s actions. Thirdly, where the representor encourages the 
representee to believe that certain rights of the representor will not be exercised, 
then the court should be concerned to impose terms that will allow the 
representor to insist on those rights, while preventing any disadvantage accruing 
to the representee.26
Finn’s approach was clearly based primarily on the proprietary estoppel cases, 
and could not have anticipated the direction the High Court was to take in 
relation to equitable estoppel relief in Waltons Stores and Commonwealth v 
Verwayen.21 The approaches to relief in those cases, as will be discussed below, 
indicate that any reference to unconscionability in the determination of relief is a 
reference to the unfairness of departing from an assumption where to do so would 
cause detriment to the representee as a result of the representee’s reliance on that 
assumption.28 The notion of unconscionability has not been used, as Finn 
proposed, to shape relief by reference to the reprehensibility of the representor’s 
conduct.29 Nevertheless, Finn’s analysis is interesting because it suggests a means
25 Ibid 92.
26 Ibid 92-3.
27 (1990) 170 CLR 394 ( ‘Verwayen’).
28 See, eg: Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 423 (Brennan J); Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 
394, 411 (Mason CJ), 428-9 (Brennan J), 501 (McHugh J)
29 Wright J observed in Blazely v Whiley (1995) 5 Tas R 254, 277 that ‘[m]oral indignation at 
the plaintiffs shabby treatment of his younger relatives whilst assuming the guise of their 
benefactor does not enter into the equation’ as to how relief should be framed.
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by which the courts could take the unconscionable nature of the representor’s 
conduct into account in determining relief.30
II. COMMON LAW ESTOPPEL
To the extent that common law estoppel can be said to provide a remedy, it is 
clearly an expectation-based remedy that is provided. While both detrimental 
reliance and unfair conduct are required to establish an estoppel at common law, 
the effect of such an estoppel is not determined by reference to the detriment 
suffered in reliance on the relevant assumption, and nor is it concerned with 
notions of unconscionability.31 According to Brennan J in Waltons Stores, ‘the 
effect of an estoppel in pais ... is to establish the state of affairs by reference to 
which the legal relationship between [the parties] is to be established.’32 As 
discussed in Chapter 1, when common law estoppel is applied in relation to 
assumptions of existing legal rights, its effect is to prevent the representor from 
denying the existence of those rights.
Although the avoidance of detriment has for some time been seen as the ‘basal 
purpose’ of the common law doctrine of estoppel,33 the remedy provided by the 
doctrine is less than precise in its fulfilment of that purpose. Common law 
estoppel operates to avoid detriment by preventing the estopped party from 
departing from the relevant assumption, or by compelling that party to adhere to 
it.34 As Dawson J made clear in Verwayen,35 it is for historical, rather than
30 It should be noted that, since Verwayen, at least two commentators have suggested that the 
reprehensibility of the representor’s conduct should be taken into account in determining relief. 
Alec Leopold, ‘Estoppel: A Practical Appraisal of Recent Developments’ (1991) 7 Australian 
Bar Review 47, 59 has suggested that a more extensive remedy should be given in cases of 
‘extreme unconscionability’, such as where the encouragement offered by the representor is 
extensive and of lengthy duration. MJ Tilbury, Civil Remedies (vol 2, 1993) 277 has also 
suggested that generally a plaintiff will be unlikely to be limited to the recovery of reliance loss 
where the defendant has positively encouraged the plaintiffs reliance.
31 A common law estoppel will, however, usually have the effect of protecting the representee’s 
reliance interest and could be said to purge the representor’s conscience.
32 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 414.
33 Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641, 674 (Dixon J).
34 Ibid.
35 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 453-4. See also Mark Lunney, ‘Towards a Unified Estoppel—The Long 
and Winding Road’ [1992] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 239, 241-2.
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practical, reasons that the aim of common law estoppel has been pursued by the 
‘crude expedient’36 of fulfilling the relevant assumption. The ‘basal purpose’ 
identified by Dixon J could, of course, be fulfilled more precisely by providing a 
remedy which serves only to prevent or reverse the detriment suffered by the 
representee.
Mark Lunney has suggested that the result of the ‘all or nothing’37 nature of 
common law estoppel is that ‘the party misled may recover more than the actual 
loss suffered by that party.’38 That argument assumes, however, that ‘actual loss’ 
is limited to reliance loss and does not include the loss of an expectation. The 
remedy provided by common law estoppel simply protects the representee against 
expectation loss as well as reliance loss. The loss of an expectation is no less 
‘actual’ in the case of estoppel than in the case of a breach of contract, although, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 8, the policy reasons for protecting against 
expectation loss are far weaker in estoppel cases than in contract cases.
In Avon County Council v Howiett,39 the English Court of Appeal gave some 
consideration to the question whether there is any flexibility available to a court 
giving effect to an estoppel at common law. The case was discussed in Chapter 1 
to illustrate the difference between the effects of common law and equitable 
estoppel. It will be recalled that the plaintiff council paid wages to the defendant, 
its employee, to which the defendant was not entitled. In response to the 
defendant’s inquiries about the payments, the plaintiff made representations 
which led the defendant to believe that he was entitled to treat the money as his 
own. On the faith of that belief, the defendant expended some of the money on 
things he would not otherwise have bought, and omitted to claim social security 
benefits to which he would have been entitled. The trial judge admitted evidence 
which satisfied him that the defendant had spent all of the money but, at the 
request of the parties, decided the case on the facts pleaded by the defendant,
36 Finn, above n 23, 91.
37 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 454 (Dawson J).
38 Lunney, above n 35, 241, citing Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd [ 1932] 1 KB 371 and Avon 
County Council v Howlett [1983] 1 All ER 1073.
39 [1983] 1 A11ER 1073.
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which revealed a change of position equivalent in value to only half of the 
plaintiffs claim.40 The trial judge held that the plaintiffs claim to recover the 
moneys was barred only to the extent of the sum spent and the benefits forgone. 
The effect of the estoppel was not, therefore, to hold the representee to the 
represented state of affairs, but simply to prevent the representee from suffering 
detriment as a result of his reliance on the representor’s conduct.
The defendant appealed from that decision in order to have the Court of Appeal 
consider the hypothetical question whether an estoppel at common law can 
operate pro tanto, rather than on an all or nothing basis. The notion that an 
estoppel at common law could operate pro tanto is clearly inconsistent with 
suggestions that common law estoppel is simply an evidentiary principle, which 
operates to hold the representee to the represented state of affairs.41 As discussed 
in Chapter 1, a doctrine of estoppel that operates in a flexible way, and requires a 
court to fashion a remedy to suit the circumstances of the case, must logically be 
regarded as a source of substantive rights.
Cumming-Bruce LJ allowed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge should not 
have acceded to the parties’ request that the case be decided on a hypothetical 
basis, and should have found for the defendant on the facts as proved 42 He 
refused to consider the hypothetical question. Slade and Eveleigh LJJ were 
prepared to consider the question, however, and held that once the defendant had 
shown detriment resulting from reliance on the representation, the plaintiff was 
prevented from asserting its entitlement to the money. Accordingly, the estoppel 
operated to bar the whole of the plaintiffs claim 43 This was, according to Slade 
LJ, a consequence of the fact that estoppel by representation was merely a rule of 
evidence, which operated to prevent the representor from asserting facts contrary
40 The case was evidently being run as a test case, in order to determine the rights of the parties 
where overpaid wages had been partially spent.
41 See, eg: Seton, Laing, & Co v Lafone (1887) 19 QBD 68, 70 (Lord Esher MR); Low v 
Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch 82, 101 (Lindley LJ); Re Ottos Kopje Diamond Mines Ltd [1893] 1 Ch 
618, 628 (Bowen LJ).
42 [1983] 1 All ER 1073, 1076.
43 Ibid 1078 (Eveleigh LJ).
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to those represented.44 In the course of his judgment, Slade LJ adverted to the 
problem that might arise in a case where the sum sought to be recovered by the 
representor was so large as to bear no relation to the detriment suffered by the 
representee. Slade LJ specifically left open the question whether the court would 
have jurisdiction in those circumstances to exact an undertaking from the 
representee that he or she would return to the representor any moneys remaining 
in the hands of the representee 45
It is difficult to conceive of any basis on which the court could require such an 
undertaking as a condition of giving effect to a principle of the common law, 
particularly a principle which has a limited preclusionary operation, and which is 
often described as evidentiary.46 While a court of equity can require that a party 
seeking the court’s assistance ‘does equity’ as a condition of granting relief,47 
no analogous principle operates at common law. This was confirmed by the 
Full Court of the Federal Court in obiter dictum in S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v 
Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd:
The price of equitable relief may be the imposition of terms upon the
successful party, on the footing that because it seeks equity it must be
44 Ibid 1087.
45 Ibid 1089. Such an undertaking was voluntarily offered by a representee seeking to assert an 
estoppel as a defence to a restitutionary claim in RE Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow Ltd [1926] 
AC 670. In a dissenting judgment in the House of Lords, Viscount Cave LC appeared to regard 
such an undertaking as a necessary precondition to allowing the estoppel to be asserted. Sir 
Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, The Law o f Restitution (2nd ed, 1978) 556 also suggested that 
such an undertaking may be required, but offered no basis in principle for requiring it. In the 
current edition of their work (4th ed, 1993) 750, Goff and Jones describe as ‘regrettable’ the 
position taken by the Court of Appeal in Avon County Council v Howlett that estoppel should 
be regarded as a rule of evidence. They observe, however, that the fact that the court left open 
the question whether an undertaking could be exacted ‘destroys the credibility of the principle 
that an estoppel cannot operate pro tanto' (ibid 750, n 64). Elizabeth Cooke, ‘Estoppel and the 
Protection of Expectations’ (1997) 17 Legal Studies 258, 275 suggests that ‘in extreme cases it 
is unrealistic to suppose that the court would not find itself able to order partial restitution’ but 
also provides no basis in principle on which the court could make such an order.
46 As discussed in Chapter 1, although common law estoppel is often described as evidentiary, it is 
not accurate to do so when the doctrine is applied in relation to assumptions of existing rights.
47 Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102, 115-6 (Deane, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
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prepared to do equity. There is no comparable common law precept of 
such wide application.48
The innate lack of flexibility of common law estoppel in this regard has been 
accepted by the High Court of Australia in a number of cases. In David Securities 
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, in a judgment which recognised a 
reliance-based change of position defence to restitutionary claims, the Court 
referred to the ‘inflexibility of the related doctrine of estoppel, as evidenced by 
Avon CC v Howlett where the Court of Appeal held that estoppel could not 
operate pro tanto . ’49 This aspect of common law estoppel was also accepted in 
Waltons Stores50 and Verwayen,51 although those members of the High Court 
who accepted the existence of a unified estoppel in the latter case regarded such 
an doctrine as having a more sophisticated approach to relief.52 The clearest 
acknowledgment of a lack of flexibility in the common law doctrine is to be 
found in the judgment of Mason CJ in Verwayen:
Being an evidentiary principle, estoppel by conduct achieved, and could 
only achieve, the object of avoiding the detriment which would be 
suffered by another in the event of departure from the assumed state of 
affairs by holding the party estopped to that state of affairs. The rights
48 (1994) 122 ALR 637, 653 (Neaves, Gummow and Higgins JJ).
49 (1992) 175 CLR 353, 385 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
50 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 398 (Mason CJ and Wilson J indicated that the effect of a common 
law estoppel was that ‘a party is required to abide by an assumption made by the other’), 414 
(Brennan J: ‘The effect of an estoppel in pais is not to create a right in one party against the 
other; it is to establish the state of affairs by reference to which the legal relationship between 
them is ascertained’), 444-5 (Deane J: an estoppel by conduct ‘operates negatively to preclude 
the denial of, or a departure from the assumed or promised state of affairs’), 458 (Gaudron J 
‘Common law or evidentiary estoppel compels adherence to an assumption of fact by denying 
the person estopped the right to assert a contrary matter of fact’).
51 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 411 (Mason CJ), 422 (Brennan J: ‘Estoppel by representation of a fact 
... precludes a [representor] from asserting a right inconsistent with the fact on which the other 
party acted’), 454 (Dawson J: ‘The result of an estoppel at common law was ... to preclude the 
party estopped from denying the assumption upon which the other party acted to his 
detriment.’), 501 (McHugh J: ‘because the common law doctrine of estoppel in pais is a rule of 
evidence, it operates to preclude the party estopped from denying the assumption of fact 
whenever it is necessary to do so for the purpose of determining the rights of the parties’).
52 Ibid 415-6 (Mason CJ), 441-3 (Deane J), 487 (Gaudron J). The relief provided to give effect 
to a unified doctrine will be considered in Part IV of this Chapter.
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of the parties were ascertained and declared by reference to that state of 
affairs.53
The lack of flexibility in common law estoppel is clearly a weakness of the 
doctrine, and provides a compelling argument for the acceptance of a substantive 
unified doctrine which provides more flexible relief,54 or alternatively the 
extension of the substantive doctrine of equitable estoppel to representations of 
existing fact. More importantly in the context of this thesis, the preclusionary 
effect of the common law doctrine means that it does not operate strictly in 
accordance with its ‘basal purpose’55 of preventing detriment resulting from 
reliance on the conduct of others. Although the purpose of preventing detriment 
may be fulfilled, it is fulfilled by the oblique means of making good the 
assumption of fact adopted by the representee. The effect of the common law 
doctrine is most consistent with a fundamental concern with the enforcement of 
promises, since its effect is to fulfil the representee’s expectations in every case. 
The representee’s expectation interest is given primacy, while the reliance interest 
is protected only incidentally.
III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
In giving effect to an equitable estoppel, a court exercises a wide discretion as 
to the nature of the relief to be granted.56 The present discussion is concerned 
with the considerations that guide a court of equity in exercising that discretion. 
The courts have traditionally been reluctant to articulate those considerations, 
although a number of judgments in recent years have started to explore them in 
more detail. In Australia, that trend has culminated in the High Court’s 
articulation in Verwayen of a reliance-based approach to the determination of
53 Ibid 411 (emphasis added).
54 This idea is implicit in the advocacy of a unified estoppel by Mason CJ in Verwayen, ibid 
410-3 and by Lunney, above n 35.
55 Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641, 674 (Dixon J).
56 Members of the High Court in Verwayen were unanimous in recognising the flexibility of the 
equitable doctrine in this regard: (1990) 170 CLR 394, 411-2 (Mason CJ), 429 (Brennan J),
439 & 442 (Deane J), 444 (Dawson J), 475 (Toohey J), 487 (Gaudron J), 501 (McHugh J).
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relief. The following discussion of equitable estoppel remedies will examine 
the development of the reliance-based approach to relief, and the way in which 
it has been implemented since the Venvayen decision. The historical section 
will trace the development of the approach to relief from an original concern 
with the fulfilment of expectations, to a concern with satisfying equities, then 
to a concern with ‘minimum equities’, which ultimately led to the adoption of a 
reliance-based approach in Venvayen. Against that background, an examination 
of the approach to relief in the post -Venvayen cases can be undertaken.
A. History of the Reliance-Based Approach 
1. The Proprietary Estoppel Cases
The proprietary estoppel cases cause considerable difficulty to anyone 
attempting to reconcile the various ways in which equitable estoppel remedies 
have been determined. Proprietary estoppel has a long history and the basis on 
which relief has been determined has rarely been clearly enunciated. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to trace the development of the minimum equity 
principle through the proprietary estoppel cases over the last 100 years. The 
analysis of those cases below shows that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 
was originally concerned with the fulfilment of expectations. That was at least 
partly a result of the confusion discussed in Chapter 1 as to the distinction 
between the developing doctrine of proprietary estoppel, the enforcement of 
contractual promises and the making good of representations of fact through 
estoppel in pais. The move towards a concern with fulfilment of equities, and 
towards flexibility in the fulfilment of an equity, began in cases where the 
representee’s assumptions or expectations were uncertain, and so expectation 
relief could not easily be granted.
It should be noted that the word ‘equity’ in this context is used to describe the 
right of a representee to obtain equitable relief against a representor, the
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determination of which is within the court’s discretion.57 Marcia Neave and 
Mark Weinberg have described the equity arising by way of estoppel as an 
‘undefined equity’ on the basis that, where an equitable estoppel arises, the 
representee cannot assert a right to a particular remedy, but must persuade the 
court to fashion a remedy on the facts of the particular case.58 Similarly, in 
Pilling v Armitage the Master of the Rolls regarded facts which would today 
found a proprietary estoppel as giving rise to a ‘general equity’, rather than a 
specific one.59
Although proprietary estoppel was described in the early cases as ‘an equity’ 
raised by the facts,60 the concept of satisfying such an equity by means other 
than expectation relief first arose in cases where there was no clear promise 
which could be enforced, and it was not clear what interest the representee 
assumed he or she had or would receive. The concern with satisfying equities 
was then adopted in cases where the representee’s expectations were clear. The 
focus on the fulfilment of equities led, in turn, to the development of the 
minimum equity principle, which required the courts to grant a remedy which 
was the minimum necessary to satisfy the equity raised in favour of the 
representee.61
(a) Expectation-based relief
As two commentators have recently noted, in most of the nineteenth century 
cases and, indeed, several of the twentieth century cases, the equity raised by 
proprietary estoppel was simply treated as a basis for enforcing a gratuitous
57 Marcia Neave and Mark Weinberg ‘The Nature and Function of Equities’ (Part 1) (1978) 6 
University o f Tasmania Law Review 24, 24. See also Diane Skapinker ‘Equitable interests, 
mere equities, “personal” equities and “personal equities” - distinctions with a difference’
(1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 593.
58 Neave and Weinberg, above n 57, 27.
59 (1805) 12 Ves Jnr 79; 33 ER 31, 33.
60 Pilling v Armitage, ibid; The Duke of Beaufort v Patrick (1853) 17 Beav 60; 51 ER 954,
959.
61 The shift in the courts’ approach from expectations to equities was noted in 1985 by Finn, 
above n 23, 68, but since he was writing some years before the articulation of a reliance-based 
approach to relief, he was not able to trace the development of that approach. It is, therefore, 
worth revisiting the early cases to do so.
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promise or fulfilling a relied-upon expectation.62 The decision of Lord 
Westbury LC in Dillwyn v Llewelyn provides a good example of that 
approach.63 The plaintiffs father offered to give the plaintiff a farm so that the 
plaintiff could build a house on the farm and live near his father. The plaintiff 
accepted the offer, and the father signed a memorandum ‘presenting’ the farm 
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then took possession of the farm and expended a 
large sum of money in building a house on it. The land was not conveyed to the 
plaintiff and, on the father’s death, passed under his will to others.
In those circumstances, the Master of the Rolls declared that the plaintiff was 
entitled to a life-estate in the land. On appeal, the Lord Chancellor held that 
‘the son’s expenditure on the faith of the memorandum supplied a valuable 
consideration and created a binding obligation’ on the father to transfer the fee 
simple to the son in accordance with the memorandum.64 The effect of the 
estoppel was, therefore, to render the promise enforceable. Indeed, Lord 
Westbury LC suggested that the case was analogous to that of a verbal 
agreement which became binding by virtue of subsequent part performance.65 
Despite that analogy, the Lord Chancellor held that the extent of the plaintiff’s 
interest in the land depended, not on the terms of the memorandum, but on the 
acts done by the plaintiff.66
Lord Kingsdown adopted a similar approach to relief in his dissenting speech in 
Ramsden v Dyson.67 He maintained that where a person expends money on the 
faith of a promised or expected interest in land then ‘a Court of equity will
62 Finn, ibid 90-1; Patrick Parkinson, ‘Equitable Estoppel: Developments after Waltons Stores 
(Interstate) Ltd v Maher’ (1990) 3 Journal o f Contract Law 50, 60.
63 (1862) 4 De G F & J517 ;45  ER 1285.
64 Ibid 1287.
65 Ibid 1286.
66 Ibid 1286-7. It should be noted that, having said that the extent of the plaintiffs interest did 
not depend on the terms of the memorandum, the Lord Chancellor did say that the language of 
the memorandum was relevant in so far as it ‘shews the purpose and intent of the gift’. Lord 
Westbury held that on its proper construction the memorandum made it clear that the intention 
of the representor was to vest absolute ownership in the representee, rather than a lesser estate 
such as a life interest.
67 (1866) LR 1 HL 129.
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compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation. ’68 Lord 
Cranworth also appeared to regard the doctrine of acquiescence as justifying 
the granting of relief which fulfils the representee’s expectations. He observed 
that where the owner of land stands by while another person mistakenly 
improves his or her land, knowing of the mistake, then a court of equity will 
not allow the owner to assert his or her title to that land.69
In Hamilton v Geraghty, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales applied the Ramsden v Dyson doctrine of acquiescence to dismiss a 
demurrer, and made some observations in passing as to the effect of the 
doctrine.70 The plaintiff in that case sought a declaration that the defendant’s 
land was chargeable with the amount the plaintiff expended on it. The 
expenditure was made under a mistaken belief as to the ownership of the land, 
while the defendant stood by with knowledge of the mistake. Darley CJ 
expressed the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that the 
land belonged to him, which was greater relief than he had sought.71 Owen J 
expressed no clear view as to the effect of the doctrine.72 Interestingly, 
however, Walker J thought that a reliance-based remedy was more appropriate. 
He said that the estate created by the expenditure would not necessarily be 
equal to the whole estate of the person standing by: rather it would ‘be co­
extensive with the amount of expenditure; that is to say, a charge or lien to that 
extent.’73 Although Justice Walker’s comments were made by way of obiter 
dicta in a short judgement, they are significant because they provide a rare
68 Ibid 170.
69 Ibid 140-1. Neither the speech of Lord Cranworth LC nor that of Lord Kingsdown supports 
the distinction drawn by RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and 
Remedies (3rd ed, 1992) 429 between cases of promised gifts of land (such as Dillwyn v 
Llewelyn), which give rise to a right to expectation relief, and cases of mere acquiescence in 
mistaken improvements, in which the representee is only entitled to a charge or lien over the 
land in order to ‘strip any profit’ made by the representor.
70 (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (Eq) 81.
71 Ibid 88.
72 Ibid 88-90.
73 Ibid 91.
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example of an attempt to articulate a principled basis for the determination of 
relief by which to give effect to proprietary estoppel.74
When an expectation-based approach is taken to relief in proprietary estoppel, 
the operation of the doctrine is closely analogous to the operation of common 
law estoppel or the enforcement of a contract. Proprietary estoppel resembles 
common law estoppel when representations as to existing rights are made good, 
and resembles contract when promises are enforced by the granting of 
expectation relief. As discussed in Chapter 1, there was clearly confusion in the 
early cases as to whether the basis of the jurisdiction was contract, estoppel or 
an equitable doctrine which was separate from both. The preference for 
expectation relief in the early proprietary estoppel cases may well be 
attributable to that confusion.
(b) Uncertain expectations
The expectation-based approach applied in the early proprietary estoppel cases 
caused difficulties in those cases where there was uncertainty as to the nature of 
the promised or expected interest in the subject land. The court could not 
simply fulfil a representee’s expectations, for example, where the representee 
had acted on an assumption that the subject land would one day be theirs or that 
they would be entitled to remain on the land indefinitely. Two quite different 
approaches have been adopted by the courts to deal with the situation of an 
uncertain expectation. The first is to grant reliance-based relief; that is, relief 
which reverses the detriment suffered by the representee in reliance on the 
relevant promise or representation.75 The second approach is to grant relief
74 The quoted passage of Justice Walker’s judgment was applied by the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Re Whitehead [1949] NZLR 1066, where precisely the remedy contemplated by 
Walker J was granted. The representee in Re Whitehead had incurred expenditure in 
constructing a cottage on his father’s land on the assumption, encouraged by his father, that the 
land was his. The representee was held to have acquired a lien or charge over the land to the 
extent of his expenditure.
75 A similar approach was articulated by the Privy Council in Chalmers v Pardoe [1963] 1 
WLR 677, 681-2. The Judicial Committee said in obiter dicta that where the owner of land has 
encouraged expenditure on the faith of an assurance or promise that part of the land would be 
made over to the person expending the money, a court of equity will prima facie require the 
owner to make a conveyance of that land. Where such a conveyance cannot be made, for
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which, in the court’s view, best accommodates the representee’s uncertain 
expectations or, in other words, best satisfies the equity arising in favour of the 
representee.
(i) Reliance-based relief
In Ramsden v Dyson, Lord Kingsdown contemplated the granting of a reliance- 
based remedy in situations where the promised or expected interest was 
uncertain.76 Although he stated the general rule of proprietary estoppel in terms 
of the court fulfilling the relevant promise or expectation,77 Lord Kingsdown 
went on to say that if there is uncertainty as to the particular terms of the 
contract, then a court of equity would grant relief ‘either in the form of a 
specific interest in the land, or in the shape of compensation for the 
expenditure’ .78 He did not explain why the personal remedy of compensation 
for expenditure should be granted in some cases, while the proprietary, and 
potentially more extensive, remedy of a specific interest should be granted in 
others.
A reliance-based remedy was granted by Sir John Romilly MR to give effect to 
a proprietary estoppel in The Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking Association v 
King.19 Mr King allowed his sons to erect certain buildings on land that he 
intended to transfer to them at some time in the future. On that basis, the 
Master of the Rolls held that the father could not have retaken possession of the 
land ‘without allowing to his sons the amount of money they had laid out on it’, 
and he therefore held that ‘the money laid out by the sons was a lien and charge 
upon it, as against the father. ’80 The effect of granting the lien was to reverse 
the detriment the sons had suffered in reliance on the assumption that they 
would be granted a proprietary interest in the land in the future. The Master of
reasons of title for example, then the court may declare the person expending the money 
entitled to an equitable charge or lien for the amount so expended.
76 (1866) LR 1 HL 129, 171.
77 Ibid 170.
78 Ibid 171.
79 (1858) 25 Beav 72; 53 ER 563 ( ‘Unity Bank v King').
80 Ibid 565.
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the Rolls did not indicate why he granted a reliance-based remedy, but there 
was uncertainty as to the nature of the expectation: it was not clear what 
interest would be granted to the sons, or when it would be granted to them.
That decision was relied upon by Cox J of the South Australian Supreme Court 
in a dissenting judgment in Jackson v Crosby (No 2).81 The respondent in that 
case built a house on land owned by the appellant in the expectation that they 
would be married and the respondent would live with the appellant in the 
house. When the relationship broke down, the respondent was held to be 
entitled to relief on the basis of proprietary estoppel. The trial judge found the 
terms of the agreement between the parties to be sufficiently certain that it 
could be concluded that the respondent was to receive a half interest in the 
property, and accordingly he was held to be entitled to such an interest. At his 
request the respondent was granted damages in lieu of such proprietary relief.82 
On appeal, that determination of relief was upheld by a majority of the Full 
Court.83
The third member of the Full Court, Cox J, considered that the case was not 
one of the Dillwyn v Llewelyn kind, where there was a complete agreement 
between the parties, and so that form of remedy was inappropriate.84 Since 
there was no agreement as to the basis upon which a joint interest in the 
property would be transferred to the respondent, the proper order was ‘a 
declaration or award in favour of the respondent reflecting the respondent’s 
expenditure of labour and skill upon the house’.85 Cox J said that in a suitable 
case relief could be assessed as compensation for the value of the work done by 
the representee.86
81 (1979) 21 SASR280.
82 Ibid 288 (Bright J).
83 Ibid 302 (Zelling J), 310 (Mohr J).
84 Ibid 307.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid, citing Unity; Bank v King as an example of a case in which such relief had been granted.
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The approach of Cox J seemed to be that expectancy relief was only to be 
granted where there was a complete agreement between the parties. Where 
there was a clear agreement that a particular interest would be transferred to the 
representee then, as in Dillwyn v Llewelyn, the appropriate relief was to order 
the representor to transfer that interest to the representee. Where there was no 
clear agreement and, therefore, no clear expectation which could be fulfilled, 
the court should grant reliance-based relief by way of compensation or a lien 
for the value of work done by the representee.87
(ii) Satisfying the equity
A lack of certainty in the representee’s expectation did not, however, lead the 
Privy Council to grant a reliance-based remedy in Plimmer v Wellington 
Corporation.88 The appellants in Plimmer had incurred considerable 
expenditure on improvements to crown land, in circumstances creating a 
reasonable expectation that their occupation would not be disturbed. They 
could not, however, point to any specific promise or expectation of an interest 
in the land. Sir Arthur Hobhouse, giving judgment on behalf of the Privy 
Council, observed that there had been a difference of opinion amongst great 
judges as to the nature of the relief to be granted in such cases, but there was no 
doubt that relief would be granted, ‘either in the form of a specific interest in 
the land, or in the shape of compensation for the expenditure’ .89 The Privy 
Council held that ‘the court must look at the circumstances in each case to 
decide in what way the equity can be satisfied. ’90 Their Lordships explained 
the remedies granted in The Duke of Beaufort v Patrick,91 Dillwyn v Llewelyn 
and Unity Bank v King, on the basis that, in each case, the remedy granted
87 It should be noted that reliance-based relief has also been granted in cases where the 
expectancy could not be fulfilled for reasons of title or because of supervening events:
Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 68, 428. See also Chalmers v Pardoe [1963] 1 WLR 
677, 681-2, discussed above n 75. An example is provided by Morris v Morris [1982] 1 
NSWLR 61, where the representee was granted an equitable charge over the subject property in 
circumstances where his expectation of an indefinite right of residence in the property could not 
be fulfilled because of a breakdown in the relationship between the parties.
88 (1884) 9 App Cas 699 (‘Plimmer').
89 Ibid 710-1.
90 Ibid 714.
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satisfied the equity raised.92 The Privy Council did not explain, however, how 
the equity differed from case to case or how the circumstances of each case 
helped to determine the most appropriate way in which to satisfy the equity. In 
Plimmer itself, the equity was satisfied by granting to the appellants a perpetual 
licence to use the subject property.
The Plimmer approach has been followed in a number of cases in which 
representees’ expectations have been uncertain.93 The approach also came to be 
applied in cases where the expectations were clear, such as ER Ives Investments 
Ltd v High,94 where the English Court of Appeal found that fulfilment of the 
defendant’s expectations, by the grant of a perpetual right of access, was the 
only way in which the equity could be satisfied. The decision in Plimmer can, 
therefore, be seen as an important staging post in the development of the 
minimum equity principle. Although the judgment did not provide any 
framework for determining relief, it did recognise the fact that the court was 
faced with alternatives in the granting of relief, and was afforded a wide 
discretion in satisfying the equity in each case.
2. Development of the Minimum Equity Approach
Prior to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Crabb v Arun District 
Council, 95 the court’s purpose in determining relief, following Plimmer and 
Inwards v Baker, was simply to fashion a remedy to fit the circumstances of 
each case. In most cases, that simply meant granting the interest the representee 
expected to receive. In Crabb v Arun District Council, Scarman LJ introduced 
the concept of the ‘minimum equity’. Scarman LJ observed that it was well 
settled law that:
91 (1853) 17 Beav 60; 51 ER 954.
92 (1884) 9 App Cas 699, 713-4.
93 Notably Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29; Holiday Inns v Broadhead (1974) 232 EG 951; 
Riches v Hogben (1986) 1 Qd R 315, 327 (Macrossan J); Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve 
Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 604-16 (Priestley JA, dissenting).
94 [1967] 2 QB 379.
95 [1976] 1 Ch 179.
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the court, having analysed and assessed the conduct and relationship of 
the parties, has to answer three questions. First, is there an equity 
established? Secondly, what is the extent of the equity, if one is 
established? And, thirdly, what is the relief appropriate to satisfy the 
equity? 96
Having established that an equity arose in favour of the plaintiff in the 
circumstances, Scarman LJ said that he ‘would analyse the minimum equity to 
do justice to the plaintiff as a right either to an easement or to a licence upon 
terms to be agreed’ .97 The reference to the ‘minimum equity’ could be 
construed as a reference to the minimum relief necessary to prevent the 
representee suffering detriment as a result of his or her reliance,98 or as the 
minimum relief necessary to fulfil the representee’s expectations (such as 
declaring the representee to be entitled to a right of way over the representee’s 
land, rather than a conveyance of the fee simple) .99
The concept of a ‘minimum equity’ approach to relief was taken up by the 
Court of Appeal in Pascoe v Turner. 100 The case was concerned with a 
dwelling house owned by the plaintiff. The defendant lived with the plaintiff in 
his house for several years until the plaintiff terminated the relationship and 
went to live elsewhere. The defendant continued to live in the house, was later 
told by the plaintiff that the house and its contents were hers, and subsequently 
expended a sum of money on repairs, improvements and redecorations to the 
house. Having established that, on those facts, an equity arose in favour of the 
defendant, the Court of Appeal discussed the question whether the equity 
should be satisfied by granting a licence to the defendant to occupy the house
96 Ibid 192-3.
97 Ibid 198 (emphasis added).
98 The expression was construed in this way in 1982 by JD Heydon, WMC Gummow and RP 
Austin, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (2nd ed, 1982) 307 and subsequently by 
Brennan J in Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387, 423-7 and Priestley JA in Silovi Pty Ltd v 
Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, 472.
99 It should be noted that, on the facts of Crabb, the detriment suffered by the representee as a 
result of his reliance on the representation probably exceeded the value of the expectation, 
justifying the grant of expectation relief even on a reliance-based approach: JD Heydon and PL 
Loughlan, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (5th ed, 1997) 398.
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for her lifetime, or whether there should be a transfer to her of the fee simple. 
Ultimately, the court determined that the only way to give effect to the 
defendant’s equity was ‘by compelling the plaintiff to give effect to his promise 
and her expectations’ by conveying the fee simple to her. 101
Since Pascoe v Turner, the English courts have not attempted to define the 
minimum equity concept any further. Although one English commentator has 
suggested that ‘[t]he doctrine of proprietary estoppel is traditionally understood 
to give rise to a reliance-based remedy, rather than an expectation based 
one’ , 102 the minimum equity concept has not been interpreted in that way in the 
English courts. 103 Indeed, it seems the minimum equity concept itself is not 
uniformly applied by the English courts in the determination of equitable 
estoppel remedies. In Way ling v Jones, 104 the Court of Appeal granted 
expectation relief to give effect to proprietary estoppel, without raising any 
question of what was the equity or minimum equity raised by the representor’s
100 [1979] 2 All ER 945.
101 Ibid 951 (Cumming-Bruce LJ, giving judgment for the Court of Appeal).
102 Christine Davis, ‘Estoppel— Reliance and Remedy’ [1995] The Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 409, 415. A similar claim has been made by PS Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises, and the 
Law of Obligations’ in Essays on Contract (1986) 10, 55-6. RD Oughten, ‘Proprietary 
Estoppel: A Principled Remedy’ (1979) 129 New Law Journal 1193, on the other hand, has 
argued that relief in the English cases should be based on protecting the representee’s reliance 
interest, but often is not. He criticises decisions such as Pascoe v Turner in which expectations 
have been fulfilled despite minimal reliance.
103 Roger Smith, ‘How Proprietary is Proprietary Estoppel?’ in FD Rose (ed), Consensus Ad 
Idem (1996) 235, 240 in fact argues that the objective pursued by the English courts in 
proprietary estoppel cases is fulfilment of the expectation, and ‘we can predict that expectations 
will, in a normal case, be recognised as the most appropriate remedy.’ It is interesting to note, 
however, that in Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P & CR 196, 208, 208, Hobhouse LJ applied 
Chief Justice Mason’s statement in Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 413 that 
there must be proportionality between the remedy and the detriment. Hobhouse LJ interpreted 
this to mean ‘little more than that the end result must be a just one having regard to the 
assumption made by the party asserting the estoppel and the detriment which he has 
experienced’: (1996) 72 P & CR 196, 208, 209. This indication that a principled, reliance- 
based approach to relief may be adopted in England has been welcomed by at least one English 
commentator: Mark Pawlowski, ‘Proprietary Estoppel— Satisfying the Equity’ (1997) 113 Law 
Quarterly Review 232, 236-7.
104 (1995 ) 69 P & CR 170. The representee in Wayling v Jones cohabited with the representor. 
The representee acted as the representor’s chauffeur for many years in return for only pocket 
money and living expenses, on the faith of the representor’s promise that the representee would 
inherit a hotel owned by the representor. The hotel owned by the representor at the time of his 
death was not left to the representee. The Court of Appeal held that a proprietary estoppel arose 
in favour of the representee, which entitled him to the net sale proceeds of the hotel.
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conduct. 105 In Baker v Baker,106 on the other hand, all three members of the 
Court of Appeal referred with apparent approval to Lord Justice Scarman’s 
minimum equity principle, but did not see it as requiring the court to grant 
reliance-based relief.
B. Promissory Estoppel
From it origins in the famous statement of Lord Cairns LC in Hughes v 
Metropolitan Railway Company, promissory estoppel also had a preclusionary 
operation. 107 It prevented a person from enforcing contractual rights which a 
second person had been led to believe would not be enforced. 108 Lord Cairns’ 
statement assumed that the equitable principle operated in much the same way 
as common law estoppel, by holding a person to the supposition they had 
caused another person to adopt. In other words, the effect of the estoppel (as it 
later came to be known) was that, to the extent that the representee expected 
that the representor would not enforce certain rights, the representee’s 
expectations would be fulfilled.
When the decision of the House of Lords in Hughes was followed by the Court 
of Appeal in Birmingham & District Land Company v London & North
105 It should be noted, however, that the representee in Wayling v Jones had relied on the 
relevant assumption for a considerable period and suffered substantial and irreversible 
detriment as a result. Fulfilment of the representee’s expectations can be justified in such 
circumstances, even if one adopts a strict reliance-based approach to relief: see Verwayen 
(1990) 170 CLR 394, 416 (Mason CJ).
106 (1993 ) 25 HLR 408, 412 (Dillon LJ), 415 (Beldam LJ), 418 (Roch LJ). The plaintiff in 
Baker v Baker gave up his rented accommodation and contributed £33,950 towards the 
purchase by the defendants (his son and daughter in law) of a house, in the expectation that he 
would have a right to reside in a room in the house rent-free for the rest of his life. When the 
relationship between the parties broke down, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to 
compensation equal to the value of the promised rent-free accommodation.
107 (1877) 2 App Cas 439 ( ‘Hughes').
108 Ibid 448 (emphasis added):
[I]t is the first principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed, that if parties who 
have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results - certain 
penalties or legal forfeiture - afterwards by their own act or with their own consent 
enter upon a course of negotiations which has the effect of leading one of the parties to 
suppose that the strict rights arising under the contract will not be enforced, or will be 
kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who otherwise might have enforced 
those rights will not be allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable having 
regard to the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties.
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Western Railway Company,109 it again had the effect that the representor was 
prevented from departing from the relevant assumption. Bowen LJ stated the 
relevant principle in broader terms than Lord Cairns, and with a slightly 
different approach to relief: a person who had led another to believe that certain 
contractual rights would not be enforced for a particular time could not enforce 
them until that time had elapsed, ‘without at all events placing the parties in the 
same position as they were before. ’ 110 Lord Justice Bowen’s reference to 
‘placing the parties in the same position as they were before’ seems to point to 
an obligation on the part of the representor to make good any detriment 
suffered as a result of the induced belief. It is not clear, however, whether his 
Lordship intended that a court would grant relief having that effect, or whether 
he simply intended that a representor could avoid an estoppel arising by taking 
steps which had that effect. * 111
When the doctrine of promissory estoppel was ‘established, or revived’ 112 by 
Denning J in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd, 113 
the principle he enunciated operated by holding parties to the promises they had 
made that certain rights would not be enforced. Once the estoppel was raised, 
the court was to give effect to it by means of expectation relief, without 
reference to the detriment suffered by the promisee as a result of reliance on the 
promise. His Lordship held that ‘a promise intended to be binding, intended to 
be acted upon and in fact acted upon, is binding so far as its terms properly 
apply’ . 114 That doctrine, of course, had a limited operation: it only applied to a 
promise not to enforce existing legal rights, and did not ‘go so far as to give a 
cause of action in damages for breach of such a promise’, but operated
109 (18 8 8 ) 40 Ch D 268.
110 Ibid 286 (emphasis added).
111 The latter approach was applied by Drummond J in Re Neal; ex parte Neal v Duncan 
Properties Pty Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 659, discussed below, text accompanying nn 203-205.
112 NC Seddon and MP Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law o f Contract (7th Aust ed, 1997) 
58.
113 [1947] 1 KB 130.
114 Ibid 136.
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defensively to prevent the party making the promise from acting inconsistently 
with it. 115
In Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd, 116 the House 
of Lords qualified the principle of promissory estoppel, emphasising the fact 
that its effect is not to extinguish rights, but only to suspend them. Thus, the 
representor can revert to his or her original position by giving reasonable notice 
to the representee of the representor’s intention to enforce his or her strict 
rights. Reasonable notice means sufficient notice to allow the representee to 
resume his or her original position, and the representor’s rights will be 
extinguished only if the representee cannot resume his or her original 
position. 117 Although Lord Denning subsequently indicated that the effect of 
promissory estoppel was permanent, 118 it is now well accepted that the effect of 
promissory estoppel is suspensory in all cases other than those in which the 
representee cannot resume his or her original position. 119
115 Ibid 134.
116 [19551 2 A11ER 657.
117 Ajayi v RT Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd [1964] 3 All ER 556, 559 (PC). An example is provided 
by Ogilvy v Hope-Davies [1976] 1 All ER 683, where the vendor of land indicated two weeks 
prior to the agreed completion date that he would not insist on completion on that date. Graham 
J held, ibid 689, that there was no question of reinstating the completion date ‘because the time 
was far too short.’
118 D & C Builders Ltd v Rees [1965] 3 All ER 837, 841.
119 The view was reiterated by the House of Lords in Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA 
v Shipping Corporation o f India Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391, 399, and is supported by 
leading commentators: George Spencer Bower and Sir Alexander Turner, The Law Relating to 
Estoppel by Representation (1977) 395-400; GH Treitel, The Law o f Contract (9th ed, 1995) 
106-7. Under the reliance-based approach to equitable estoppel adopted in Australia, the 
question of suspensory effect is subsumed by the focus on the detriment suffered by the 
representee. As discussed in Chapter 4, an estoppel will only arise in Australia where the 
representee will suffer detriment as a result of his or her reliance, if the representor is allowed 
to resile from the assumption induced by his or her conduct. As discussed below, the effect of 
an equitable estoppel in Australia is to raise an equity in favour of the representee, which the 
court must satisfy by granting relief designed to prevent or reverse any detriment resulting from 
reliance on the relevant assumption. Thus, where no detriment will be suffered by the 
representee if the representor reasserts his or her rights at a future date, the representor is free to 
do so, and no estoppel will arise. In a case where the representee has acted on the relevant 
assumption, the representor may effectively give notice to the representee of the representor’s 
intention to reassert his or her rights, and will be liable to ensure only that the representee does 
not suffer detriment as a result of past acts of reliance. See Forbes v Australian Yachting 
Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241, 289.
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That preclusionary approach to promissory estoppel was adopted and applied 
by the South Australian Supreme Court in Je Maintiendrai Pty Ltd v 
QuagliaJ20 Having determined that the respondent tenant had acted to his 
detriment in reliance on the appellant landlord’s representation that a reduced 
rent would be accepted, a majority of the court held that the landlord was 
‘estopped from claiming’ the difference. 121 The doctrine applied in Je 
Maintiendrai had an operation similar to that of common law estoppel when it 
is applied in relation to rights, rather than existing facts. There was no 
reference in the judgments to any flexibility available to the court in satisfying 
the equity. The effect of the estoppel was simply to prevent the promisor from 
acting inconsistently with the relevant promise.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel which Gibbs CJ and Murphy J would have 
upheld in their dissenting judgment in Legione v Hateley had a similar 
preclusionary operation, preventing the representors from asserting rights 
which they had represented would not be exercised. 122 It will be recalled that 
the purchasers in that case acted to their detriment, by failing to tender the 
purchase price within the time specified in the vendors’ notice of rescission, on 
the faith of a representation made on behalf of the vendors that an extension of 
time would be granted. Gibbs CJ and Murphy J held that ‘[t]he vendors were 
estopped from treating the contract as rescinded’, and would have granted 
specific performance to the purchasers. 123
C. Equitable Estoppel
Having considered the approach to relief in the early proprietary estoppel cases 
and the early promissory estoppel cases, the next step is to consider the 
approach taken to relief in those cases decided after the two doctrines were 
recognised as emanations of a unified equitable estoppel. As Mason CJ and
120 (1980) 26 SASR 101 {'Je Maintiendrai').
121 Ibid 116 (White J).
122 (1983) 152 CLR 406. Mason and Deane JJ described the operation of the doctrine in similar 
terms, ibid 432.
123 Ibid 423.
264
Wilson J noted in Waltons Stores, the Court of Appeal in Crabb v Arun District 
Council ‘treated promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel ... as mere facets 
of the same general principle’.124 That notion of a generic equitable estoppel 
appeared to be accepted by the House of Lords in its recent decision in Roebuck 
v Mungovin.125 In Australia, it was the High Court’s judgment in Waltons 
Stores which recognised the existence of a unified doctrine of equitable 
estoppel encompassing both proprietary estoppel and promissory estoppel.126
A consequence of the recognition of a unity of principle between promissory 
and proprietary estoppels was that the flexible ‘equities’ based approach to 
relief in the proprietary estoppel cases came to be applied in the promissory 
estoppel cases. Although promissory estoppel had previously had a purely 
preclusionary operation in Australia, the ‘minimum equity’ approach, which 
emerged from the judgment of Scarman LJ in Crabb v Arun District Council, 
was held in Waltons Stores to be applicable to all types of equitable estoppel. 
The adoption of the minimum equity principle in Waltons Stores and its 
refinement in Verwayen will be examined below.
Although the minimum equity principle has been interpreted by the Australian 
courts as requiring a reliance-based approach to remedy in equitable estoppel, 
the English courts do not seem to have moved beyond the flexible ‘minimum 
equity’ approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Pascoe v Turner. Finn 
observed in 1985 that, although it became the court’s function to divine the 
‘minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff, the judgments in Crabb v Arun 
District Council and Pascoe v Turner left unexplained the precise signification 
of the word ‘minimum’.127 Since Pascoe v Turner, however, the English courts 
have not treated the minimum equity concept as anything more than a guiding 
principle in the exercise of the court’s discretion and, indeed, have often
124 (19 8 8) 164 CLR 387, 403.
125 [1994] 2 AC 224.
126 Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, 472 (Priestley JA).
127 Finn, above n 23, 91.
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ignored it. 128 In its recent decision in Roebuck v Mungovin, the House of Lords 
held that ‘[i]f an equitable estoppel is raised the court’s function is to determine 
what, if anything, is necessary to satisfy the equity in all the circumstances of 
the case. ’ 129 Their Lordships did not refer to the ‘minimum equity’ concept and 
did not articulate the basis on which the court might determine what was 
necessary to satisfy the equity in a particular case.
1. The Approaches to Relief in Waltons Stores
Although the approach articulated by Scarman LJ in Crabb v Arun District 
Council was adopted by four members of the High Court in Waltons Stores, 130 
only Brennan J took the opportunity of exploring in detail the nature of the 
‘minimum equity’ identified by Scarman LJ. In fact, an examination of the 
judgments shows that very little consideration was given to identifying the 
minimum equity necessary to do justice to the representee in that case, 
presumably because that was not an issue argued before the court. It will be 
recalled that a majority of the High Court decided the case on the basis of 
equitable estoppel, having found that the relevant assumption adopted by the 
Mahers was that Waltons would enter into an agreement of lease. 131 The effect 
of the equitable estoppel that arose in Waltons Stores was essentially 
preclusionary: the estoppel effectively prevented Waltons from denying the 
existence of contractual rights which the Mahers were induced to believe they 
would have. 132
128 See, for example, Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1983] QB 
133 (Oliver J); Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498 (Edward Nugee QC) and Wayling v Jones 
(1995) 69 P & CR 170 (Court of Appeal).
129 [1994] 2 AC 224, 235.
130 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 404 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 425 (Brennan J), 460 (Gaudron J).
131 Ibid 397-8 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 417-8 (Brennan J); cf 439-40 (Deane J) and 458-60 
(Gaudron J), who held that the relevant assumption was that a binding agreement had been 
made.
132 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 408 (Mason CJ and Wilson J); cf 431-3 (Brennan J). The facts of the 
case were discussed in Chapter 3 above.
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Although Mason CJ and Wilson J cited with approval Lord Justice Scarman’s 
‘minimum equity’ approach to relief, 133 they did not discuss how best to satisfy 
the equity arising in favour of the Mahers. They simply held that Waltons was 
‘estopped in all the circumstances from retreating from its implied promise to 
complete the contract. ’ 134 In accordance with his interpretation of the facts, 
Deane J found that the estoppel which arose against Waltons precluded 
Waltons from ‘denying the existence of a binding contract’ and provided ‘the 
factual foundations for an ordinary action for enforcement of that 
“contract” . ’ 135 Similarly, Gaudron J found that Waltons was estopped from 
denying that exchange had taken place and, accordingly, the rights and 
liabilities of the parties were to be determined on the basis that it had in fact 
taken place. 136
Brennan J gave detailed consideration in his judgment to the object to be 
pursued by a court in giving effect to an equitable estoppel. Justice Brennan’s 
refinement of the concept of a ‘minimum equity’ marks a turning point in the 
development of equitable estoppel because he articulated, for the first time, a 
clearly reliance-based approach to the determination of relief. The equity 
created by estoppel is, he suggested, to be satisfied by the party estopped:
doing or abstaining from doing something in order to prevent detriment 
to the party raising the estoppel which that party would otherwise suffer 
by having acted or abstained from acting in reliance on the assumption 
or expectation which he has been induced to adopt. 137
Central to Justice Brennan’s approach to relief was the notion that equitable 
estoppel operates as a source of legal obligation, rather than operating, like 
common law estoppel, as a means of establishing a state of affairs by reference
133 Ibid 404.
134 Ibid 408.
135 Ibid 445.
136 Ibid 464.
137 Ibid 416.
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to which the legal relationship between the parties is to be established. 138 On 
that basis, the object of equitable estoppel is to prevent the detriment flowing 
from reliance on promises, rather than to enforce those promises, 139 and relief 
is determined accordingly. 140
Applying those principles to the facts, Brennan J found that an equity was 
raised against Waltons, which was to be satisfied by treating Waltons ‘as 
though it had done what it induced Mr Maher to expect that it would do, 
namely by treating Waltons as though it had executed and delivered the original 
lease. ’ 141 Brennan J went on to say that:
It would not be appropriate to order specific performance if only for the 
reason that the detriment can be avoided by compensation. The equity is 
fully satisfied by ordering damages in lieu of specific performance. 142
It is clear that the Mahers’ equity was fully satisfied by granting damages in 
lieu of specific performance, but one must ask whether an award of expectation 
damages143 represented the minimum equity. 144 Brennan J himself said that ‘the 
equity is to be satisfied by avoiding a detriment suffered in reliance on an 
induced assumption. ’ 145 The relevant detriment suffered by the Mahers was the 
wasted expenditure in demolishing the existing building and constructing the 
building required by Waltons, along with any diminution in the value of the 
land as a result of the demolition. It is possible that an award of compensation 
(representing the cost of the demolition and building works, and any
138 Ibid. Cf Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 439 & 443 (Deane J).
139 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 426.
140 Ibid 427.
141 Ibid 430.
142 Ibid.
143 Damages awarded in lieu of specific performance under Lord Cairns’ Act provisions must 
be calculated on an expectation basis since they are required to ‘constitute a true substitute for 
specific performance’: Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30, 58 (Megarry J). See also Johnson v Agnew 
[1980] AC 367, 400 (Lord Wilberforce) and the discussion of equitable damages as an estoppel 
remedy below.
144 John Carter, ‘Contract, Restitution and Promissory Estoppel’ (1989) 12 University o f New 
South Wales Law Journal 30, 57, has also questioned the granting of an expectation based 
remedy in Waltons Stores given that, ‘for the majority, there was no contract by estoppel.’
145 (1988) 164 CLR 387, 433.
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diminution in the value of the land) may have represented the minimum equity, 
but evidence of the quantum of the Mahers’ loss does not appear to have been 
before the court. 146
2. The Approaches to Relief in Venvayen
(a) The relief granted
The reliance-based approach to relief articulated by Brennan J in Waltons 
Stores came more clearly to represent the law in Australia when it was taken up 
by five members of the High Court in Venvayen. 141 If the judgments in Waltons 
Stores were notable for the lack of attention given to relief, the judgments in 
Verwayen were characterised by a focus on the nature of the relief to be 
granted. Although five members of the High Court supported a reliance-based 
approach to determining relief in cases of equitable estoppel, 148 the remedy 
granted to Mr Verwayen did have the effect of fulfilling his expectation that the 
Commonwealth would not take advantage of the relevant defences. Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ based their decisions on waiver, rather than estoppel, holding that
146 As LJ Priestley, ‘Estoppel: Liability and Remedy?’ in Donovan Waters (ed), Equity, 
Fiduciaries and Trusts (1993) 273, 293, has suggested, the granting of expectation relief in 
Waltons Stores may be explicable on the basis that the nature of the relief to be granted was not 
argued before the court.
147 Although in Waltons Stores only Brennan J had construed the minimum equity principle in 
such a way as to require relief to be determined according to a reliance-based approach, 
Priestley JA in Silovi Pty Ltd v Darbaro (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, 472 took that approach to 
represent the law. Since Verwayen, many judges have regarded the reliance-based approach as 
representing the law, and have felt obliged to determine relief in accordance with that approach: 
Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 
324, 346 (FC); Lorimer v State Bank o f New South Wales, (New South Wales Court of Appeal; 
Kirby P, Priestley and Handley JJA, 5 July 1991) (Kirby P); Re Neal; ex Parte Neal v Duncan 
Properties Pty Ltd (1993) 114 ALR 659, 669 (Drummond J); DTR Securities Pty Ltd v 
Sutherland Shire Council (1993) 79 LGERA 88, 98 (Talbot J); Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 
2 VR 333, 383 (Ormiston J); Blazely v Whiley (1995) 5 Tas R 254, 276-7 (Wright J); CIC 
Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Ins Cas 61-232, 75,594 (Powell 
JA); Sunpost Pty Ltd v Alsons Pty Ltd [1995] ANZ Conv R 575, 578 (Bryson J); Forbes v 
Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241, 286-9 (Santow J); Woodson (Sales) 
Pty Ltd v Woodson (Aust) Pty Ltd (1997) 7 BPR 14,685, 14,721 (Santow J); The Public 
Trustee, as Administrator o f the Estate o f Williams (dec’d) v Wadley (Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Tasmania, Wright, Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 27 June 1997), Crawford and 
Zeeman JJ; but cf Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333, 342-3 (Marks J); Giumelli v 
Giumelli (1996) 17 WAR 17, 166 (Rowland J) who felt free to adopt different approaches.
148 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 415-7 (Mason CJ), 429-30 (Brennan J), 454 (Dawson J), 475 
(Toohey J) and 500-1 (McHugh J). The facts of the case were discussed in Chapter 3.
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the Commonwealth had irrevocably waived its right to take advantage of the 
relevant defences. 149 The other members of the majority, Deane and Dawson 
JJ, granted Mr Verwayen expectation-based relief on the basis of estoppel.
Deane J adopted an expectation-based approach to giving effect to estoppel, 
although it is notable that he was applying a unified doctrine of estoppel by 
conduct, which operates both at law and in equity:
Prima facie, the operation of an estoppel by conduct is to preclude 
departure from the assumed state of affairs. It is only where relief 
framed on the basis of that assumed state of affairs would be inequitably 
harsh, that some lesser form of relief should be awarded. 150
Deane J found that Mr Verwayen had suffered detriment consisting of stress, 
anxiety and ill health which would be rendered futile if the Commonwealth 
were allowed to depart from its assumption. 151 The relevant detriment would 
extend far beyond any question of legal costs and was of such a nature and 
extent that it was not unjust to hold the Commonwealth ‘to the assumed state of 
affairs on the basis of which it induced Mr Verwayen to act. ’ 152 While Dawson 
J approved the reliance-based approach to relief articulated by Brennan J in 
Waltons Stores, 153 he found that Mr Verwayen had suffered substantial 
detriment as a result of his reliance on the relevant assumption, which could not 
be measured in terms of money. 154 Accordingly, the equity raised by the 
Commonwealth’s conduct could only be accounted for by fulfilment of 
Verwayen’s assumption. The Commonwealth was thus ‘estopped from 
insisting upon the statute of limitations’ . 155
149 Ibid 475 (Toohey J) and 487 (Gaudron J).
150 Ibid 443. Although in the passage extracted Deane J was describing the operation of a 
unified estoppel, it is clear that he considered that equitable principle also entitled a party to 
relief framed on that basis: ibid 439.
151 Ibid 448.
152 Ibid 449.
153 Ibid 454.
154 Ibid 461-2.
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Of the three dissentients, Brennan J found that an equitable estoppel did arise, 
but would have ordered an inquiry into Verwayen’s out of pocket costs in order 
to determine what relief was appropriate. 156 Mason CJ and McHugh J held that 
there was no evidence of any non-financial loss. Since an order for costs would 
have been sufficient recompense for the detriment suffered by Verwayen, any 
estoppel which arose did not prevent the Commonwealth from pleading the 
relevant defences. 157 McHugh J observed that, had Verwayen established that 
he had suffered additional worry and stress as a result of his reliance on the 
Commonwealth’s assurances, his equity would have been satisfied by an award 
of compensation. 158
(b) Support for a reliance-based approach to relief
Although the Court was divided on the question whether Verwayen had 
established that he had suffered material detriment on the faith of the 
assumption which the Commonwealth’s conduct induced him to adopt, there 
was clear majority support for a reliance-based approach to relief. Although 
Mason CJ was referring to a doctrine of estoppel which operates at common 
law as well as in equity, the Chief Justice held that the court:
may do what is required, but no more, to prevent a person who has 
relied upon an assumption as to a present, past or future state of affairs 
... which assumption the other party has induced him to hold, from 
suffering detriment in reliance upon the assumption as a result of the 
denial of its correctness. A central element of that doctrine is that there 
must be proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is 
its purpose to avoid. 159
155 Ibid 462.
156 Ibid 430.
157 Ibid 416-7 (Mason CJ) and 504 (McHugh J).
158 Ibid 504.
159 Ibid 413.
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Brennan J affirmed and applied the reliance-based approach he articulated in 
Waltons Stores, finding that ‘to hold the Commonwealth to its promise to admit 
liability in negligence would be to go beyond the minimum equity’ needed to 
avoid the relevant detriment.160 Dawson J quoted with apparent approval a 
statement from the judgment of Brennan J in Waltons Stores that the equity 
raised by estoppel is to avoid the detriment suffered as a result of reliance, 
rather than to entitle the party to the full benefit of the assumption which he or 
she relied upon.161 Although Justice Toohey’s remarks on estoppel were purely 
by way of obiter dicta, his Honour’s interpretation was that ‘on the present 
state of the authorities, the consequence of any promissory estoppel is that the 
court should enforce the promise only as a means of avoiding the relevant 
detriment and to the extent necessary to achieve that end’.162 Finally, McHugh J 
approved the statement of Priestley JA in Silovi Pty Ltd v Barbarom  that ‘[t]he 
remedy granted to satisfy the equity ... will be what is necessary to prevent 
detriment resulting from unconscionable conduct.’164
Two members of the Court, Deane and Gaudron JJ, favoured an expectation- 
based approach to relief, holding that the representee has a prima facie right to 
have his or her expectations made good. According to Deane J, the relevant 
assumption should be made good unless to do so would ‘exceed what could be 
justified by the requirements of good conscience and would be unjust to the 
estopped party.’165 Just as Justice Brennan’s reliance-based approach to relief 
flowed from his belief that estoppel operates as a source of legal obligation, 
Justice Deane’s expectation-based approach stemmed from his view of estoppel 
by conduct as an evidentiary principle, rather than a substantive doctrine. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, Justice Deane’s view is that estoppel by conduct ‘does 
not of itself constitute an independent cause of action’, but simply operates ‘to 
fashion an assumed state of affairs’ which may be relied upon defensively or
160 Ibid 430.
161 Ibid 454.
162 Ibid 475.
163 (1988) 13 NSWLR 466, 472.
164 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 501.
165 Ibid 445-6.
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aggressively ‘as the factual foundation of an action arising under ordinary 
principles with the entitlement to ultimate relief being determined on the basis 
of the existence of that fact or state of affairs.’ 166
Gaudron J, on the other hand, was somewhat more concerned with reliance, 
suggesting that ‘it may be that an assumption should be made good unless it is 
clear that no detriment will be suffered other than that which can be 
compensated by some other remedy. ’ 167 Two different expectation-based 
approaches, therefore, emerged from Verwayen. On the approach of Deane J, 
the representee’s assumption should be made good unless that would cause 
injustice to the representor and, on the approach of Gaudron J, the representee’s 
assumption should be made good unless it is clear that some other remedy will 
be effective to prevent detriment being suffered. Under both approaches the 
representee has a prima facie right to expectation relief; the approaches differ 
only as to the circumstances in which that prima facie right would be displaced.
(c) Granting expectation relief
Five of the seven members of the High Court in Verwayen, though, favoured a 
reliance-based approach to the determination of relief in equitable estoppel. In 
applying that approach, a court should seek to provide relief which protects the 
representee’s reliance interest. That is, relief which prevents or reverses the 
detriment which would be suffered by the representee, as a result of action 
taken by the representee in reliance on the relevant assumption, if the 
representor were allowed to depart from that assumption. 168 As noted above, 
many judges in subsequent cases have regarded this approach as representing 
the law in Australia. 169 The question which must therefore be addressed is 
when, in accordance with that approach, a court should grant relief which has 
the effect of fulfilling the representee’s assumptions or expectations.
166 Ibid 445.
167 Ibid 487.
168 This approach to relief was recently criticised by Elizabeth Cooke, above n 45, who argued 
that the courts should, so far as possible, continue to protect expectations in full. Cooke’s 
arguments are addressed in detail in Chapter 8 below.
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Mason CJ suggested in Verwayen that there are three situations which might 
justify a court in making an assumption good. 170 The first is where there has 
been reliance on an assumption for an extended period, the second is where the 
representee has suffered substantial and irreversible detriment in reliance on the 
assumption, and the third is where detriment cannot satisfactorily be 
compensated or remedied by any means short of fulfilling the representee’s 
expectations. It is arguable that the first two of those situations are 
encompassed by the third, and that the court should only grant expectation 
relief where the nature or extent of the detriment suffered by the representee is 
such that it cannot satisfactorily be compensated or remedied without fulfilling 
the representee’s expectations.
The result in Verwayen can be accommodated within that approach. The 
principal difference between the majority and the minority judges was whether 
there was adequate proof that Mr Verwayen had suffered increased stress, 
anxiety and ill health as a result of his reliance on the assumption that the 
Commonwealth would not dispute liability. If one accepts that the evidence 
was sufficient, then clearly such detriment could not be adequately 
compensated or reversed if the Commonwealth were allowed to depart from the 
assumption. Although common law courts routinely calculate damages to 
compensate for such loss, such damages do not have the effect of reversing or 
preventing the detriment suffered, but are merely designed to make good the 
plaintiffs loss ‘so far as money can do. ’ 171 An analogy might be drawn 
between the grant of expectation-based relief in an estoppel case such as 
Verwayen and relief in specie elsewhere in equity. A court of equity will make 
an order for ‘specific performance instead of damages, only when it can by that 
means do more perfect and complete justice’ . 172 Similarly, it could be said that, 
where a person would suffer substantial physical or mental pain as a result of
169 Above, n 147.
170 (1990) 170 CLR 394,416.
171 Todorovic v Waller (1981) 150 CLR 402, 412 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J).
172 Wilson v Northampton and Banbury’ Junction Railway Company (1874) LR 9 Ch App 279, 
284, cited with approval in Dougan v Ley (1946) 71 CLR 142, 150 (Dixon J).
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reliance on a representation if the representor were allowed to resile from it, 
then the relevant assumption should be fulfilled in order to do more complete 
justice than an order for monetary compensation would provide. 173 As Dawson 
J observed in coming to the conclusion that Verwayen’s equity could only be 
satisfied by fulfilling his assumption: ‘justice cannot always be measured in 
terms of money’ . 174
A further reason for granting expectation relief which was not discussed in 
Verwayen has been advanced by Heydon and Loughlan. Modem English 
authority, according to Heydon and Loughlan, suggests that ‘the remedy should 
be designed to reverse the plaintiff’s detriment rather than make good the 
plaintiff’s expectation, unless his expectation is of less value than his 
detriment’ . 175 That interpretation is borne out by the recent case of Baker v 
Baker, 176 in which the English Court of Appeal substituted an expectation- 
based remedy for the reliance-based relief granted by the trial judge, on the 
basis that the expectancy was less valuable than the detriment suffered by the 
representee. 177
(d) Is there any difference?
Justice Priestley, writing extra-judicially, has suggested that ‘there may not in 
the end be any great difference’ between the reliance-based approach to relief 
adopted by Mason CJ and the expectation-based approach favoured by Deane J
173 As noted above, however, McHugh J said in Verwayen that ‘even if the plaintiff had sought 
to make out a case along these lines [based on worry and stress suffered as a result of reliance 
on the representation!, his equity would be satisfied by an award of compensation for that 
additional worry and stress’: (1990) 170 CLR 394, 504.
174 Ibid 461, quoting Ketterman v Hansel Properties [1987] AC 220 (Lord Griffiths).
175 Heydon and Loughlan, above n 99, 398.
176 (1993) 25 HLR 408 (discussed above, n 11).
177 Interestingly, the result in such a case would appear to be different in the United States, 
where the unjust enrichment of the promisor would be taken into account. Comment d to s 90 of 
the Restatement of Contracts (2d) suggests that ‘ Unless there is unjust enrichment o f the 
promisor, damages should not put the promisee in a better position than performance of the 
promise would have put him.’ (Emphasis added). In Baker v Baker, the representors were 
unjustly enriched by the representee’s contribution of £33,950 to the representors’ house 
purchase.
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in Verwayen.178 Indeed, he suggested that he could not construct any plausible 
situation in which a court would reach a different result, depending on whether 
it adopted the view of Mason CJ or Deane J.179 It is possible to suggest such a 
scenario, similar to the facts of Jackson v Crosby (No 2).180 Assume A and B 
are in a relationship and are planning to live together in a house owned by A, 
which is then worth $150,000. A gratuitously promises to transfer to B a half 
interest in the house property. In reasonable reliance on that gratuitous promise, 
and with A’s knowledge, B expends $50,000 on improvements to the property, 
increasing its value to $200,000.181 A and B then part company, and A refuses 
to transfer the promised interest to B.
According to Justice Deane’s approach, the prima facie position is that B’s 
expectations should be fulfilled unless that would cause injustice to A. The 
court should, therefore, order A to transfer the half interest to B, or order 
payment of equivalent damages or compensation in the sum of $100,000.182 
The only question is whether that would be unjust to A. It is difficult to see 
why that would be so, unless it were regarded as unjust to provide an 
expectation remedy when a reliance remedy is available, which would seem to 
be inconsistent with the tenor of Justice Deane’s judgment. It should be noted, 
though, that B’s prima facie right to expectation relief, under Justice Gaudron’s 
approach, would be lost on the basis that ‘it is clear that no detriment will be 
suffered other than that which can be compensated by some other remedy.’183 
Any detriment suffered by B could be compensated by ordering A to pay 
equitable compensation in the sum of $50,000 to B, or by granting B a lien or 
charge on the land to recover that amount.
178 Priestley, above n 146, 290.
179 Ibid.
180 (1979) 21 SASR280.
181 In this example B’s restitution interest happens to be equal to his reliance interest of 
$50,000. As argued at the beginning of this chapter, however, the restitution interest should 
play no role in the determination of relief to give effect to an equitable estoppel.
182 As a majority of the Full Court ordered in Jackson v Crosby (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 280, 
302 (Zelling J), 310 (Mohr J).
183 (1990) 170 CLR 394,487.
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According to the reliance-based approach, on the other hand, the court should 
seek to provide relief which reverses the detriment suffered by B in reliance on 
the assumption that A would transfer the half interest to him. The court can do 
that by requiring A to pay compensation to B, or by granting a lien in favour of 
B, for the value of the work done, namely $50,000.184 The reliance and 
expectation-based approaches would, on those facts, seem to produce quite 
different results. Indeed, reliance and expectation-based approaches should 
produce different results every time a representee has suffered quantifiable 
detriment, in reliance on a promise or expectation of rights, be they contractual, 
proprietary or otherwise, which are of greater value than the detriment. In such 
cases, the choice between a reliance-based approach and an expectation-based 
approach is a choice with significant consequences for the parties involved.185
D. Application o f the Principle Since Verwayen
The above discussion traced the development of the courts’ approach to 
equitable estoppel remedies from an expectation-based approach, to one which 
is now concerned primarily with protecting against detriment resulting from 
reliance. The approach adopted by five members of the High Court in 
Verwayen requires a court, in giving effect to an equitable estoppel, to satisfy 
the minimum equity. That means the court is required to grant relief which does 
no more than is necessary to prevent detriment being suffered by the 
representee as a result of his or her reliance on the representor’s conduct. The 
court should provide expectation relief only when the detriment cannot be 
avoided by another means. The following discussion will consider the way in 
which that approach has been carried into effect in the seven years since 
Verwayen.
184 As Cox J would have ordered in Jackson v Crosby (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 280, 307, but 
only because on the facts of that case the promise was unclear.
185 An example of a case in which a representee suffered quantifiable detriment which was 
substantially less valuable than the benefit expected is The Public Trustee, as Administrator of 
the Estate of Williams (dec’d) v Wadley (Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Wright, 
Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 27 June, 1997), discussed below, text accompanying n 217.
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Similar studies have been carried out in relation to promissory estoppel in the 
United States under s 90 of the Restatement of Contracts (2d), most recently by 
Edward Yorio and Steve Thel.186 Yorio and Thel’s examination of the US cases 
shows that, despite the fact that most commentators consider that the objective 
of s 90 is to protect promisees against loss caused by reliance on a promise, the 
courts routinely grant expectation relief in promissory estoppel cases.187 A 
number of surveys cited by Yorio and Thel show that the remedies routinely 
granted under s 90 are specific performance and expectation damages, with 
negative injunctions being granted in cases where a promisor undertakes to 
refrain from acting in a particular way.188 Reliance damages are awarded only 
rarely, according to Yorio and Thel, ‘and then only if no promise is made out or 
proven or if expectation damages are difficult to determine. Otherwise the 
courts grant expectation relief.’189 An examination of the recent Australian 
cases reveals a surprisingly similar tendency towards expectation relief, 
although in Australia it seems that is more a consequence of giving equitable 
estoppel a preclusionary operation, similar to that of common law estoppel, 
than a consequence of giving the equitable doctrine a contractual operation.
Suggestions that equitable estoppel is frequently being pleaded190 are borne out 
by the fact that there have been have been thirty reported cases since Verwayen
186 Yorio and Thel, above n 13.
187 A number of US commentators drew that conclusion before Yorio and Thel: Jay Feinman, 
‘Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method’ (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 678, 687-8, 
suggested that ‘the typical damage remedy applied in promissory estoppel cases is measured by 
the expectation interest’; Daniel Färber and John Matheson, ‘Beyond Promissory Estoppel: 
Contract Law and the Invisible Handshake’ (1985) 52 University o f Chicago Law Review 903, 
909, observed that ‘reliance plays little role in the determination of remedies’; Mary Becker, 
‘Promissory Estoppel Damages’ (1987) 16 Hofstra Law Review, 131, 135, concluded that the 
courts ‘routinely award expectation damages’; W David Slawson, ‘The Role of Reliance in 
Contract Damages’ (1990) 76 Cornell Law Review 197, 202, noted that ‘[o]f the possibly 
hundreds of reported decisions applying promissory estoppel since 1932, only three have been 
widely read as holding that damages in a promissory estoppel case are limited to the reliance 
measure.’
188 Yorio and Thel, above n 13, 130-7.
189 Ibid 151.
190 Leopold, above n 30, 47. It has also been suggested that estoppel is ‘more often cited than 
applied and more often applied than understood’: Geoffrey Cheshire and Cecil Fifoot, ‘Central 
London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd’ (1947) 63 Law Quarterly Review 283, 
286.
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in which pleas of equitable estoppel have been upheld. 191 In each of those cases 
expectation relief was granted. 192 In none of the cases did the court provide
191 I have attempted to cover all successful equitable estoppel cases decided after the High 
Court handed down its judgment in Verwayen in September 1990, and reported by the end of 
1997. Cases such as Ditford v Temby (1990) 26 FCR 72, in which it was held without 
discussion that an estoppel would have arisen had other rights not been available, have been left 
out of consideration. I have also left out of consideration cases in which findings of equitable 
estoppel were overturned on appeal, such as Territory Insurance Office v Adlington (1992) 84 
NTR 7 and Trippe Investments Pty Ltd v Henderson Investments Pty Ltd (1992) 106 FLR 214. 
Although Justice French’s decision in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 119 
ALR 423 was overturned by the Court of Appeal: Commonwealth v Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd 
(1995) 130 ALR 193, the relevant findings on estoppel were not challenged.
192 Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 
324 (declaration that defendant entitled to possession of land under invalid lease assumed 
valid); Australian Workers Union (NSW Branch) v Minister for Natural Resources (1991) 43 
IR 158 (union estopped from challenging exemption after conducting proceedings on basis of 
its validity); Lee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 571 (bank 
estopped from denying existence or binding quality of promise to pay builder); Kintominas v 
Secretary, Dept o f Social Security (1991) 30 FCR 475 (promisor’s assets for purpose of aged 
pension valued exclusive of property promised to son); Quach v Marrickville Municipal 
Council [No 77 (1991) 22 NSWLR 55 (declaration confirming the priority of plaintiffs’ title as 
represented by defendant); Corumo Holdings Pty Ltd v C Itoh Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 370 
(discharged guarantee enforced on basis of assumption that it would remain binding); Tasita v 
Papua New Guinea (1991) 34 NSWLR 691 (landlord estopped from denying determination of 
lease after representing that it would accept surrender); Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd v 
Walker Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 524 (specific performance of contract on basis of 
assumed variation as to essentiality of time); FAI Leasing Pty’ Ltd v Nyst (1992) 5 BPR 11,673 
(purchaser allowed to rescind contract entered into on basis of vendor’s representation that 
cooling off period applied); Linter Group Ltd v Goldberg (1992) 7 ACSR 580 (representor 
estopped from asserting a constructive trust after inducing representee to assume it would 
obtain a paramount interest in the trust property); Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Bank o f New 
Zealand (1992) 7 ACSR 70 (liquidator estopped from asserting that transaction was a loan after 
parties had acted on the assumption that it was a sale); CSR Ltd v The New Zealand Insurance 
Co Ltd (1993) Aust Contract Reports 90-034 (insurer estopped from denying that insurance 
policy extended to cover subsidiary of insured); DTR Securities Pty Ltd v Sutherland Shire 
Council (1993) 79 LGERA 88 (landowner estopped from denying obligation to dedicate land to 
council as promised); Re Ferdinando; ex parte Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 
v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (as Trustee o f the bankrupt estate o f Maurice Christie 
Ferdinando) (1993) 42 FCR 243 (declaration of liability under mortgage refused after 
mortgagee induced assumption that liability was not secured by mortgage); Leda Commercial 
Properties Pty Ltd v DHK Retailers Pty Ltd [1993] ANZ Conv R 163 (lessee estopped from 
denying validity of determination of lease after creating assumption that it was abandoning 
premises); Lee v Ferno Holdings Pty Ltd (1993) 33 NSWLR 404 (specific performance of 
invalid sublease assumed valid); Re Neal; ex parte Neal v Duncan Properties Pty Ltd (1993)
114 ALR 659 (bankruptcy notice set aside after creditor induced assumption that debt not due); 
Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 119 ALR 423 (Commonwealth precluded 
from asserting that transfer of leases was ineffective after parties proceeded on common 
assumption that transfer was effective); Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333 (defendant 
prevented from pleading defences it represented would not be pleaded); Drummoyne District 
Rugby Club Inc v NSW Rugby Union Ltd (1994) Aust Contract Reports 90-039 (representor 
ordered to invite representee to participate in rugby competition as representee expected); S & 
E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637 (specific performance of 
new term for sublease granted after sublessor induced assumption that notice of exercise of 
option for renewal not necessary); Sharp v Anderson (1994) 6 BPR 13,801 (representor 
estopped from relying on Statute of Frauds in relation to verbal testamentary promise to leave 
land to son); CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Ins Cas 61-232
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limited relief which simply reversed the detriment suffered by the representee, 
without fulfilling his or her expectations. 193 The apparent preference for 
expectation relief gives rise to two important questions. First, are the courts 
determining relief in accordance with the reliance-based approach adopted in 
Verwayen! Secondly, is there a flaw in the reliance-based approach which 
prevents relief in the reliance measure from being granted more often? Those 
questions will be addressed under the two headings below.
1. Adherence to the Verwayen Approach
In order to comply with the Verwayen approach in determining relief, a court 
should aim to provide the minimum remedy needed to avoid the detriment 
suffered by the representee as a result of reliance on the relevant assumption. 
Expectation relief should be granted only if there is no other way to prevent the 
representee from suffering detriment. In only fourteen of the successful 
equitable estoppel cases decided since Verwayen, though, did the reported 
judgment contain any reference to the need to determine relief in accordance 
with the concepts of proportionality, preventing detriment or satisfying the 
minimum equity. 194 It could be argued that, since Verwayen, it is no longer
(club estopped from asserting continuance of contract of insurance after representing that 
cancellation was accepted); Morris v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Ins Cas 
75,881 (insurer prevented from departing from representation that it would not contest 
liability); Sunpost Pty Ltd v Alsons Pty Ltd [1995] ANZ Conv R 575 (sublessor ordered to 
renew sublease as promised); Blazely v Whiley (1995) 5 Tas R 254 (purchaser granted specific 
performance of an anticipated contract of sale); Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc 
(1996) 131 FLR 241 (representor ordered to compensate representees for expenses incurred in 
replacing promised equipment); W v G (1996) 20 Farn LR 49 (representee awarded monetary 
compensation for the loss of financial assistance from the representor in raising children); 
Giumelli v Giumelli (1996) 17 WAR 159 (representors ordered to transfer promised land to 
representee); Woodson (Sales) Pty Ltd v Woodson (Aust) Pty Ltd (1997) 7 BPR 14,685 (Santow 
J proposed making an order which would have the effect of fulfilling the representee’s 
expectation of a sale of the trust property in a fair and equitable manner).
193 Such limited relief has been granted in at least two unreported cases: Adore Pty Ltd v 
Blenkinsop Nominees Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Malcolm CJ, 1 September 
1993), discussed below nn 212-216 and accompanying text; and The Public Trustee, as 
Administrator o f the Estate o f Williams (dec’d) v Wadley (Full Court of the Supreme Court of 
Tasmania, Wright, Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 27 June 1997), discussed below n 217 and 
accompanying text.
194 Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 
324, 346; Corumo Holdings Pty Ltd v C Itoh Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 370, 389 (Kirby P); 
Kintominas v Secretary, Dept o f Social Security (1991) 30 FCR 475, 484-5; DTR Securities Pty 
Ltd v Sutherland Shire Council (1993) 79 LGERA 88, 98; Re Neal (1993) 114 ALR 659, 669;
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satisfactory simply to say that, an equitable estoppel having arisen, the 
representor is ‘estopped’ from resiling from the assumption he or she has 
created. Rather, the court should consider in every case what is the minimum 
relief necessary to do justice between the parties. Despite the apparent lack of 
attention paid to the minimum equity requirement, in only four of the cases 
under discussion can it be argued that the relief granted went further than 
satisfying the minimum equity. In other words, only in those cases can it be 
argued that the detriment suffered by the representee in reliance on the relevant 
assumption could have been avoided by the granting of lesser relief. The 
approach to relief in each of those cases will be discussed below, followed by a 
discussion of two unreported cases since Verwayen in which relief in the 
reliance measure has been held to represent the minimum equity.
(a) Reliance relief as the minimum equity
(i) Cases in which reliance relief was not granted
The unusual way in which estoppel was raised in Kintominas v Secretary, Dept 
of Social Security to some extent clouded the issue of relief. 195 The matter came 
before Einfeld J as an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal relating to the valuation of the applicant’s assets for the purpose of the 
‘assets test’ for aged pensioners. The relevant issue was whether, for the 
purposes of that valuation, the applicant had any subsisting interest in a house 
property of which she was the registered proprietor. The applicant had 
promised her son that she would leave the house to him in her will and would
Commonwealth v Clark [1994] 2 VR 333, 338-44 (Marks J), 381-4 (Ormiston J); Drummoyne 
District Rugby Club Inc v NSW Rugby Union Ltd (1994) Aust Contract Reports 90-039,
89,948; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Ins Cas 61-232, 
75,594 (Powell JA); Sunpost Pty Ltd v Alsons Pty Ltd [1995] ANZ Conv R 575, 578; Blazely v 
Whiley (1995) 5 Tas R 254, 276-8; Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 
FLR 241, 289; W v G (1996) 20 Fam LR 49, 66; Giumelli v Giumelli (1996) 17 WAR 159, 
164-6 (Rowland J); Woodson (Sales) Pty Ltd v Woodson (Aust) Pty Ltd (1997) 7 BPR 14,685, 
14,721. It should be noted that in at least two of the other cases there was no need to discuss the 
minimum equity principle because the parties had accepted that expectation relief was 
appropriate if an estoppel was established: Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd v Walker Nominees 
Pty Ltd (1992) 26 NSWLR 524, 538; S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd 
(1994) 122 ALR 637,651.
195 (1991) 30 FCR 475.
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allow him to reside in the house until her death. In reliance on that promise, the 
son expended a sum of money on improving the property. It appeared to be 
common ground between the parties that those circumstances gave rise to an 
equity in favour of the son by way of proprietary estoppel. The dispute 
concerned the way in which a court would give effect to that equity.
The respondent argued that the son had only a charge over the property to the 
extent of the sum expended on it. Although Einfeld J was ‘mindful o f the 
minimum equity requirement, he nevertheless found that the house was 
beneficially owned by the son.196 Accordingly, he ordered that the valuation of 
the applicant’s assets should not include any amount in respect of the property 
in question. The effect of that order was that a court of equity would fulfil the 
son’s expectations of an irrevocable life tenancy and eventual ownership of the 
property. Einfeld J did not make it entirely clear why reliance-based relief, in 
the form of a lien or an award of equitable compensation, was not appropriate. 
It seems from the report that the expenditure incurred in reliance on the 
relevant assumption was able to be quantified, and at the time it was incurred 
amounted to ‘about half the then value of the house.’197 There appeared, 
therefore, to be a lack of ‘proportionality between the remedy and the detriment 
which is its purpose to avoid’.198 The only possible explanation is that the 
extended period (some 15 years) during which the son relied on the relevant 
assumption justified the court in granting expectation relief.199
It also appears that reliance-based relief may have been satisfied the minimum 
equity in Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd v DHK Retailers Pty Ltd.200 
There, a lessee by its conduct created the impression that it was abandoning the 
leased premises. The lessor ‘acted in reliance on the impression created by the 
[lessee’s] conduct in acting to secure possession of the premises for
196 Ibid 484-6.
197 Ibid 486.
198 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 413 (Mason CJ).
199 Mason CJ said in Verwayen, ibid 416, that ‘[rjeliance on an assumption for an extended 
period may give rise to an estoppel justifying a court in requiring that the assumption may be 
made good.’
200 [1993] ANZConvR 163.
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reletting.’201 Higgins J held that, in those circumstances, the lessee was 
estopped from denying the validity of the lessor’s determination of the lease. It 
was also established that the lessee had repudiated the lease by abandonment, 
so estoppel was an alternative ground for Justice Higgins’s conclusion that the 
lease was at an end. Since the lease was brought to an end by the lessor’s 
acceptance of the lessee’s repudiation, though, it seems that the lessor suffered 
no detriment as a result of the lessee’s departure from the relevant assumption. 
On that basis, no estoppel should have arisen.
Nevertheless, an estoppel was held to have arisen, so it is appropriate to 
consider whether the relief granted represented the minimum equity. It is 
arguable that it did not. Leaving aside the fact that the lease was at an end in 
any event, the relief granted would appear to have been out of proportion to the 
detriment suffered by the landlord. The effect of the tenant being estopped from 
denying the validity of the landlord’s determination of the lease was that the 
tenant was liable for substantial damages for breach of the lease. If the only 
detriment suffered by the landlord was the wasted effort and expense incurred 
in unnecessarily securing the premises for reletting, then an award of equitable 
compensation, of the type proposed by Brennan and McHugh JJ in 
Verxvayen,202 would appear to have been sufficient to reverse it.
The third reported case in which reliance relief may have represented the 
minimum equity, but was not granted, was Re Neal; ex parte Neal v Duncan 
Properties Pty Ltd,203 That case was concerned with the validity of a 
bankruptcy notice. A judgment creditor entered into a deed of compromise with 
two debtors granting them a stay of execution in return for a cash payment and 
a bill of exchange. The bill was dishonoured when presented on behalf of the 
creditor. The creditor then represented to the debtors that it would not insist on 
its right to receive the proceeds of the bill if the debtors were to arrange to have 
$100,000 transferred to the trust account of the creditor’s solicitor. In reliance
201 Ibid 169.
202 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 431 (Brennan J), 504 (McHugh J).
203 (1993) 114 ALR 659.
283
on that representation, the debtors incurred legal costs in seeking to make 
arrangements for that transfer. The creditor then sought to insist on its right to 
payment of the bill and later served a bankruptcy notice based on non-payment. 
The debtors sought to have the bankruptcy notice set aside on the ground, inter 
alia, that the creditor was estopped from insisting on its right to payment of the 
bill.
Drummond J held that the legal costs incurred by the debtors in reliance on the 
creditor’s representation constituted sufficient detriment to raise an estoppel 
against the creditor. Referring to the requirement under Verwayen for 
proportionality between the remedy and the detriment, he said that an 
undertaking to pay the legal costs incurred by the debtors in reliance on the 
representation would have been enough to preclude a finding of estoppel. Since 
the creditor did not offer such an undertaking, however, the creditor was 
estopped from insisting on its right to payment.204 On that basis, Drummond J 
ordered that the bankruptcy notice be set aside:
on the ground [inter alia] that the creditor continues to be estopped 
from denying [the suspension of the creditor’s rights] until it undertakes 
to pay the legal costs the debtors incurred in seeking to make 
arrangements for the transfer of the $100,000 to the creditor’s 
solicitors.205
The effect of that decision is that a representor can avoid a remedy which has 
the effect of fulfilling the representee’s expectations only by undertaking to 
reverse the relevant detriment suffered by the representee. That approach would 
appear to be inconsistent with those statements of principle in Verwayen which 
require a court, if possible, to frame relief which has the effect of reversing the 
detriment suffered by the representee, rather than fulfilling his or her
204 Ibid 669.
205 Ibid 671.
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expectations.206 Drummond J could have reversed the relevant detriment by 
ordering the creditor to pay equitable compensation to the debtors in an amount 
equivalent to the legal costs unnecessarily incurred by the debtors. Although 
the amount of those legal costs does not appear in the report, the relief granted 
by Drummond J, which consisted of setting aside the bankruptcy notice and 
effectively forcing the issue of a new demand for the debt and a new 
bankruptcy notice, seems likely to have been out of proportion to the detriment 
suffered by the debtors.
The final case since Verwayen in which relief in the reliance measure could 
have been granted was Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc.207 The 
defendant was responsible for selecting and nominating two teams to compete 
in the Tornado class yachting event at the 1996 Olympic games. The defendant 
published certain criteria by which the selections would be made, which 
required participation in two nominated regattas with the same crew. In reliance 
on those rules, the plaintiffs incurred expenditure in competing in one such 
regatta, as a result of which they were ranked third. The constitution of the first 
ranked crew was then changed. Had the selection criteria been complied with, 
the plaintiffs would then have been ranked second and would have been 
entitled to sail in one of the defendant’s two high performance boats. Contrary 
to the published criteria, however, the defendants allowed the change in the 
first-ranked crew. In order to be competitive in the second regatta, the plaintiffs 
purchased their own high performance boat. Santow J held that an estoppel 
arose against the defendant in those circumstances because the plaintiffs had 
planned and carried out their campaign in reliance on the assumption that the 
rules would be complied with. He found, however, that the detriment suffered 
by the plaintiffs lay in ‘having to buy a fully competitive boat [for the second 
regatta] being denied access to the [defendant’s] two boats.’208 Santow J held
206 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 413 (Mason CJ), 429-430 (Brennan J), 454 (Dawson J), 501 
(McHugh J).The approach also appears to be inconsistent with the dictum of Gaudron J, ibid 
487, that ‘an assumption should be made good unless it is clear that no detriment will be 
suffered other than that which can be compensated by some other remedy’ (emphasis added).
207 (1996) 131 FLR241
208 Ibid 288.
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that it would be unconscionable for plaintiffs to bear those costs, and ordered 
the defendant to pay compensation to make up that detriment.209
Although Santow J concluded that the relief granted was proportionate to the 
detriment suffered by the plaintiffs,210 that relief in fact had the effect of 
fulfilling the plaintiffs’ expectations. The costs of acquiring the second boat 
were not incurred in reliance on the assumption that the published criteria 
would be complied with, but were in fact incurred after the defendant had 
announced that it was changing the criteria. The only detriment suffered by the 
plaintiffs in reliance on the relevant assumption was the cost of competing in 
the first regatta.211 It was that reliance loss which should properly have been 
compensated.
(ii) Cases in which reliance relief has been granted
There have been at least two unreported cases in which reliance-based relief 
has been found to satisfy the minimum equity raised by an estoppel. In Adore 
Pty Ltd v Blenkinsop Nominees Pty Ltd,212 Malcolm CJ gave effect to an 
equitable estoppel by awarding payment of equitable compensation which was 
calculated so as to reverse the detriment suffered by the representee in reliance 
on the relevant assumption. The dispute between the parties concerned a 
bowling alley leased by the representor to the representee. Prior to the 
expiration of the original term of the lease, the representor led the representee 
to believe that a binding agreement for a further lease and option to purchase 
the property had been concluded.213 The representee acted on the faith of that 
assumption by incurring expenditure in relation to the business which it would 
not have incurred had it known that it did not have security of tenure. That 
expenditure was rendered futile when the representor resiled from the relevant
209 Ibid 289.
210 Ibid.
211 Santow J in fact held, ibid 255, that the expenses associated with the first regatta were 
irrelevant because the selection criteria did not change until after that regatta.
212 Supreme Court of Western Australia, Malcolm CJ, 1 September 1993. Page numbers refer 
to the judgment transcript.
213 Ibid 47.
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assumption, by demanding vacant possession of the property shortly after the 
expiration of the original term. Malcolm CJ held that an estoppel arose against 
the representor in those circumstances, and held that the appropriate relief 
would be to award equitable compensation to the representee for the detriment 
suffered.214
The compensation which the representor was ordered to pay to the representee 
included amounts representing the additional expenses incurred by the 
representee on the assumption of continued occupancy, such as advertising and 
promotional expenses and additional wages incurred while the directors were 
engaged in promotional activities. Those expenses can legitimately be regarded 
as items of detriment suffered by the representee as a result of action taken in 
reliance on the representor’s conduct. Curiously, the award of compensation 
also included an amount representing payments made by the representee to 
creditors owed money at the time the representee was forced to vacate the 
premises. Those payments were taken into account on the basis that they 
‘would have been paid from income received from the future operation of the 
Bowl had Adore continued to occupy the premises. ’215 If the expenses in 
question were incurred in reliance on the representee’s assumption of continued 
occupancy, then they were clearly losses flowing from action taken by the 
representee in reliance on that assumption, and were thus compensable under 
the minimum equity principle. The fact that they would have been paid from 
future trading income does not, however, establish that they were reliance 
losses. Instead it characterises them as expectation losses suffered as a result of 
the representor’s departure from the relevant assumption, which are not
214 This compensatory form of relief can be contrasted with the expectation relief granted in the 
analogous pre-Verwayen case Metropolitan Transit Authority v Waverley Transit Pty Ltd 
[1991] 1 VR 181. In that case the representor authority induced the representee company to 
believe that certain bus service licences would be renewed without recource to public tenders, 
and the representee incurred substantial expenditure on the faith of that expectation. O’Bryan J 
found that an equitable estoppel arose against the representor when it terminated the contracts 
and called for tenders. He gave effect to the estoppel by ordering a renewal of the contract, thus 
fulfilling the representee’s expectations. The finding of an equitable estoppel was upheld by the 
Full Court, although there was no challenge to the form of relief granted by the trial judge: ibid 
210.
215 Above n 212, 55.
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compensable under the High Court’s interpretation of the minimum equity 
principle.216
A second unreported case in which reliance-based relief was found to represent 
the minimum equity was The Public Trustee, as Administrator of the Estate of 
Percy Henry Williams (dec’d) v Wadley.211 This decision of the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court of Tasmania is very important, because it indicates a 
willingness to adopt a strict interpretation of the reliance-based approach to 
relief. The plaintiff was induced to believe that her father’s house, which was 
worth $68,500 at the date of judgment, would be left to the plaintiff on her 
father’s death. In reliance on that assumption, the plaintiff performed services 
for her father which she would not otherwise have performed. The father died 
intestate. The trial judge held that an equitable estoppel arose in favour of the 
plaintiff, but considered the detriment was not sufficient to justify a full 
proprietary interest in the property. He held that she was entitled to equitable 
compensation of $34,250 in lieu of a half-interest in the property. The Full 
Court, by majority, allowed an appeal on the basis that the remedy was 
excessive. Crawford and Zeeman JJ found that the plaintiffs services should 
have been valued at a generous hourly rate, taking into account the fact that the 
compensation was not paid for her services at the time the services were 
performed. Accordingly, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to compensation in 
the sum of $15,000.
The strict reliance-based approach to determining relief adopted by the Full 
Court contrasts sharply with the reported decisions discussed above under this 
heading. The willingness of the Full Court to satisfy the plaintiffs equity by 
means of a reliance-based award of compensation is particularly remarkable in 
this case because of the great difficulty of valuing the work performed by the 
plaintiff over a period of years. Although it is possible to criticise some of the
216 This aspect of the decision has been questioned by Andrew Beech, ‘The Remedy for 
Estoppel: Identifying and Preventing Detriment’ in Robyn Carroll (ed), Civil Remedies: Issues 
and Developments (1996) 156 at 180-1.
217 Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Wright, Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 27 June 
1997.
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post-Verwayen decisions for failing to determine relief in accordance with the 
reliance-based approach laid down by the High Court, the decision in Public 
Trustee v Wadley involved a very strict application of that compensatory 
approach to the minimum equity principle.
(b) Expectation relief as the minimum equity
In each of the other reported cases since Verwayen, expectation relief appeared 
to be the only way of satisfying the equity raised by the representor’s conduct. 
In most of the cases, that relief can be justified on the basis that the detriment 
suffered by the representee in reliance on the relevant assumption could not be 
quantified,218 because expectation relief neatly avoided a detriment which 
would have been difficult to quantify precisely,219 or because the reliance and 
expectation interests coincided.220 Expectation relief can also be justified in
218 Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (expenditure 
incurred over 33 years); Quach v Marrickville Municipal Council [No I] (expenditure incurred 
over 34 years); Lee v Ferno Holdings Pty Ltd (expenditure incurred over five years); 
Commonwealth v Clark (representee suffered stress, anxiety, effort and inconvenience as a 
result of reliance on assumption); Drummoyne District Rugby Club Inc v NSW Rugby Union 
Ltd (representee club arranged sponsorship, players and hiring of grounds on basis of 
assumption); Sunpost Pty Ltd v Alsons Pty Ltd (representee purchased and conducted business 
for some years on the basis of assumption); Giumelli v Giumelli (representee remained in 
partnership with the representors, improved the representors’ land and passed up other job 
opportunities in reliance on the assumption).
219 Australian Workers Union (NSW Branch) v Minister for Natural Resources (employer lost 
opportunity to seek fresh exemption which would not have been open to challenge); Lee 
Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd (builder lost opportunity to secure payment by other 
means); Corumo Holdings Pty Ltd v C Itoh Ltd (creditor lost opportunity to obtain substitute 
guarantee); Austral Standard Cables Pty Ltd v Walker Nominees Pty Ltd (vendor lost 
opportunity to complete contract on time); FAI Leasing Pty Ltd v Nyst (purchaser entered into 
contract on basis of assumption that it could rescind); DTR Securities Pty Ltd v Sutherland 
Shire Council (council lost opportunity to require dedication of land); S & E Promotions Pty 
Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (sublessee lost opportunity to exercise option for renewal of 
lease); Sharp v Anderson (son invested savings into house for his mother, losing opportunity to 
purchase own property); CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Limited (insurer lost 
opportunity to cancel policy); Blazely v Whiley (representees were exposed ‘to an inconvenient 
and noisy environment’, lost the opportunity to buy their own house and spent money on 
maintenance and improvements: (1995) 5 Tas R 254, 276); Woodson (Sales) Pty Ltd v 
Woodson (Aust) Pty Ltd (representee entered into a complex commercial arrangement on the 
faith of the assumption in question). In Sunpost Pty Ltd v Alsons Pty Ltd [1995] ANZ Conv R 
575, 578, Bryson J justified granting expectation relief on the following basis:
I do not have confidence in achieving a just result by attempting to assess a sum of 
money to be paid as a condition of allowing the first defendant to rely on its legal 
rights. The principles for assessment of compensation would not be clear or simple.
220 CSR Ltd v The New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd (1993) Aust Contract Reports 90-034,
89,745 (insured failed to obtain a substitute insurance policy on the assumption that activities of
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some of the cases on the basis that the relevant assumption was relied upon for 
an extended period of time,221 or because the expectation was of less value than 
the detriment.222 In W v G, the granting of expectation relief may be explicable 
on the basis that the representee’s reliance loss, the effort and expense of 
raising two children, exceeded the value of the financial and other assistance 
which the representee expected to receive from the representor.223 There are 
several cases in which it is not clear from the report what detriment was 
suffered in reliance on the relevant representation: either because it was not 
clear what action was taken in reliance on the relevant representation,224 or 
because the representor’s departure from the assumption did not appear to 
cause the representee to suffer detriment.225 In those cases, it is not possible to 
identify the minimum equity arising out of the representor’s conduct.
2. Conclusions to be Drawn
The above discussion considers cases decided over the relatively short period 
of seven years since the High Court in Verwayen laid down a new approach to 
the formulation of relief in equitable estoppel cases. Obviously, it will take 
some time for the new approach to be widely understood and accepted.
subsidiary were covered by existing policy); Morris v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (1995) 8 
ANZ Ins Cas 75,881 (plaintiff refrained from instituting proceedings within limitation period 
on faith of defendant’s admission of liability). In each of those cases it was clear that the 
detriment suffered by the representee as a result of reliance on the relevant assumption 
coincided with the benefit expected by the representee. It may be possible to rationalise some of 
the cases listed above in n 219 in the same way.
221 Burnside Sub-Branch RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc; Quach v 
Marrickville Municipal Council [No 1 ]\ Lee v Ferno Holdings Pty Ltd; Sharp v Anderson.
222 As previously discussed, Heydon and Loughlan, above n 99, suggest that in such 
circumstances expectation relief should be preferred to reliance relief. In Burnside Sub-Branch 
RSSILA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc, the expectancy, a lease with only 7 years 
left to run, may have been of less value than the detriment, which consisted of considerable 
expenditure incurred over a period of 33 years.
223 (1996) 20 Farn LR 49.
224 Tasita v Papua New Guinea', Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Bank o f New Zealand; Re 
Ferdinando. The issue of the representees’ detrimental reliance in Re Ferdinando is discussed 
in Andrew Robertson, ‘Limits on the Recovery of Secured Debts: Estoppel and Section 52’ 
(1994) 5 Journal o f Banking and Finance Law and Practice 211.
225 Linter Group Ltd v Goldberg (Southwell J held that no constructive trust could be asserted 
by the representor because the trust moneys could not be traced; accordingly, departure by the 
representor from the assumption it induced, that it would not assert its rights as beneficiary, did 
not cause detriment to the representee); Leda Commercial Properties Pty Ltd v DHK Retailers
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Nevertheless, in the short time since Verwayen some patterns are emerging, and 
some conclusions can be drawn.
First, it seems that the courts have not all embraced the reliance-based approach 
to relief laid down by the High Court in Verwayen. It is clear from the 
judgments since Verwayen that many Australian judges still instinctively give 
equitable estoppel, like common law estoppel, a preclusionary operation. That 
instinct leads to the conclusion that a representor is ‘estopped’ from resiling 
from a relied-upon representation, rather than a finding that an equity has arisen 
by way of estoppel and relief must be granted to prevent the representee from 
suffering detriment as a result of his or her reliance on the relevant 
assumption.226 Secondly, it is clear that, even if the reliance-based approach is 
strictly applied, the circumstances will often require the grant of expectation 
relief on the basis that the detriment suffered by the representee cannot be 
prevented in any other way. That seemed to be the case in at least 22 of the 30 
reported decisions discussed.227 A number of commentators have suggested 
that, under the approach adopted in Verwayen, it will only be in exceptional 
circumstances that gratuitous promises will be enforced, and the remedy will 
normally be restricted to reversing detriment.228 The above examination of the 
early post -Verwayen cases strongly suggests the opposite conclusion.
Pty Ltd (departure by tenant from the assumption induced by its conduct did not affect landlord 
because the lease was at an end in any event).
226 One of the post- Verwayen decisions, that of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Morris v 
FA1 General Insurance Co Ltd (1995) 8 ANZ Ins Cas 75,881, has been criticised for failing to 
‘explore in any depth the process of determining the appropriate remedy’: Des Butler, 
‘Admissions of liability in Litigation: Contractual Undertakings and Estoppel’ (1995) 25 
Queensland Law Society Journal 591, 594.
227 This conclusion is arrived at by excluding from the 30 cases under discussion those four 
cases in which reliance relief could have been granted, and the four others in which it was not 
clear what relevant detriment would be suffered by the representee if the representor was 
allowed to depart from the assumption in question.
228 JW Carter, ‘Chapter 2: Australia’ in Ewoud Hondius (ed), Precontractual Liability (1991) 
29, 37 ( ‘it would not be going too far to say that compensation for loss by reliance or in respect 
of benefits conferred, rather than expectation damages, is more likely to be the norm’); Justine 
Munro, ‘The New Law of Estoppel’ (1993) 23 Victoria University o f Wellington Law Review 
271, 280 ( ‘it is only in exceptional cases that the court will order that the party estopped be held 
to the assumption created’); Derek Davies, ‘What Should Happen When Developments 
Outpace Origins?’ in Malcolm Cope (ed), Equity: Issues and Trends (1995) 7 (‘Estoppel does 
not enforce gratuitous promises save in exceptional circumstances where there is no viable 
alternative. Ordinarily the remedy will be restricted to a correction of the detriment actually 
suffered’).
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Since the courts in the United States and England have also shown a consistent 
preference for expectation relief, it is illuminating to compare the conclusions 
which have recently been drawn by commentators in those jurisdictions, and to 
consider the applicability of those conclusions in Australia. In their article, 
Yorio and Thel argue that, since issues of liability and remedy turn on promise, 
the true basis of promissory estoppel in the US is promise, not reliance.229 They 
claim that finding undermines the suggestions made by Grant Gilmore230 and 
Patrick Atiyah231 that contract law is being absorbed into a general theory of 
civil liability based on the tort concept of compensation for harm.232 Reliance, 
like consideration, serves the function of screening for serious promises, 
according to Yorio and Thel. If a promise is identified as serious, they suggest, 
the court will enforce it by means of expectation relief.233
There are at least three reasons why those conclusions cannot be drawn in 
Australia, despite an apparent similarity in the preference for expectation relief. 
First, in the United States promissory estoppel is seen as part of the law of 
contract, with reliance on a promise acting as a substitute for consideration and 
giving rise to what is often referred to as a ‘contract’.234 In the Second 
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, s 90 appears under the heading ‘Contracts 
Without Consideration’. In Australia, on the other hand, promissory estoppel is 
a purely equitable doctrine which is still enforced exclusively by way of 
equitable remedies. The High Court of Australia has in recent years 
consistently take pains to distance equitable estoppel from the law of
229 Yorio and Thel, above n 13, 113.
230 Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974) 87 et seq.
231 Such as PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 111. See also: Jane 
Swanton, ‘The Convergence of Tort and Contract’ (1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 40; Nicholas 
Seddon, ‘Australian Contract Law: Maelstrom or Measured Mutation’ (1994) 7 Journal of 
Contract Law 93, 94.
232 Yorio and Thel, above n 13, 115. See also Faber and Matheson, above n 187, 905.
233 Ibid 113.
234 See, for example, E Allan Farnsworth, Contracts (2nd ed, 1990) 102. In Waltons Stores 
(1988) 164 CLR 387, 401-2, Mason CJ and Wilson J explain the contractual nature of 
promissory estoppel in the United States as a response to the constraining effects of the bargain 
theory of consideration.
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contract.235 Secondly, in Australia, unlike the United States, issues of liability 
consistently turn on reliance, rather than promise, as Chapters 3-6 of this thesis 
have shown. This question will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 below. 
Thirdly, equitable estoppel has only recently begun to be seen as a substantive 
doctrine in Australia, and a reliance-based approach to relief has even more 
recently been adopted to give effect to that doctrine. Australian lawyers’ 
perception of estoppels as preclusionary doctrines has evoked an instinct for 
expectation relief.236 That instinct should gradually disappear as the ‘new 
equitable estoppel’237 comes to be more widely understood. The decision of the 
Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in Public Trustee v Wadley 
provides a striking illustration of the shift effected in Verwayen from a 
preclusionary approach to remedy to a compensatory one.
Hugh Collins has argued that the preference for expectation relief in England 
undermines claims that equitable estoppel in that country is based on reliance, 
and that its purpose is merely restorative.238 Collins uses the preference for 
expectation relief to criticise the notion that the purpose of equitable estoppel 
lies in compensating losses which individuals have suffered as a result of 
reliance on others. Collins acknowledges that the restorative theory of the 
reliance model is supported by the way in which the courts approach the 
establishment of an estoppel, focussing on the change of position, but argues 
that it fails to account for the fact that the courts use this test of liability to put a
235 See, for example, Waltons Stores, ibid 400-1 (Mason CJ and Wilson J), 423-7 (Brennan J); 
Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 439-40 (Deane J) 453 (Dawson J), 501 (McHugh J).
236 This tendency was particularly marked in Justice Wilcox’s interpretation of the 
proportionality principle (that is, the principle that the remedy must be proportional to the 
detriment suffered) in Lyndel Nominees Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1997) 37 IPR 599. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Wilcox J held that, because of the need for proportionality between 
the remedy and the detriment, a promissory estoppel could only arise where the detriment 
suffered by the representee in reliance on the relevant assumption was proportional to the 
expectation or to the relief claimed by the representee. It seemed that the only remedy Wilcox J 
would consider granting was the fulfilment of the representees’ expectations. In order to ensure 
proportionality between the detriment and the remedy, therefore, the detriment had to be 
proportional to the expectation in order to make out an estoppel.
237 Mark Dorney, The New Estoppel’ (1991) 7 Australian Bar Review 19, 46.
238 Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (1st ed, 1986) 44, attributing such a claim to PS Atiyah, 
‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ (1978) 94 Law Quarterly Review 193. These 
issues are given a slightly different treatment in the 2nd edition of Collins’ work: The Law of 
Contract (2nd ed, 1993) 84-7, which will be discussed in Chapter 8 below.
293
person in a better position than he or she was originally. The fact that cases 
such as Pascoe v Turner involve the enforcement of promises, according to 
Collins, indicates that the purpose of the reliance model is not simply 
restorative but includes the encouragement of certain kinds of economic 
relations by making the position of one who acts in reliance on others 
financially secure.239 The crucial difference between Australian law and 
English law in this regard is that, since Verwayen, the purpose of granting relief 
in Australia is restorative. In due course the Australian cases should, like 
Public Trustee v Wadley, begin to reflect the new orientation towards 
compensation for harm, and away from the fulfilment of expectations.
3. Problems with the Reliance-Based Approach
In Commonwealth v Clark240 the Victorian Full Court subjected the reliance- 
based approach laid down in Verwayen to a thorough analysis. The facts of 
Clark were almost identical to those in Verwayen. Mr Clark was also a member 
of the Royal Australian Navy injured in the Voyager collision in 1964. He 
commenced action against the Commonwealth in August 1985 in reliance on 
representations that the Commonwealth would not take advantage of defences 
open to it. In February 1986 the Commonwealth indicated that it would defend 
the action and would rely on the two defences in question. The most important 
difference between Clark and Verwayen was that, since the High Court’s 
decision in Verwayen had been handed down by the time Clark came to trial, 
Clark did provide evidence to substantiate the detriment he would suffer as a 
result of reliance on the Commonwealth’s representations if it were allowed to 
resile from the assumption it created.
The trial judge found that Clark had participated in the litigation as a result of 
the Commonwealth’s representations and, in doing so, incurred a debt of 
$10,000 as well as stress, anxiety, effort and inconvenience. He found that 
detriment to be such that the minimum equity required to do justice between
239 Hugh Collins, The Law o f Contract (1st ed, 1986) 44.
240 [1994] 2 VR 333 (‘Clark’).
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the parties was to hold the Commonwealth to its original representations that it 
would not plead the relevant defences. The Commonwealth’s appeal from that 
decision was dismissed by the Full Court. Fullagar J found that there was no 
material distinction between the facts of Verwayen and the facts of the present 
case. Since there was no clearly binding ratio decidendi in the High Court’s 
decision, the Full Court was obliged to follow its own previous decision.241 
Marks J found the minimum equity concept unhelpful in framing relief, 
preferring the formulation that allows a court to grant whatever relief is 
necessary to prevent unconscionable conduct and to do justice between the 
parties.242 He dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasoning of Deane and 
Dawson JJ in Verwayen.243
Ormiston J, on the other hand, adopted an interpretation of the approach to 
relief in the judgments of the High Court in Verwayen which is more consistent 
with the interpretation adopted in this thesis:
In my opinion, although I am more inclined to favour Deane J’s analysis 
in that it would more evenly place the competing considerations on the 
scales, I feel obliged to accept that the other members of the court, with 
the possible exception of McHugh J (who might take a more stringent 
approach), would appear to have held that the relevant equity does not 
in every case require the party sought to be bound to fulfil the 
assumption and is designed primarily to avoid the detriment which the 
court sees as likely to flow from the non-fulfilment of the 
assumption.244
241 Ibid 335.
242 Ibid 342-3. This type of approach, which emphasises the flexibility available to the court, 
has been criticised in England by Oughten, above n 102; AS Burrows, ‘Contract, Tort and 
Restitution - A Satisfactory Division of Not?’ (1983) 99 Law Quarterly Review 217, 243 and 
Smith, above n 103, 239-246. The approach has, however, received some support in the United 
States: Comment, ‘Once More into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract 
Doctrine’ (1970) 37 Chicago Law Review 559, 564-5, and in Australia from Tilbury, above n 
30, 77, who suggests that the measure of the relief in equitable estoppel is entirely a matter of 
discretion, and any attempt to prescribe either expectation or reliance loss as the prima facie 
measure of damages is fundamentally misconceived.
243 [1994] 2 VR 333, 343-4.
244 Ibid 383.
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Applying that approach, Ormiston J found that the detriment suffered by Clark 
was such that it could not ‘be fairly compensated except by holding the 
Commonwealth to the assumptions which it induced’ .245 Both Marks J and 
Ormiston J seemed to be opposed to the reliance-based approach and, in the 
course of their respective judgments, raised a number of important issues which 
have the potential to undermine the viability of that approach. The principal 
problems raised in those judgments will be addressed under the four headings 
below.
(a) Estoppel as a defensive equity
The first challenge made by Marks J to the reliance-based approach was to 
question its application in cases where equitable estoppel is raised defensively. 
Marks J noted that, in the Victorian Full Court’s decision in Verwayen:246
the majority took the view that the doctrine [of promissory estoppel] 
was capable of being relied on as an answer and would succeed as such 
in the same way as estoppel at common law, that is, if it were 
established.247
On that interpretation, the minimum equity principle does not apply where 
promissory estoppel, or indeed any equitable estoppel, is raised as a defence. 
The estoppel simply has a preclusionary effect, and the parties’ rights are 
determined according to the state of affairs which the plaintiff representor 
induced the defendant representee to assume existed. Equitable estoppel would 
then in many cases afford a complete defence. As Marks J noted,248 however, in 
Verwayen, Brennan J appeared to take a different view of the effect of equitable 
estoppel when raised in answer to a defence:
245 Ibid 384.
246 Verwayen v The Commonwealth (No 2) [1989] VR 712.
247 [1994] 2 VR 333, 337.
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In strict theory, a party who is entitled to equitable relief to make good 
some detriment suffered in reliance on a promise has a cause of action 
rather than an answer to a plea raised by a defendant-promisor in 
proceedings to enforce another cause of action. But when an equity by 
way of estoppel is raised as an answer to a plea in a defence which a 
defendant promisor seeks to raise contrary to his promise, it may be 
appropriate to give effect to the defence on terms that the defendant- 
promisor satisfy the plaintiffs equity.249
By parity of reasoning, it would seem clear that where estoppel is raised as a 
defence, then the court should give judgment for the plaintiff on terms that 
require the plaintiff to satisfy the defendant’s equity. As Marks J noted in 
Clark, although Justice Brennan’s view was not explicitly supported by the 
other members of the High Court in Verwayen, ail members of the Court 
‘accepted the relevance of the extent of detriment to the availability of 
equitable estoppel as an answer’ .250
Marks J suggested, however, that where estoppel is raised defensively, Deane J 
would perhaps only relate the representee’s detriment to the question whether it 
was unconscionable to depart from the relevant assumption. In other words, the 
representee’s detriment would only be relevant to the question whether an 
estoppel was made out. If material detriment was not made out, then the plea 
would fail. If it was made out, then estoppel would operate as a complete 
answer to the plaintiffs claim. When raised defensively, equitable estoppel 
would then ‘become an all or nothing plea to be determined in the same way as 
estoppel at common law. ’251 Marks J conceded, though, that the law ‘has not 
yet rationalised itself in this way. ’252 Indeed, it would not appear that Justice 
Deane’s judgment supports such a rationalisation. His statement of the 
principles of estoppel by conduct in Verwayen would tend to suggest that he
248 Ibid.
249 (1990) 170 CLR 394,430.
250 [1994] VR 333, 338.
251 Ibid 341.
252 Ibid.
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supports Justice Brennan’s analysis. Deane J said that the assumed fact or state 
of affairs may be relied upon defensively and went on to say, without 
distinguishing between a defensive or aggressive use of the doctrine, that the 
prima facie entitlement to relief based on the assumed state of affairs will be 
qualified in a case where such relief would exceed what could be justified by 
the requirements of good conscience.253
The other judgments show a similar failure to distinguish between the effect of 
an equitable estoppel raised defensively and one raised aggressively. Mason CJ, 
for example, made no such distinction when he said that ‘as a matter of 
principle and authority, equitable estoppel will permit a court to do what is 
required in order to avoid detriment to the party who has relied on the 
assumption induced by the party estopped, but no more. ’254
If the purpose of equitable estoppel is to prevent detriment resulting from 
reasonable reliance on the conduct of others, then there is no legitimate reason 
to distinguish between a defensive use of such an estoppel and an aggressive 
use. Indeed, in many cases, the question whether an estoppel is raised 
aggressively or defensively will depend only on who is the first to institute 
proceedings. If, for example, a tenant expends money on the faith of a 
representation by the landlord that a lease is valid, then either party might 
institute proceedings in the event that the landlord subsequently sought to deny 
the validity of the lease. According to Justice Marks’s analysis, the outcome 
would depend on who sued first. If the tenant sues, claiming relief on the basis 
of equitable estoppel, then the court may compensate the tenant for the 
expenditure, on the basis that such relief represents the minimum necessary to 
prevent detriment. If the landlord seeks to evict the tenant, and the estoppel is 
raised defensively by the tenant, then the estoppel has a preclusionary 
operation, preventing the landlord from denying the truth of the representation 
that the lease is valid. Such an anomaly would be avoided if the minimum
253 (1990) 170 CLR 394,445.
254 Ibid 412 (Mason CJ). Similarly unqualified statements were made at 454 (Dawson J), 475-6 
(Toohey J), 487 (Gaudron J),501 (McHugh J).
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equity requirement was applied, as the judgments in Venvayen seem to suggest, 
in the case of a defensive plea as well as an aggressive one.
There remains the problem of pleading, which was raised by Marks J in Clark 
as follows:
I refer briefly to the pleading problem which emerges from Verwayen ’s 
Case. It is whether promissory estoppel may be pleaded as an answer to 
a defence or a claim as distinct from being pleaded as a cause of action 
in itself.255
That problem raises questions of great practical importance. Must equitable 
estoppel be raised by way of cross claim, rather than a defence? Where 
equitable estoppel is raised in a defence, can a court grant anything other than 
expectation relief to the defendant? If equitable estoppel is not strictly a 
defence, but a right to relief to satisfy an equity, then equitable estoppel strictly 
should not be pleaded as a defence, except perhaps where it is clear that the 
equity raised by the plaintiffs conduct can only be accounted for by denying 
his or her cause of action. In all other cases in which a representor asserts a 
cause of action which is inconsistent with representations relied upon by the 
representee, the representee should plead equitable estoppel by way of a cross 
claim.256
On the other hand, the statement of Brennan J quoted above strongly suggests 
that a defendant need not plead a defensive equity by way of a cross claim in 
order to obtain relief.257 The court can presumably, in such circumstances, grant 
the relief claimed by the plaintiff, subject to an order reversing the detriment 
suffered by the defendant. Such an approach is consistent with the High Court’s 
recent confirmation of the flexibility enjoyed by courts of equity in giving
255 [1994] 2 VR 333, 337.
256 In Prudential Building and Investment Society of Canterbury v Hawkins [1997] 1 NZLR 
114, 121, Hammond J observed that, although equitable estoppel was raised in that case as a 
defence, it was ‘functionally raised in the character of a counterclaim.’
257 Although Leopold, above n 30, 54, suggests that it would be prudent to do so.
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effect to equitable defences. In Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd, in the 
context of partially setting aside a guarantee on the ground of 
misrepresentation, the court said that ‘[t]he concern of equity, in moulding 
relief between the parties is to prevent, nullify, or provide compensation for, 
wrongful injury. ’258 As Meagher, Gummow and Lehane have observed, ‘[i]n 
giving effect to its doctrines, equity has wide powers ... And it may, unlike the 
common law, impose terms as the price of relief. ’ 259
(b) Compensation in equity
The second challenge made by Marks J to the reliance-based approach to relief 
related to the appropriateness of compensation as an equitable remedy. Marks J 
suggested that the word ‘minimum’ in the expression ‘minimum equity’ is not 
to be given its literal meaning, and implicitly disapproved of suggestions by 
Mason CJ and Brennan J that the monetary equivalent of financial loss can be 
granted. He did not see how such a common law remedy ‘could be reconciled 
with the preservation of equitable estoppel and the equitable nature of the 
remedy. ’260 Similarly, in Venvayen Deane J said that:
estoppel does not of itself provide a cause of action in equity for non- 
traditional equitable relief in the form of compensatory damages, under 
Lord Cairns’ Act or subsequent statutory provisions, for the detriment 
caused by a departure from an otherwise unenforceable promise as to 
future conduct.261
Prior to Waltons Stores, Paul Finn observed that equity was unable to remedy 
detriment suffered as a result of the representee’s reliance because it lacked the 
power to make compensatory damages awards.262 Finn suggested that it was
258 yadcisz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 102, 115-6 (Deane, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).
259 RP Meagher, WMC Gummow and JRF Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (3rd ed, 
1992)432.
260 [1994] 2 VR 333, 342.
261 (1990) 170 CLR 394,439.
262 p£) Finn, ‘Equity and Contract’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Contract (1987) 104, 119.
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perhaps the lack of a compensatory jurisdiction which led to the emphasis on 
expectations.263 He also suggested that the inability of courts to make 
compensatory awards confined equity to the prevention of unconscionable 
insistence on the rights of representors.264 The justification for confining equity 
to representations of existing rights, according to Finn, was open to serious 
question, and there was much to be said for a move towards a partial fusion of 
equitable and common law concepts which would allow the protection of the 
representee’s reliance interest.265 Absent the unification of common law and 
equitable estoppel which would achieve that effect, the essential question is 
whether courts of equity have power to give effect to estoppel by way of 
compensation for reliance loss. There are two sources of jurisdiction to order 
payment of monetary compensation available to a court of equity which could 
potentially be used, each of which will be examined in turn.
(i) Damages under Lord Cairns’ Act
The remedy granted in many equitable estoppel cases is an award of equitable 
damages in lieu of specific performance of a contract. Courts of equity have 
jurisdiction to award damages in such circumstances under provisions in each 
jurisdiction re-enacting s 2 of the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (UK),266 
known as Lord Cairns’ Act. In Australia the provisions vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, but most provide in essence that, where the court has power to 
grant an injunction against the commission of a wrongful act or to order 
specific performance of any contract, the court may award damages to the party 
injured, either in addition to or in substitution for an order for the injunction or 
specific performance.267 There are two potential limitations on the use of Lord
263 Ibid 122.
264 Ibid 116.
265 Ibid 116, 119-20.
266 21 & 22 Viet c 27.
267 The principal provisions are: Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 11(a); Supreme Court Act 
1970 (NSW), s 68; Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 14(1 )(b); Equity Act 1867 (Qld), s 62 (as 
saved by The Statute Law Revisions Act 1908 (Qld), s 2(iv); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 
30; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 11; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 38; 
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 25. See generally Peter McDermott, Equitable Damages 
(1994).
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Cairns’ Act to give effect to equitable estoppel. First, there is the argument that 
Lord Cairns’ Act does not empower a court to award damages in substitution 
for injunctions in aid of purely equitable rights and, secondly, there is the 
requirement that equitable damages awarded in substitution for an injunction or 
specific performance must be calculated so as to provide a true substitute for 
such specific relief.
Meagher, Gummow and Lehane have argued for some time that Lord Cairns’ 
Act should be construed as applicable only in equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction, the 
reference to ‘wrongful acts’ in the statute being confined to legal wrongs.268 
The weight of authority is, however, against such an interpretation.269 Indeed, 
the decision in Waltons Stores is against such an interpretation, at least on the 
approach of Mason CJ and Wilson and Brennan JJ: Lord Cairns’ Act damages 
were awarded even though no legal wrong was committed by Waltons. 
Moreover, the reformulation of the provision in some jurisdictions to omit the 
expression ‘wrongful act’ would seem to make it clear in those jurisdictions 
that equitable damages can be awarded in the case of the infringement of a 
purely equitable obligation.270 The second limitation is, therefore, likely to be 
of greater practical relevance than the first.
In Wroth v Tyler Megarry J held that the then English provision ‘envisages that 
the damages awarded [in substitution for specific performance] will in fact 
constitute a true substitute for specific performance. ’271 Although the Lord 
Cairns’ Act provisions typically provide that the damages ‘may be assessed in 
such manner as the court shall direct’, that does not appear to give the court a 
discretion as to the basis on which damages should be calculated. In Johnson v 
Agnew, Lord Wilberforce, with whom the other members of the House of Lords 
agreed, expressed the opinion that the words do not give the court any such 
discretion, but refer only to the procedure by which the damages are
268 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 259, 649-50.
269 McDermott, above n 267, 153-5.
270 Ibid 155.
271 [1974] Ch 30,58.
302
assessed.272 Equitable damages awarded in lieu of specific performance are to 
be assessed on the same compensatory principle as common law damages, ‘ie 
that the innocent party is to be placed, so far as money can do, in the same 
position as if the contract had been performed.’273
Unless the Australian courts are prepared to depart from that interpretation, 274 
it seems that Lord Cairns’ Act damages will only be useful in those estoppel 
cases, such as Waltons Stores and Jackson v Crosby (No 2),275 where the court 
wishes to provide monetary relief in the expectation measure. The true 
substitute principle logically requires damages awarded in lieu of specific 
performance to be calculated on an expectation basis276 and will, if maintained, 
prevent the use of the Lord Cairns’ Act jurisdiction to award reliance damages 
in estoppel cases. The only means of awarding monetary compensation for 
reliance loss, then, is by invoking equity’s inherent jurisdiction to order 
payment of compensation.
(ii) Equitable compensation
An order for the payment of compensation for breach of a purely equitable 
obligation is a remedy most commonly granted to provide restitutionary relief 
against defaulting fiduciaries. As McLelland J observed in United States 
Surgical Corporation v Hospital Products Pty Ltd, however, a court of equity 
‘has an inherent power to grant relief by way of monetary compensation for 
breach of a fiduciary or other equitable obligation'.277 The New Zealand Court
272 [1980] AC 367,400.
273 Ibid.
274 As one commentator has suggested they should: RP Austin, ‘Moot Point’ (1974) 48 
Australian Law Journal 273, 274.
215 ( 1 9 7 9 ) 21 SASR 280. McDermott, above n 267, 186, seems to suggest that the court in 
Jackson v Crosby could have ordered payment of reliance damages under the South Australian 
equivalent of Lord Cairns’ Act. It is not clear, though, how that is possible under the true 
substitute principle, which is described elsewhere by McDermott, ibid 107, as an ‘important 
principle’.
276 Terence Ingman and John Wakefield, ‘Equitable Damages Under Lord Cairns’ Act’ [1981] 
The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 286, 303-4.
277 [1982] 2 NSWLR 766, 816 (emphasis added) ( ‘Hospital Products'). The breadth of the 
jurisdiction is supported by Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 259, 635, and by Ian
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of Appeal has observed that it should be regarded as settled that monetary 
compensation may be awarded for breach of any duty deriving historically from 
equity.278 Furthermore, as Meagher, Gummow and Lehane note:
whilst the monetary sum awarded to the plaintiff normally is computed 
by reference to the profit made by the defendant, this is not invariably 
so. It can be computed by reference to the detriment suffered by the 
plaintiff. Nocton v Lord Ashburton,279... McKenzie v McDonald,280 ... 
and Re Dawson281 ... all afford illustrations of that proposition.282
Indeed, in Hospital Products, McLelland J suggested that equitable 
compensation ‘differs from an account of profits in that the loss to the plaintiff 
rather than the gain to the defendant is the measure of relief. ’283 Michael 
Tilbury has explained that the purpose of equitable compensation is 
compensatory, rather than restitutionary, since the object is to restore the 
plaintiff to his or her previous position, rather than to force the defendant to 
disgorge a gain.284 A compensatory approach to the assessment of equitable 
compensation was recently adopted by the House of Lords.285
Unlike Lord Cairns’ Act damages, therefore, the remedy of equitable 
compensation appears to be flexible enough to allow a court of equity in an 
appropriate case to give effect to an estoppel, in accordance with the minimum 
equity principle, by awarding payment of compensation calculated to reverse 
detriment suffered by the representee. It also seems clear that departure from an 
assumption giving rise to an estoppel is an equitable wrong or a breach of an 
equitable obligation which gives a court jurisdiction to award compensation.
Davidson, The Equitable Remedy of Compensation’ (1982) 13 Melbourne University Law 
Review 349.
278 Aquaculture Corporation v New Zealand Green Mussel Co Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 299, 301.
279 [1914] AC 932.
280 [1927] VLR 134.
281 [1966] 2N SW R 211.
282 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, above n 259, 634-5.
283 [1982] 2 NSWLR 766, 816. The same distinction is drawn by Davidson, above n 277, 354.
284 MJ Tilbury, Civil Remedies (vol 1, 1990) 180-1. See also CEF Rickett, ‘Equitable 
Compensation: The Giant Stirs’ (1995) 112 Law Quarterly Review 27, 28-9
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Although Australian and English courts have not traditionally given effect to 
equitable estoppel by ordering payment of compensation,286 such a remedy has 
clearly been granted in Australian cases287 and has arguably been granted in 
English288 and Canadian289 cases. Moreover, its availability as an estoppel 
remedy has been supported by two members of the High Court.290
Although Marks J was right to suggest in Clark that an order for payment of the 
monetary equivalent of financial loss is a remedy more often granted at 
common law than in equity,291 courts of equity clearly do have jurisdiction in 
estoppel cases to order payment of compensation calculated on a reliance basis. 
Relief of that nature can be ‘reconciled with the preservation of equitable 
estoppel and the equitable nature of the remedy. ’292 If the courts are to give full 
effect to the reliance-based approach to relief approved by five members of the
285 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1995] 3 All ER 785, 793-5.
286 Cf Davidson, above n 277, 367-8.
287 Malcolm CJ explicitly gave effect to the equitable estoppel arising in Adore Pty Ltd v 
Blenkinsop Nominees Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Malcolm CJ, 1 September 
1993) by means of an award of equitable compensation, as did Santow J in Forbes v Australian 
Yachting Federation Inc (1996) 131 FLR 241, and both the trial judge and the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Tasmania in The Public Trustee, as Administrator o f the Estate o f Williams 
(dec’d) v Wadley (Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Wright, Crawford and 
Zeeman JJ, 27 June 1997). The monetary relief granted in W v G (1996) 20 Farn LR 49 can 
only be rationalised as an award of equitable compensation, although it was not described as 
such. Similarly, the ‘damages’ awarded in Raffaele v Raffaele [1962] WAR 29, 33, on the basis 
of a contract or ‘notional contract’ arising by way of proprietary estoppel can only be justified 
as an award of equitable compensation. An order for specific performance was held to be 
unsuitable, and the damages were assessed on a restitutionary basis, rather than an expectancy 
basis in accordance with the ‘true substitute’ principle, indicating that the Lord Cairns’ Act 
jurisdiction was not invoked.
288 In Baker v Baker (1993) 25 HLR 408, the Court of Appeal gave effect to a proprietary 
estoppel by awarding payment of ‘compensation’ calculated on an expectation basis, which 
could be rationalised as equitable compensation or as Lord Cairns’ Act damages in lieu of an 
injunction.
289 In Stiles v Tod Mountain Development Ltd (1992) 88 DLR (4th) 735, Huddart J gave effect 
to a proprietary estoppel by awarding payment of ‘equitable damages’. McDermott, above n 
267, 186, points out that since there was no jurisdiction to award damages under Lord Cairns’ 
Act in those circumstances, the award must be presumed to have been made in the inherent 
jurisdiction. In The Queen v Smith (1980) 113 DLR (3d) 522, the Federal Court of Appeal 
awarded ‘compensation’ assessed on a restitutionary basis to give effect to an equitable 
estoppel.
290 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 430-1 (Brennan J), 504 (McHugh J). At least two 
commentators have also supported the availability of compensation as a means of giving effect 
to equitable estoppel: Davidson, above n 277, 367-8 and David Jackson, ‘Estoppel as a Sword’ 
(Part 2) (1965) 81 Law Quarterly Review 223, 247.
291 [1994] 2 VR 333,342.
292 Ibid.
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High Court in Venvayen, then it is clear that the compensation jurisdiction 
must be embraced.
(c) Reconciling the earlier authorities
The third problem raised by Marks J is the question whether the reliance-based 
approach to the minimum equity principle can be reconciled with the approach 
taken by the English courts in cases such as Pascoe v Turner,293 Marks J 
pointed out that, in Pascoe v Turner, the detriment suffered by the representee 
consisted of expenditure on a house in reliance on a promise that her former de 
facto husband had given or would give her the house. Although there was no 
suggestion that the expenditure was in the least commensurate with the value of 
the house, the minimum equity accorded the claimant was perfection of the gift 
of the house by transfer of the fee simple.294
It must be conceded that the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Pascoe v 
Turner cannot be reconciled with the approach laid down by the High Court in 
Verwayen, although it is far from clear that the case would be decided 
differently in Australia today. The Court of Appeal considered that ‘the court 
must decide what was the minimum equity to do justice’295 to the defendant, 
but clearly did not regard the defendant’s reliance interest as representing the 
minimum equity:
We are satisfied here that the problem of remedy on the facts resolves 
itself into a choice between two alternatives: should the equity be 
satisfied by a licence to the defendant to occupy the house for her 
lifetime or should there be a transfer to her of the fee simple? 296
293 [1979] 2 All ER 945. A similar criticism of the reliance-based approach has been made by 
Elizabeth Cooke, above n 45, 281 & 285, who argues that the ‘meeting of reliance loss only’ 
would be inconsistent with decided cases in which claimants would have had difficulty in 
proving the value of their reliance. Cooke’s criticisms of the reliance-based approach will be 
discussed in Chapter 8 below.
294 [1994] 2 VR 333, 342 (Marks J).
295 [1979] 2 A11ER 945,950.
296 Ibid 951.
306
Ultimately, the court concluded that the equity could only be satisfied by 
‘compelling the plaintiff to give effect to his promise and her expectations. ’297 
The court was anxious to ensure that the defendant was assured of quiet 
enjoyment without interference from the plaintiff, whose conduct indicated that 
he would evict her by any legal means. It is by no means clear that a reliance- 
based approach such as that adopted in Verwayen would produce a different 
result. Although the defendant’s expenditure on the property was modest, she 
had relied on the representation over a period of some three years and ‘arranged 
her affairs on the basis that the house and contents belonged to her’, expending 
personal effort as well as capital on the house.298 On that basis, monetary 
compensation may not have prevented her from suffering detriment as a result 
of her reliance on the relevant assumption. Indeed, Heydon and Loughlan point 
to Pascoe v Turner as an example of a case in which ‘special circumstances 
render an expectation remedy more desirable than a detriment remedy’ .299
Nevertheless, it is clear that the approach taken by the Court of Appeal was 
quite different from that adopted by the High Court in Verwayen. As discussed 
above, the High Court has taken the minimum equity concept in Australia 
beyond that which is applied in England. In Pascoe v Turner, the minimum 
equity concept conferred a broad discretion on the court to do justice between 
the parties. In Verwayen the minimum equity concept was refined, so that in 
Australia it now means the minimum necessary to prevent detriment being 
suffered by the representee as a result of his or her reliance on the representor’s 
conduct. Even if the results of the earlier English decisions can be reconciled 
with that approach, it must be conceded that the way in which remedies have 
been determined cannot.
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
299 Heydon and Loughlan, above n 99.
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(d) Future detriment
A final problem with the reliance-based approach is that the detriment suffered 
by a representee often will not be able to be quantified at the time the court is 
required to grant relief. Indeed, in Clark, Ormiston J suggested that ‘proof of 
detriment must, in most cases, be hypothetical’ .300 There are two separate, but 
related, problems which can arise: hypothetical detriment and future detriment. 
First, in many cases the representor will not, up to the time of hearing, have 
departed from the relevant assumption, but will only have threatened to do so. 
The relevant question then is: what is the detriment which the court perceives 
will, hypothetically, be suffered by the representee if the representor is allowed 
to depart from the representation? Secondly, even if departure from the 
representation has already occurred, the effect on the representee may be 
ongoing. The Full Court in Clark had to contend with the first of those 
problems. Since Mr Clark had, up to the time of the Full Court’s decision, 
succeeded in his claim of estoppel, ‘the effect of any decision preventing him 
from relying on the pleaded estoppel may only finally be known if an appellate 
court reverses that finding of the trial judge’ .301
As Ormiston J observed, the need to consider detriment which is purely 
hypothetical was implicitly recognised in Justice Dixon’s statement in Grimdt v 
Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd that ‘the real detriment or harm from which 
the law seeks to give protection is that which would flow from the change of 
position if the assumption were deserted that led to it’ .302 Justice Ormiston’s 
approach to resolving the problem of hypothetical detriment was to have regard 
to what ‘the court perceives to be the likely detrimental consequences of proved 
acts or inaction in reliance on the relevant assumption. ’303 He rightly favoured a 
‘generous application’ of the reliance-based approach in those circumstances 
‘in the sense that it is not always obvious that the estimated detriment can be
300 [1994] 2 VR 333, 383.
301 Ibid 358.
302 (1937) 59 CLR 641, 674 (emphasis added), cited by Ormiston J at [1994] 2 VR 333, 356.
303 [1994] 2 VR 333, 383.
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satisfied merely by an order for costs or some other monetary sum by way of 
compensation’ .304
The broader question which this problem poses is, if proof of detriment 
suffered by the representee as a result of his or her reliance will often be 
hypothetical, does that suggest that reliance provides an unhelpful basis on 
which to determine relief? One answer is that, while some cases involve purely 
hypothetical detriment which is impossible to quantify, others, such as Re Neal 
discussed above, involve past detriment consisting purely of wasted 
expenditure which is very easy to quantify.305 If the purpose of equitable 
estoppel is to protect against the consequences of detrimental reliance, and not 
to hold parties to the expectations which they have created, then a reliance- 
based approach to relief should be retained. In those cases where detriment is 
wholly or partly hypothetical and cannot be quantified, the equity raised by the 
representor’s conduct and the representee’s reliance will only be satisfied by 
holding the representor to the truth of the assumption.
E. The Future of the Reliance-Based Approach
The adoption of a reliance-based approach to relief is clearly a significant step 
in the development of equitable estoppel. The above discussion traced the 
evolution of equitable estoppel relief from its origins in the making good of 
representations, to a concern with satisfying equities, and finally to a goal of 
fulfilling only the minimum equity. In Verwayen the High Court defined the 
concept of a ‘minimum equity’, doing so by reference to one of the purposes of 
estoppel, which is to protect reasonable reliance on the conduct of others. The 
adoption of a reliance-based approach to satisfying an equity arising by way of 
estoppel provides a more certain measure of such an equity, while retaining the 
flexibility which is necessary to do justice between the parties in each case. 
Perhaps most importantly, the adoption of a reliance-based approach to the 
determination of relief brings the remedy into line with one of the purposes of
304 Ibid.
305 See above, text accompanying nn 203-205
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equitable estoppel, which is to provide protection against the detrimental 
consequences of reliance on the conduct of others.
The above examination of the post- Verwayen cases provides some indication of 
the way in which the Verwayen approach to relief is being implemented. Three 
conclusions can be drawn from that examination. First, it seems that, with some 
notable exceptions, such as Justice Ormiston’s judgment in Clark and the 
majority judgments in Public Trustee v Wadley, there is still a tendency to see 
equitable estoppel as having a preclusionary operation. To adapt the words of 
Fuller and Perdue, expectation relief flows so naturally from the language of 
estoppel that in most cases it is granted without any discussion at all.306 
Although it seems that more attention needs to be paid to the possibility of a 
reliance-based remedy in each case, it does seem that in most cases expectancy 
relief will be the only way of satisfying the equity. It seems from the cases 
decided since Verwayen that the detriment caused by the representee’s reliance 
will often be difficult to quantify. That may be because the detriment has been 
incurred over a long period of time, because it is of such a nature that it is not 
quantifiable, because it is ongoing, or because it is has not yet been incurred. In 
each of those cases, provided the court is satisfied that the detriment is or will 
be substantial, expectation relief must be granted.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the post- Verwayen cases is that, if the 
reliance-based approach to relief is to succeed, the remedy of equitable 
compensation will need to be embraced by the courts. It is clear that courts of 
equity have jurisdiction to order payment of compensation in estoppel cases. It 
is equally clear that, in those cases where the detriment is quantifiable, the 
remedy of compensation provides the best means for a court to ‘do what is 
required in order to avoid detriment to the party who has relied on the 
assumption induced by the party estopped, but no more. ’307
306 puner an(j Perdue, above n 13, 407.
307 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 412 (Mason CJ).
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Finally, the extent of the High Court’s break with the past in Verwayen should 
be acknowledged. The adoption of a reliance-based approach to relief by five 
members of the High Court in Verwayen significantly altered the principles 
governing the way in which courts give effect to equitable estoppel. As the 
above analysis of the cases has shown, that doctrinal shift appears to have had 
little impact on the results of the cases decided since. If the approach adopted in 
Verwayen is to be applied more widely and more strictly, then the abandonment 
of the expectation-based and undefined-equities-based approaches will need to 
be articulated more clearly. Although it may be possible to reconcile the new 
approach with the results of earlier cases in which relief was determined on a 
different footing, it would be quite artificial to do so. The next step in the 
implementation of the reliance-based approach to relief in equitable estoppel 
cases should be to recognise the shift that was effected in Verwayen.
IV. A UNIFIED ESTOPPEL
The major difference between the supporters of a unified estoppel in Verwayen 
arose in relation to the nature of the relief which should be provided by the 
unified doctrine. The essence of that difference is the question whether the 
unified doctrine should operate in essentially the same way as equitable estoppel 
now operates, providing reliance-based relief, or should be based on common law 
estoppel, providing a prima facie right to expectation-based relief.
Mason CJ in Verwayen favoured a unified doctrine that operates in much the 
same way as the reliance-based approach to equitable estoppel relief outlined 
above. According to the Chief Justice, a central element of the unified doctrine of 
estoppel is that ‘there must be a proportionality between the remedy and the 
detriment which is its purpose to avoid. It would be wholly inequitable and unjust 
to insist upon a disproportionate making good of the assumption. ’308
The Chief Justice made it clear that ‘doing justice’ in this context means 
protecting only against the representee’s reliance loss. In distinguishing between
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detriment in the broad sense (detriment flowing from the denial of the correctness 
of the assumption induced by the representor) and detriment in the narrow sense 
(detriment flowing from the representee’s change of position in reliance on that 
assumption), Mason CJ made it clear that ‘the detriment against which the law 
protects is that which flows from reliance upon the deserted assumption’ .309
The unified estoppel proposed by Mason CJ, therefore, provides a remedy which 
is essentially compensatory in nature. Its adoption would provide us with a 
substantive doctrine of estoppel which would provide compensation for harm 
suffered as a result of reliance on representations of fact. Since it would operate 
as a cause of action, the doctrine would be more widely available than the present 
common law estoppel,310 and its remedial effect would be dramatically different. 
This change in the law gives rise to two questions of practical importance. The 
first question is whether this new doctrine, which provides a compensatory 
remedy for the consequences of reliance on false statements of fact, will overlap 
with causes of action in tort for misrepresentation, and with the remedies 
available under statute for loss suffered as a result of misleading or deceptive 
conduct.311 The answer to that question is that a unified estoppel would not 
greatly overlap with the remedies otherwise available for misrepresentation 
because a unified estoppel would not provide compensation for all harm suffered 
as a result of reliance on representations of fact. It would only provide a remedy 
where harm is suffered as a result o f the representor’s departure from the 
relevant assumption in question. The remedy provided by a unified estoppel 
would thus complement the remedies available in tort and under statute,
308 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 413.
309 (1990) 170 CLR 394, 415-6: ‘So while detriment in broad sense is required to found an 
estoppel,... the law provides a remedy which will often be closer in scope to the detriment suffered 
in the narrow sense.’
310 The circumstances in which common law estoppel can be utilised by a representee are 
limited to those situations in which it can be used as a defence to an action brought by the 
representor or those in which it happens to provide the factual foundation of a cause of action 
against the representor.
311 Misleading or deceptive conduct is prohibited by the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52; 
Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), s 42; Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), s 38; Fair Trading Act 1987 
(SA), s 56; Fair Trading Act 1990 (Tas), s 14; Fair Trading Act 1985 (Vic), s 11; Fair Trading 
Act 1987 (WA), s 10; Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT), s 42; Fair Trading 
Act 1992 (ACT), s 12. Damages are recoverable by a person who suffers loss ‘by’ such conduct
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providing an additional cause of action in circumstances in which harm is 
suffered as a result of a change of position on the faith of a representation of fact, 
which proves detrimental when the representor subsequently acts inconsistently 
with that representation.
A more important question is the impact of a unified estoppel in those areas of 
the law in which the preclusionary effect of estoppel is taken for granted. The law 
of agency, for example, would be dramatically affected if the principle of agency 
by estoppel were regarded as part of a unified estoppel. That is, if a person 
dealing with an agent who had been held out as having certain authority could not 
hold the principal to that representation and enforce the contract made by the 
agent, but instead had a cause of action against the principal/representor for 
compensatory relief. This would clearly introduce an undesirable measure of 
uncertainty into commercial dealings. A similar problem would arise in 
circumstances in which a contract is created by estoppel. A contract is said to be 
formed if a person (A) conducts himself or herself in such a way that a reasonable 
person would believe that A was assenting to the terms of a contract, and another 
party (B) contracts with A on that basis.312 This principle is either based on an 
objective theory of contract formation, or on estoppel by conduct.313 If it were 
regarded as a manifestation of estoppel by conduct, then the law relating to 
contract formation would be greatly complicated by the application of a unified 
estoppel with a compensatory approach to relief. The better view of the law is, 
however, that the principle mentioned above is based on an objective approach to 
contract formation, rather than a principle of estoppel.314 The problem can, 
therefore, be neatly avoided. The difficulties relating to agency by estoppel 
cannot be so easily overcome, because it is well accepted that the principles of 
ostensible authority and agency arising by ‘holding out’ are based on estoppel by
from the person who engages in it: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 82 and state Fair Trading 
Act equivalents.
312 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597, 607 (Blackburn J).
313 Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422, 428 (Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ).
314 As Mason ACJ, Murphy and Deane JJ observed in Taylor v Johonson, ibid 429, ‘the clear 
trend in decided cases and academic writings has been to leave the objective theory in command 
of the field.’
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representation.315 The answer may ultimately lie in the abandonment of the 
notion that ostensible authority and analogous principles are based on estoppel, or 
in regarding them as a preclusionary form of estoppel which is unique to the law 
of agency.316
In contrast to the approach adopted by Mason CJ, the other supporters of a 
unified estoppel in Verwayen, Deane and Gaudron JJ, saw the unified doctrine as 
operating primarily to fulfil expectations. The influence of the preclusionary 
common law doctrine is clearly more evident in their judgments than that of the 
Chief Justice. As discussed above, both Deane and Gaudron JJ saw the unified 
estoppel as providing a prima facie right to expectation relief, but they differed in 
relation to the circumstance in which a court should substitute other relief. On 
Justice Gaudron’s view, the prima facie right could be lost if the representor 
could prove that another remedy would clearly compensate the representee for all 
of the detriment suffered.317 Deane J, on the other hand, would focus on the 
position of the representor: he would overturn the prima facie right only if to do 
so would be ‘inequitably harsh’318 for the representor.319
The difference of opinion as to remedy is a major obstacle facing proponents of a 
unified estoppel, but can be resolved by reference to what is thought to be the 
essential purpose of the doctrine. If the object of the unified doctrine is to provide 
protection against harm resulting from reliance, then the remedy proposed by 
Mason CJ is more apt to fulfil that purpose. The detriment itself must be the 
focus of the court’s inquiry, and the starting point in the determination of relief. 
If, on the other hand, the guiding objective of estoppel is the prevention of
315 See, eg: Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480, 
498 (Pearson LJ) and 503-4 (Diplock LJ) and DW Greig and NA Gunningham, Commercial 
Law (3rd ed, 1988) 15.
316 This may in turn lead to difficult problems of classification. If a distinction were to be 
drawn between estoppel by conduct and agency by estoppel, then cases such as Spiro v Lintern 
[1973] 3 All ER 319 may be difficult to categorise.
317 (1990) 170 CLR 394,487.
318 Ibid 443.
319 Ibid 445-6. This approach to a unified estoppel could also create problems in the area of 
agency and contract formation. It could no longer be said that an agency is created or a contract 
formed by estoppel, since it would be open to a representor to argue in a particular case that such a 
result would be inequitably harsh.
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unconscionable conduct, then the relief granted ought to be consistent with that 
objective. The proposals outlined by Paul Finn formed an approach to relief 
which focuses on the conscience of the representor, essentially determining the 
extent of the relief by the blameworthiness of the representor’s conduct.320 
Finally, if the object of a unified estoppel is the enforcement of promises, both 
warranties as to states of affairs and promises relating to future conduct, then the 
approach favoured by Deane J would be most apt to fulfil that purpose. The 
representor would be required to make good the relevant assumption unless to do 
so would cause injustice to the representor.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The question of remedy is of considerable importance to a discussion of the 
philosophy of estoppel, because giving effect to an estoppel requires a clear 
choice between the contending philosophies. This chapter has shown that the 
three different philosophies of estoppel, based on reliance, promise and 
conscience, match neatly the three different approaches to determining relief to 
give effect to estoppel, which can be described as reliance-based, expectation- 
based and conscience-based approaches. In none of the three different types of 
estoppel discussed above is the question of remedy clearly settled, although the 
order of discussion of the three different estoppels in this chapter could be said to 
represent a spectrum from the doctrine with the most settled approach to relief, 
common law estoppel, to that with the least settled, the unified estoppel.
The question of relief is well settled at common law, although those rare cases in 
which the value of the representee’s expectation is out of proportion to the 
detriment resulting from his or her reliance show that the inflexibility of the 
doctrine leads to unjust results at the margins. Cases such as Avon County 
Council v Howlett suggest that the simplicity of common law estoppel masks a 
fundamental flaw, which is that its preclusionary operation is inconsistent with 
what many see as its fundamental purpose, which is to prevent harm resulting 
from reliance. It seems that only a substantive doctrine can fulfil that purpose
320 See above nn 23-26 and accompanying text.
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effectively. The need for flexibility in the remedy provided by common law 
estoppel provides a powerful incentive for a merger of that doctrine with its 
equitable counterpart.
It is only very recently, on the other hand, that a clear basis for the determination 
of relief to give effect to the equitable doctrine has been outlined. Although the 
High Court has laid down clear principles for the determination of relief, the 
cases decided since Venvayen show that a number of practical issues need to be 
resolved before those principles can be implemented effectively. Those issues 
are: first, the way in which the courts should give effect to an estoppel raised 
defensively; secondly, the circumstances in which the courts should grant 
expectation-based relief instead of relief in the preferred reliance measure; 
thirdly, how the courts should deal with the problem of future detriment; fourthly, 
whether the courts should be adopting an approach to relief that can be reconciled 
with the prz-Verwayen cases; and, fifthly, whether the courts can give effect to 
the minimum equity principle in an appropriate case by an award of equitable 
compensation, which is not traditionally recognised as a means by which to give 
effect to an estoppel.
The above discussion has offered a means by which each of those questions can 
be resolved. First, both principle and authority indicate that the courts should give 
effect to all equitable estoppels in the same way, whether they are raised 
aggressively or defensively. Secondly, even under a strictly reliance-based 
approach to relief, the courts should still grant expectation relief in two sets of 
circumstances. The courts should grant expectation relief where the relevant 
detriment cannot be quantified, because it has been incurred over a long period of 
time, because it is of such a nature that it is not quantifiable, because it is 
ongoing, or because the potential for significant future detriment remains at the 
time of judgment. The courts should also grant expectation relief in cases where 
the value of the representee’s reliance loss exceeds the value of the expectancy. 
Thirdly, it seems that the only way in which the courts can deal with cases in 
which the potential for substantial future detriment remains at the time of 
judgment is to grant expectation relief. Fourthly, the reliance-based approach may
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be more easily understood if it is recognised as a newly principled approach to 
giving effect to equitable estoppel. Fifthly, it seems clear that equitable 
compensation is a remedy which is available in equitable estoppel cases, and 
which will need to be embraced if the reliance-based approach is to be more 
consistently applied.
Although the unified doctrines proposed in recent judgments draw on hundreds 
of years of authority, the notion of a substantive doctrine of estoppel which 
operates both at common law and in equity is new. Accordingly, the question of 
remedy in a unified doctrine is a live question which should be answered by 
reference to the philosophy of the doctrine. This thesis suggests that the 
fundamental purpose of all estoppels by conduct is to protect against the 
detrimental consequences of reliance on the conduct of others. A reliance-based 
approach to relief would be most consistent with that purpose. Apart from the 
philosophy of the doctrine, there are other reasons to prefer a reliance-based 
approach to remedy in a unified estoppel. This chapter has shown that recent 
authority supports a reliance-based approach to relief in equitable estoppel. As 
the next chapter will show, there are also sound reasons of principle and policy 
favouring a reliance-based approach over expectation-based or conscience-based 
approaches.
317
Chapter 8
THE RELIANCE BASIS OF ESTOPPELS BY CONDUCT*
Having examined in detail the elements required to establish an estoppel, and 
the way in which the courts give effect to the various different types of 
estoppel, it is possible to return to the central questions posed by this thesis 
concerning the fundamental purpose underlying estoppel by conduct. This 
chapter is essentially concerned with evaluating the descriptive and normative 
claims of promise, conscience and reliance-based theories of estoppel. In the 
light of the detailed examination of the doctrinal requirements in chapters 3-7 
above, this chapter will attempt to answer the questions of what is, and what 
should be, the essential purpose of estoppel by conduct.
I. THE NEED FOR A BASAL PURPOSE
Before examining in detail the relative merits of the various philosophies of 
estoppel, it is necessary to return to the threshold question whether there is any 
real need to choose between them, or at least to emphasise one philosophy at the 
expense of the others as representing the basal purpose of estoppel by conduct. 
Such a choice is needed for two reasons: first, to provide a basis on which to 
resolve the outstanding questions in estoppel and, secondly, in order to situate the 
doctrines of estoppel by conduct within the law of obligations. The identification 
of the ‘foundational norm’* 1 of estoppel would provide a basis on which to settle 
the outstanding questions, and would help us to understand the conceptual 
foundations of estoppel by conduct, and consequently its place within the law of 
obligations.
* Substantial parts of this chapter have been published in ‘Situating Equitable Estoppel Within 
the Law of Obligations’ (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 32-64.
1 As discussed in Chapter 2, the need to identify a ‘foundational norm’ underlying tort law was 
articulated by Richard Wright, ‘Right, Justice and Tort Law’ in David Owen (ed), 
Pliilospopliical Foundations of Tort Law (1995) 159, 160.
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A. Unresolved Questions
The most pressing reason to take the question of a basal purpose of estoppel by 
conduct seriously is that it provides a means by which to resolve several 
fundamental questions about the nature and operation of common law and 
equitable estoppel. As Fuller and Perdue pointed out in relation to promissory 
estoppel in the United States almost sixty years ago, ‘by leaving the matter of the 
controlling motive in this ambiguous state, we have unsettled questions of very 
considerable practical importance.’2 Since the controlling motive of estoppel by 
conduct is still in an ambiguous state in Australia, five principal areas of conflict 
between the competing motives or philosophies of estoppel remain.
1. The Threshold Requirement
The first question, which remains unresolved in both common law and equitable 
estoppel, is the nature of the threshold conduct required to establish an estoppel. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis showed that, although the High Court in Legione v 
Hateley required a clear and unequivocal statement as a foundation of equitable 
estoppel, in more recent decisions the courts seem to be adopting a rather less 
strict approach to the threshold question, as they move away from a concern with 
promises and representations and towards the notion of an induced assumption. It 
is clear that the threshold question is closely connected with the requirement of 
reasonable reliance, and particularly with the requirement that it must have been 
reasonable for the representee to adopt the assumption on which the estoppel is 
based. A stricter threshold requirement obviates the need to consider the 
reasonableness of adopting an assumption as a result of that promise or 
representation. The courts are faced, then, with a choice between a strict 
threshold requirement and an emphasis on reasonableness of reliance.
That choice between a strict threshold requirement and an emphasis on 
reasonableness is closely connected with the philosophy of estoppel. If one
2 LL Fuller and William Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1* (1936) 46 Yale 
Law Journal 52, 69.
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regards estoppel as essentially concerned with the enforcement of promises, then 
the promise itself must be the primary concern of the doctrine. A strict threshold 
requirement provides a means by which the nature of the promise can be 
emphasised. It then becomes important to scrutinise the extent to which the 
representor committed himself or herself to a particular course of action or to the 
existence of a particular state of affairs. If, on the other hand, estoppel by conduct 
is essentially concerned with reliance, then the threshold conduct on which the 
estoppel is based becomes less important. The court is then primarily concerned 
with the position of the representee, and the circumstances of his or her reliance. 
Consideration of the reasonableness of the representee’s adoption of the 
assumption clearly encompasses questions of the type of conduct which founded 
the assumption. If the reasonableness of the representee’s reliance is to be closely 
scrutinised, then it is unnecessary to characterise the nature of the conduct on 
which the assumption was based. The balance to be achieved between the 
threshold requirement and the reasonableness requirement is, therefore, a 
practical question which can be resolved by reference to the philosophy of 
estoppel. The essential choice here is between a promise-based doctrine, which is 
primarily concerned with the nature of a representor’s conduct, and a reliance- 
based doctrine, which is fundamentally concerned with the reasonableness of the 
assumption adopted by the representee.
2. The Reasonableness Question
The second question that needs to be resolved in both the common law and 
equitable doctrines is the role and formulation of the reasonableness requirement. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis showed that reasonableness is increasingly being seen as 
the principal means by which the availability of both common law and equitable 
estoppel is limited. The reasonableness requirement is capable of doing the work 
that might otherwise be done by a strict threshold requirement. It is also capable 
of doing the work that might otherwise be done by a requirement that it must be 
unconscionable to depart from the relevant assumption.
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As chapter 5 of this thesis showed, the principal unanswered question in relation 
to reasonableness is the choice between a focus on reasonableness of reliance and 
a reasonable expectation of reliance. The former is more consistent with a 
reliance-based, representee-focussed doctrine, while the latter is more consistent 
with a conscience-based, representor-focussed doctrine. As Chapters 5 and 6 
showed, both questions appear to be relevant, although the role of the latter 
question has not yet been clarified. It seems that the reasonableness of reliance 
question is favoured as the basic test applied in all cases in which an estoppel is 
claimed to arise. Chapter 6 argued that in cases of estoppel by silence the 
reasonableness of reliance test should be supplemented by consideration of the 
question whether the representor should have reasonably expected reliance, and 
should, therefore, have taken steps to caution the representee against such 
reliance.
It is clearly necessary to strike a balance between these two'different approaches 
to reasonableness. They can be reconciled in the way described above, but the 
courts must favour one approach over the other as the principal means by which 
estoppel by conduct is limited. That choice can be made by reference to the 
philosophy of estoppel. The essential question here is whether estoppels by 
conduct are conscience-based, and essentially concerned with the position of the 
representor (justifying the reasonable expectation of reliance test as the principal 
means by which the application of estoppel is limited), or whether they are 
reliance-based, and primarily concerned with the position of the representee 
(justifying the reasonableness of reliance test as the principal means by which the 
application of estoppel is limited).
3. The Role of Unconscionability
One of the most difficult unresolved questions in estoppel by conduct is the role 
that is and should be played by the concept of unconscionability. While it is 
arguable according to some formulations that notions of unconscionability have 
no role to play in estoppel by conduct, it has also been observed that
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unconscionability is the touchstone for estoppel by conduct.3 It has variously 
been suggested that unconscionability is the only relevant question that a court 
must consider in an estoppel case,4 that unconscionability is one of the elements 
that must be made out to establish an estoppel,5 that questions of causation can be 
tested by reference to unconscionability,6 and that the remedy provided to give 
effect to the estoppel is shaped by reference to unconscionability.7 As Chapter 6 
has shown, the notion that an estoppel should be established by reference to a 
broad test of unconscionability, even as only one of the elements that needs to be 
established, does not sit comfortably with the approach taken in the common law 
estoppel cases. This provides a formidable barrier to the unification of the 
common law and equitable doctrines.
The role of unconscionability in estoppel by conduct can be determined by 
reference to the essential purpose of estoppel by conduct. If estoppel by conduct 
is essentially concerned with preventing unconscionable conduct, then the 
representor’s conscience should play a prominent role in the determination of 
questions of both liability and remedy. If, on the other hand, the principal purpose 
of estoppel by conduct is to prevent detriment resulting from reliance on the 
conduct of others, then the representor’s conscience has a limited role to play in 
the operation of these doctrines.
4. The Unification of Estoppels by Conduct
One of the most significant differences of judicial opinion in relation to estoppel 
is the question of unification: whether common law and equitable estoppel should 
be unified to form a single doctrine of estoppel by conduct. While there is 
considerable support for the maintenance of separate doctrines, there are
3 JW Carter and DJ Harland, Contract Law in Australia (3rd ed, 1996) 133.
4 Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 133, 155.
5 Eg: Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 585 (Kirby P): ‘for 
equitable estoppel to operate, there must relevantly be [an assumption, inducement and 
detrimental reliance] in circumstances where departure from the assumption by the defendant 
would be unconscionable.’
6 Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank 
Ltd [1982] 1 QB 84, 104 (Robert Goff J at first instance).
7 Eg: Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 419 (Brennan J).
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significant practical reasons for amalgamating them. First, unification would 
resolve the difficult question of demarcation between assumptions relating to 
existing facts and assumptions relating to existing legal rights. Secondly, 
unification would allow flexibility to be exercised in giving effect to an estoppel 
arising from an assumption of fact, preventing injustice in those cases in which a 
representee’s expectation is disproportionate to his or her reliance. Thirdly, 
unification would greatly simplify what is an unnecessarily complex area of the 
law. If one accepts the need for unification, then a further question arises of the 
basis on which unification should take place. The differences between the unified 
doctrines proposed by Mason CJ and Deane J show that there is no obvious form 
for the unified doctrine to take. It could be shaped primarily by reference to the 
equitable doctrine, as Mason CJ has proposed, or primarily by reference to the 
common law doctrine, as Deane J has proposed.
As with the other unresolved issues, a consideration of the philosophy of estoppel 
can provide an answer to the question of unification. If the common law and 
equitable doctrines serve the same fundamental purpose, then there is little 
justification for two separate sets of principles. As Chapters 3-7 of this thesis 
have shown, there are traces of all three purposes, fulfilling promises, preventing 
unconscionable conduct and preventing harm resulting from reliance, in both the 
common law and equitable doctrines. If one of those purposes could be identified 
as the basal purpose of both the common law and equitable doctrines, then that 
essential purpose would provide both a reason for unification, and a basis upon 
which unification could take place. The unified doctrine could, and should, be 
shaped by reference to that unifying purpose.
5. The Question of Remedy
The final unresolved question relates to the way in which the courts should give 
effect to the equitable doctrine of estoppel, and a unified doctrine, if such a 
doctrine was to be recognised. Chapter 7 of this thesis showed that it is possible 
to approach the question of remedy on a promise basis, a conscience basis and a
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reliance basis. The High Court in Commonwealth v Verwayen was divided on 
the question whether the effect of an equitable estoppel was, prima facie, to make 
good the relevant assumption or fulfil the relevant promise, or whether the court 
should set out to fashion relief which has the effect of preventing or reversing 
detriment resulting from reliance on the relevant assumption. A similar remedial 
question arises in relation to a unified doctrine: again, the relevant question is 
whether the doctrine should operate to make good the relevant assumption where 
possible, or whether the court should seek from the outset to grant relief that is 
proportional to the detriment suffered by the representee.
As discussed in Chapter 7, these remedial questions can also be resolved by 
reference to the philosophy of estoppel by conduct. If equitable estoppel and a 
unified estoppel are fundamentally concerned with the enforcement of promises, 
then the courts should be concerned to give effect to that purpose in the granting 
of remedies. The prima facie effect of the estoppel should be to make good the 
relevant promise or representation. If the purpose of estoppel by conduct is to 
prevent harm resulting from reliance on the conduct of others, then a reliance- 
based approach to remedy is more appropriate. The courts should then, if 
possible, grant a remedy that has the effect of preventing or reversing detriment 
resulting from reliance. If, on the other hand, the purpose of estoppel by conduct 
is to prevent unconscionable conduct, then it could be argued that the conscience- 
based approach to relief outlined in Chapter 7 should be adopted.
B. Situating Estoppel by Conduct within the Law of Obligations
The second reason to identify the basal purpose of estoppel by conduct is that it 
would help us to locate estoppel by conduct within the law of obligations, and 
to understand its relationship to contract and tort. The need to develop a 
coherent taxonomy or map of the law of obligations has been identified by 
Nicholas McBride and Peter Birks.8 9 Locating, and debating the location of, a
8
8 (1990) 170 CLR 394 ( ‘ Verwayen’), discussed in Chapter 7 above.
9 Nicholas McBride, ‘A Fifth Common Law Obligation’ (1994) 14 Legal Studies 35, 35-6; 
Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 University o f
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particular doctrine within the law of obligations helps us to understand the 
nature of that doctrine, and its relationship with other parts of the law. In 
mapping the law of obligations we must, as far as possible, refuse to accept the 
existence of anomalous doctrines which appear to stand outside a coherent 
framework. The more anomalies we accept, the more difficult it becomes to 
identify and to deal with duplication and inconsistencies in our legal system. 10
According to Fowler, the relations between certain words:
plainly show that the language has not been neatly constructed by a 
master builder who could create each part to do the exact work required 
of it, neither overlapped nor overlapping; far from that, its parts have 
had to grow as they could. * 11
Similarly the relations between estoppel, contract, tort and restitution show that 
the law of obligations has not been neatly constructed. The categories are 
overlapping, the work to be performed by each remains undefined and each part 
has, according to the fashions of the day, expanded as it could. Examining the 
fundamental purpose and basis of operation of estoppel by conduct helps us to 
locate estoppel within a coherent taxonomy of the law of obligations, allowing 
us to resist the temptation to label estoppels as anomalous doctrines which have 
no coherent rationale or mode of operation and which, accordingly, defy 
classification.
Common law estoppel operates merely as an adjunct to the substantive parts of 
the law of obligations. The effect of common law estoppel in most cases is 
simply to prevent a person from denying certain facts, and thereby establish a 
state of affairs by reference to which the substantive rights of the parties are 
determined. Even where common law estoppel operates in relation to an
Western Australia Law Review 1, 3-7. A book of essays devoted to the topic has recently been 
published: Peter Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (1997).
10 See Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 
University of Western Australia Law Review 1, 7.
11 HW Fowler and Sir Ernest Gowers, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (2nd ed, 1965)
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assumption of rights, its effect is simply to prevent the representor from 
denying the existence of such rights. Thus, common law estoppel may allow a 
cause of action to be established in contract, tort or restitution which could not 
otherwise be established, or it may operate as a defence by preventing a cause 
of action from being established which, but for the estoppel, could be 
established. Common law estoppel is not, therefore, an independent source of 
rights which needs to be situated on a map of the law of obligations.
On the other hand, equitable estoppel and the unified doctrines applied in the 
High Court do operate as independent sources of rights. Unlike common law 
estoppel, they are not limited to assumptions of existing fact and can operate in 
relation to assumptions as to a representor’s future conduct. As argued in 
Chapter 1, equitable and unified estoppels thus provide causes of action in 
themselves and operate as independent sources of substantive rights. 
Accordingly, equitable estoppels and unified estoppels cannot operate as mere 
evidentiary principles.
Both equitable estoppel and the proposed unified estoppels have developed in 
such a way that they cannot readily be situated on a map of the law of 
obligations. The fundamental question that must be resolved is whether they 
should be seen as part of the law of contract, as part of the law of wrongs, or as 
an anomalous category, which is neither contract nor wrong. That question will 
be taken up later in this chapter after a review of the contending theories.
II. A REVIEW OF THE CONTENDING THEORIES
A. Promise Theory
In essence, the promise theory of estoppel holds that estoppel by conduct is 
fundamentally concerned with the enforcement of promises and should, 
therefore, be seen as, or adapted to become, part of the law of contract. As
625.
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discussed in Chapter 2, promise theory can be applied to common law estoppel 
and provides some useful insights into its operation, despite the fact that it is 
limited to assumptions of existing fact. Since equitable estoppel can operate in 
relation to promises relating to a person’s future conduct, however, it is more 
readily explicable on the basis of promise theory than its common law 
counterpart. Accordingly, the following discussion concentrates primarily on 
the equitable doctrine and, by implication, a unified doctrine that operates in 
similar circumstances.
As outlined in Chapter 2, different varieties of promise theory have been 
advanced by commentators in Australia,12 the United States13 and England.14 
This section will critically examine three different arguments made by promise 
theorists. The first question to be addressed is whether, as Edward Yorio and 
Steve Thel have claimed of promissory estoppel in the United States,15 estoppel 
by conduct in Australia is essentially concerned with the enforcement of 
promises. Although I will argue that the Australian doctrines of estoppel are not 
based on promise, it is an important question to ask, since it helps us to address 
the broader question whether estoppel is essentially contractual in nature. The 
second and third parts of this section will deal with proposals for changes to 
contractual principles which would have the effect of bringing equitable 
estoppel cases within the law of contract.
12 Barbara Mescher, ‘Promise Enforcement by Common Law or Equity?’ (1990) 64 Australian 
Law Journal 536-566.
12 Edward Yorio and Steve Thel, ‘The Promissory Basis of Section 90’ (1991) 101 Yale Law 
Journal 111; Randy Barnett, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract’ (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 
269; Daniel Färber and John Matheson, ‘Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the 
“Invisible Handshake’” (1985) 52 University o f Chicago Law Review 903.
14 PS Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law o f Contract (5th ed, 1995) 137-41; Birks, above n 10, 
60-64.
15 Yorio and Thel, above n 13.
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1. Is Estoppel by Conduct Based on Promise?
(a) Equitable estoppel
Despite the occasional confusion in the cases,16 the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel operating in Australia is regarded as quite separate from the law of 
contract.17 There have been numerous statements by members of the High 
Court in recent years seeking to distance equitable estoppel from contract.18 
The only connections between equitable estoppel and contract are: first, that 
liability in estoppel can, like contractual liability, arise from a promise; and, 
secondly, that the remedies provided by equitable estoppel and contract mirror 
each other in terms of purpose and effect. Although it seems after Verwayen 
that the purpose of equitable estoppel relief is to protect the representee’s 
reliance interest, the relief granted to give effect to an estoppel will very often 
have the effect of protecting the representee’s expectation interest.19 
Conversely, although the purpose of contractual relief is to protect the
promisee’s expectation interest, the reliance interest will occasionally be
20protected instead.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Yorio and Thel have conducted a detailed 
examination of the decisions on promissory estoppel in the United States 
which, they argue, reveals that the true basis of both liability and remedy under 
that doctrine is promise, rather than reliance. The relevant question for this 
thesis is whether a similar argument can be made in relation to equitable 
estoppel in Australia. Turning first to the question of liability, or the 
establishment of an estoppel, Yorio and Thel argue that the courts in the United 
States distinguish enforceable promises from unenforceable promises under s
16 See Chapter 1 above.
17 See Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162, 170 (Kirby P), 182 (McHugh J).
18 See, for example, Waltons Stores (Interstate) Pty Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 400-1 
(Mason CJ and Wilson J), 423-7 (Brennan J); Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 439-40 (Deane 
J), 453 (Dawson J), 501 (McHugh J).
19 See Chapter 7 above.
20 See, eg, McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377; 
Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64.
21 Yorio and Thel, above n 13.
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90 by reference to the quality of the promisor’s commitment.22 The US courts 
do not always require the promise to induce action or forbearance, and do not 
always insist that the promisee suffers detriment as a result of reliance on the 
promise.23
While the Australian cases may also appear superficially to be concerned with 
enforcing promises, close examination shows that the basis of liability in 
Australia is clearly reliance, rather than promise. First, it is clear that the 
requirement of detrimental reliance by the representee is a central element of 
the Australian doctrine. Chapter 5 showed that Justice Dixon’s statement that 
detrimental reliance was an indispensable condition of estoppel has been 
extremely influential.24 The Australian courts have adopted a very strict 
approach to the requirement for the purposes of both common law and 
equitable estoppel. Although there have been occasional lapses, the Australian 
courts have generally been consistent in denying recovery where the 
representee cannot point to a detrimental change of position in reliance on the 
relevant assumption.25
Perhaps the clearest indication that equitable estoppel in Australia is not 
promise-based is the fact that a promise is not required to establish an equitable 
estoppel. This aspect of equitable estoppel was considered in Chapter 3, which 
showed that both common law and equitable estoppel appear to require an 
induced assumption, rather than any particular type of conduct on the part of 
the representor. That approach was contrasted with the principle applied in the 
United States, that an estoppel as to future conduct must be founded on a 
promise, which requires a commitment to act in a certain way. Several different 
types of conduct can be held to induce the adoption of an assumption, and thus 
can found an equitable estoppel in Australia. An equitable estoppel can be 
founded on a course of conduct that indicates that the representor will act in a
22 Ibid 167.
23 Ibid. Yorio and Thel do admit that there are still ‘many cases that adduce reliance as a reason 
for enforcing the promise’.
24 Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 641, 674.
25 See Chapter 5 above.
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certain way or that the parties have certain rights, a representation as to the 
representor’s intention to act in a certain way or as to the existing legal rights of 
the parties, or even silence in certain circumstances.
Although some courts in the United States have interpreted the notion of a 
promise quite broadly, it seems clear that the requirement of an induced 
assumption is potentially broader, since it abandons the notion of a 
commitment by the representor to a future course of action or to the truth of a 
representation. Accordingly, estoppels by conduct in Australia are based on a 
weaker threshold of conduct by the representor, which suggests that the focus 
of the doctrines is elsewhere. This chapter will show that the focus is indeed 
elsewhere, namely on the action taken by the representee on the faith of the 
relevant assumption, and the consequences of that action for the representee.
Yorio and Thel also argue that remedies in promissory estoppel cases are based 
on promise, rather than reliance. They point to a number of surveys which show 
that the US courts routinely give effect to promissory estoppel by enforcing 
promises, ordering either specific performance or payment of expectation 
damages. Yorio and Thel show that, even where reliance damages are 
quantifiable, courts still opt for expectation relief. It is only in rare cases where 
no clear promise has been made, or expectation damages are difficult to 
determine, that reliance damages are awarded.
The examination of the recent Australian cases in Chapter 7 showed a similarly 
overwhelming preference for expectation relief.31 That survey covered 30 
reported decisions since Verwayen in which relief was granted, and showed that 
expectation relief was granted in each of those cases. Chapter 7 provided three
26 See, eg , S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637.
27 See, eg, Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394.
28 See, eg, Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387.
29 Yorio and Thel, above n 13, 130-2.
30 Ibid 151.
31 Elizabeth Cooke, ‘Estoppel and the Protection of Expectations’ (1997) 17 Legal Studies 258, 
258, has also observed that in applying equitable estoppel the English courts have ‘with very 
few exceptions, protected the claimant’s expectation interest, and that the courts’ preference 
and tendency has been to protect expectations in full so far as is possible’.
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reasons why the preference for expectation relief should not lead to the 
conclusion that equitable estoppel in Australia is promise-based. First, 
equitable estoppel in Australia is not seen as part of the law of contract. As 
discussed above, Australian courts have consistently distanced equitable 
estoppel from contract. Secondly, issues of liability in Australia turn on 
reliance, rather than promise. Thirdly, a reliance-based approach to equitable 
estoppel relief is new to Australia. The instinct for expectation relief evoked by 
the concept of an estoppel should disappear as the new approach adopted by the 
High Court in Verwayen comes to be more widely understood.
A further reliance-based explanation for the regular awarding of expectation 
relief is that reliance loss is often very difficult to calculate. That explanation is 
supported by the recent Australian cases. It is only in a limited number of cases 
that a representee’s reliance loss can be quantified with precision. Indeed, of 
the 30 reported cases since Verwayen discussed in Chapter 7, only four could 
be argued to have been wrongly decided on the ground that equitable 
compensation, representing the representee’s reliance loss, should have been 
awarded instead of expectation relief. In cases where reliance loss cannot be 
quantified with precision, the only means by which to protect the reliance 
interest is the granting of expectation relief. The regularity with which 
expectation relief is provided does not, therefore, undermine the reliance basis 
of the doctrine.
The realist approach of Yorio and Thel sheds considerable light on the state of 
promissory estoppel in the United States. Since the reliance basis of the 
doctrine has been widely accepted in those jurisdictions for over 60 years,32 it is 
important to consider whether the courts are in fact deciding cases by reference 
to reliance. A realist examination also sheds some light on the Australian
32 Larry DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the 
Subjectivity of Judgment’ (1997) 48 University o f Southern California Law Review 293, 302 (n 
40), has suggested that the first notable case to recognise detrimental reliance as a substitute for 
bargained-for consideration was Allegheny College v National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 
NE 173 (NY 1923). According to Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips, The Emergence of 
Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery’ (1983) 35 Rutgers Law Review 
472, 484, ‘[t]he new reliance-based doctrine got full recognition in 1932, when the first
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position. Although a reliance-based approach to relief now represents the law in 
Australia, it is clear that the recent doctrinal developments have not been 
reflected in the results of all of the cases since.33 A truly reliance-based 
approach to relief in equitable estoppel is, however, only eight years old in 
Australia, having been adopted by five members of the High Court in 
Verwayen in 1990. It is, therefore, far too early to abandon the reliance-based 
approach on the basis that it is not being applied strictly in the determination of 
relief.
(b) Common law estoppel
The question whether common law estoppel is based on promise raises slightly 
different considerations. Like equitable estoppel, common law estoppel also 
does not depend on the making of a promise. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
common law estoppel depends on the representor inducing the representee to 
adopt an assumption as to the existence of a state of affairs. There is no 
requirement that the representor’s conduct must convey a commitment that a 
certain state of affairs exists. The central focus in the establishment of an 
estoppel at common law is on the representee’s detrimental reliance on the faith 
of the assumption he or she has been induced to adopt.
Unlike equitable estoppel, however, common law estoppel can be said to be 
promise-based in its remedial effect. The effect of an estoppel at common law 
is to make good the representee’s assumption, by holding the representor to the 
truth of that assumption and determining the rights of the parties accordingly. 
This preclusionary effect of common law estoppel seems at odds with 
suggestions that the purpose of common law estoppel is to prevent detriment 
resulting from reliance on an assumption of fact induced by another person.
Restatement of Contracts was published.’
33 As discussed in Chapter 7, although the reliance-based approach does not appear to have 
affected the outcome of any of the cases reported to date, it has had a striking effect in at least 
one unreported case: The Public Trustee, as Administrator o f the Estate o f Williams (dec’d) v 
Wadley (Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Wright, Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 27 
June 1997).
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That is particularly so when, in cases such as Avon County Council v Howlett,M 
we see the representee’s expectations fulfilled, even where doing so exceeds 
the reliance loss suffered by the representee. Accordingly, although the 
establishment of a common law estoppel is clearly not based on promise, in the 
sense of a commitment to the existence of a state of affairs, the remedy 
provided by common law estoppel is promise-based, in the sense that the 
representor is held to the truth of the assumption which they have induced the 
representee to adopt, regardless of the extent of the representee’s reliance on 
that assumption.
2. Subsuming Equitable Estoppel within Contract
Like Yorio and Thel, Patrick Atiyah also sees equitable estoppel as essentially 
concerned with the enforcement of promises, and advocates the expansion of 
the scope of the law of contract to encompass cases currently decided on the 
basis of equitable estoppel. The essence of Atiyah’s argument is as follows. 
The enforcement of promises is the province of the law of contract. Tort and 
equity are often invoked in situations in which it would be perfectly plausible,
o /r
and more appropriate, to suggest that liability exists in contract. Estoppel is 
invoked for two reasons: first, simply because it is fashionable, and, secondly, 
in order to evade the inconvenient technical rules preventing liability from 
arising in contract, such as uncertainty or lack of writing.'
In order to overcome those technical rules, according to Atiyah, the courts 
should recognise that once an agreement has been acted upon, or relied upon, it
34 [19831 1 A11ER 1073.
35 Atiyah, above n 14, 137-41. Similarly, Samuel Stoljar, ‘Estoppel and Contract Theory’
(1990) 3 Journal of Contract Law 1-22 has argued that both common law and equitable 
estoppel are essentially based on agreement, and such agreements are capable of being 
integrated within contract law itself. The deficiencies of contract law should, he suggests, be 
cured by a reconstruction of relevant contract principles, rather than by supplementing them 
with estoppel.
36 Atiyah, above n 14, 139.
37 Ibid. Atiyah does not regard the doctrine of consideration as an inconvenient technical rule 
because he argues that the representee’s detrimental reliance could itself be regarded as 
providing the necessary consideration. In other words, he advocates an expanded conception of 
what suffices to satisfy the consideration requirement.
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may be justifiable to recognise contractual rights which would not have been 
recognised before such action or reliance.38 An uncertain agreement, for 
example, should be enforced in some way when it has been partly performed. If 
the law of contract recognised action in reliance as changing the situation, then 
there would be less need for estoppel. Some judges and writers are reluctant to 
admit such a possibility because, in accordance with classical principles, they 
see contractual liability as stemming from the agreement and consider that 
action in reliance cannot change the rights of the parties.
What Atiyah is proposing is, in effect, that equitable estoppel be subsumed, 
wholly or partly, by the law of contract. The result of the relaxation of contract 
rules in cases where non-bargain promises have been detrimentally relied upon, 
would be to impose contractual liability in many cases in which equitable 
estoppel presently provides the only remedy. Depending on how many 
contractual rules were relaxed in the event of detrimental reliance, the need for 
equitable intervention could disappear completely. The effect of Atiyah’s 
proposal would be similar to the approach articulated in s 90 of the 
Restatement of Contracts (2d) in the United States, where detrimental reliance 
on a promise gives rise to contractual liability, justifying the ‘enforcement’ of 
that promise. In fact, Atiyah has gone so far as to suggest that ‘it may soon be 
necessary to insist that detrimental reliance is simply an alternative to 
consideration as a source of contractual rights.’40
While it has some superficial attraction, there are several reasons why the 
adoption of Atiyah’s proposals is not warranted in Australia. First, Atiyah’s 
attention is focussed on the contractual context, and the role of estoppel in the 
enforcement of promises. Although Atiyah acknowledges the very considerable 
role of estoppel outside the realm of promises,41 his reform proposals do not 
take that important aspect of estoppel into account. It is clear that equitable
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid 140.
40 Ibid 141. See also PS Atiyah, ‘Consideration: A Restatement’ in Essays on Contract (1986) 
179, 240. This approach is also favoured by Birks, above n 10, 60-64.
41 Atiyah, above n 14, 148.
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estoppel overcomes more fundamental problems than a lack of consideration 
and a failure to comply with formalities, including the lack of a clear agreement 
or understanding between the parties42 and, in many cases, the lack of a 
promise.43 Equitable estoppel very often deals with cases in which there is 
clearly no agreement struck between the parties, and it would be extremely 
artificial to attempt to rationalise liability in such cases on a contractual basis.44 
Promises could be implied in order to bring some cases within the contractual 
framework, but there are many cases in which a promise could not be implied 
without considerable artificiality.45
Accordingly, the appropriate solution to the inadequacy of contract law in 
coping with reliance is not to expand contract, but to allow the development of
42 Holiday Inns Inc v Broadhead (1974) 232 EG 951, 1087 (Goff J), in a passage adopted by 
the Privy Council in A-G o f Hong Kong v Humphreys Estate (Queen’s Gardens) Ltd [1987] 2 
All ER 387, 391.
43 See, eg, S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637, where 
liability arose out of a course of conduct by a landlord, during negotiations for the surrender of 
a lease and the granting of a new lease, which induced the tenant to assume that the relationship 
of landlord and tenant would continue without the tenant having to exercise an option for 
renewal. Although the landlord’s conduct clearly induced the tenant to adopt the relevant 
assumption, it is not possible to characterise the landlord’s conduct as a promise or a even a 
representation. Similarly Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co [1877] 2 AC 439; Birmingham and 
District Land Co v London and North Western Railway Co (1888) 40 Ch D 268.
44 Atiyah has acknowledged this elsewhere: PS Atiyah, ‘Fuller and the Theory of Contract’ in 
Essays on Contract (1986) 73, 88; see also Hugh Collins, The Law o f Contract (2nd ed, 1993) 
83.
45 The clearest examples are provided by cases of estoppel by acquiescence, founded on the 
principle articulated in Dann v Spurier (1802) 7 Ves Jun 232; 32 ER 94, 95 (Lord Eldon); 
Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129, 140-1 (Lord Cranworth LC), 168 (Lord Wensleydale) 
Willmott v Barber (1880) 15 C hD 96, 105-6 (Fry J) and Svenson v Payne (1945) 71 CLR531, 
539 (Latham CJ, Rich and Williams JJ), that where the owner of land stands by and knowingly 
allows another to build on that land under a mistake as to title, equity will not allow the owner 
subsequently to assert his or her rights. Examples of the application of that principle, in 
circumstances in which no promise could be implied on the part of the landowner, include:
Huning v Ferrers (1711) Gilb Eq 85; 25 ER 370 (representee built on land assuming he had 
possession under a valid lease); Savage v Foster (1723) 9 Mod 35; 88 ER 299 (representee 
purchased and build on land assuming he was obtaining good title); Steed v Whitaker (1740) 
Barn Ch 220; 27 ER 621 (mortgagee allowed the representee to build on mortgaged property 
without giving the representee notice of the mortgage); Hardcastle v Shafto (1793) 1 Anst 184; 
145 ER 839 (representees spent money improving land on the assumption that they had 
possession under a valid lease); Hamilton v Geraghty (1901) 1 SR (NSW) (Eq) 81 (representee 
built on land assuming it was his own); Attorney General to HRH Prince o f Wales v Collom 
[1916] 2 KB 193 (representee expended money on improvements to a house, believing it to be 
her own); The Queen v Smith (1981) 113 DLR (3d) 522 (the Crown knowingly stood by while 
representees improved land). Nor could a promise could be implied in those analogous cases in 
which the holders of interests in property have been estopped from asserting their interests as a 
result of knowingly standing by while another person acquires an interest in the property from a 
third party, eg: Savage v Foster (1866) 9 Mod 36; 88 ER 299; Gregg v Wells (1839) 10 Ad & E
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a coherent jurisdiction for the protection of reliance outside contract to 
continue.46 Another significant reason for allowing those developments to 
proceed outside contract is that detrimental reliance on a promise does not 
always justify the enforcement of that promise according to contractual 
principles. As Atiyah has conceded elsewhere,47 there is no obvious reason for 
protecting the promisee’s expectation interest in estoppel cases.
This raises the important question whether there need necessarily be 
consistency between the determination of liability and the determination of 
remedy. Commentators are divided on this issue. On the one hand AS Burrows 
has argued that the remedy provided by a particular doctrine should be 
consistent with the basis of liability.49 On the other hand Hugh Collins has 
suggested that it is a mistake to suppose that the same policies and values 
should determine both questions of liability and the measure and type of 
remedies available.50 There is an important philosophical reason why the first 
approach should be preferred and the question of remedy should turn on 
essentially the same questions as liability. As argued throughout this thesis, 
questions of liability and questions of remedy should both be addressed in a 
way that is consistent with the essential purpose of the doctrine. They should 
ultimately be consistent with one another because they should each be framed 
with that fundamental purpose in mind. As Patrick Parkinson has suggested, 
‘[t]he remedy should accord with the reason for intervention’ .51 If the reason 
for intervention is to prevent harm being suffered by the representee as a result
90; 113 ER 35; Midland Bank Ltd v Farpride Hatcheries Ltd (1981) 260 EG 493.
46 Cf JW Carter, ‘Contract, Estoppel and Unconscionability’ (1993) 1 Judicial Review 129,
131, who also advocates the reform of contractual rules, rather than the development of 
estoppel, on the basis that the continued development of estoppel and neglect of the law of 
contract might have the effect of stultifying contract.
47 PS Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (1981) 42. See also Atiyah, above n 40, 240.
48 Fuller and Perdue, above n 2, 64-5. Cf AS Burrows, ‘Contract, Tort and Restitution - A 
Satisfactory Division or Not’ (1983) 99 Law Quarterly Review 217, 243-4 & 259.
49 Burrows, above n 48, 265: ‘the law should not, and if correctly understood, does not show 
any inconsistency between the basis of liability and the basis for assessing damages.’
50 Collins, above n 44, 85. Similarly, Birks, above n 10, 63-4, argues that, although liability in 
estoppel is based on detrimental reliance, there is still a choice to be made between a reliance- 
based and an expectation-based approach to remedy.
51 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Equitable Estoppel: Developments after Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v 
Maher’ (1990) 3 Journal of Contract Law 50, 59.
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of his or her reliance on the conduct of the representor, then questions of 
remedy and liability should both focus on that harm.
Apart from questions of consistency between liability and remedy and between 
remedy and purpose, there is also an important policy reason why a contractual 
approach to remedies is inappropriate in estoppel cases. Although Chapter 7 
showed that expectation-based remedies are granted in all common law 
estoppel cases and most equitable estoppel cases, there are cases at the margins 
in which fulfilment of the representee’s expectations is quite unnecessary and 
would cause injustice to the representor.
The point can be illustrated by way of an example of a promise to make a gift. 
Assume A promises to make a gift of land worth $100,000 to B. In reasonable 
reliance on that promise, and with A’s knowledge, B spends $5,000 on 
improvements to the land. B’s detrimental reliance is substantial, but is not 
proportional to the value of the expectation. If A later refuses to make good the 
promise, then the court does not intervene because A has breached a promise to 
make a gift, but rather because B will suffer harm as a result of reliance upon 
the assumption which A’s conduct caused B to adopt. As Paul Finn52 and RD 
Oughten53 have observed, there is no obvious imperative in public policy which 
should give the expectation interest paramountcy in such cases. In a case where 
a representor has not promised or undertaken to make a gift, but has simply led 
a representee to believe that one will be made, it is even more clear that there is 
no reason to fulfil the representee’s expectations, unless it is necessary to do so 
in order to prevent the representee suffering harm.
Fuller and Perdue have observed that most of the arguments for awarding 
expectation damages in the case of bargain promises do not apply in the case of 
promises that are enforced because they have been relied upon.54 Fuller and 
Perdue argue that the main reasons for awarding expectation damages in the
52 PD Finn, ‘Equity and Contract’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Contract (1987) 104, 122.
52 RD Oughten, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: A Principled Remedy’ (1979) 129 New Law Journal 
1193, 1195.
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case of bargain promises are: first, to give executory contractual rights a present 
value for the purposes of trade and credit; secondly, to facilitate reliance on 
business agreements; thirdly, to provide simple and effective compensation for 
the loss of opportunities to enter into other contracts; and, fourthly, to provide a 
more easily administered measure of recovery than reliance damages and, 
therefore, a more effective sanction against contract breach.55 The last three 
policy considerations might be argued to have some application to non­
contractual promises relied upon by the promisee, but it is clear that none of the 
considerations hold as strongly for reliance cases as they do for bargain 
contracts.
Elizabeth Cooke has recently argued that the English courts should not follow 
the lead of the Australian courts in adopting a reliance-based approach to 
remedy in equitable estoppel cases.56 She provides four arguments in support of 
her claim that the English courts should continue to protect expectations in full 
so far as is possible. First, Cooke suggests that protecting reliance loss would 
‘confuse and emasculate the law of estoppel’.57 This thesis has shown, 
however, that the increased emphasis on reliance in the Australian doctrine has 
made the determination of questions of remedy more consistent with the 
approach to liability, and has made the doctrine more coherent than its English 
counterpart. Far from creating uncertainty, the High Court’s adoption of a 
reliance-based approach to remedy in equitable estoppel has put an end to the 
remedial uncertainty attaching to the doctrine, which has been strongly
CO
criticised by a number of commentators. As Chapter 7 has shown, expectation 
remedies continue to be granted in most cases, but the reliance-based approach 
operates at the margins to prevent injustice where the representee’s 
expectations are disproportionate to his or her detrimental reliance.
54 Fuller and Perdue, above n 2, 64.
55 Ibid 59-64.
56 Cooke, above n 31, esp at 258 & 280-5.
57 Ibid 280.
58 See, eg: Oughten, above n 53; Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) 
293; Burrows, above n 48, 243.
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Secondly, Cooke argues that the adoption of reliance loss theory would lead to 
inconsistencies with the law of restitution because there would inevitably be 
cases in which the courts would grant restitutionary remedies.59 It is not at all 
clear why the courts would grant restitutionary remedies under a reliance-based 
approach. Under the reliance-based approach discussed in Chapter 7, the courts 
would only protect the representee’s restitution interest where that interest 
happened to coincide with the representee’s reliance interest. That occasional 
coincidence would not undermine the law of restitution any more than the law 
of contract is undermined by the common protection of the representee’s 
expectation interest in equitable estoppel cases.60 As will be discussed below, a 
reliance-based doctrine of equitable estoppel is clearly distinguishable from the 
law of unjust enrichment: it serves a fundamentally different purpose and 
adopts fundamentally different approaches to questions of liability and 
remedy.61
The third argument made by Cooke is that a doctrine of estoppel which protects 
the reliance interest is not an appropriate way to supplement the doctrine of 
consideration. She argues that the law of contract is sufficiently flexible to 
cover reliance which has not been bargained for, and such reliance should be 
protected within the law of contract itself.62 If it is felt desirable to enforce 
relied-upon promises, Cooke argues, then the remedy for breach of such 
promises should be an expectation remedy. As the above discussion showed, 
however, there is no good reason why the remedy granted in the case of relied- 
upon promises should exceed the reason for intervention. The question whether 
it is preferable to expand the scope of contract to deal with relied-upon 
promises will be discussed further below.
59 Cooke, above n 31, 281-2.
60 It now seems quite clear that the law of contract is not under threat from doctrines like 
estoppel, despite the predictions of ‘death of contract’ theorists: see Andrew Robertson, 
‘Situating Equitable Estoppel Within the Law of Obligations’ (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 
32, 39-40
61 Below, text accompanying nn 117-140.
62 Cooke, above n 31, 283, citing in support Mescher, above n 12, whose arguments will be 
discussed in detail below.
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The final argument made by Cooke is that the meeting of reliance loss only 
would be inconsistent with decided cases in which claimants would have had 
difficulty in proving the value of their reliance. The adoption of a reliance- 
based approach would, therefore, cause undesirable uncertainty. This perhaps 
reflects a misunderstanding of the Australian approach. The Australian courts 
are not required to protect reliance loss only, but to seek to provide a remedy 
which is the minimum necessary to prevent detriment resulting from reliance. 
In cases in which reliance loss is difficult to calculate, the only way to ensure 
that reliance is fully protected is to fulfil the claimant’s expectations. Chapter 7 
showed that the reliance-based approach adopted by the Australian courts does 
not in fact affect the result in most cases, but has an impact only where the 
representee’s reliance loss is quantifiable and is out of proportion to his or her 
expectation loss. Because the primary concern of the courts is to ensure that no 
detriment will be suffered by claimants as a result of their reliance, expectation 
relief remains the norm. Although it does not affect the outcome of most cases, 
approaching the question of remedy on the basis of reliance prevents injustice 
at the margins and provides a more certain measure of the equity created by an 
estoppel.
A final problem with the proposal made by Atiyah is that the only real mischief 
he advances to justify reform is the unnecessary complexity of the law in this 
area.64 While that may be true of English law, it is less true of Australian law, 
in which it can be argued that a single, reliance-based doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is emerging, which operates according to clearer principles than its 
English counterpart. If one accepts the reliance-based framework for equitable 
estoppel advanced in this thesis, then the only real complexity is that there are 
two different types of legal obligation which can arise out of a promise. If 
estoppel and contract serve fundamentally different purposes, and determine 
questions of liability and remedy according to fundamentally different
63 Cooke, above n 31, 280-1, 285.
64 Atiyah, above n 14, 140.
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considerations,65 then those differences surely justify the complexity of two 
different sources of obligation.
3. Abolishing the Doctrine of Consideration
Barbara Mescher sees equitable estoppel as an intrusion by equity into the area 
of promise enforcement, which, she says, should belong exclusively to the law 
of contract. Her solution to that intrusion is to abolish the doctrine of 
consideration.66 The requirement of an intention to create legal relations would 
then be left to perform alone the important task of determining which promises 
to enforce. Abolishing the doctrine of consideration, Mescher says, would 
‘place most of the fact situations found in equitable estoppel cases within the 
province of contract. ’68
The first problem with Mescher’s criticism of equitable estoppel is that it 
hinges on an oversimplified distinction between assumed and imposed 
obligations. Mescher argues that in contract the obligations arise from the 
parties’ promises, whereas in estoppel, since there is not necessarily an overt 
act of acceptance by the promisee, obligations are imposed by the court.69 In 
the case of contract, she says, the parties create many of the obligations, 
whereas in equitable estoppel the obligations imposed by the court ‘may vary 
according to the circumstances of the case and the general notions of 
unconscionability. ’70
65 Sec above nn 16-20 and accompanying text.
6<> Above n 12, 562-6.
67 Similarly, Randy Barnett, above n 13, 291-321, has suggested that all contractual liability 
should be based on a contracting party’s ‘consent to a transfer of alienable rights’. A party’s 
consent, Barnett suggests, should be tested by looking for a manifestation of that party’s 
intention to be legally bound. As KCT Sutton, Consideration Reconsidered (1974) 195-6, has 
pointed out, the call for an increased emphasis on the ‘intention to create legal relations’ 
requirement has been echoed by almost every writer who has advocated the abolition of the 
doctrine of consideration. See also KCT Sutton, ‘Promises and Consideration’ in Finn, PD (ed), 
Essays on Contract (1987) 35, 78-80. On the potential role of an ‘intention to create legal 
relations’ requirement in equitable estoppel, see Brian Coote, ‘The Essence of Contract (Part 
II)’ (1989) 1 Journal of Contract Law 183, 202-3.
68 Mescher, above n 12, 563-4.
69 Ibid 547-8.
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The notion that contractual obligations are ‘within the exclusive realm of 
private ordering’ ,71 as distinct from other legal obligations which are imposed 
by the state through the courts, has been subject to sustained criticism in the 
United States over a considerable period.72 It is, therefore, somewhat artificial 
to distinguish between contractual liability and liability arising from equitable 
estoppel on the basis that the former is voluntarily assumed by the parties, 
whereas the latter is imposed on the parties by the courts. The distinctions 
between contractual obligations and obligations arising from equitable estoppel 
are in many cases purely formalistic. The realists showed us that contractual 
liability is not necessarily consensual73 and, as Paul Finn has observed, many 
equitable estoppel cases exemplify consensual dealings left without contractual 
force because of the formalistic restrictions on contractual liability.74 Even if 
contractual obligations can be said to be assumed by the parties, the remedies 
provided by the courts in the event of a breach of those obligations cannot be 
regarded as consensual. Leaving to one side limited exceptions such as 
enforceable liquidated damages clauses, the remedies for breach of contract are 
fashioned by the court, not by the parties.75 It is, therefore, an 
oversimplification to suggest that a clear line can be drawn between contractual 
obligations, which are assumed by the parties, and obligations flowing from 
equitable estoppel, which are imposed by the court.76
A more fundamental problem with Mescher’s proposal is that it leaves the 
central question, which is when liability should be imposed, to be decided
70 Ibid 548.
71 Jay Feinman, ‘Critical Approaches to Contract Law’ (1983) 30 University of California Los 
Angeles Law Review 829, 834.
72 See, for example, the legal realists Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract’ (1933) 46 Harvard 
Law Review 553, 575-8; Friedrich Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion —  Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 629, 629-33; John Dawson, ‘Economic 
Duress - An Essay in Perspective’ (1947) 45 Michigan Law Review 253, 266-7 and 
contemporary writers such as Betty Mensch, ‘Freedom of Contract as Ideology’ (1981) 33 
Stanford Law Review 753, 764-5; Feinman, above n 71, and Clare Dalton, ‘An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine’ (1985) 94 Harvard Law Review 997-1114. See also PS 
Atiyah, ‘Misrepresentation, Warranty and Estoppel’ in Essays on Contract (1986) 275, 280- 
286.
73 Ibid.
74 Paul Finn, ‘Unconscionable Conduct’ (1994) 8 Journal of Contract Law 37, 40.
75 PS Atiyah, ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ in Essays on Contract (1986) 
10, 50-1.
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according to the arbitrary criterion of whether the promisor intended to create 
legal relations. As Atiyah has argued, the intention to create legal relations 
requirement is quite unsuited for this role, since the courts arrive at the 
conclusion that no such intention exists by means of ‘fictitious reasoning’: in 
most cases where the intention is denied, the courts are really saying that the 
promise in question is one that ought not to be enforced.77 That approach is 
inevitable because, as a reading of almost any estoppel case shows, parties 
making informal promises or representations simply do not indicate whether 
they intend to create legal relations or intend to assume any responsibility for 
their actions.
The very nature of the inquiry into a party’s intention to create legal relations is 
problematic, as Clare Dalton has explained:
Any inquiry into a party’s intent must confront the problem of 
knowledge—our ultimate inability to gain access to the subjective intent 
underlying any particular agreement.
The essence of the problem, as Dalton has explained in some detail,79 is that a 
subjective approach to determining the intent of a party leads us to basing 
liability on an unreliable assertion of intention. The alternative is to approach 
the question objectively, relying on an objective interpretation of external 
manifestations of that party’s intent. A subjective approach is inherently 
unreliable, whereas an objective approach involves the imposition of an 
external standard on the parties,80 making it difficult to deny that contract law 
is a system of imposed, rather than assumed, obligation.81 The inevitable 
tendency to adopt an objective approach to the question of intent deprives the
76 See Atiyah, ibid 41.
77 Atiyah, above n 14, 150. Similarly, John Swan, ‘Consideration and the Reasons for Enforcing 
Contracts’ in Barry Reiter, and John Swan (eds), Studies in Contract Law (1980) 23, 58. Cf PS 
Atiyah, ‘Consideration: A Restatement’ in Essays on Contract (1986) 179, 241.
78 Dalton, above n 72, 1011.
79 Ibid 1039-1066.
80 Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (1981) 61. See also Sir Anthony Mason and SJ Gageler, 
‘The Contract’ in PD Finn (ed), Essays on Contract (1987) 1, 8.
81 Dalton, above n 72, 1066.
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inquiry as to intention of its primary justification, which is that it facilitates the 
implementation by the courts of the will of the parties.
The final problem with Mescher’s proposal is the absence of a need for such 
radical reform. Mescher has advocated reform on the basis that promise 
enforcement should be the exclusive domain of the law of contract. Recent 
decisions, though, have shown that it is bargains that are the exclusive domain 
of contract.83 On the present state of the law, promises will give rise to 
contractual liability when they have been bargained for, and will give rise to 
liability in estoppel where they have been reasonably relied upon. The law of 
contract is certainly narrower than it was in pre-classical times when reliance 
upon a promise was regarded as a reason for its enforcement, but there is no 
compelling reason to restore the territory of reliance to the empire of contract.
It is also important to note that, since promise theorists are generally only 
concerned with reconciling equitable estoppel with contract, promise theory 
gives a misleading impression of the scope and nature of equitable estoppel. 
The doctrine is much broader than promise theorists indicate, and the relevance 
of contract to estoppel is somewhat overstated. This thesis has shown that the 
concern of equitable estoppel is not the enforcement of promises, but the much 
broader goal of protecting reliance on the conduct of people who depart from 
assumptions induced by their conduct. Although there has occasionally been 
confusion between contract and estoppel in the past, estoppel now has little in 
common with the law of contract. Considering the doctrine in terms of its 
relationship with contract ignores the breadth of operation of the doctrine 
outside the field of promises.
82 Similarly, Brian Coote, ‘The Essence of Contract (Part 1)’ (1988) 1 Journal o f Contract Law 
91, 100, has observed that the common law’s response to the impossibility of ascertaining the 
will of the parties has been to apply objective tests of will and intention. While resort to an 
objective test makes an inquiry into the parties’ intention practically possible, it destroys the 
notion that the parties’ will is the basis of the contract, ‘since it is not necessarily the actual will 
which is the determinant.’
83 Beaton v McDivitt (1987) 13 NSWLR 162, 168-9 (Kirby P), 180-2 (McHugh J).
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B. Conscience Theory
Like promise theory, conscience theory has both descriptive and normative 
aspects: its proponents suggest that estoppel does and should operate by 
reference to the concept of unconscionability.84 Conscience theory is, however, 
far more elusive than promise theory because, although considerable support 
can be found in the commentary for the notion that a concern with
o r  o / r
unconscionability is, and should be, the basis of equitable estoppel, neither 
the descriptive claim nor the normative claim has been spelt out in any detail. 
Only one commentator, Margaret Halliwell, has gone beyond those broad 
assertions and made a clear argument that equitable estoppel is, and should be, 
organised around the concept of unconscionability.87 According to Halliwell: 
‘[i]t is now necessary to recognise that the organising concept of estoppel is 
unconscionability because the function of estoppel is to restrain injustice 
resulting from unconscionable conduct. ’88
84 It is important to distinguish here between, on the one hand, proponents of a truly conscience- 
based doctrine and, on the other hand, those who simply invoke the rhetoric of 
unconscionability in support of an approach that is clearly reliance-based. For examples of the 
latter approach, see Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 428-9 (Brennan J) and 501 (McHugh J).
85 Eg: Eugene Clark, ‘The Swordbearer has Arrived: Promissory Estoppel and Waltons Stores 
(Interstate) Ltd v Maher’ (1987-9) 9 University o f Tasmania Law Review 68, 73 
( ‘unconscionability is the unifying principle which forms the basis of the different heads of 
equity incorporated under equitable estoppel’); Joshua Getzler, ‘Unconscionable Conduct and 
Unjust Enrichment as Grounds for Judicial Intervention’ (1990) 16 Monash University Law 
Review 283, 305-6 (the ‘unified principle of equitable estoppel’ is ‘based on the prevention of 
unconscionable conduct’); Mark Lunney, ‘Towards a Unified Estoppel—The Long and 
Winding Road’ [1992] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 239, 250 (all forms of estoppel 
have the prevention of unconscionable conduct as their foundation); Kris Arjunan, ‘Waiver and 
Estoppel - A Distinction Without a Difference’ (1993) 21 Australian Business Law Review 86,
109 (‘unconscionability is the undercurrent of equitable estoppel’); Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The 
Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law World’ (1994)
110 Law Quarterly Review 238, 254 ( ‘the concept of unconscionability has been at the heart of 
the doctrinal refinements which have been made’ to equitable estoppel); Carter and Harland, 
above n 3 (unconscionability is the touchstone for estoppel by conduct).
86 Eg: Lunney, ibid, advocates the adoption of ‘a unified doctrine of estoppel based on 
unconscionability’; Mason, ibid 255, also appears to advocate the ‘elaboration of the doctrine 
of estoppel by means of unconscionability.’
87 Margaret Halliwell, ‘Estoppel: Unconscionability as a Cause of Action’ (1994) 14 Legal 
Studies 15.
88 Ibid 15.
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Halliwell argues that proprietary estoppel is conscience-based because the 
cause of action is not a response to the representee’s reliance, but to the type of 
conduct engaged in by the representor.90 Proprietary estoppel, according to 
Halliwell, does not seek to compensate for reasonable reliance because the 
concern of equity, as Lord Evershed has said, is not to do justice, but rather to 
restrain injustice.91 Halliwell’s advocacy of a conscience-based equitable 
estoppel is both descriptive and normative. She suggests that the ‘modem 
tendency, as evidenced by all case law, is to treat estoppel as a legal response 
triggered by a cause of action founded upon unconscionability’ .92 Halliwell 
does not, however, make good her descriptive claim. She does not attempt to 
show that the doctrine operates by reference to unconscionability, rather than 
reliance. Although she purports to include the Australian cases within her 
framework, she does not explain why a cause of action which is ‘not a response 
to the reliance itself’ ' is so fundamentally concerned with reliance in the 
determination of questions of liability and remedy.
Since the unconscionability question necessarily involves an examination of the 
knowledge and conduct of the representor,94 the essential difference between a 
cause of action founded on unconscionability and one founded on reliance must 
be that the former is essentially defendant-focussed (or concerned with the 
position of the representor), while the latter is essentially plaintiff-focussed (or 
concerned with the position of the representee). In the case of equitable 
estoppel, questions of liability and remedy are clearly not determined by 
reference to the position of the representor. Turning first to questions of 
liability, a consideration of the conduct of the representor is essential for
89 It should be noted that Halliwell, ibid 15 & 22-30, distinguishes proprietary estoppel, which 
she suggests is conscience-based, from promissory estoppel, which is not based on the concept 
of unconscionability, but is essentially contractual, representing a limited exception to the 
requirement of consideration in relation to gratuitous variations to contracts.
90 Ibid 17.
91 Ibid, citing Raymond Evershed, ‘Reflections on the Fusion of Law and Equity After 75 
Years’ (1954) 70 Law Quarterly Review 326, 329.
92 Halliwell, above n 87, 33 (emphasis added).
93 Ibid 17.
94 See Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 444 (Deane J); NC Seddon and MP Ellinghaus, 
Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law o f Contract (7th Aust ed, 1997) 69; Getzler, above n 85, 323; and 
Chapter 2 above.
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determining the threshold question whether the representor bears responsibility 
for the adoption of the relevant assumption, but it is then only regarded as 
unconscionable to depart from such an assumption if the representee has relied 
on that assumption to his or her detriment.
Simply to change one’s mind or to break a promise is not of itself 
unconscionable in the eyes of the law. But it becomes so the more that 
reliance has been placed on the promisor not changing his or her mind 
and the greater the consequential detriment that will be suffered.95
The question of unconscionability is, therefore, dependant upon detrimental 
reliance. Chapter 6 of this thesis showed that the primary concern of the courts 
with the position of the representor is in determining whether the representor 
can be said to bear sufficient responsibility for the assumption adopted by the 
representee. In cases of silence the courts consider the representor’s knowledge 
of the representee’s reliance but, even in those cases, it seems that the courts 
will adopt an objective approach to the question of knowledge, suggesting that 
the courts are not really concerned with the representor’s conscience at all.
As I will argue below, this thesis has shown that the approach of the Australian 
courts to the establishment of an estoppel is characterised by its focus on the 
position of the representee.96 Accordingly, it is difficult to see how the cause of 
action can be said to be based on unconscionability, rather than reliance. 
Similarly, although relief is occasionally said to be shaped by reference to 
unconscionable conduct, under the approach laid down by the High Court in 
Venvciyen, relief is determined exclusively by reference to the representee’s 
detrimental reliance, with no consideration whatsoever of the knowledge or
no
conduct of the representor.
95 Scddon and Ellinghaus, ibid 65.
96 See below nn 108-112 and accompanying text.
97 See, eg, Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 419 (Brennan J).
98 Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 415-7 (Mason CJ), 429-30 (Brennan J), 454 (Dawson J), 
475 (Toohey J), 500-1 (McHugh J). See Chaper 7 above.
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It is even clearer that common law estoppel is not based on preventing 
unconscionable conduct. The notion of conscience playing a role in the 
common law doctrine was discussed in Chapter 2. That discussion concluded 
that, although it may seem incongruous for such a concept to play a role in a 
common law principle, it is widely accepted that the equitable notion of 
unconscionable departure from an assumption is equivalent to the common law 
concept of unjust or inequitable departure. As Chapter 6 showed, however, the 
common law doctrine has always focussed primarily on the position of the 
representee, looking only to the position of the representor in order to 
determine whether the representor bears responsibility for the representee’s 
adoption of the relevant assumption. Accordingly, common law estoppel is no 
more concerned with questions of the representor’s conscience than the 
equitable doctrine.
Turning to the normative claim, Halliwell fails to outline how a conscience- 
based doctrine of equitable estoppel would operate, except to emphasise the 
considerable flexibility and discretion the courts have at their disposal in 
determining equitable estoppel cases." Indeed, it is difficult to see what role 
conscience can play in a coherent doctrine of equitable estoppel. The first 
problem is the indeterminacy of the concept of unconscionability, which, as 
Justice Gleeson has said extra-judicially, is too vague a legal standard to be 
applied consistently or predictably.100 Attempts in England to unite promissory 
and proprietary estoppel on the basis that both involve a simple application of 
the question whether it would be unconscionable for a promisor to go back on 
his or her promise, have also been criticised as unhelpful, ‘as they provide no 
basis on which a legal doctrine capable of yielding predictable results can be 
developed.’101 While acknowledging that ‘unconscionability is very much a 
matter of fact, degree and value judgment’, Sir Anthony Mason has defended 
the standard, suggesting that it is erroneous to believe that ‘rigid rules promote
99 Halliwell, above n 87, 32.
100 AM Gleeson, ‘Individualised Justice —  The Holy Grail’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 
421,425-7.
io! Treitel, The Law o f Contract (9th ed, 1995) 136.
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clarity and certainty in the law. ’ 102 A middle ground can, however, be found 
between rigid rules and broad concepts such as unconscionability, which do 
little more than convey a notion of moral criticism. 103
Leaving to one side the indeterminacy of the broad principle of 
unconscionability, it is difficult to see what role the representor’s knowledge 
and conduct can play in determining liability, beyond the threshold question 
whether the representor bears sufficient responsibility for the representee’s 
adoption of the relevant assumption. The most significant problem with a 
conscience-based approach, however, is that the representor’s conscience does 
not provide sufficient guidance in the difficult, but fundamental, question of the 
relief to be provided to give effect to an estoppel in a particular case. The 
essential question in the granting of relief in an estoppel case is whether the 
representor’s expectation interest or reliance interest should be protected. 104 
While there might be some cases in which the representor’s conduct might be 
seen to be sufficiently reprehensible as to require the fulfilment of the 
representee’s expectations, 105 in most cases the nature of the representor’s 
conduct does not help the courts to choose between reliance and expectation 
relief. The notion of assuaging the representor’s conscience does not, therefore, 
provide any real guidance in the determination of relief. The adoption of a 
conscience-based approach to relief would, as Gleeson has suggested:
give rise to difficult questions as to how one distinguishes between the 
circumstances where conscience requires the representor to make good 
a representation, and the circumstances where it is sufficient to require 
the representor to compensate the representee for the loss suffered by 
reliance upon the representation. 106
102 Mason, above n 85, 256.
103 Birks, above n 10, 16-17 has suggested that ‘the word “unconscionable” is so unspecific that 
it simply conceals a private and intuitive evaluation.’
104 See Chapter 7 above.
103 Alec Leopold, ‘Estoppel: A Practical Appraisal of Recent Developments’ (1991) 7 
Australian Bar Review 47, 59, suggests, for example, that where the encouragement offered by 
the representor to the representee to proceed along a certain course is extensive and of lengthy 
duration, then such ‘extreme unconscionability’ might justify the grant of expectation relief.
106 Gleeson, above n 100, 427.
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C. Reliance Theory
1. The Reliance Basis of Estoppel
As discussed in Chapter 2, the reliance theory of estoppel holds that the 
objective of promissory estoppel is to protect promisees from loss caused by 
reliance on a promise, and that issues of liability and remedy should turn on 
reliance. This thesis has shown that, although there is some equivocation 
between promise, conscience and reliance in the determination of questions of 
liability and remedy, estoppel by conduct in Australia now operates primarily 
by reference to the representee’s reliance. The reliance basis of estoppel by 
conduct in Australia was established in the above discussion of the application 
of Yorio and Thel’s claims to the Australian context.108 That discussion 
outlined three aspects of the Australian doctrines which establish their reliance 
basis: first, the strict requirement of detrimental reliance by the representee in 
the establishment of liability which was examined in Chapter 4; secondly, the 
relative weakness of the emerging requirement, explored in Chapter 3, that the 
representee’s assumption must be induced by the conduct of the representor; 
and, thirdly, in the case of the equitable doctrine, the recent adoption by the 
High Court of a reliance-based approach to relief, which was outlined in 
Chapter 7. To that list can be added the fact that there also appears to be a 
preference for considering the question of reasonableness from the 
representee’s perspective, rather than that of the representor.109
The reliance basis of equitable estoppel is supported by Nicholas McBride’s 
analysis of the fundamental duty underlying equitable estoppel and other 
doctrines.110 McBride argues that the doctrines of equitable estoppel recognised 
in England and Australia, and the doctrine of promissory estoppel recognised in
107 Similarly, Metzger and Philips, above n 32, 536-543 have argued that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel recognised in the United States is an independent, non-contractual, 
reliance-based cause of action.
108 Above nn 16-32 and accompanying text.
109 See Chapter 5 above.
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the United States, are manifestations of an ‘as yet undefined’ duty to prevent 
detrimental reliance on a promise. * 111 The duty that emerges from the recent 
Australian cases is even wider than McBride suggests. Liability under the 
Australian doctrine does not depend on the making of a promise, but rather on 
the representee adopting an assumption induced by the conduct of the 
representor. 112 As discussed above, that assumption can be induced by several 
different types of conduct, including a representation, a course of conduct and 
even silence in certain circumstances. Accordingly, the duty on which the 
Australian doctrine of equitable estoppel is based must be a duty to prevent 
harm being suffered by those who rely on one’s conduct, not just on one’s 
promises. 114 Estoppel does not, of course, protect against all such harm. If it 
did, it would render redundant the torts of deceit and negligent misstatement, as 
well as the statutory protection against harm resulting from misleading or 
deceptive conduct. The particular harm against which estoppel protects is the 
harm resulting from reliance on the conduct of another person where that 
person departs from the assumption induced by his or her conduct. 115
110 McBride, above n 9, 45-50.
111 More recently, Nicholas McBride, The Classification of Obligations and Legal Education’ 
in Peter Birks (ed), The Classification o f Obligations (1997) 71,77 has characterised the 
obligation created by equitable estoppel as an obligation ‘not to make someone worse off as a 
result of that someone’s relying on one’s promise’, which is considerably closer to the 
characterisation of the relevant obligation in this thesis. McBride, ibid, also noted that, unlike 
the position in Australia and the United States, the relevant obligation ‘is not fully enforced in 
English law’ because it is restricted to promises to enforce rights and promises to give someone 
an interest in one’s land.
112 Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 407 (Mason CJ and Wilson 
J), 428-9 (Brennan J), 447-55 (Deane J), 458 (Gaudron J); Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 
412-3 (Mason CJ), 444 (Deane J), 460-1 (Dawson J), 487 (Gaudron J), 500 (McHugh J).
113 Above nn 26-28 and accompanying text.
114 Michael Spence, ‘Australian Estoppel and the Protection of Reliance’ (1997) 11 Journal o f 
Contract Law 203, 204 has characterised the duty created by equitable estoppel as a ‘duty to 
ensure the reliability of induced assumptions’. This is a most inaccurate way to characterise the 
duty, since both the primary and secondary duties are based on harm. As Spence acknowledges 
(esp at 204 & 208), an estoppel will only arise where harm is suffered as a result of reliance on 
an induced assumption, and the remedy is based on providing protection against such harm. 
Accordingly, it is clear that there is no duty to ensure the reliability of induced assumptions, but 
only a duty to ensure that harm does not result from reliance on such assumptions.
115 Thus, as Brennan J observed in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 
387, 427, equitable estoppel ‘complements the tortious remedies of damages for negligent 
misstatement or fraud and enhances the remedies available to a party who acts or abstains from 
acting in reliance on what another induces him to believe.’
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The remedial effect of common law estoppel prevents it from operating strictly 
in accordance with the duty outlined above: although it only operates where 
harm is suffered as a result of reliance, its effect is not limited to the prevention 
of such harm. It is interesting to note, however, that the unified estoppel 
envisaged by Mason CJ in Venvayen accords entirely with that duty. It is a 
substantive doctrine, which applies to both assumptions of existing fact and 
assumptions relating to the future conduct of the representor. It operates where 
the representee has relied on such an assumption to his or her detriment, and its 
effect is to require the representor to prevent or compensate harm resulting 
from the representee’s reliance on the representor’s conduct, where the 
representor seeks to act inconsistently with the assumption induced by that 
conduct.
2. Equitable Estoppel as Part of the Law of Wrongs
Having established the nature of the duty created by equitable estoppel, the next 
step is to locate it within the law of obligations. The traditional classification of 
common law obligations is threefold, the categories being contract, tort and 
restitution (or unjust enrichment) . 116 If one is dealing with equitable causes of 
action as well, then the category of tort will need to be expanded to cover all 
civil wrongs, both common law and equitable. More sophisticated taxonomies 
are necessary to accommodate all causes of action within the law of 
obligations. 117 The threefold classification is adequate for present purposes, 
however, since the essential question here is whether the duty established by 
equitable estoppel should be regarded as part of the law of contract or as part of 
the law of civil wrongs. Three different means of classifying a cause of action 
can be identified. 118 First, one can look to the origin of the duty or the source of
116 Peter Birks has convincingly argued that the third category of obligation is better described 
by reference to the event giving rise to the obligation (unjust enrichment), rather than the 
remedial response to that event (restitution): Birks, above n 10; Peter Birks, ‘Definition and 
Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13’ in Peter Birks (ed), The Classification o f Obligations 
(1997) 1,20-1.
117 See, for example, McBride, above n 9, Birks, above n 10, esp at 8-16; Peter Birks, ‘The 
Concept of a Civil Wrong’ in David Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations o f Tort Law (1995) 
31; Birks, above n 116; McBride, above n 111, 71-89.
118 The first two of these methods are used by McBride, above n 9, 35; the third is used by
353
liability, secondly one can look to its content, or the pattern by which liability is 
established, and thirdly, one can look to its remedial consequences. Each of 
those aspects of equitable estoppel will be examined in turn.
An essential characteristic of a wrong, which distinguishes it from contractual 
liability, is that it is a breach of a primary duty, primarily fixed by law. 119 That 
is, the duty does not arise by virtue of the consent of the parties or the 
occurrence of an event. Contractual duties can be seen as arising by virtue of 
the consent of the parties or, if one does not accept the legitimacy of the 
distinction between obligations assumed by the parties and those imposed by 
law, then one can see contractual duties as arising out of an event, which we 
call the formation of a contract. 120 Restitutionary duties clearly arise by virtue 
of the occurrence of an event, namely the enrichment of one party, at the 
expense of another, in circumstances in which the enrichment is regarded as 
unjust. The duty created by equitable estoppel does not arise by virtue of the 
consent of the parties, since the courts do not require even objective indicia of 
consent to the assumption of obligation. Nor does the obligation arise by virtue 
of an event; like other primary duties created by the law of wrongs, the duty to 
prevent harm resulting from reliance on one’s conduct is owed at all times, and 
potentially to all parties with whom one deals.
The second characteristic to be examined is the content of the duty, or the 
pattern by which liability is established. Nicholas McBride suggests that the 
duty created by equitable estoppel is not contractual in pattern because the 
defendants in the cases he cites were not under a duty to perform their
Burrows, above n 48, 217-9 and Jane Stapleton, ‘A New “Seascape” for Obligations: 
Reclassification on the Basis of Measure of Damages’ in Peter Birks (ed), The Classification o f 
Obligations (1997) 193.
119 PH Winfield, The Province o f the Law o f Tort (1931) 32; Birks, above n 10, 8-16 & 40-42; 
Birks, above n 117; RWM Dias et al, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (16th ed, 1989) 3-4; Carlo 
Castronovo, ‘Liability Between Contract and Tort’ in Thomas Willhelmsson (ed), Perspectives 
of Critical Contract Law (1993) 273, 273-4. On the distinction between primary (or 
substantive) duties and secondary (or remedial) duties, see Dias et al, ibid 3-5, Birks, above n 
10, 10-11; Birks, above n 117, 37-8; Birks, above n 116, 23-7.
120 Birks, above n 10, 52.
121 Whether the duty is owed to all persons, or whether some relationship between the parties is 
required, has not yet been resolved: see Chapter 5 above.
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promises, but merely a duty to prevent their breaches of promise from causing
detriment to plaintiffs who had relied on those promises. 122 The fact that a
promise is not required to establish liability is an even clearer indication that
1the Australian doctrine of equitable estoppel is not contractual in pattern. 
The duty is obviously not restitutionary since it arises independently of any 
enrichment of the promisor arising out of the promisee’s reliance on the 
promise. McBride also suggests that the duty is not tortious in pattern because 
tortious duties require a person to constrain his or her conduct in the interests of 
others, not to ensure that a state of affairs exists, such as ensuring that someone 
is not made worse off as a result of reliance on one’s promise. 124 There does 
not, however, appear to be any reason to define the class of civil wrongs so 
narrowly. A pattern for wrongs which would include equitable estoppel is that 
proposed by Burrows, who suggests that the cause of action in tort is based on 
wrongful harm, which can be contrasted with the basis of the contractual cause 
of action in the breach of a binding promise and the restitutionary cause of
125action in unjust enrichment.
A third distinction between wrongs and other sources of civil liability lies in the 
nature of the legal response to the breach of the primary duty. Burrows has 
approached the question of classification on the basis of remedy, suggesting 
that the categories of contract, tort and restitution flow from the three ‘cardinal 
principles’ of ‘the fulfilment of expectations engendered by a binding promise,
1 9 f \the compensation of wrongful harm and the reversing of unjust enrichment’. 
The traditional response to a breach of contract is to order the contract breaker 
to perform his or her promise, or to order the payment of damages calculated to 
place the innocent party in the position he or she would have occupied had the 
contract been performed. The traditional legal response to a wrong, on the other 
hand, is compensatory: the wrongdoer is compelled to pay damages calculated
122 McBride, above n 9, 49.
123 See Chapter 3 above.
124 Ibid.
125 Burrows, above n 48, 218. Similarly, Castronovo, above n 119, 274, suggests that tort 
actions protect the interest in freedom from harm, rather than the interest in having promises 
enforced.
126 Burrows, above n 48, 217.
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so as to put the innocent party in the position they would have occupied had the 
wrong not been committed.127 Both of those types of response can be identified 
in the equitable estoppel cases. A court can give effect to an estoppel by means 
of reliance-based relief, which reverses the detriment suffered by the 
representee as a result of his or her reliance on the representor’s conduct.128 
Reliance-based relief is compensatory in nature and can, therefore, be identified 
as a typical legal response to a wrong.129 As discussed in Chapter 7, however, a 
court can also give effect to an estoppel by means of expectation relief, which 
has the effect of fulfilling the expectations induced by the representor’s 
conduct, and which is equivalent to the relief provided by the law of contract.
A difficulty faced in rationalising equitable estoppel as a reliance-based wrong 
lies in the regularity with which the courts grant expectation relief to give effect 
to equitable estoppel. The tendency of courts to grant expectation relief in 
estoppel cases, according to Hugh Collins, presents a difficulty for those who 
hold that harm represented by detrimental reliance not only triggers liability, 
but also dictates the appropriate remedy.130 If the appropriate remedy is not 
designed to protect against harm, but to enforce promises or fulfil expectations,
i ' l l
that does tend to suggest that equitable estoppel is contractual in nature.
In England, it is particularly difficult to rationalise equitable estoppel as part of 
the law of wrongs, given the failure of the courts to articulate the basis on 
which relief is determined, and the tendency towards expectation relief.
127 It should be noted that not all commentators accept that the category of ‘wrongs’ should be 
restricted to breaches of duty for which compensatory remedies alone are granted. Derek 
Davies, ‘Restitution and Equitable Wrongs: An Australian Analogue’ in FD Rose (ed), 
Consensus Ad Idem (1996) 158-178, for example, characterises as wrongs equitable causes of 
action for which restitutionary remedies are available, such as breach of fiduciary duty and 
breach of confidence.
128 See above Chapter 7.
129 As noted above, in discussing the goal of equitable estoppel remedies in Waltons Stores 
(Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 427, Brennan J observed that equitable estoppel 
‘complements the tortious remedies of damages for negligent misstatement or fraud and 
enhances the remedies available to a party who acts or abstains from acting in reliance on what 
another induces him to believe.’
130 Collins, above n 44, 84-5.
131 Cf Birks, above n 10, 12-15, and above n 117, 34-6, who argues that the legal response to a 
wrong is a matter of choice, not logic, and the award of compensatory damages just happens to 
be the response provided in the case of most wrongs.
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Nicholas McBride has attempted to account for the fact that the duty to prevent 
detrimental reliance is so often enforced by means of enforcement of the 
promise. He suggests that fulfilling the promisee’s expectations is an equally 
effectual way of preventing the representee from being made worse off as a 
result of the breach of promise as the more ‘subtle’ grant of reliance 
damages.132 Hugh Collins, on the other hand, argues that the rationale for the 
reliance model might fit the cases better if the requirement of harm was seen as 
a condition of liability, but not the guiding principle of the remedy.133 Collins 
suggests that the approach adopted by the English and Australian courts can be 
regarded as essentially the same as that applied in the United States, where the 
remedy may go beyond compensation for harm where justice so demands. This 
leaves equitable estoppel, in Collins’ view, as a reliance-based form of 
contract, albeit one with its own distinctive set of rules and remedies.134
In Australia, on the other hand, it is possible to rationalise the approach to 
remedy in equitable estoppel with its place in the law of wrongs. Although 
English commentators such as Collins purport to include the Australian cases 
within their theories, after Verwayen, the position here is entirely different from 
that in England. In clear dicta in Venvayen, five members of the High Court 
adopted a reliance-based, compensatory approach to giving effect to equitable 
estoppel, which is the traditional legal response to a wrong.135 Although the 
new approach adopted by the High Court has not yet had a great impact on the 
results of cases in the lower courts, the approach clearly characterises equitable 
estoppel as part of the law of wrongs, and there are signs that the new approach 
is beginning to have a significant impact in particular cases. As Chapter 7 of 
this thesis showed, the approach taken by the High Court represents a clear
132 McBride, above n 9, 65-6.
133 The question whether issues of liability and remedy should be resolved by reference to the 
same considerations was addressed above, text accompanying nn 49-51.
134 Collins, above n 44, 45 & 82.
135 Finn, above n 74, 43, suggests that ‘the most transparently tort like case is Commonwealth of 
Australia v Verwayen where some number of the justices would have allowed a pecuniary 
award to reverse the actual detriment suffered by the plaintiff in reasonably relying on the 
representation of the defendant’.
136 Eg: The Public Trustee, as Administrator of the Estate of Williams (dec’d) v Wadley, (Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Wright, Crawford and Zeeman JJ, 27 June 1997), 
discussed in Chapter 7.
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break with the past and cannot sensibly be reconciled with the approach taken 
in earlier cases in which expectation relief was favoured.
Patrick Parkinson has offered support for the view that the remedial approach 
taken by the High Court identifies equitable estoppel as part of the law of 
wrongs. 137 Parkinson suggests that where the effect of an estoppel is to provide 
a plaintiff with a remedy for reliance on a non-contractual promise, then the 
intervention of equity to reverse the detriment suffered, rather than to fulfil the 
expectation, differentiates that doctrine from the law of contract. 138 He
11Qobserves that, under the approach articulated by Mason CJ in Verwayen, 
which requires proportionality between the remedy and the detriment,
the role of equity is more analogous to the law of tort than the law of 
contract. It fulfils expectations only to the extent necessary to reverse a 
detriment, and its role is to compensate the plaintiff for a wrong rather 
than to hold the defendant to a promise. In this way the demarcation 
lines between estoppel and contract are made clear. 140
The final point to note about the duty created by equitable estoppel is that it 
remains for the present a purely equitable duty. Peter Birks has argued that, in 
mapping the law of obligations, there is no legitimate reason to distinguish 
between wrongs deriving traditionally from the common law and those deriving 
from equity. 141 There should, Birks suggests, be a single class of wrongs, with a 
unified remedial regime. 142 For the present, however, the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel remains distinctly equitable in nature. It is, therefore, properly seen as
137 Patrick Parkinson, ‘Estoppel’ in Patrick Parkinson (ed), The Principles of Equity (1996)
201, 226-7.
138 Ibid 226.
139 (1990) 170 CLR 394,413.
140 Parkinson, above n 137, 227.
141 Birks, above n 10, 25-52.
142 Davies, above n 127, 176 on the other hand, has suggested that equitable wrongs may be 
best left separate from the common law, so that they can develop in their own way. He does 
argue, however, that the remedies for equitable wrongs ‘remain governed to an undesirable 
degree by their history, being in some instances too restrictive, in others too generous.’ 
Accordingly, he suggests, there is a need for equitable wrongs to be brought into a better 
relationship with one another, and a need to bridge the gap between the remedies that flow from
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part of the equitable branch of civil wrongs, taking its place alongside doctrines 
such as breach of confidence. 143 Leaving to one side the rhetoric of 
unconscionability, which certainly gives the doctrine an equitable flavour, the 
doctrine is clearly equitable in substance. Although the doctrine operates by 
reference to the tort-like concept of reasonable reliance, it is essentially 
equitable in nature, being subject to equitable defences and providing a 
discretion in relation to relief. Equitable defences, such as a lack of clean 
hands, can be pleaded to prevent an equitable estoppel from arising. 144 Once 
liability is established, the court’s response is classically equitable. Liability in 
estoppel gives rise to ‘an equity’, which means that the remedy is at large. 145 
Although the courts now seek to protect a representee’s reliance interest, the 
representee does not have a right to relief in damages. Instead, it is within the 
court’s discretion to satisfy the equity as it sees fit, but within certain 
guidelines. The exercise of that discretion often involves the granting of 
expectation relief146 and relief in specie. 147
As noted above, the preclusionary effect of common law estoppel prevents it 
from forming a substantive part of the law of obligations. The substantive 
unified estoppel proposed by Mason CJ would, however, clearly form part of 
the law of wrongs. It also creates a primary duty, fixed by law, which is based 
on wrongful harm, the effect of which is compensatory in nature. To the extent 
that the unified estoppel proposed by Deane J can be regarded as substantive, it 
is not easily classified within the law of obligations, since its effect is, prima 
facie at least, to fulfil the representee’s expectations. Deane J seemed to regard 
it as falling somewhere between an evidentiary principle and a substantive
them: ibid 174.
143 Davies, ibid, discusses breach of confidence, participation in a breach of fiduciary 
obligation, unconscionable conduct and breach of fiduciary duty as equitable wrongs, but 
deliberately refrains from exploring the question of how much of equity and trusts should be 
brought under the heading of wrongs: ibid 175, n 61.
144 See, eg, Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Tooheys Ltd (1993) 29 NSWLR 641.
145 See, eg, Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 419 (Brennan J).
146 See Chapter 7 above.
147 Examples include landmark cases such as Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) 4 De GF & J 517; 45 
ER 1285 and Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179 as well as more recent cases such 
as Drummoyne Distict Rugby Club Inc v NSW Rugby Union (1994) Aust Contract Reports 90- 
039 and S & E Promotions Pty Ltd v Tobin Brothers Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 637.
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doctrine. Similarly, in the structure of the law of obligations, it would fall 
somewhere between contract and wrong: while it would be tort-like in its 
determination of liability (depending on wrongful harm), it would be contract­
like in effect (resulting in the fulfilment of promises).
3. The Balance of the Reliance-Based Approach
The normative advantage of a reliance-based approach to estoppel by conduct 
is that it achieves a balance between various competing factors. There are two 
clear benefits. The first is that the reliance model achieves a balance between 
individual liberty and the communitarian value of preventing harm resulting 
from reliance on the conduct of others. As Hugh Collins explains, on the one 
hand the reliance model ‘attaches less weight to the value of personal autonomy 
than the classical exchange model. ’ 148 On the other hand, the requirement that 
reliance must be reasonable ‘allows the courts to preserve a realm of liberty 
within which parties enjoy room for manoeuvre without incurring legal 
obligations. ’ 149
The second advantage of the reliance-based approach is that it achieves a 
balance between what Jay Feinman has called ‘factual particularisation and 
normative abstraction’ . 150 On the one hand, the reliance-based approach 
provides a clear basis for determining questions of liability and remedy in 
estoppel cases. On the other hand, the requirement of reasonableness in the 
determination of liability, and, in the case of the equitable doctrine, the 
discretion retained by the court in the granting of relief, ensure that the courts 
are not solely concerned with abstracted questions. Under a reliance-based 
approach, liability turns on a balanced combination of the abstracted question 
of detrimental reliance (whether the representee has acted to his or her 
detriment on the faith of an assumption induced by the representor’s conduct) 
and the particularised notion of reasonableness of reliance (whether the
148
149
150
Hugh Collins, The Law o f Contract (1st ed, 1986) 40.
Ibid.
Jay Feinman, ‘Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method’ (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review
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representee’s reliance was reasonable in the circumstances) . 151 In the granting 
of relief in the case of the equitable doctrine, a balance is achieved by, on the 
one hand, the exclusive focus on the consequences of the representee’s reliance 
and, on the other, the discretion that allows the court to do what is necessary to 
prevent or reverse the detriment resulting from that reliance. Those finely 
balanced combinations allow questions of liability and remedy to be clearly 
enunciated and consistently and predictably applied, while retaining the 
flexibility necessary to do justice in individual cases.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The essential questions posed by this thesis were: what are the goals of estoppel 
by conduct, and are the principles of estoppel by conduct structured in 
accordance with those goals? The thesis has shown that the doctrines of 
estoppel by conduct appear to have three different goals: the fulfilment of 
promises (including promises relating to the existence of factual states of 
affairs), the prevention of unconscionable conduct, and the prevention of a 
particular type of harm resulting from reliance on the conduct of others. 152 The 
principles of estoppel by conduct are structured in accordance with that 
plurality of goals: different aspects of the doctrines appear to emphasise 
different goals. A consequence of the failure to identify a basal purpose or 
fundamental goal of estoppel by conduct is that, despite the obvious practical 
importance of both common law and equitable estoppel, numerous doctrinal 
questions remain unanswered, and it remains difficult to see where estoppel by 
conduct fits within a coherent structure of the law of obligations.
If one accepts the need to identify a fundamental purpose of estoppel by 
conduct, then one could approach that question in two ways. First, one could 
ask the descriptive question of what appears to be the fundamental or principal
678,698.
151 As Getzler, above n 85, 325 has observed in a broader context, a reliance-based principle of 
obligation provides a ‘framework for reasoned resolution of issues’ while giving the court ‘a 
sophisticated policy discretion in the ascription of ... responsibility.’
152 That is, the harm that results where those others act inconsistently with the assumptions
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purpose of estoppel by conduct. That essential goal could then be emphasised 
more strongly in order to provide a coherent basis and a consistent operation 
for the doctrines of estoppel by conduct. Alternatively, one could ask the 
normative question of what is the best possible basis for the principles of 
estoppel or how best could they operate. The outstanding questions in estoppel 
could then be structured in accordance with that normatively superior 
philosophy.
This thesis has shown that, descriptively, the principles of estoppel by conduct 
are organised primarily around concepts of reliance, rather than conscience or 
promise. Although there is some equivocation between the different 
philosophies, questions of liability are determined primarily by reference to 
reliance. The Australian courts appear to prefer a weak threshold on the 
representor’s side to establish an estoppel. The court’s attention is then 
focussed on the question whether the representee has substantially, and 
reasonably, relied on the assumption induced by the representor’s conduct. The 
courts do not look to the strength of the representor’s commitment or to the 
conscience of the representor to determine liability, despite the prominent 
rhetoric of unconscionability in the recent equity cases. In relation to remedy, 
the promise aspect seems most prominent, since the effect of common law 
estoppel is invariably to fulfil the representee’s expectations, and the effect of 
equitable estoppel is usually to do so. With the articulation of a reliance-based 
approach to relief in Verwayen, relief in the reliance measure should become 
more common in equity cases. If the unified estoppel proposed by Mason CJ 
were adopted, reliance would be emphasised consistently in relation to both 
liability and remedy, and in relation to both assumptions of fact and 
assumptions of future conduct.
From a normative point of view, this chapter has shown that the reliance-based 
approach which has come to shape equitable estoppel in recent years best 
balances the competing factors. The reliance-based approach balances the
induced by their conduct.
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liberal desire for individual freedom of action against the communitarian need 
to protect reasonable reliance on the conduct of others. It provides clear 
principles for the determination of questions of liability and relief, while 
allowing courts the measure of flexibility required to do justice according to the 
facts of each particular case. The normative superiority of the reliance-based 
approach to remedy justifies either the extension of the equitable doctrine to 
cover assumptions of existing fact, or the recognition of a substantive unified 
doctrine which operates in the manner proposed by Mason CJ in Venvayen.
If one accepts that the prevention of harm resulting from reliance on the 
conduct of others is, and should be, the fundamental purpose of estoppel by 
conduct, then the unresolved questions identified at the beginning of this 
chapter can readily be resolved. If both common law and equitable estoppel are 
fundamentally concerned with the protection of reliance, then there seems little 
justification for the retention of separate sets of principles relating to 
assumptions of fact and assumptions of future conduct. The difficult questions 
of overlap between the common law and equitable doctrines, the unnecessary 
complexity of this area of the law, and the inadequacies of the common law 
doctrine with regard to relief can be overcome by the recognition of a single, 
substantive doctrine of estoppel which operates in relation to assumptions of 
existing fact, assumptions relating to the rights of the parties and assumptions 
relating to the future conduct of the representor. 153
If it is recognised that the unified doctrine is based on the prevention of harm 
resulting from reliance on the conduct of others, then the unresolved questions 
relating to the doctrine can be resolved by reference to that fundamental 
purpose. The emphasis on reliance justifies the trend towards a weak threshold 
requirement. Instead of focusing on the type of conduct engaged in by the 
representor, the court should focus on the circumstances of the representee’s 
reliance and the question whether it was reasonable in those circumstances for
153 As discussed in Chapter 7, however, the practical consequences of a unified doctrine in the 
‘contract by estoppel’ and ‘agency by estoppel’ cases would need to be resolved before such a 
doctrine could be accepted.
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the representee to adopt, and to act upon, the assumption in question. The 
question of reasonableness should clearly be considered from the point of view 
of the representee, and the representor’s conscience should have only a limited 
role to play in the establishment of an estoppel. The knowledge and conduct of 
the representor should be relevant only to the question whether the representor 
bears sufficient responsibility for the adoption of the assumption, and should 
not have any bearing on questions of causation or remedy. If the essential 
purpose of the common law and equitable doctrines is the same, then 
unification is clearly desirable. A substantive unified doctrine should seek to 
provide relief which prevents or reverses detriment resulting from reliance, 
rather than aiming to fulfil the representee’s expectations. Such a unified 
doctrine would fit neatly within the traditional taxonomy of the law of 
obligations, as part of the law of wrongs.
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